[SC-L] OWASP DEVELOPMENT GUIDE NEWS/CALL FOR CONTRIBUTORS

2010-02-11 Thread Boberski, Michael [USA]
News Release/Call For Contributors
OWASP Development Guide Project begins work on next Guide version
The Guide is a manual for designing, developing, and deploying secure web 
applications

OWASP Development Guide Project
MCLEAN
February 10, 2010

MCLEAN, Feb. 10 /OWASP Development Guide 
Projecthttp://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Guide_Project/ -- After 
many months of planning and preparation, the OWASP Development Guide project 
announced today that it is ready to begin work on the next revision of the 
Guide, and that that the project is looking for volunteers to do the work, both 
individuals and organizations.

The OWASP Development Guide is aimed at architects, developers, consultants and 
auditors and is a comprehensive manual for designing, developing and deploying 
secure web applications. The original OWASP Development Guide has become a 
staple diet for many web security professionals. Since 2002, the initial 
version was downloaded over 2 million times. Today, the Development Guide is 
referenced by many leading government, financial, and corporate standards and 
is the Gold standard for Web Application and Web Service security.

The next version of the OWASP Development Guide will be in effect the detailed 
design guide for the requirements of the OWASP Application Security 
Verification Standard (ASVS), which can be found here: 
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ASVS. Key features of the next Guide will 
include use of the new OWASP common numbering scheme. The new numbering scheme 
will be common across OWASP Guides and References, more information can be 
found here: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Common_OWASP_Numbering. Additional 
key features will be the inclusion of worksheets and checklists, such as the 
sample input validation worksheet which can be found here: 
http://code.google.com/p/owasp-development-guide/wiki/WebAppSecDesignGuide_D5_2_1_1

For more information, and for more information if you are interested in 
volunteering, please see: 
http://owasp-development-guide.googlecode.com/files/development-guide-contributing.pdf
  Please forward this email as you think appropriate. Got buddies and want to 
work on a section or two as a team? Professional project management will be a 
key feature of the next release of the Guide and can help to facilitate such 
arrangements. Here is what the work streams will look like: 
http://owasp-development-guide.googlecode.com/files/guide-org-chart.pdf. And, 
the Guide project is always on the lookout for volunteers. If you think you 
might have availability in the future, please do reach out at that time. For 
more information, email the OWASP Development Guide project manager Mike 
Boberski at mike.bober...@owasp.orgmailto:mike.bober...@owasp.org.

About OWASP

The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a 501c3 not-for-profit 
worldwide charitable organization focused on improving the security of 
application software. Our mission is to make application security visible, so 
that people and organizations can make informed decisions about true 
application security risks. Everyone is free to participate in OWASP and all of 
our materials are available under a free and open software license at 
http://www.owasp.org

SOURCE: OWASP Development Guide Project

Web site: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Guide_Project


___
Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
___


Re: [SC-L] win win for owasp and television spots

2010-01-22 Thread Boberski, Michael [USA]
My #1 rule is to avoid jargon and to speak in as conversational a way as 
possible, targeting (and retargeting as the conversation progresses) the level 
of detail/abstraction to the targeted audience, whether it's one person or a 
bunch. Start broad, then narrow it down, change direction as the flow of the 
conversation dictates.

E.g.,

Is your application this secure (hand gesture) or T--H--I--S secure (bigger 
hand gesture)? This is what application security is all about. Application 
security can perhaps be thought of in terms of buying, building, and breaking 
software.BLAH BLAH..[buy=OWASP legal project's contract annex, 
build=OWASP ESAPI, break=OWASP ASVS]..[awareness=OWASP Top 
10]...[injecting security into development cycles=OWASP SAMM].. To 
explain further, to put all of this together...While most people are 
familiar with passwords, and people like to say firewall!, authentication, 
encryption and digital signatures, and logging are only the beginning, in terms 
of application security. Additional technical security controls are necessary 
to write applications that can (or should) be trusted by the customer not to 
spill data regardless of environment, from private networks to clouds, given 
modern-day threats.BLAH BLAH..China! Google! .BLAH BL!
 AH..

FWIW,

Best,
 
Mike B.

-Original Message-
From: sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org [mailto:sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org] On 
Behalf Of Matt Parsons
Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 5:40 AM
To: 'Secure Code Mailing List'
Subject: Re: [SC-L] win win for owasp and television spots

Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am starting to get approached by a few television stations to talk about 
application security.  I would like to promote Owasp in these talks.  What
would be the best way to do it professionally and competently?   

See below news story.   

Thanks,
Matt


http://www.the33tv.com/news/kdaf-password-security-jim,0,3650695.story



Matt Parsons, MSM, CISSP
315-559-3588 Blackberry
817-294-3789 Home office
mailto:mparsons1...@gmail.com
http://www.parsonsisconsulting.com
http://www.o2-ounceopen.com/o2-power-users/
http://www.linkedin.com/in/parsonsconsulting
http://parsonsisconsulting.blogspot.com/




___
Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
___

___
Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
___


Re: [SC-L] Ramesh Nagappan Blog : Java EE 6: Web Application Security made simple ! | Core Security Patterns Weblog

2010-01-07 Thread Boberski, Michael [USA]
To expand upon But you need A ESAPI for your organization briefly, 

From a certain point of view, just as application can be PK-enabled, they can 
be ES-enabled. Instead of a PKI toolkit, one uses an Enterprise Security API 
toolkit. Instead of signature functions, think input validation functions, 
where security checks and effects are performed and result according to a 
given organization's/application's security policy. Note that crypto should 
also be wrapped, but trying not to overcomplicate things in this note. The 
toolkit may be an OWASP version, or it may be one of any number of flavors 
described below, where security functions are logically and/or physically 
grouped into an organization/application-specific ESAPI. The OWASP ones just 
happen to exist and are free. Then, developers are trained/instructed/etc. to 
use them depending on their own life cycle best practices.

I have more to say, but let us start here.

Best,
 
Mike B.

-Original Message-
From: sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org [mailto:sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org] On 
Behalf Of Jim Manico
Sent: Thursday, January 07, 2010 10:56 AM
To: John Steven
Cc: Secure Coding
Subject: Re: [SC-L] Ramesh Nagappan Blog : Java EE 6: Web Application Security 
made simple ! | Core Security Patterns Weblog

John,

You do not need OWASP ESAPI to secure an app. But you need A ESAPI for your 
organization in order to build secure Apps, in my opinion.  
OWASP ESAPI may help you get started down that path.

An ESAPI is no silver bullet, there is no such thing as that in AppSec. But it 
will help you build secure apps.

Jim Manico

On Jan 6, 2010, at 6:20 PM, John Steven jste...@cigital.com wrote:

 All,

 With due respect to those who work on ESAPI, Jim included, ESAPI is 
 not the only way to make a secure app even remotely possible. And I 
 believe that underneath their own pride in what they've done--some of 
 which is very warranted--they understand that. It's hard not to become 
 impassioned in posting.

 I've seen plenty of good secure implementations within organizations' 
 own security toolkits. I'm not the only one that's
 noticed: the BSIMM SSF calls out three relevant activities to this
 end:

 SDF 1.1 Build/publish security features (*1) SDF 2.1 Find/publish 
 mature design patterns from the organization (similar URL) SDF 2.3  
 Build secure-by-design middleware frameworks/common libraries (similar 
 URL)

 Calling out three activities within the SSF means that it can't just 
 be John Steven's top client (whatever that means) that's doing this 
 either. I've formally reviewed some of these toolkits and I'd pit them 
 against ESAPI and expect favorable results. Plenty of organizations 
 are doing a great job building stuff on top of profoundly broken 
 platforms, frameworks, and toolkits... and they're following a 'secure 
 SDL' to get there. ESAPI can not be said to have adhered to that rigor 
 (*2). Organizations care about this risk regardless of the pedigree 
 and experience of those who are building it.

 Is the right answer for everyone to drop everything and build their 
 own secure toolkit? I don't think so. I like that the OWASP community 
 is taking a whack at something open and free to share.
 These same people have attempted to improve Java's security through 
 the community process--and though often correct, diligent, friendly, 
 and well-intentioned, their patience has often been tested to or 
 beyond the breaking point: those building the platforms and frameworks 
 simply aren't listening that well yet. That is very sad.

 One thing I've seen a lot of is organizations assessing, testing, 
 hardening, documenting, and internally distributing their own versions 
 of popular Java EE toolkits (the secure struts
 phenomenon). I've seen some organizations give their developers 
 training and write SAST rules to automatically verify correct use of 
 such toolkits. I like this idea a hell of a lot as an alternative to 
 an ESAPI-like approach. Why? A few reasons:

 1) Popularity - these toolkits appeal to developers: their interfaces 
 have been voted on by their adopting user population-- not conceived 
 and lamented principally by security folk. No one forces developers to 
 go from Struts to Spring they do it because it saves them time, makes 
 their app faster, or some combination of important factors.

 2) Changes App Infrastructure - MVC frameworks, especially, make up 
 the scaffolding (hence the name 'Struts') of an application. MVC code 
 often touches user input before developer's see it and gets the last 
 chance to encode output before a channel (user or otherwise) receives 
 it. Focusing on an application's scaffolding allows in some cases, a 
 best-chance of touching all input/out and true invisibility relative 
 to developer generated code. Often, its configuration is declarative 
 in nature as well--keeping security from cluttering up the Java code. 
 Note that this approach is fundamentally different from Firewalls 

Re: [SC-L] Ramesh Nagappan Blog : Java EE 6: Web Application Security made simple ! | Core Security Patterns Weblog

2010-01-07 Thread Boberski, Michael [USA]
Regarding PKI, we travel in different circles when it comes to that, perhaps 
best to leave that one there.

Anywho... All sorts of apples and oranges are being mixed up here. There is the 
security of a targeted app, of the components in the environment that it 
depends on to run, of the environment itself, and of the whole mess when 
everything's up and running. ESAPI is intended to be used by the targeted app. 
The overall security will then be dragged up or down depending on the 
components in the environment and the operation and the development of the app 
in the first place. Different strategies and whatnot can then be applied to 
claw one's way back up to a targeted level of assurance. Your comments below 
span these areas, when we're really just trying to talk about one. Hooray for 
ESAPI for helping out with the piece of the puzzle that it can. You bet that 
we're going to explain and promote its use, as people who have contributed to 
its development and adoption.

The documentation and whatnot is being worked on. We could use a hand if you've 
got some cycles! I wrote a first draft of a design patterns guide not too long 
ago, please feel free to review and provide comments, it's on the project page. 
The project presentation also speaks to a number of the items below. Threat 
models, white papers, all good, if you (or anyone) wish to contribute!

Best,

Mike B.

-Original Message-
From: sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org [mailto:sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org] On 
Behalf Of John Steven
Sent: Thursday, January 07, 2010 1:03 PM
To: Secure Coding
Subject: Re: [SC-L] Ramesh Nagappan Blog : Java EE 6: Web Application Security 
made simple ! | Core Security Patterns Weblog

Jim,

Yours was the predicted response. The ref-impl. to API side-step does not fix 
the flaw in the argument though.

No, you do not need A ESAPI to build secure apps.

Please re-read my email carefully.

Alternatives:
1) Some organizations adopt OWASP ESAPI's ref-impl.
2) Others build their own do agree and see the value; yes

#1 and #2 agree with your position.

3) Some secure their toolkits (again, a la secure struts)

Indicating such a secure struts is an organization's ESAPI perverts the ESAPI 
concept far too greatly to pass muster. Indeed, were it to, it would violate 
properties 3 and 4 (and very likely 2) within my previous email's advantage 
list.

Mr. Boberski, you too need to re-read my email. I advise you strongly not to 
keep saying that ESAPI is like PK-enabling an APP. I don't think many people 
got a good feeling about how much they spent on, or how effective their PKI 
implementation was ;-). Please consider how you'd ESAPI-enable the millions of 
lines of underlying framework code beneath the app.

4) Policy + Standards, buttressed with a robust assurance program

Some organizations have sufficiently different threat models and deployment 
scenarios within their 'four walls' that they opt for specifying an overarching 
policy and checking each sub-organization's compliance--commensurate with their 
risk tolerance and each app deployment's threat model. Each sub-organization 
may-or-may-not choose to leverage items one and two from this list. I doubt, 
however, you'd argue that more formal methods of verification don't suffice to 
perform 'as well' as ESAPI in securing an app (BTW, I have seen commercial 
implementations opt for such verification as an alternative to a security 
toolkit approach). Indeed, an single security API would likely prove a 
disservice if crammed down the throats of sub-organizations that differ too 
greatly.

At best, the implicit ESAPI or the highway campaign slogan  applies to only 
50% of the alternatives I've listed. And since the ESAPI project doesn't have 
documented and publicly available good, specific, actionable requirements, 
mis-use cases, or a threat model from which it's working, the OWASP ESAPI 
project doesn't do as much as it could for the #2 option above.

Jim, Mike, I see your posts all-througout the the blog-o-sphere and mailing 
lists. Two-line posts demanding people adopt ESAPI or forgo all hope can 
off-put. It conjures close-minded religion to me. Rather:

* Consider all four of the options above, one might be better than OWASP ESAPI 
within the context of the post
* Consider my paragraph following Point #4. Create:

* An ESAPI mis-use case guide, back out security policy it manifests,
  or requirements it implements (and don't point me to the unit
  tests--I've read them)
* Document an ESAPI threat model (For which apps will developers have
  their expectations met adopting ESAPI? Which won't?)
* A document describing experiment results: before and after ESAPI:
  how many results does a pen-test find?, 'Code review?
* Write an adoption guide. Apps are only created in a green-field
  once. Then they live in maintenance forever. How do you apply
  ESAPI to a real-world app already 

Re: [SC-L] InformIT: You need an SSG

2009-12-22 Thread Boberski, Michael [USA]
but it is nowhere near as important or as effective as teaching defensive 
programming

I.e., arming developers with toolkits that perform expected security checks and 
that result in expected security effects, and making sure they can use them.

Not a sermon just a thought, as the local radio station ad goes.

Best,
 
Mike B.


-Original Message-
From: sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org [mailto:sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org] On 
Behalf Of Gary McGraw
Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2009 12:09 PM
To: list-s...@secureconsulting.net; Secure Code Mailing List
Subject: Re: [SC-L] InformIT: You need an SSG

hi ben,

You may be right.  We have observed that the longer an initiative is underway 
(we have one in the study that checks in at 14 years old), the more actual 
activity tends to get pushed out to dev.  You may recall from the BSIMM that we 
call this the satellite.  Microsoft has an extensive satellite with 300 or so 
people embedded throughout their huge company (recall that their SSG is 100).  
Because the notion of satellite is not as common a phenomenon in our data, we 
can't draw conclusions as clear as the ones we can draw regarding an SSG.

Think of the SSG and the Satellite as coaches and mentors who are tasked 
with helping development get it right (not simply cleaning up their messes).  I 
agree that we have spent too much effort over the past decade simply trying to 
assess the mess and not enough getting dev to change their behavior.   The 
companies we studied in the BSIMM are trying to change dev.

As a particular example of where I agree with you that we go off track as a 
discipline, consider training.  Teaching developers about the OWASP top 10 in 
training may be exciting, but it is nowhere near as important or as effective 
as teaching defensive programming.  (And this from the guy who wrote 
Exploiting Software.)  Developers need to know how to do it right, not just 
what bugs look like on TV.

gem

company www.cigital.com
podcast www.cigital.com/silverbullet
blog www.cigital.com/justiceleague
book www.swsec.com


On 12/22/09 10:11 AM, Benjamin Tomhave list-s...@secureconsulting.net wrote:

I think the short-term assertion is sound (setup a group to make a push in 
training, awareness, and integration with SOP), but I'm not convinced the 
long-term assertion (that is, maintaining the group past the initial
push) is in fact meritorious. I think there's a danger in setting up dedicated 
security groups of almost any sort as it provides a crutch to organizations 
that then leads to a failure to integrate security practices into general SOP.

What is advocated seems to be consistent with how we've approached security as 
an industry for the past couple decades (or longer), and I don't see this as 
having the long-term benefit that was desired or intended. It seems that when 
you don't make people directly responsible and liable for doing the right 
things, they then fail at the ask and let others do it instead. It's the old 
lazy sysadmin axiom that we script repeatable tasks because it's easier in 
the long run.

The question, then, comes down to one of psychology and people management. How 
do we make people responsible for their actions such that they begin to adopt 
better practices? The basic response should be to enact consequences, and I 
think that now is probably an optimal time for businesses to get very 
hard-nosed about these sorts of things (high unemployment means lots of people 
looking for work means employers have the advantage). This perhaps sounds very 
ugly and nasty, and obviously it will be if taken to an extreme, but we have a 
serious problem culturally in that non-security people still don't seem to 
think, on average, that security is in their job description. Solve that 
problem, and all this other stuff becomes a footnote.

fwiw.

-ben

Gary McGraw wrote:
 hi sc-l,

 This list is made up of a bunch of practitioners (more than a thousand 
 from what Ken tells me), and we collectively have many different ways 
 of promoting software security in our companies and our clients.  The 
 BSIMM study http://bsi-mm.com focuses attention on software security 
 in large organizations and just at the moment covers the work of 1554 
 full time employees working every day in 26 software security 
 initiatives.  One phenomenon we observed in the BSIMM was that every 
 large initiative has a Software Security Group
 (SSG) to carry out and lead software security activities.

 I wrote about our observations around SSGs in this month's informIT
 article:

 http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1434903

 Simply put, an SSG is a critical part of a software security 
 initiative in all companies with more than 100 developers.  (We're 
 still not sure about SSGs in smaller organizations, but the BSIMM 
 Begin data (now hovering at 75 firms) may be revealing.)

 Cigital's SSG was formed in 1997 (with John Viega, Brad Arkin, and me 
 as founding members).  Since its inception,