Hi Alex,
Your correct, sks does not have a future as no one is maintaining them and as
you have seen they can no longer fullfil their intended purpose.
Yakamo
On Tue, 2 Jul 2019 07:31:17 -0700 (MST)
compuguy wrote:
> Robert,
>
> I think the question that people want answered is does the sks
Robert,
I think the question that people want answered is does the sks keyserver
network have a future? Based on what I've been reading as far back as 2018,
seems to indicate that servers like keys.openpgp.org are the future.
Thank You,
Alex "compuguy" Hall
Robert J. Hansen-3 wrote
>>
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
* Stop serving poisoned certificates to any client (by configuring our
HTTP gateway with another URL blacklist, so that GETs for poisoned
keys are not allowed). I'm planning to use some of the existing DB
statistics scripts to extract
Hi Jorge,
you might as well use keys.openpgp.org in that case.
you wont have to maintain broken software or deal with piosoned keys.
or you can even run your own instance of Hagrid if you want to maintain control.
Yakamo
On Tue, 2 Jul 2019 12:16:24 +0200
Jorge Gonzalez wrote:
> Hi, all,
Hi, all,
just in case anyone is interested, these are the first measures that I
have implemented (or plan to implement) on ICIJ key server:
* Stop accepting SKS updates from peers (by removing all peers from our
"membership" file). - DONE
* Stop accepting SKS updates from external sources (by
> https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d6955275f
As the guy who wrote that, yeah, I'm pretty sure we here are aware of
it. ;)
Kristian, who is the major figure behind the SKS keyserver network, has
also apparently been targeted. We are keenly aware of the issue. But
thank
Hello,
Some friends just send me information about some keys been updated and signed
too much times in the SKS network that can be the origin of the new keys
updated in the last days, the video from the tweet show the problem.
https://twitter.com/ssantosv/status/1145289171273224193
