ISC(2), which sponsors the CISSP, co-developed with NSA a CISSP
Concentration called the ISSEP - Information Systems Security
Engineering Professional. The focus is really on the National Security
Agency's way of doing systems security engineering, as reflected in the
SSE-CMM methodology, and in
I think it's a matter of SHARED reponsibility. Yes, the programmers and
their managers are directly responsible. But it's consumers who create
demand, and consumers who, out of ignorance, continue to fail to make
the connection between bad software security and the viruses, privacy,
and other
Isn't a Single Sign-on System supposed to address exactly this kind of
problem?
Users need to be authenticated individually. Also, they don't want to
have to deal with multiple sets of credentials and different login
procedures for different apps/systems.
Login requirements for various apps and
I'm wondering whether role-based credentials, vs. individual user
credentials, might not make more sense here. Could the database owner
key be issued to a role vs. an individual identity? In this way, your
human users could be associated with a role that has a right to issue a
query to the
I'll be there, and presenting. I'd be interested in a BoF (but not a
BOF).
--
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.902.6981
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Kenneth Van Wyk
Sent: Thursday,
I've always had a question about this as well; specifically, what is really
meant by adding security to a CMM?
I've always felt that the level at which the software (or system) process is
defined by a CMM is too high and too abstract for the addition of security
activities to be particularly
Do you really mean secure coding only, or are you looking for books on
secure software development more generally?
--
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.902.6981
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Lawson, David L
Sent: Fri
I would refer you to Section 7.2.2.2, Professional Certifications, starting on
page 272 of Software Security Assurance: A State-of-the-Art Report which can
be downloaded from: http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/security.pdf
The report was published in July 2007; there may be additional
Yes, yes. We know. It's April 1st and all's right with the world.
--
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
-Original Message-
From: sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org on behalf of SC-L Reader Dave Aronson
Sent: Wed 01-Apr-09 11:25
To: Secure
I'm more devious. I think what needs to happen is that we need to redefine what
we mean by functionally correct or quality code. If determination of
functional correctness were extended from must operate as specified under
expected conditions to must operate as specified under all conditions,
Here's an extract from the Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center
(part of DTIC) Software Security Assurance: A State of the Art Report
(http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/security.pdf):
Courses on secure software development, secure programming, etc., typically
begin by introducing
A colleague and I have been looking at the problem a bit, in the context of
need for survivability in safety-critical systems. Below is an extract of the
paper Software Survivability: Where Safety and Security Converge authored by
Larry Feldman, Ph.D., and myself, and presented by our colleague
We looked at the problem of voting system security specifically in the context
of insider threat for last year's IATAC State of the Art Report on the Insider
Threat to Information Systems - some of which involved rogue developers
engineering backdoors into such systems. Unfortunately the
I think we need to start indoctrinating kids in the womb. Start selling Baby
Schneier CDs alongside Baby Mozart. :)
Seriously, though, cyberspace is such an integral part of modern life, parents
need to inculcate online security into their toddlers the same way they teach
them to look both
Actually, we can't prove programs are bug free if by bug we also mean all
possible anomalous behaviours. My colleagues keep pointing this out to me when
I suggest that we should start leveraging the computational power of computing
grids to analyze complex software the same way other
For consistency's sake, I hope you agree that if security is an
intermediate-to-advanced concept in software development, then all the other
-ilities (goodness properties, if you will), such as quality, reliability,
usability, safety, etc. that go beyond just get the bloody thing to work are
1:14 PM
To: Goertzel, Karen [USA]
Cc: Benjamin Tomhave; sc-l@securecoding.org
Subject: Re: [SC-L] Where Does Secure Coding Belong In the Curriculum?
On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 7:26 AM, Goertzel, Karen
[USA]goertzel_ka...@bah.com wrote:
For consistency's sake, I hope you agree that if security
Not so much anti-social as untrusting, supicious, and paranoid. Actually, being
highly social could provide an excellent cover to fool the bad guys into
thinking one is a lot less security-savvy than one actually is.
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Associate
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
...@bah.com
From: Benjamin Tomhave [list-s...@secureconsulting.net]
Sent: Wednesday, August 26, 2009 12:27 AM
To: Goertzel, Karen [USA]
Cc: sc-l@securecoding.org
Subject: Re: [SC-L] Where Does Secure Coding Belong In the Curriculum?
Goertzel, Karen [USA] wrote:
We
I too remember learning proofs in Jr. High. And I also believe the main
objective was to teach 12 and 13 year olds that it is possible to apply a
repeatable, disciplined process to how they approach problem solving. Certainly
not a worthless lesson, even if the mathematics involved are never
I see your point. On the other hand, there are times I worry that teach the
hacker mentality approach to secure development training smacks a bit too much
teaching future policemen the delights of robbery, rape, torture, and murder in
order to prepare the to defend the public against robbers,
Your Picasso - or, perhaps, Frank Lloyd Wright would be a better analogy -
definitely has a role in software development. I want his creativity up front
in the specification and high-level design of the building (the software
system). But when it comes to detailed design and testing, I'm going
For those who might be interested. There are still a couple weeks until the
submission deadline
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Associate
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
---
Special Issue of IJSSE
Theme: Software Safety Dependability - the Art of Engineering
There are these:
ISC(2) Secure Software Conference Series -
https://www.isc2.org/PressReleaseDetails.aspx?id=650
ESSoS - http://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/events/essos/2012/
SecSE - http://www.sintef.org/secse
SSIRI - http://paris.utdallas.edu/ssiri11/
But your point is taken. Most of the
What we need is to start building software that can fight back. Then we could
become part of cyber warfare which is much sexier than software assurance.
:)
===
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
Sorry, you have reached an imaginary number.
If
Unfortunately, it seems like the SWEBOK folks still believe that if you have
high-quality software, that will be sufficient to assure robustness against
intentional threats. It also shows a touching lack of faith that there will
never be an malicious participant in the SDLC intentionally
In other words, flaws and defects caused through developer error, ignorance,
negligence etc. can be exploited to cause harm. So even if one could prevent
actual intentional malicious inclusions in software, one hasn't eliminated the
problem of exploitable flawed logic.
The megachallenge, of
]
Sent: 13 May 2012 04:17
To: sc-l@securecoding.org
Cc: Goertzel, Karen [USA]; Peter G. Neumann; Gary McGraw
Subject: Re (badware vs. goodware): [SC-L] SearchSecurity: Badware versus
malware
Karen, whereas flaws and defects can hardly be argued to have possibly
some good affects, there have been
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729045.400-the-computer-that-never-crashes.html
===
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Lead Associate
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
If you're not failing every now and again,
it's a sign you're not doing anything very innovative.
-
I agree - and grow increasingly frustrated with those who insist on confusing
cyber war with cyber espionage (and vice versa). But I've found it's quite
easy to get them to understand the difference by simply asking them to drop the
prefix cyber from each. Cyber war is simply war fought on an
I agree that ONE end goal of software security is to safeguard data - but it is
not the only goal...and may not even be the primary goal, depending on the type
of system the software is part of. In a safety-critical system, safeguard the
data takes on a very different meaning from what one
On the other hand, isn't it somewhat analagous to hiring 24/7 armed security
guards and installing a state of the art physical security system in a museum,
and passing and enforcing strict laws against grand larceny?
The secure coding alternative would be for museums to stop displaying
The one point that's missing from the article is to remind people: What the
heck do you think firewalls are made of? Software! So unless a software
manufacturer has got software security religion, their product is just as
likely to be broken inside than the things it allegedly protects.
===
Scientist
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
Answers are easy. It's asking the right questions which is hard.
- The Doctor
From: Jeffrey Walton [noloa...@gmail.com]
Sent: 07 July 2014 14:56
To: Goertzel, Karen [USA]
Cc: Secure Code
k cat in a dark room,
especially if there is no cat."
- Confucius
From: Peter G. Neumann [neum...@csl.sri.com]
Sent: 06 September 2015 15:24
To: Goertzel, Karen [USA]
Cc: Alfonso De Gregorio; Johan Peeters; Secure Code Mailing List
Subject: Re: [SC-L]
From: Gary McGraw [g...@cigital.com]
Sent: 08 September 2015 15:44
To: Goertzel, Karen [USA]; Peter G. Neumann
Cc: Secure Code Mailing List
Subject: Re: [SC-L] [External] Re: SearchSecurity: Dynamism
As far as I know, Microsoft integrated some reference monitoring into their OS
family under Fred S
Does anyone else remember "reference monitors"?
What an old-fashioned idea. But they'd certainly solve a lot of problems.
===
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP, CSSLP
Senior Lead Scientist
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
"The hardest thing of all is to
find a black cat in a
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