Re: [SC-L] 4 Questions: Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile, and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

2006-04-07 Thread der Mouse
If an application is a File Compression utility, then there is no reason why it should have access to the TCP stack. The problem then, is how to prevent an unprivileged user from setting up a File Compression utility to access TCP and establish a port to which an incoming connection can be

Re: [SC-L] 4 Questions: Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile, and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

2006-03-27 Thread der Mouse
At least one aspect of that is a design defect in TCP/IP, allowing unprivileged users to create a port to receive inbound connections. I don't think it's fair to call that any kind of defect in TCP/IP. There is nothing at all in TCP or IP that says anything whatsoever about what privilege may

Re: [SC-L] 4 Questions: Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile, and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

2006-03-25 Thread ljknews
At 11:39 AM + 3/25/06, Dinis Cruz wrote: 3) Since my assets as a user exist in user land, isn't the risk profile of malicious unmanaged code (deployed via IE/Firefox) roughly the same if I am running as a 'low privileged' user or as administrator? (at the If the administrator's assets are