On 02/01/2018 09:02 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
On Thu, 2018-02-01 at 08:20 -0800, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
On 02/01/2018 08:00 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Thu, Feb 1, 2018 at 10:37 AM, Mark Salyzyn <saly...@android.com>
wrote:
In the absence of commit a4298e4522d6 ("net: add SOCK_RCU_FREE
0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 83 01 00
00 41 8b 75 10 31
RIP [] sock_has_perm+0x1fe/0x3e0
security/selinux/hooks.c:4069
RSP
---[ end trace 7b5aaf788fef6174 ]---
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <saly...@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <p...@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg KH <
On 01/19/2018 09:41 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
If we can't safely dereference the sock in these hooks, then that seems
to point back to the approach used in my original code, where in
ancient history I had sock_has_perm() take the socket and use its inode
i_security field instead of the sock.
On 01/19/2018 09:06 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Mark Salyzyn <saly...@android.com> wrote:
On 01/18/2018 02:36 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Thu, Jan 18, 2018 at 4:58 PM, Mark Salyzyn <saly...@android.com> wrote:
general protection fault: [#1] PREEMPT S
On 01/18/2018 02:36 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Thu, Jan 18, 2018 at 4:58 PM, Mark Salyzyn <saly...@android.com> wrote:
general protection fault: [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 14233 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.4.112-g5f6325b #28
. . .
[] selinux_socket_setsockopt+0x4
nt to null
check sk_security, and if the case, reject the permissions.
This adjustment is orthogonal to infrastructure improvements that may
nullify the needed check, but should be added as good code hygiene.
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <saly...@android.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <p...@paul-moore
