Who's had experience using the new strcpy_s, etc. functions?
What are your opinions?
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dncode/html/secure03102004.asp
http://std.dkuug.dk/jtc1/sc22/wg14/www/docs/n1031.pdf
- Jared
While the book does have useful information, I'd also encourage people
to read NIST publication 800-30 "Risk Management Guide for Information
Technology Systems". I'd like it if the authors of "Threat Modeling" had
learned a few things from that document -- it would have helped them
improve their b
I read the paper, and found it interesting. I read the statistic "50
percent of security problems are the result of design flaws". Where does
that number come from? Experience?
I also liked the statement, "few traditional methodologies adequately
address the contextual variability of risk given ch
On Wed, Jun 09, 2004 at 03:34:52PM +0100, David Crocker wrote:
> Apart from the obvious solution of choosing another language, there are at least
> two ways to avoid these problems in C++:
>
> 1. Ban arrays (to quote Marshall Cline's "C++ FAQ Lite", arrays are evil!). Use
> classes from the STL, o
Does anyone know the security ramifications of using Aspect Oriented
Programming such as AspectJ? (http://eclipse.org/aspectj/)
Seems like it might make code injection and behavior modification
easier, but it doesn't, by itself, make it easier to inject hostile code
remotely as with SQL injection
Bruce Schneier frequently talks about the same things that he publishes
in his books. So, you may want to get your hands on a copy of "Beyond
Fear". I think you can read the last two chapters and get good value out
of the book. Also subscribe to Crypto-Gram, his monthly newsletter, if
you haven
> Does anyone know more about the Fortify product? Gary mentioned it in
> his webcast the other day.
Details are sketchy on the Fortify product. It's supposed to be able to
analyze C, C++ and Java. See http://fortifysoftware.com and contact them
directly if you want to evaluate their product.
Se
Is the actual report this one?
Security Across the Software Development Life Cycle
http://www.cyberpartnership.org/init-soft.html
- Jared
Hi Crispin,
Thanks for the detailed response and comparison of SubDomain to SELinux
and systrace.
As I understand it, if SubDomain-restricted program A starts program B,
then B is governed by the SubDomain rules for B, and not by the rules of
A. Correct?
In theory, an attacker that compromise
> This is exactly what Immunix SubDomain does: define the files and
> network activities that each program may access. We use use regular
> expressions to specify policy, so for instance, fingerd could be
> permitted to read /home/*/.plan and not read anything else.
I'm glad to hear that SubDomain
On Fri, Mar 12, 2004 at 04:03:34PM -0800, Crispin Cowan wrote:
> Jose Nazario wrote:
>
> >SELinux. LIDS. systrace (Linux, BSD, MacOS X). a few things on FreeBSD i
> >can't recall.
> >
> SubDomain predates all of these except for SELinux (which has roots that
> go back nearly 20 years) and LIDS go
My company outsourced a C to Java porting project to India, and we ended
up having to help them salvage the project. It was obvious that the
engineers were inexperienced. All user data (including authentication
credentials) was stored in an application directory, completely
world-writable.
When I
> I'd go futher - I think it is extremley rare that anyone configures their
> sandbox properly. I "do" Java development, and I would guess that less than
> 10% of application server deployments are done with the Java security
> manager enabled.
Complex security systems are often completely ignored
On Tue, Mar 09, 2004 at 07:12:35PM -0500, Bill Cheswick wrote:
> One of the things I'd like to see in Linux and Windows is better sandboxing
> of user-level programs, like Outlook and the browsers. There have
> been a number of approaches proposed over the years, and numerous papers, but
> haven't
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