On 2/17/08, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If computation is multiply realizable, it could be seen as being
implemented by an endless variety of physical systems, with the right
mapping or interpretation, since anything at all could be arbitrarily
chosen to represent a tape, a
bonjour à tous
for info
http://xxx.lanl.gov/ftp/arxiv/papers/0802/0802.1835.pdf
http://xxx.lanl.gov/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0711/0711.1366v1.pdf
cordialement votre
bruno
- Message d'origine
De : Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED]
À : singularity@v2.listbox.com
Envoyé le : Mercredi, 6 Février
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 17/02/2008, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The first problem arises from Lanier's trick of claiming that there is a
computer, in the universe of all possible computers, that has a machine
architecture and a machine state that is isomorphic to BOTH the
--- Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
When people like Lanier allow themselves the luxury of positing
infinitely large computers (who else do we know who does this? Ah, yes,
the AIXI folks), they can make infinitely unlikely coincidences happen.
It is a commonly accepted practice
--- John Ku [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 2/16/08, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I would prefer to leave behind these counterfactuals altogether and
try to use information theory and control theory to achieve a precise
understanding of what it is for something to be the
Matt Mahoney wrote:
--- Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
When people like Lanier allow themselves the luxury of positing
infinitely large computers (who else do we know who does this? Ah, yes,
the AIXI folks), they can make infinitely unlikely coincidences happen.
It is a commonly
On 2/17/08, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Nevertheless we can make similar reductions to absurdity with respect to
qualia, that which distinguishes you from a philosophical zombie. There is no
experiment to distinguish whether you actually experience redness when you see
a red
On 18/02/2008, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The last statement you make, though, is not quite correct: with a
jumbled up sequence of episodes during which the various machines were
running the brain code, he whole would lose its coherence, because input
from the world would now
--- John Ku [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 2/17/08, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Nevertheless we can make similar reductions to absurdity with respect to
qualia, that which distinguishes you from a philosophical zombie. There
is no
experiment to distinguish whether you actually
