Re: [SC-L] How is secure coding sold within enterprises?

2007-03-20 Thread McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
Thanks for the response. I already own the book and understand how to engage 
vendors. Where I am seeking assistance is all the work that goes on within a 
large enterprise before these two things occur. The ideal situation for me 
would be to get my hands on the five to ten page Powerpoint slide deck that 
others who have blazed this path before me have used to sell the notion to 
their executives.

-Original Message-
From: Andrew van der Stock [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 5:06 PM
To: McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
Cc: SC-L
Subject: Re: [SC-L] How is secure coding sold within enterprises?


In terms of creating a SDLC, pop out to Borders and get Howard and Lipner's 
The Security Development Lifecycle ISBN 9780735622142

http://www.microsoft.com/mspress/books/8753.aspx

It is simply the best text I've read in a long time. 

You may be interested in the work Mark Curphey et al is doing at his new start 
up. They launched an ISM portal a couple of weeks back. 

http://www.ism-community.org/

If you're just after ideas on how to engage vendors, check out Curphey's blog 
for some nice insider posts:

http://securitybuddha.com/2007/03/07/top-10-tips-for-hiring-web-application-pen-testers/
http://securitybuddha.com/2007/03/07/top-ten-tips-for-hiring-security-code-reviewers/
http://securitybuddha.com/2007/03/08/top-ten-tips-for-managing-technical-security-folks/

He ran Foundstone's services for a while, and built up a pretty good 
consultancy. 

The sort of metrics you're after are notoriously hard to find out in the wild. 
There's some folks capturing screenshots of enterprise dashboards. This may or 
may not help at all. 

http://dashboardspy.com/

Thanks,
Andrew


On 3/19/07 4:12 PM, McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT) [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



I agree with your assessment of how things are sold at a high-level but still 
struggling in that it takes more than just graphicalizing of your points to 
sell, hence I am still attempting to figure out a way to get my hands on some 
PPT that are used internal to enterprises prior to consulting engagements and I 
think a better answer will emerge. PPT may provide a sense of budget, 
timelines, roles and responsibilities, who needed to buy-in, industry metrics, 
quotes from noted industry analysts, etc that will help shortcut my own work so 
I can start moving towards the more important stuff.



-Original Message-
From: Andrew van der Stock  [ mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 2:50  PM
To: McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
Cc:  SC-L
Subject: Re: [SC-L] How is secure coding sold within  enterprises?

There are two major methods:

 


1.  Opportunity cost / competitive advantage (the  Microsoft model)   

2.  Recovery cost reductions (the model used by most  financial 
institutions)



Generally,  opportunity cost is where an organization can further its goals by 
a secure  business foundation. This requires the CIO/CSO to be able to sell the 
business  on this model, which is hard when it is clear that many businesses 
have been  founded on insecure foundations and do quite well nonetheless. 
Companies that  choose to be secure have a competitive advantage, an advantage 
that will  increase over time and will win conquest customers. For example (and 
this is  my humble opinion), Oracle's security is a long standing unbreakable 
joke, and  in the meantime MS ploughed billions into fixing their tattered 
reputation by  making it a competitive advantage, and thus making their market 
dominance  nearly complete. Oracle is now paying for their CSO's mistake in not 
 understanding this model earlier. Forward looking financial institutions are  
now using this model, such as my old bank's (with its SMS transaction  
authentication feature) winning many new customers by not only promoting  
themselves as secure, but doing the right thing and investing in essentially  
eliminating Internet Banking fraud. It saves them money, and it works well for  
customers. This is the best model, but the hardest to sell.

The second  model is used by most financial institutions. They are mature risk 
managers  and understand that a certain level of risk must be taken in return 
for doing  business. By choosing to invest some of the potential or known 
losses in  reducing the potential for massive losses, they can reduce the 
overall risk  present in the corporate risk register, which plays well to 
shareholders. For  example, if you invest $1m in securing a cheque clearance 
process worth (say)  $10b annually to the business, and that reduces check 
fraud by $5m per year  and eliminates $2m of unnecessary overhead every year, 
security is an easy  sell with obvious targets to improve profitability. A well 
managed operational  risk group will easily identify the riskiest aspects of a 
mature company's  activities, and it's easy to justify improvements in those 
areas. 

The  FUD model (used by many vendors - do this or the SOX

Re: [SC-L] How is secure coding sold within enterprises?

2007-03-20 Thread Gunnar Peterson
JD Meier had a good post recently on influencing without authority, which is the
position security finds itself in:

1. assume all potential allies
2. clarify goals and priorities
3. diagnose the allies world
4. identify relevant currencies
5. deal with relationships
6. influence through give and take

http://blogs.msdn.com/jmeier/archive/2007/03/09/influencing-without-authority.aspx

how does this translate to app security? well i think it means find
stakeholders/allies wherever you can. any group that is interested try to 1)
educate them about software risks and software security and 2) give them
tools/process they can bring to bear on the problem. specifically, legal teams
are generally very interested in risks, so i have seen several legal teams at
very large companies deploy parts of the OWASP legal project to good effect.
business analysts can be trained on how specify some security concerns in use
cases/user stories. qa teams can be educated on security specific testing tools
and techniques, architects can learn how to design reusable security services,
and so on. so whatever group that seems eager to get involved it makes sense to
engage, once security concerns are embedded in test plans and use cases, aligned
with business goals, the software security effort is not a one off from a
developer point of view.

find all allies, turn none away, arm them with knowledge, turn em loose.

the other issue is that there are many security services that you cannot expect
an app project to deliver on its own. skyscrapers should not have to have their
own fighter jets to protect against people flying planes into them, that is why
you have an air force. making the case for platform security can be hard, but
that is where the architects have to help (i seem to recall that security is a
nonfunctional requirement and that architects are supposed to own non
functional requirements). one of the reasons i like browser-based federated
identity is because you can externalize some authN code from the app, you get
stronger identity tokens across the wire, you don't have developers creating
their own authN code, and of course the users get SSO and SLO. this is like app
armor, in my view, a reference model for security services - improved security
mechanism, great usability, business value, and a simplified programming model.

-gp

Quoting McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT) [EMAIL PROTECTED]:

 Thanks for the response. I already own the book and understand how to engage
 vendors. Where I am seeking assistance is all the work that goes on within a
 large enterprise before these two things occur. The ideal situation for me
 would be to get my hands on the five to ten page Powerpoint slide deck that
 others who have blazed this path before me have used to sell the notion to
 their executives.

 -Original Message-
 From: Andrew van der Stock [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 5:06 PM
 To: McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
 Cc: SC-L
 Subject: Re: [SC-L] How is secure coding sold within enterprises?


 In terms of creating a SDLC, pop out to Borders and get Howard and Lipner's
 The Security Development Lifecycle ISBN 9780735622142

 http://www.microsoft.com/mspress/books/8753.aspx

 It is simply the best text I've read in a long time.

 You may be interested in the work Mark Curphey et al is doing at his new
 start up. They launched an ISM portal a couple of weeks back.

 http://www.ism-community.org/

 If you're just after ideas on how to engage vendors, check out Curphey's blog
 for some nice insider posts:


http://securitybuddha.com/2007/03/07/top-10-tips-for-hiring-web-application-pen-testers/

http://securitybuddha.com/2007/03/07/top-ten-tips-for-hiring-security-code-reviewers/

http://securitybuddha.com/2007/03/08/top-ten-tips-for-managing-technical-security-folks/

 He ran Foundstone's services for a while, and built up a pretty good
 consultancy.

 The sort of metrics you're after are notoriously hard to find out in the
 wild. There's some folks capturing screenshots of enterprise dashboards. This
 may or may not help at all.

 http://dashboardspy.com/

 Thanks,
 Andrew


 On 3/19/07 4:12 PM, McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



 I agree with your assessment of how things are sold at a high-level but still
 struggling in that it takes more than just graphicalizing of your points to
 sell, hence I am still attempting to figure out a way to get my hands on some
 PPT that are used internal to enterprises prior to consulting engagements and
 I think a better answer will emerge. PPT may provide a sense of budget,
 timelines, roles and responsibilities, who needed to buy-in, industry
 metrics, quotes from noted industry analysts, etc that will help shortcut my
 own work so I can start moving towards the more important stuff.



 -Original Message-
 From: Andrew van der Stock  [ mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 2:50  PM
 To: McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
 Cc

[SC-L] How is secure coding sold within enterprises?

2007-03-19 Thread McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
I am attempting to figure out how other Fortune enterprises have went about 
selling the need for secure coding practices and can't seem to find the answer 
I seek. Essentially, I have discovered that one of a few scenarios exist (a) 
the leadership chain was highly technical and intuitively understood the need 
(b) the primary business model of the enterprise is either banking, 
investments, etc where the risk is perceived higher if it is not performed (c) 
it was strongly encouraged by a member of a very large consulting firm (e.g. 
McKinsey, Accenture, etc).
 
I would like to understand what does the Powerpoint deck that employees of 
Fortune enterprises use to sell the concept PRIOR to bringing in consultants 
and vendors to help them fulfill the need. Has anyone ran across any PPT that 
best outlines this for demographics where the need is real but considered less 
important than other intiatives?


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Re: [SC-L] How is secure coding sold within enterprises?

2007-03-19 Thread Andrew van der Stock
In terms of creating a SDLC, pop out to Borders and get Howard and Lipner¹s
³The Security Development Lifecycle² ISBN 9780735622142

http://www.microsoft.com/mspress/books/8753.aspx

It is simply the best text I¹ve read in a long time.

You may be interested in the work Mark Curphey et al is doing at his new
start up. They launched an ISM portal a couple of weeks back.

http://www.ism-community.org/

If you¹re just after ideas on how to engage vendors, check out Curphey¹s
blog for some nice insider posts:

http://securitybuddha.com/2007/03/07/top-10-tips-for-hiring-web-application-
pen-testers/
http://securitybuddha.com/2007/03/07/top-ten-tips-for-hiring-security-code-r
eviewers/
http://securitybuddha.com/2007/03/08/top-ten-tips-for-managing-technical-sec
urity-folks/

He ran Foundstone¹s services for a while, and built up a pretty good
consultancy. 

The sort of metrics you¹re after are notoriously hard to find out in the
wild. There¹s some folks capturing screenshots of enterprise dashboards.
This may or may not help at all.

http://dashboardspy.com/

Thanks,
Andrew


On 3/19/07 4:12 PM, McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 I agree with your assessment of how things are sold at a high-level but still
 struggling in that it takes more than just graphicalizing of your points to
 sell, hence I am still attempting to figure out a way to get my hands on some
 PPT that are used internal to enterprises prior to consulting engagements and
 I think a better answer will emerge. PPT may provide a sense of budget,
 timelines, roles and responsibilities, who needed to buy-in, industry metrics,
 quotes from noted industry analysts, etc that will help shortcut my own work
 so I can start moving towards the more important stuff.
  
 -Original Message-
 From: Andrew van der Stock  [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 2:50  PM
 To: McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
 Cc:  SC-L
 Subject: Re: [SC-L] How is secure coding sold within  enterprises?
 
 There are two major methods:
 
  
 1. Opportunity cost / competitive advantage (the  Microsoft model)
 2. Recovery cost reductions (the model used by most  financial institutions)
 
 Generally,  opportunity cost is where an organization can further its goals
 by a secure  business foundation. This requires the CIO/CSO to be able to
 sell the business  on this model, which is hard when it is clear that many
 businesses have been  founded on insecure foundations and do quite well
 nonetheless. Companies that  choose to be secure have a competitive
 advantage, an advantage that will  increase over time and will win conquest
 customers. For example (and this is  my humble opinion), Oracle¹s security is
 a long standing unbreakable joke, and  in the meantime MS ploughed billions
 into fixing their tattered reputation by  making it a competitive advantage,
 and thus making their market dominance  nearly complete. Oracle is now paying
 for their CSO¹s mistake in not  understanding this model earlier. Forward
 looking financial institutions are  now using this model, such as my old
 bank¹s (with its SMS transaction  authentication feature) winning many new
 customers by not only promoting  themselves as secure, but doing the right
 thing and investing in essentially  eliminating Internet Banking fraud. It
 saves them money, and it works well for  customers. This is the best model,
 but the hardest to sell.
 
 The second  model is used by most financial institutions. They are mature
 risk managers  and understand that a certain level of risk must be taken in
 return for doing  business. By choosing to invest some of the potential or
 known losses in  reducing the potential for massive losses, they can reduce
 the overall risk  present in the corporate risk register, which plays well to
 shareholders. For  example, if you invest $1m in securing a cheque clearance
 process worth (say)  $10b annually to the business, and that reduces check
 fraud by $5m per year  and eliminates $2m of unnecessary overhead every year,
 security is an easy  sell with obvious targets to improve profitability. A
 well managed operational  risk group will easily identify the riskiest
 aspects of a mature company¹s  activities, and it¹s easy to justify
 improvements in those areas.
 
 The  FUD model (used by many vendors - ³do this or the SOX boogeyman will get
 you²)  does not work.
 
 The do nothing model (used by nearly everyone who  doesn¹t fall into the
 first two categories) works for a time, but can  spectacularly end a
 business. Card Systems anyone? Unknown risk is too risky a  proposition, and
 is plain director negligence in my view.
 
 Thanks,
 Andrew 
 
 
 On 3/19/07 11:35 AM, McGovern, James F  (HTSC, IT)
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  
 I am attempting to figure out how other Fortune enterprises have  went about
 selling the need for secure coding practices and can't seem to  find the
 answer I seek. Essentially, I have discovered that one of a few  scenarios

Re: [SC-L] How is secure coding sold within enterprises?

2007-03-19 Thread John Steven
 attach a PPT ;)


John Steven
Technical Director; Principal, Software Security Group
Direct: (703) 404-5726 Cell: (703) 727-4034
Key fingerprint = 4772 F7F3 1019 4668 62AD  94B0 AE7F

Blog: http://www.cigital.com/justiceleague
http://www.cigital.com
Software Confidence. Achieved.


On Mar 19, 2007, at 4:12 PM, McGovern, James F ((HTSC, IT)) wrote:

I agree with your assessment of how things are sold at a high-level  
but still struggling in that it takes more than just graphicalizing  
of your points to sell, hence I am still attempting to figure out a  
way to get my hands on some PPT that are used internal to  
enterprises prior to consulting engagements and I think a better  
answer will emerge. PPT may provide a sense of budget, timelines,  
roles and responsibilities, who needed to buy-in, industry metrics,  
quotes from noted industry analysts, etc that will help shortcut my  
own work so I can start moving towards the more important stuff.

-Original Message-
From: Andrew van der Stock [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2007 2:50 PM
To: McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
Cc: SC-L
Subject: Re: [SC-L] How is secure coding sold within enterprises?

There are two major methods:

Opportunity cost / competitive advantage (the Microsoft model)
Recovery cost reductions (the model used by most financial  
institutions)


Generally, opportunity cost is where an organization can further  
its goals by a secure business foundation. This requires the CIO/ 
CSO to be able to sell the business on this model, which is hard  
when it is clear that many businesses have been founded on insecure  
foundations and do quite well nonetheless. Companies that choose to  
be secure have a competitive advantage, an advantage that will  
increase over time and will win conquest customers. For example  
(and this is my humble opinion), Oracle’s security is a long  
standing unbreakable joke, and in the meantime MS ploughed billions  
into fixing their tattered reputation by making it a competitive  
advantage, and thus making their market dominance nearly complete.  
Oracle is now paying for their CSO’s mistake in not understanding  
this model earlier. Forward looking financial institutions are now  
using this model, such as my old bank’s (with its SMS transaction  
authentication feature) winning many new customers by not only  
promoting themselves as secure, but doing the right thing and  
investing in essentially eliminating Internet Banking fraud. It  
saves them money, and it works well for customers. This is the best  
model, but the hardest to sell.


The second model is used by most financial institutions. They are  
mature risk managers and understand that a certain level of risk  
must be taken in return for doing business. By choosing to invest  
some of the potential or known losses in reducing the potential for  
massive losses, they can reduce the overall risk present in the  
corporate risk register, which plays well to shareholders. For  
example, if you invest $1m in securing a cheque clearance process  
worth (say) $10b annually to the business, and that reduces check  
fraud by $5m per year and eliminates $2m of unnecessary overhead  
every year, security is an easy sell with obvious targets to  
improve profitability. A well managed operational risk group will  
easily identify the riskiest aspects of a mature company’s  
activities, and it’s easy to justify improvements in those areas.


The FUD model (used by many vendors - “do this or the SOX boogeyman  
will get you”) does not work.


The do nothing model (used by nearly everyone who doesn’t fall into  
the first two categories) works for a time, but can spectacularly  
end a business. Card Systems anyone? Unknown risk is too risky a  
proposition, and is plain director negligence in my view.


Thanks,
Andrew


On 3/19/07 11:35 AM, McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)  
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


I am attempting to figure out how other Fortune enterprises have  
went about selling the need for secure coding practices and can't  
seem to find the answer I seek. Essentially, I have discovered that  
one of a few scenarios exist (a) the leadership chain was highly  
technical and intuitively understood the need (b) the primary  
business model of the enterprise is either banking, investments,  
etc where the risk is perceived higher if it is not performed (c)  
it was strongly encouraged by a member of a very large consulting  
firm (e.g. McKinsey, Accenture, etc).


I would like to understand what does the Powerpoint deck that  
employees of Fortune enterprises use to sell the concept PRIOR to  
bringing in consultants and vendors to help them fulfill the need.  
Has anyone ran across any PPT that best outlines this for  
demographics where the need is real but considered less important  
than other intiatives?







This electronic message transmission contains