Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07

2017-03-13 Thread Declan Ma
+1 As far as we programmed to support Validation Reconsidered by using OPENSSL , a bug was found. For instance, if one calls v3_addr_get_range() in OPENSSEL library to get INR 1::/16 from a RC, one will get a right MAX but a wrong MIN NULL, which should have been 1:: . Di > 在 2017年3月13日,23:4

[sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-delta-protocol-08.txt

2017-03-13 Thread internet-drafts
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing of the IETF. Title : RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) Authors : Tim Bruijnzeels Oleg Muravs

[sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-04.txt

2017-03-13 Thread internet-drafts
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing of the IETF. Title : Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI Authors : David Mandelberg

Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07

2017-03-13 Thread Carlos M. Martinez
Rob, On 13 Mar 2017, at 12:16, Rob Austein wrote: You are making assumptions about how the library code works. As it happens, those assumptions are incorrect for the OpenSSL case. can you expand on this ? I think if you help us on this front a lot of the concerns and misunderstandings will

Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07

2017-03-13 Thread Rob Austein
At Mon, 13 Mar 2017 15:25:13 +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote: > > I understand that. I meant to say that the switch should be based on > the RPKI CA certificate policy qualifier. That is specific to RPKI > so, other applications would not break. The problem is that you're talking about applications,

Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07

2017-03-13 Thread Tim Bruijnzeels
Hi Rob, all, > On 13 Mar 2017, at 14:11, Rob Austein wrote: > > At Mon, 13 Mar 2017 10:55:56 +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote: >> >> So, to me it seems that having new OIDs makes perfect sense as long >> as there is a choice of two validation algorithms. Then having an >> explicit flag set by CAs t

Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07

2017-03-13 Thread Chris Morrow
At Mon, 13 Mar 2017 10:55:56 +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote: > > Hi, > > So, to me it seems that having new OIDs makes perfect sense as long as > there is a choice of two validation algorithms. Then having an > explicit flag set by CAs tells RPs decide which way to go. Because of > this I also do

Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07

2017-03-13 Thread Chris Morrow
At Mon, 13 Mar 2017 08:47:11 -0400, Rob Austein wrote: > > At Mon, 13 Mar 2017 14:16:59 +0800, Declan Ma wrote: > ... > > It seems to me that the only concern on OID is about using OPENSSL > > to get resource sets for further validation process. If the WG has > > decided to deprecate the original

Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07

2017-03-13 Thread Rob Austein
At Mon, 13 Mar 2017 10:55:56 +0100, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote: > > So, to me it seems that having new OIDs makes perfect sense as long > as there is a choice of two validation algorithms. Then having an > explicit flag set by CAs tells RPs decide which way to go. Because > of this I also do not see an

Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07

2017-03-13 Thread Rob Austein
At Mon, 13 Mar 2017 14:16:59 +0800, Declan Ma wrote: ... > It seems to me that the only concern on OID is about using OPENSSL > to get resource sets for further validation process. If the WG has > decided to deprecate the original by using the Validation > Reconsidered, why bother to bring a new OI

Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07

2017-03-13 Thread Tim Bruijnzeels
Hi, So, to me it seems that having new OIDs makes perfect sense as long as there is a choice of two validation algorithms. Then having an explicit flag set by CAs tells RPs decide which way to go. Because of this I also do not see an immediate need to have a time line for all CAs to use the new