Re: [SC-L] Inherently Secure Code?

2009-08-28 Thread ljknews
At 8:47 AM -0700 8/27/09, Benjamin Tomhave wrote:

  Should any sort of overflow really be allowed?

It is not, except by management decision (in choosing an unsafe
language).
-- 
Larry Kilgallen
___
Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
___


Re: [SC-L] Inherently Secure Code?

2009-08-27 Thread Benjamin Tomhave
To be sure, inherently secure code is a misnomer. However, that being
said, my original contention was that certain common vulnerabilities
should be automatically managed these days rather than relying on
explicit code to catch them. Should any sort of overflow really be
allowed? I have to believe there are ways to safely trap those - perhaps
they result in an abend, but at least not in a manner that achieves the
goals of a compromise attempt. Similarly, it seems that there should be
ways to force the deserialization and parsing of data that could be
safer than allowing raw, unvalidated input to be acted upon.

I wonder, too, if part of the error in the curriculum thread is focusing
too low-level - that is, instead of focusing just on coding skills,
maybe there should also be a larger discussion of publishing frameworks,
development environments, etc., that introduce a lot of these security
capabilities as inherited properties/functions? Done properly, it would
lead to inherently better properties. fwiw.

-ben

Peter G. Neumann wrote:
 I don't much like INHERENTLY SECURE CODE.
 Software components by themselves are not secure.
 Security (and trustworthiness that encompasses security, reliability,
   survivability, etc.) is an emergent property of the entire system
   or enterprise.  To say that a component is secure is rather fatuous.
 
 See my DARPA report on composable trustworthy architectures for
 starters.
   http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/chats4.pdf or .html
 
 ___
 Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
 List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
 List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
 SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
 as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
 ___
 
 

-- 
Benjamin Tomhave, MS, CISSP
fal...@secureconsulting.net
Blog: http://www.secureconsulting.net/
Twitter: http://twitter.com/falconsview
Photos: http://photos.secureconsulting.net/
Web: http://falcon.secureconsulting.net/
LI: http://www.linkedin.com/in/btomhave

[ Random Quote: ]
We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when
we created them.
Albert Einstein
___
Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
___


[SC-L] Inherently Secure Code?

2009-08-26 Thread Brad Andrews


I am not sure I agree that this is any more achievable than claiming a  
bank building should allow all valid customers in, but keep out all  
thieves.  While we can and should make great strides, we will always  
have some exposure because we have to let some things through.  The  
only way we can have perfectly secure code is to not allow someone to  
use it.  The same is true of bug free code, but that is another  
argument.  :)


Isn't this kind of like wanting the evil bit to be set in all  
malicious packets?  Great idea, but not achievable.


--

Brad Andrews
RBA Communications
CISM, CSSLP, SANS/GIAC GSEC, GCFW, GCIH, GPCI


Quoting Benjamin Tomhave list-s...@secureconsulting.net:


we are now trapped in a box of our own
making that has us squabbling over academic minutiae like how to teach
secure coding when we should not have to consider this topic at all -
the code itself should be inherently secure.

___
Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org
List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
___