The author claims, This flaw, caused by something as seemingly
harmless as a missing closing parenthesis, allowed local users to
execute code with root
Certainly that part is OS-specific. On my VMS machine, X-windows
processes do not run as root.
OS- and installation-specific. Neither the
der Mouse wrote:
And, of course, nobody ever bothers to say just what the problem was.
Grrr. (Fortunately, I don't care, since I am running pre-X11R6.9.0
code, or I'd be trying to chase down the diff.)
Bad code:
/* First the options that are only allowed for root */
if (getuid() == 0
Certainly that part is OS-specific. On my VMS machine, X-windows processes
do not run as root.
The X Window server needs elevated privileges because it can trigger
DMA on the graphics card (and thus read arbitrary memory, unless
you've got an IOMMU). Chances are, however, that your VMS
PROTECTED]
To: Gadi Evron [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Secure Coding SC-L@securecoding.org
Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2006 10:37 AM
Subject: Re: [SC-L] HNS - Biggest X Window security hole since 2000
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At 11:12 AM -0400 5/4/06, Kenneth R. van Wyk wrote:
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Stories about this (below) X bug and the DHS-sponsored project that found it
On Thu, 4 May 2006, Kenneth R. van Wyk wrote:
Stories about this (below) X bug and the DHS-sponsored project that found it
have been floating around the net all week. This story caught my eye,
though:
http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=3994
The author claims, This flaw, caused
On Thursday 04 May 2006 12:40, Gadi Evron wrote:
Hmm, I think this was fixed in earlier X versions.
Not impossible, but the article clearly indicated that it's in 6.9.0 and
7.0.0, which are the most current in general circulation, I believe.
But, some bugs are so important that they deserved
