Re: [SC-L] Insider threats and software

2007-08-16 Thread silky
On 8/17/07, Gary McGraw [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Hi,

 The point here is NOT to pull a person-in-the-middle attack against the 
 protocol, but rather to subvert the client completely and have the subverted 
 client do all of your talking for you.  The most advanced (game)bot 
 techniques that we describe in EOG work by shimming (in an almost invisible 
 way) the game client, then setting up a communication channel with another 
 processor after a hardware interrupt in the main game thread is thrown.  For 
 those of you with the book, see pages 228-230.

 A less hairy approach is to attach to the game client as a debugger and just 
 call methods like there's no tomorrow.  The only problem with that approach 
 is it is like stomping around in the mud puddle and you are likely to be 
 detected.

 Effectively then, you ARE the client.  That's why I think it's more of an 
 insider attack
 than your standard BO sploit.

how is this different then sending malformed packets to an rpc
interface? the rpc would normally take it's protocol from some app;
but what you, as the smart attacker, have done is to review the app,
exploit it's weakness's in client-side protocol assumptions (client
will always send correctly formed packets) and profit. seems like the
classic remote exploit development strategy.

you are also 'mixing in' a bot as an exploit. it's not an exploit
of the game in terms of compromising it, what you're actually
compromising if the in-game protocols (not
out-of-game-and-operating-system protocols).

for example, there is a korean game for which you can buy a physical
device that you attach to your mouse that plays the game for you. what
sort of attack is this? it isn't any sort of classical attack. it's a
automation of the game. which is a problem; granted, but not an
'insider attack'.

why blur the line on what insider attack means? it will only make life
worse/easier for CTO's to fob it off as too hard.

if you specifically define it it can be acted on and solved. expanding
the definition will only complicate matters, imho.




 gem

 p.s. I added a little bit of data on the justice league blog about this:
 http://www.cigital.com/justiceleague/2007/08/16/software-the-new-insider-threat/



 -Original Message-
 From: silky [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2007 7:44 PM
 To: Gary McGraw
 Cc: SC-L@securecoding.org
 Subject: Re: [SC-L] Insider threats and software

 i really don't see how this is at all an 'insider' attack; given that
 it is the common attack vector for almost every single remote exploit
 strategy; look into the inner protocol of the specific app and form
 your own messages to exploit it.



 On 8/15/07, Gary McGraw [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Hi sc-l,
 
  My darkreading column this month is devoted to insiders, but with a twist.  
  In this article, I argue that software components which run on untrusted 
  clients (AJAX anyone?  WoW clients?) are an interesting new flavor of 
  insider attack.
 
  Check it out:
  http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=131477WT.svl=column1_1
 
  What do you think?  Is this a logical stretch or something obvious?
 
  gem
 
  company www.cigital.com
  podcast www.cigital.com/silverbullet
  blog www.cigital.com/justiceleague
  book www.swsec.com
 
  ___
  Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
  List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
  List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
  SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
  as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
  ___
 


 --
 mike
 http://lets.coozi.com.au/

 ___
 Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
 List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
 List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
 SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
 as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
 ___



-- 
mike
http://lets.coozi.com.au/
___
Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
___


Re: [SC-L] Insider threats and software

2007-08-15 Thread silky
i really don't see how this is at all an 'insider' attack; given that
it is the common attack vector for almost every single remote exploit
strategy; look into the inner protocol of the specific app and form
your own messages to exploit it.



On 8/15/07, Gary McGraw [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Hi sc-l,

 My darkreading column this month is devoted to insiders, but with a twist.  
 In this article, I argue that software components which run on untrusted 
 clients (AJAX anyone?  WoW clients?) are an interesting new flavor of insider 
 attack.

 Check it out:
 http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=131477WT.svl=column1_1

 What do you think?  Is this a logical stretch or something obvious?

 gem

 company www.cigital.com
 podcast www.cigital.com/silverbullet
 blog www.cigital.com/justiceleague
 book www.swsec.com

 ___
 Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
 List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
 List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
 SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
 as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
 ___



-- 
mike
http://lets.coozi.com.au/
___
Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
___