On Jun 14, 2007, at 3:51 PM, Gary McGraw wrote:
I am in complete agreement with your thinking, which is why one of
the touchpoints (and chapter 9 of Software Security is about
operations. Ken knows more about this than any of us, but he's on
a plane now...right Ken?
Wow, I'd stop far
Gary McGraw wrote:
Though I don't quite understand computer science theory in the same way that
Crispin does, I do think it is worth pointing out that there are two major
kinds of security defects in software: bugs at the implementation level, and
flaws at the design/spec level. I think
On Mon, 11 Jun 2007, Crispin Cowan wrote:
Gary McGraw wrote:
Though I don't quite understand computer science theory in the same way
that Crispin does, I do think it is worth pointing out that there are two
major kinds of security defects in software: bugs at the implementation
Steven M. Christey wrote:
On Mon, 11 Jun 2007, Crispin Cowan wrote:
Kind of. I'm saying that specification and implementation are
relative to each other: at one level, a spec can say put an iterative
loop here and implementation of a bunch of x86 instructions.
I agree with this
I agree with Ryan, at the top skill levels anyway. Binary reverse
engineering seems to have evolved to the point where I refer to binary as
source-equivalent, and I was told by some well-known applied researcher
that some vulns are easier to find in binary than source.
But the bulk of public
Crispin Cowan wrote:
Do you suppose it is because of the different techniques researchers use
to detect vulnerabilities in source code vs. binary-only code? Or is
that a bad assumption because the hax0rs have Microsoft's source code
anyway? :-)
I'm in the process of hiring an outside firm for
Like it or not, the Web doesn't work right without Javascript now.
Depends on what you mean by the Web and work right. Fortunately,
for at least some people's values of those, this is not true.
/~\ The ASCII der Mouse
\ / Ribbon Campaign
X Against HTML
Crispin Cowen wrote:
IMHO, all this hand wringing is for naught. To get systems that never fail
requires total correctness. Turing tells us that total correctness is not
decidable, so you simply never will get it completely, you will only get
approximations at best.
What Turing actually tells
/silverbullet
blog www.cigital.com/justiceleague
book www.swsec.com
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Crispin Cowan
Sent: Monday, June 11, 2007 2:33 AM
To: Blue Boar
Cc: SC-L@securecoding.org
Subject: Re: [SC-L] Harvard vs. von Neumann
IMHO, all
What Turing actually tells us is that it is possible to construct
programs that may be correct but whose correctness is not decidable.
This is a far cry from saying that it is not possible to build
well-structured programs whose correctness _is_ decidable.
True as far as it goes - but don't
At 9:00 AM -0400 6/11/07, Gary McGraw wrote:
If we assumed perfection at the implementation level (through better
languages, say), then we would end up solving roughly 50% of the
software security problem.
Clearly we need to make some progress at the architecture/design level
to attain
der Mouse wrote:
What Turing actually tells us is that it is possible to construct
programs that may be correct but whose correctness is not decidable.
This is a far cry from saying that it is not possible to build
well-structured programs whose correctness _is_ decidable.
True as far as
der Mouse wrote:
Like it or not, the Web doesn't work right without Javascript now.
Depends on what you mean by the Web and work right. Fortunately,
for at least some people's values of those, this is not true.
Obviously, I'm oversimplifying. I claim that there are enough web sites
that
ljknews wrote:
It amazes me that someone in a discussion of software security would point
to a page that requires Javascript to be viewed.
I'm on a couple of mailing list with Dr. Solly, an early antivirus
researcher. he likes to talk about this idea of Grannyx an
(hypothetical) operating
14 matches
Mail list logo
