What To Do With Iran? By Srdja Trifkovic On September 24 the International Atomic Energy Agency voted 22 to 1 (with 12 abstentions, including Russia and China) to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council for violating its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The IAEA condemned Iran for pursuing uranium enrichment program that could help it manufacture nuclear weapons. The EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) initially intended to refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council immediately, but they are now seeking to defuse the dispute by offering Iran diplomatic and economic inducements to cooperate. President George W. Bush has said that he retains all options in dealing with Iran. A military strike is one of them, and in Washington some observers say that this is now a matter of when, not if.
Iran and the the United States appear to be on a collision course. This is what some strategists in Washington had wanted all along; but Irans recent intransigence has given them the opportunity to pursue their agenda. Until recently it could claim with some plausibility that what Washington was demanding of it was an abdication of all ability to make nuclear material by enriching uranium to produce electric poweran activity that the current nuclear-arms regime permits Iran to pursue. Now, however, anger over Iran is growing even among those who have defended Tehrans rights to technology, as an Austrian commentator put it The fact that the European Union Troikaincluding Mr. Bushs long-time critics over the war in Iraq, France and Germanyis now in substantial agreement with Washington is a measure of that intransigence. Some commentators are calling for an end to what they see as EU Troikas excessively conciliatory posture. Much too often they created the impression of appeasement and a willingness to make concessions after the Iranians acted in a very self-confident manner, opined Nikolaus Busse in the Frankfurter Allgemeine (Sept. 26). The IAEA had tried to postpone its censure of Iran for a long time, viewing it as the measure of last resort, but in recent months the negotiations between Tehran and the IAEA have reached an impasse. By violating agreements to suspend the uranium enrichment program and by refusing any restrictions on his countrys nuclear options, Irans president Mohammad Ahmadinejad has helped the advocates of the Axis of Evil paradigm in Washington. Even the traditionally anti-American Euro-left is indignant. Stefano Cingolani thus wrote in Romes Il Riformista on September 27 that the United States has offered many clues [that] lead to the rational conclusion that the Iranian nuclear program, it its advanced phase, has more than just civilian purposes. Ahmadinejads defiant speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 17 included the promise that sounded deliberately provocative, that Iran will share its nuclear technology with other Muslim countries. This statement was no mere rhetoric, however. It reflected Ahamdinejads core belief that the Middle East can have either an American future, or an Islamic one led by Iran. Ahamdinejad is said to be contemptuous of Britain, France, and Germany. His advisor Muhammad-Javad Larijani said they were among the most savage powers on earth and should never have been allowed to meddle in what was not their business. According to Larijani the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is already dead and there is no reason why Iran should take more notice of it than anyone else: We have bloodthirsty foes like the United States and Israel who could attack us with all they have. So, why should we deny ourselves any category of weapons just to please the savage European powers? Even those Iranians usually deemed moderate are behind the government. Tehrans English-language Kayhan International commented in the aftermath of the IAEA vote that Iran should now withdraw from the NPT: It is wrong to commit suicide because of the fear of death [since] with a bit of resistance and resolve, UNSC referral could cause little or no serious damage to the country. Instead, it could, in the end, even bring with it some major accomplishments. On September 26 Tehran Times also advocated Irans withdrawal from the NPT: If this happens, other NPT member states might follow Irans lead, this weakening international organizations. . . . The Iranian nation [may] serve as a model for all Third World states. The U.S. options in dealing with such intransigence appear limited. Going through the UN Security Council to try and enforce its cooperation with the IAEA is the likely first step. If Iran refuses to play along the Council could impose a wide range of sanctions. For diplomacy to work, however, Iran would need to be convinced that defiance would offend not just the EU or America, but the rest of the world too. Furthermore, an appeal to the Security Council would not yield any results if either or both Russia and China veto strong action. Russia does not wish to put its profitable nuclear business with Iran at risk; while China is an important consumer of Iranian oil. Both would be loath to go along with a Security Council resolution that would be seen as addressing primarily Western concerns, and both are likely to insist on a very narrow interpretation of the term violation. On the other hand the prospect of another military confrontation in the Middle East is the last thing the rest of the world wants (with the unsurprising exception of Israel). Even as they grant the American point that Iran is being unreasonable and devious, European opponents of the war in Iraq are already warning that we are stumbling down the same path of confrontation. Even Mr. Bushs staunch ally Britain rules out strikes against Irans nuclear program and seems ready to offer inducements for cooperation that smack of appeasement. If Iran does come into compliance, the door will be thrown wide open to cooperation, economic, political and social with the European Union, U.K. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said in a speech to the annual conference of Britains ruling Labour Party in Brighton. He said that military action is not on anyones agenda and that Britain was seeking an international consensus on how to resolve the problem by diplomatic means. All U.S. presidents say all options are on the table, he said, implying that Mr. Bushs implied threat may not be too serious. Last August Mr. Bush appeared pretty resolute, however, when he declared on Israeli television that he is prepared to use force to stop Iran and that the United States and Israel are united in our objective to make sure that Iran does not have a weapon. His unusually harsh language reflected an immediate concern and one underlying agenda. The concern is, of course, Washingtons suspicion that Irans nuclear energy program is clandestinely designed to produce nuclear weapons, which would be deemed injurious to the vital interests of the United States. The agenda, set by the neoconservative establishment years ago and summarized in Mr. Bushs inclusion of Iran in his Axis of Evil, is to effect a regime change in Iran, or else to neutralize it by military force as a meaningful factor in the regional equation. It takes the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program for granted, and asserts that there are only two things that will stop it: revolution from below or an attack on its nuclear facilities. The revolution is not happening, however, which the promoters of this agenda take as proof that a pre-emptive strike is all the more urgent, or else a fanatical terrorist regime openly dedicated to the destruction of the Great Satan will have both nuclear weapons and the terrorists and missiles to deliver them. All that stands between us and that is either revolution or pre-emptive strike. The assertion that Iran is the road to acquiring nuclear weapons is not without merit. The first requirement for a nuclear programpeaceful or otherwiseis fissile material, composed of atoms that can be split by neutrons in a self-sustaining chain-reaction that releases enormous amounts of energy. Iran has three uranium mines with total reserves of 800m tonnes of ore, which means that its raw material needs may be covered from its own sources. Nuclear power plant uranium needs about 20 percent of fissile material, but weapons-grade goes up to 80-90 percent. Enrichment process is performed in gas centrifuges. IAEA scientists visiting Iranian facilities at Natanz in February 2003 reported a series of gas centrifuges in an underground complex that may be a pilot plant for a much bigger system. Another requirement for a weapons program is heavy water, used for soaking up the excess neutrons. The existence of a heavy-water plant may be indicative of weapons-grade enrichment, and Iran does have one such plant at Arak. In addition, continued development of a reactor at Bushehr originally commissioned by the Shah in 1974 but suspended in 1979 and subsequently resurrected with Russian help, caused suspicion in Washington. Iran has five small reactors which the U.S. says is sufficient for its requirements. In any event, the United States has argued, Iran has ample oil and gas for power generation, whereas nuclear reactors are expensive, unnecessary, and could be used for military purposes. The issue came to a head in August 2003, when experts from the IAEA found traces of weapons-grade uranium at Natanz. Iran denied the weapons charge and claims that its program is designed solely for the generation of electricity. It asserted that the samples taken by IAEA come from nuclear equipment that was contaminated when it was bought over a decade ago from Pakistan for civilian purposes. The International Atomic Energy Agency has issued a report that appeared to confirm this particular assertion. When the assertive new leadership in Tehran resumed uranium conversion at Isfahan in early August, the IAEA initially responded by expressing serious concern about Irans intentions and hinting at the possibility of U.N. sanctions. On August 23 the IAEA softened its position, however, and its officials announced that traces of weapons-grade highly enriched uraniumdetected on Iranian centrifuge parts in 2003had entered the country on equipment it bought from Pakistan. A senior U.S. official reportedly admitted that the biggest smoking gun was eliminated The EU said that it was ready to resume talks with Tehran that had been suspended in August, and the director general of the IAEA, Mohamed El-Baradei declared that although Iran would not give up the right to a nuclear program, it would allow the agency to monitor it to assure it would not turn into a weapons program. Ahmadinejads subsequent show of defiance over IAEA inspections and his openly provocative debut at the UN have given the advocates of tough course against Iran in the United States a strong card. Admittedly their agenda had never been dependent on a verifiable set of conditions, just as in Iraqto quote Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfelds memorable dictumthe absence of proof that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction was no proof of their absence. Now they can claim with greater plausibility that Iran wants the bomb, or at least that it is actively seeking the ability to develop one. Furthermore, the earlier CIA 6-10 year estimate before Iran can develop a weapon may be too optimistic: Iran received the blueprints for bomb-making technology about ten years ago from Pakistan, and it has also obtained foreign hard-to-find components such as specialised magnets. It can be argued that a country awash with hydrocarbons does not really need nuclear energy, Irans response is that it is merely preparing for the day it runs out of fossil fuel, but that does not explain its decision to renege on the agreement with the EU-3 to freeze its activities and to resume work on the uranium conversion plant at Isfahan. It should be understood, however, that quite apart from security considerations or energy needs, in Irans current ideological climate, nuclear identity is consistent with both the internal and external identification of Irans right of passage from technological adolescence, gaining symbolic value and significance built partly around the on-going bout with the West, the hostile other. In Saddams case two key arguments had been invoked to justify the war: his alleged links with terrorists, and his possession of, or intention to develop, weapons of mass destruction. The accusations proved to be at least insufficient to justify the war. Senior U.S. officials have made similar charges against Iran repeatedly over the past five years. In the aftermath of the war in Iraq, Tehrans support for terrorists was treated as a given. In May 2003 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld thus asserted that there was no question al-Qaeda terrorists were present in Iran, and warned that countries that are harboring those terrorist networks and providing a haven for them are behaving as terrorists by so doing. Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Richard Myers echoed him when he said that the issue with Iran is pretty clear: We have to eliminate the safe havens where the terrorists are, and Iran of course has some of the al-Qaeda members. The reports are that al-Qaeda has been in Iran off and on for some time, particularly after our actions in Afghanistan. The State Department went one better, by stating that Iran was the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world. In reality Iran could not be linked to any direct attack on the U.S. since the 444 day hostage crisis (1979-1981). It supports the Hezbollah but over the years this Shiite group has evolved from an organization tainted by terrorism into a major political player and social movement in Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. The rulers of Iran take an interest in its co-religionists in Iraq, but there they are behaving with considerable restraint, no doubt trusting that the political process in Baghdad will be bound to strengthen the hand of their Shiite co-religionists who comprise the majority of the countrys population. In the second term the Bush administration has maintained its pressure on Iran, but it has shifted its rhetorical focus from terrorism to the nuclear issue. American pressure has helped Irans hard-liners, however. Over the previous decade a reformist movement had taken root among the usual harbingers of change: students, middle classes, the Internet-connected young and educated. Mr. Bushs Axis of Evil rhetoric made the reformers uneasy and vulnerable to the charge of treason. With every new threat from Washington, pro-government papers in Teheran, such as Jomhuri-ye Eslami, pointed the accusing finger at the reformers at home, suggesting that the enemy is preparing the ground for its lackeys and calling on Irans law enforcement and the judiciary not to wait for their superiors before acting decisively. The moderates within the ruling establishment were eventually marginalized, giving way to a new generation of Islamists pure and simple who had claimed all along that the Great Satan cannot be appeased. This development was predictable. In May 2003, I wrote that destabilization of the relatively moderate Khatami government may result in a regime more reminiscent of the darkest days of Ayatollah Khomeini . . . more dangerous and unpredictable. My view coincided with that of Iranian affairs specialists who held that threatening Iran was counterproductive and that it was necessary to distinguish the Iranian people from their clerical rulers. Thirty months later Iran has a rigid Islamist president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He is a disciple of Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a fiery Shiite cleric who advocates suicide operations against the enemies of Islam. After eight years of cautious liberalisation under Mohammed Khatami, Iranians have re-entered a period of austere Islamist leadership. Ahmadinejad is supported by the basij, a volunteer force that acts as a vigilante militia enforcing Islamic laws. His victory over Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a moderate by Iranian standards, was resounding and indicative of the nations mood. Ahmadinejad appointed a cabinet dominated by religious conservatives. His views on the nuclear issue could be predicted from his description of nuclear technology as the demand of the whole Iranian nation. He accused Irans negotiators of allowing their EU interlocutors to intimidate them, and barely a month into his presidency he resumed work at the Isfahan uranium conversion facility, which-an enthusiastic Iranian commentator wroteindicates Iranians strong will to defend their inalienable right to access nuclear technology meant for peaceful purposes . . . Due to their neocolonialist attitude, the US and other western countries have always tried to monopolise nuclear technology and at the same time have been afraid that other countries would one day gain access to it. Faced with such determination, what can the United States do about Iran, and what should it do about Iran? Operation Iranian Freedom is not one of them. Even with its unsurpassed military capabilities, the United States would not be able to mount an Iraqi-style invasion. There is no doubt that from the perspective of Bush and the neocons, the U.S. has been at war with Iran since 1979 and the time has come to settle the score in the same way that we did with Iraq but Iran is much bigger than Iraq (1.65 million square miles) with three times the population (over 70 million). Its regime of Shiite clerics is authoritarian but it has a broad popular base; it is not a closed autocracy a la Saddam. When Iraq attacked in 1980, it was shown that the regime in Tehran could count on considerable popular supporton nationalist, as well as religious grounds. Most Iranians would resist an American attack, and it would have to be a strictly American undertaking: not even Britain would join in. With the ongoing imbroglio in Iraq, and with the chronic instability in Afghanistan unresolved, not even the Weekly Standard is audacious enough to advocate an Operation Iranian Freedom any time soon. AIR ATTACKS. If all EU and UN attempts to deal with with Iran by diplomatic means aree deemed unsatisfactory, i.e., if Tehran does not give up on uranium enrichment, a limited military action will find many advocates in Washington. Ever since President Bush named Iran as a member of the Axis of Evil in 2002 it has been on the cards. A sustained air campaign is possible regardless of the ongoing commitment of the ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan: Americas devastating air power is not committed in Iraq. Just 120 B52, B1 and B2 bombers could hit 5,000 targets in a single mission. Thousands of other warplanes and missiles are available. The army and marines are heavily committed in Iraq, but enough forces could be found to secure coastal oilfields and to conduct raids into Iran. A disabled Iran could be further crippled by internal dissent, especially if the U.S. were to support Azeri separatists in the north-west and in the Iranian part of Kurdistan. Irans oil production would be disrupted, but the silver lining is that much of its supplies are destined for China, which is increasingly perceived in Washington as Americas main long-term rival. This scenario could be offset by short and long-term costs. Keeping Iraqs Shiites cooperative is a key element in the U.S. strategy. A massive Shia insurgency in southern Iraq, triggered off by the attack on their co-religionists across the Euphrates, would be a major setback to the stabilization that is proving elusive anyway, making the country utterly unmanageable. If Irans output of 4 million barrels per day is not only disrupted but completely halted, the rise of crude oil prices to well beyond $100 a barrel could trigger off a world-wide recession. If in addition Iran blocks the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which most of oil from the Gulf passes on its way to the Far East and Europe, the resulting global energy crisis would make the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War pale by comparison. Tehran would also have an incentive to support or even sponsor terrorist attacks against the United States, and its proxy groups in Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority would resume their terror campaign against Israel. Last but not least, there would be a new crisis in trans-Atlantic relations, far deeper than the one over Iraq. USING DIPLOMACY. Expressing strong opposition to Irans nuclear program but not opting for a policy of radical containment by force is the worst possible policy. It is far better to offer to Tehran U.S. security guaranteesno more Axis of Evil bravado!in return for a clear no nukes commitment from Iran. Multilateral initiatives with Europeans and Russians will be long-drawn-out and futile without a direct American approach to Iran. That approach should bear in mind that the Iranian leaders are aptly playing the nationalist card with the nuclear issue, evoking Irans struggle to nationalize its oil industry in the early 1950s. Ignoring the national pride aspect would lead the U.S. to repeat the mistake the British made in 1951, when they turned a question of oil royalties into a groundswell of Iranian nationalism: Washington may now be creating exactly such a reaction with its suggestion that Iran should be required to import fuel for its reactors rather than be allowed to have access to a nuclear fuel cycle of its own. Such a requirement would make Iran a consumer, completely dependent on the nuclear market. Thats not likely to sit well with the people of Iran, because they have learned the hard way not to trust foreign suppliers of essential resources. It is not too late for solving the conflict by negotiation. Ahmadinejad says that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons, but he has not renounced its ambition to independently enrich uranium that may yet lead to a military option. A reasonable deal would entail allowing Iran to enrich uranium partially, acknowledging its right to this technology, provided that it keeps the entire nuclear program under international oversight. That would clearly reduce Irans capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Europeans in particular have a number of tangible sanctions they could impose if Tehran refuses to play along, such as freezing Irans foreign accounts, tougher regulations on debts, lifting the currencys convertibility, and not allowing Iranian leaders and aircraft to enter Europe. The fundamental question is clear: why should the United States risk a new open-ended and risky commitment in the Middle East over Irans nuclear program? If Tehran seeks nuclear weapons, and there is reason to suspect that it does, is it not merely following in the footsteps of other regional powers, notably Israel, India, and Pakistan? Its security concerns are real. It sees U.S. bases in Turkmenistan to the north, U.S. troops in Iraq to the west, and in Afghanistan to the north-east. Its remaining neighbor Pakistan is armed with nuclear bombs, inherently unstable, and potentially hostile. The Arab world remained aloof when Iraq attacked in 1980. Under such circumstances, Iran cannot afford to develop only conventional deterrence against such threats, and it will not rely on imported armaments again. Which may explain why Irans rulers would desire an alternative deterrent: limited nuclear weapons coupled with domestically manufactured missiles. The notion that Iran would seek to threaten the United States with four, five or six bombs that it may build over the next decade (and no long-range delivery vehicles) is preposterousand that is the kind of threat that should determine U.S. response. The mullahs are devious and dogmatic, but they are neither suicidal nor mad. Israel may have every reason to feel threatened, but it should be up to Israel to consider its options and to act accordingly. It may well decide on a robust response reminiscent of its action in Iraq, with all the attendant risks and uncertainties. It should not expect the United States to do the job on its behalf, however. Rather than contemplate military action the United States would be well advised to look beyond the nuclear issue: A viable resolution of the nuclear row depends very much on how the parties can come to terms with each other politically. If Washington recognized Tehrans Islamic regime, stopped constantly threatening Iran, and agreed to controls on weapons of mass destruction across the region-including Israels-it would make considerable progress in dealing with the nuclear issue. But Washington has never wished Israel to become subject to the same constraints as the Arabs and Iranians. Constructive American disengagement from the Middle East, coupled with an ever-greater reliance on alternatives to oil for our energy needs, is a sound alternative to the quest for regional hegemony and the resulting containments, deployments, passionate attachments and long-term commitments. Avoiding them in Iran is essential. It is dictated by common sense, experience, and a sober assessment of the American interest. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> DonorsChoose.org helps at-risk students succeed. 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