Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

On Fri, 13 Jul 2018, Ryan Hunt wrote: > Sooner or later you guys need > start looking forward, if mistakes were made in the past ignoring them is not > going to solve anything. > Ignore the users, your the sysops.. Either SKS will die, or the entire thing > is going to have to be scrapped and

Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

> Does a user revolt even matter as the SKS pool is dismantled by > continuous attacks? "We had to burn the village in order to save it!", I see. There are three questions: 1. Can SKS be saved? 2. If so, how? 3. If not, what next? I believe the answers are "no", "N/A", and "I don't know

Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

> Is it possible without facing a user revolt? No. SKS does do key parsing though, and we could surely figure out just how big the photo-id is in bytes. I suggest to impose a limit. Does it really need to be any bigger than 10kB? My suggestion: - impose a 10kB image size limit - max one image

Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

Does a user revolt even matter as the SKS pool is dismantled by continuous attacks? I think a significant amount of redesign is required to save the SKS network at this point, the crusades against SKS have just been ratcheting up and they are winning IMO, I dropped my server from the pool eons

Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

> IMHO Photo-ID should be dropped entirely, I see no point and its just > ripe for abuse like this.. Unfortunately, we really can't. They've been part of OpenPGP certificates for just about twenty years now. They are an expected part of the certificate. Users already scream bloody murder about

Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

IMHO Photo-ID should be dropped entirely, I see no point and its just ripe for abuse like this.. We should not be relying on that w/cryptography.. If I’m going to sign your key and validate I know you then I should be validating your the holder of that private key with an exchange first (much

Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

> that would probably be an incomplete mitigation: Sounds better than no solution! > -people can use the photo id field instead Size limit can be enforced. > -people can use valid e-mail addresses under an own domain ("catch-all") As long as it can validate, seems fine to me. Better than no

Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

Hi Ryan, that would probably be an incomplete mitigation: -people can use the photo id field instead -people can use valid e-mail addresses under an own domain ("catch-all") -your keyserver suddenly can be abused for email spamming Best regards Tobias Frei Am 14.07.2018 um 02:57 schrieb Ryan

Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

Could this be mitigated by validating email addresses as they come in? Like sending an encrypted mail to the said address with a return token, If the token is not provided the key is never put into the SKS rotation? I think a solution like this would be much more effective, and if there was

Re: [Sks-devel] withdrawal of service: sks.spodhuis.org

I would have loved to write an alternative SKS implementation that addresses the issues we were seeing recently. However, this: - Set Reconciliation with Nearly Optimal Communication Complexity - Practical Set Reconciliation

Re: [Sks-devel] withdrawal of service: sks.spodhuis.org

> On 13 Jul 2018, at 22:43, Moritz Wirth wrote: > > FWIW, has anybody even started working on a fix for any of the bugs? There has been a fair bit of discussion, but no consensus has been reached, apart from a general agreement that major changes to the recon model will be required, and that

Re: [Sks-devel] withdrawal of service: sks.spodhuis.org

FWIW, has anybody even started working on a fix for any of the bugs? Am 13.07.18 um 21:52 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: >> Sad but not surprised. Thanks for all your time and effort. It has been much >> appreciated. > Yes. > >> I am reluctant to declare defeat, but this calls for a tactical

Re: [Sks-devel] withdrawal of service: sks.spodhuis.org

> Sad but not surprised. Thanks for all your time and effort. It has been much > appreciated. Yes. > I am reluctant to declare defeat, but this calls for a tactical retreat and > regroup. Yes. There's a certain dark lesson to be learned here. The keyserver network was designed in the

[Sks-devel] dump_new_only and modified keys

Does the -dump_new_only option dump keys that are in an existing keydump file but have changed (eg new sigs since it was dumped the first time)? Thanks in advance Bill signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ Sks-devel mailing list

Re: [Sks-devel] withdrawal of service: sks.spodhuis.org

Phil, Sad but not surprised. Thanks for all your time and effort. It has been much appreciated. For myself, whippet.andrewg.com has been broken for several weeks now and I’m not sure I have the heart to go to the effort of restoring it only for it to be clobbered again. I am reluctant to

Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

This is why we can't have nice things. M On Fri, 13 Jul 2018, 19:20 Phil Pennock, wrote: > Heads-up: > > > https://medium.com/@mdrahony/are-pgp-key-servers-breaking-the-law-under-the-gdpr-a81ddd709d3e > https://github.com/yakamok/keyserver-fs >

[Sks-devel] withdrawal of service: sks.spodhuis.org

Folks, with immediate effect, I am withdrawing sks.spodhuis.org from service and it will not be returning in its current form. I am about to disable the DNS in spodhuis.org, while leaving the SKS service itself running, so that clients using pools will not be adversely impacted. I'll give it a

[Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS

Heads-up: https://medium.com/@mdrahony/are-pgp-key-servers-breaking-the-law-under-the-gdpr-a81ddd709d3e https://github.com/yakamok/keyserver-fs https://lobste.rs/s/sle0o4/are_pgp_key_servers_breaking_law_under This `keyserver-fs` is software to attack SKS, using it as a filesystem, in what

Re: [Sks-devel] broken node

Hi, I was away on work, came back to one of nodes I host ran out of disk space. Users of the service would not have been effected as this node doesn't serve web traffic other than the default key stats page. And keys would have continued to sync via a backup node. Node is back in and fixed.