CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Tue Sep 24 21:28:24 UTC 2024 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv25864 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-9.9 (previous was 9.8) Changes: Future deprecation notice = OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025. This release disables DSA by default at compile time. DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated security level is only 80 bits symmetric equivalent. OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained run-time optional support for them. DSA was the only mandatory-to- implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs, mostly because alternative algorithms were encumbered by patents when the SSHv2 protocol was specified. This has not been the case for decades at this point and better algorithms are well supported by all actively-maintained SSH implementations. We do not consider the costs of maintaining DSA in OpenSSH to be justified and hope that removing it from OpenSSH can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography libraries. Currently DSA is disabled at compile time. The final step of removing DSA support entirely is planned for the first OpenSSH release of 2025. DSA support may be re-enabled on OpenBSD by setting "DSAKEY=yes" in Makefile.inc. To enable DSA support in portable OpenSSH, pass the "--enable-dsa-keys" option to configure. Potentially-incompatible changes * ssh(1): remove support for pre-authentication compression. OpenSSH has only supported post-authentication compression in the server for some years. Compression before authentication significantly increases the attack surface of SSH servers and risks creating oracles that reveal information about information sent during authentication. * ssh(1), sshd(8): processing of the arguments to the "Match" configuration directive now follows more shell-like rules for quoted strings, including allowing nested quotes and \-escaped characters. If configurations contained workarounds for the previous simplistic quote handling then they may need to be adjusted. If this is the case, it's most likely to be in the arguments to a "Match exec" confition. In this case, moving the command to be evaluated from the Match line to an external shell script is easiest way to preserve compatibility with both the old and new versions. Changes since OpenSSH 9.8 = This release contains a number of new features and bugfixes. New features * ssh(1), sshd(8): add support for a new hybrid post-quantum key exchange based on the FIPS 203 Module-Lattice Key Enapsulation mechanism (ML-KEM) combined with X25519 ECDH as described by https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-curdle-ssh-pq-ke-03 This algorithm "mlkem768x25519-sha256" is available by default. * ssh(1): the ssh_config "Include" directive can now expand environment as well as the same set of %-tokens "Match Exec" supports. * sshd(8): add a sshd_config "RefuseConnection" option that, if set will terminate the connection at the first authentication request. * sshd(8): add a "refuseconnection" penalty class to sshd_config PerSourcePenalties that is applied when a connection is dropped by the new RefuseConnection keyword. * sshd(8): add a "Match invalid-user" predicate to sshd_config Match options that matches when the target username is not valid on the server. * ssh(1), sshd(8): update the Streamlined NTRUPrime code to a substantially faster implementation. * ssh(1), sshd(8): the hybrid Streamlined NTRUPrime/X25519 key exchange algorithm now has an IANA-assigned name in addition to the "@openssh.com" vendor extension name. This algorithm is now also available under this name "sntrup761x25519-sha512" * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): prevent private keys from being included in core dump files for most of their lifespans. This is in addition to pre-existing controls in ssh-agent(1) and sshd(8) that prevented coredumps. This feature is supported on OpenBSD, Linux and FreeBSD. * All: convert key handling to use the libcrypto EVP_PKEY API, with the exception of DSA. * sshd(8): add a random amount of jitter (up to 4 seconds) to the grace login time to make its expiry unpredictable. Bugfixes * sshd(8): relax absolute path requirement back to what it was prior to OpenSSH 9.8, which incorrectly required that sshd was started with an absolute path in inetd mode. bz3717 * sshd(8): fix regression introduced in openssh-9.8 that swapped the order of source and destination addresses in some sshd log messages. * sshd(8): do not apply authorized_keys options when signature verification fails.
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Tue Sep 24 21:28:24 UTC 2024 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv25864 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-9.9 (previous was 9.8) Changes: Future deprecation notice = OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025. This release disables DSA by default at compile time. DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated security level is only 80 bits symmetric equivalent. OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained run-time optional support for them. DSA was the only mandatory-to- implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs, mostly because alternative algorithms were encumbered by patents when the SSHv2 protocol was specified. This has not been the case for decades at this point and better algorithms are well supported by all actively-maintained SSH implementations. We do not consider the costs of maintaining DSA in OpenSSH to be justified and hope that removing it from OpenSSH can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography libraries. Currently DSA is disabled at compile time. The final step of removing DSA support entirely is planned for the first OpenSSH release of 2025. DSA support may be re-enabled on OpenBSD by setting "DSAKEY=yes" in Makefile.inc. To enable DSA support in portable OpenSSH, pass the "--enable-dsa-keys" option to configure. Potentially-incompatible changes * ssh(1): remove support for pre-authentication compression. OpenSSH has only supported post-authentication compression in the server for some years. Compression before authentication significantly increases the attack surface of SSH servers and risks creating oracles that reveal information about information sent during authentication. * ssh(1), sshd(8): processing of the arguments to the "Match" configuration directive now follows more shell-like rules for quoted strings, including allowing nested quotes and \-escaped characters. If configurations contained workarounds for the previous simplistic quote handling then they may need to be adjusted. If this is the case, it's most likely to be in the arguments to a "Match exec" confition. In this case, moving the command to be evaluated from the Match line to an external shell script is easiest way to preserve compatibility with both the old and new versions. Changes since OpenSSH 9.8 = This release contains a number of new features and bugfixes. New features * ssh(1), sshd(8): add support for a new hybrid post-quantum key exchange based on the FIPS 203 Module-Lattice Key Enapsulation mechanism (ML-KEM) combined with X25519 ECDH as described by https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-curdle-ssh-pq-ke-03 This algorithm "mlkem768x25519-sha256" is available by default. * ssh(1): the ssh_config "Include" directive can now expand environment as well as the same set of %-tokens "Match Exec" supports. * sshd(8): add a sshd_config "RefuseConnection" option that, if set will terminate the connection at the first authentication request. * sshd(8): add a "refuseconnection" penalty class to sshd_config PerSourcePenalties that is applied when a connection is dropped by the new RefuseConnection keyword. * sshd(8): add a "Match invalid-user" predicate to sshd_config Match options that matches when the target username is not valid on the server. * ssh(1), sshd(8): update the Streamlined NTRUPrime code to a substantially faster implementation. * ssh(1), sshd(8): the hybrid Streamlined NTRUPrime/X25519 key exchange algorithm now has an IANA-assigned name in addition to the "@openssh.com" vendor extension name. This algorithm is now also available under this name "sntrup761x25519-sha512" * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): prevent private keys from being included in core dump files for most of their lifespans. This is in addition to pre-existing controls in ssh-agent(1) and sshd(8) that prevented coredumps. This feature is supported on OpenBSD, Linux and FreeBSD. * All: convert key handling to use the libcrypto EVP_PKEY API, with the exception of DSA. * sshd(8): add a random amount of jitter (up to 4 seconds) to the grace login time to make its expiry unpredictable. Bugfixes * sshd(8): relax absolute path requirement back to what it was prior to OpenSSH 9.8, which incorrectly required that sshd was started with an absolute path in inetd mode. bz3717 * sshd(8): fix regression introduced in openssh-9.8 that swapped the order of source and destination addresses in some sshd log messages. * sshd(8): do not apply authorized_keys options when signature verification fails.
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Mon Jul 8 22:27:36 UTC 2024 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv3538 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-9.8 (previous was 9.7) Security This release contains fixes for two security problems, one critical and one minor. 1) Race condition in sshd(8) A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges. Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will be improved upon. Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable. We thank the Qualys Security Advisory Team for discovering, reporting and demonstrating exploitability of this problem, and for providing detailed feedback on additional mitigation measures. 2) Logic error in ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming In OpenSSH version 9.5 through 9.7 (inclusive), when connected to an OpenSSH server version 9.5 or later, a logic error in the ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming feature (on by default) rendered this feature ineffective - a passive observer could still detect which network packets contained real keystrokes when the countermeasure was active because both fake and real keystroke packets were being sent unconditionally. This bug was found by Philippos Giavridis and also independently by Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford of the University of Cambridge Computer Lab. Worse, the unconditional sending of both fake and real keystroke packets broke another long-standing timing attack mitigation. Since OpenSSH 2.9.9 sshd(8) has sent fake keystoke echo packets for traffic received on TTYs in echo-off mode, such as when entering a password into su(8) or sudo(8). This bug rendered these fake keystroke echoes ineffective and could allow a passive observer of a SSH session to once again detect when echo was off and obtain fairly limited timing information about keystrokes in this situation (20ms granularity by default). This additional implication of the bug was identified by Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford and we thank them for their detailed analysis. This bug does not affect connections when ObscureKeystrokeTiming was disabled or sessions where no TTY was requested. Future deprecation notice = OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025. This release disables DSA by default at compile time. DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated security level is only 80 bits symmetric equivalent. OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained run-time optional support for them. DSA was the only mandatory-to- implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs, mostly because alternative algorithms were encumbered by patents when the SSHv2 protocol was specified. This has not been the case for decades at this point and better algorithms are well supported by all actively-maintained SSH implementations. We do not consider the costs of maintaining DSA in OpenSSH to be justified and hope that removing it from OpenSSH can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography libraries. This release, and its deactivation of DSA by default at compile-time, marks the second step in our timeline to finally deprecate DSA. The final step of removing DSA support entirely is planned for the first OpenSSH release of 2025. DSA support may be re-enabled in OpenBSD by setting "DSAKEY=yes" in Makefile.inc. To enable DSA support in portable OpenSSH, pass the "--enable-dsa-keys" option to configure. Potentially-incompatible changes * all: as mentioned above, the DSA signature algorithm is now disabled at compile time. * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever completing authentication or that crash the server. See the discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information. Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or proxies may need to consider these settings. * sshd(8): the server has been split into a
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Mon Jul 8 22:27:36 UTC 2024 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv3538 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-9.8 (previous was 9.7) Security This release contains fixes for two security problems, one critical and one minor. 1) Race condition in sshd(8) A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges. Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will be improved upon. Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable. We thank the Qualys Security Advisory Team for discovering, reporting and demonstrating exploitability of this problem, and for providing detailed feedback on additional mitigation measures. 2) Logic error in ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming In OpenSSH version 9.5 through 9.7 (inclusive), when connected to an OpenSSH server version 9.5 or later, a logic error in the ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming feature (on by default) rendered this feature ineffective - a passive observer could still detect which network packets contained real keystrokes when the countermeasure was active because both fake and real keystroke packets were being sent unconditionally. This bug was found by Philippos Giavridis and also independently by Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford of the University of Cambridge Computer Lab. Worse, the unconditional sending of both fake and real keystroke packets broke another long-standing timing attack mitigation. Since OpenSSH 2.9.9 sshd(8) has sent fake keystoke echo packets for traffic received on TTYs in echo-off mode, such as when entering a password into su(8) or sudo(8). This bug rendered these fake keystroke echoes ineffective and could allow a passive observer of a SSH session to once again detect when echo was off and obtain fairly limited timing information about keystrokes in this situation (20ms granularity by default). This additional implication of the bug was identified by Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford and we thank them for their detailed analysis. This bug does not affect connections when ObscureKeystrokeTiming was disabled or sessions where no TTY was requested. Future deprecation notice = OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025. This release disables DSA by default at compile time. DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated security level is only 80 bits symmetric equivalent. OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained run-time optional support for them. DSA was the only mandatory-to- implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs, mostly because alternative algorithms were encumbered by patents when the SSHv2 protocol was specified. This has not been the case for decades at this point and better algorithms are well supported by all actively-maintained SSH implementations. We do not consider the costs of maintaining DSA in OpenSSH to be justified and hope that removing it from OpenSSH can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography libraries. This release, and its deactivation of DSA by default at compile-time, marks the second step in our timeline to finally deprecate DSA. The final step of removing DSA support entirely is planned for the first OpenSSH release of 2025. DSA support may be re-enabled in OpenBSD by setting "DSAKEY=yes" in Makefile.inc. To enable DSA support in portable OpenSSH, pass the "--enable-dsa-keys" option to configure. Potentially-incompatible changes * all: as mentioned above, the DSA signature algorithm is now disabled at compile time. * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever completing authentication or that crash the server. See the discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information. Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or proxies may need to consider these settings. * sshd(8): the server has been split into a
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Tue Jun 25 16:30:51 UTC 2024 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv3615 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-9.7 (previous was 9.6) Future deprecation notice = OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025 and compile-time disable it later this year. DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated security level is only 80 bits symmetric equivalent. OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained run-time optional support for them. DSA was the only mandatory-to- implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs[3], mostly because alternative algorithms were encumbered by patents when the SSHv2 protocol was specified. This has not been the case for decades at this point and better algorithms are well supported by all actively-maintained SSH implementations. We do not consider the costs of maintaining DSA in OpenSSH to be justified and hope that removing it from OpenSSH can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography libraries. This release makes DSA support in OpenSSH compile-time optional, defaulting to on. We intend the next release to change the default to disable DSA at compile time. The first OpenSSH release of 2025 will remove DSA support entirely. Changes since OpenSSH 9.6 = This release contains mostly bugfixes. New features * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a "global" ChannelTimeout type that watches all open channels and will close all open channels if there is no traffic on any of them for the specified interval. This is in addition to the existing per-channel timeouts added recently. This supports situations like having both session and x11 forwarding channels open where one may be idle for an extended period but the other is actively used. The global timeout could close both channels when both have been idle for too long. * All: make DSA key support compile-time optional, defaulting to on. Bugfixes * sshd(8): don't append an unnecessary space to the end of subsystem arguments (bz3667) * ssh(1): fix the multiplexing "channel proxy" mode, broken when keystroke timing obfuscation was added. (GHPR#463) * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix spurious configuration parsing errors when options that accept array arguments are overridden (bz3657). * ssh-agent(1): fix potential spin in signal handler (bz3670) * Many fixes to manual pages and other documentation, including GHPR#462, GHPR#454, GHPR#442 and GHPR#441. * Greatly improve interop testing against PuTTY. Portability --- * Improve the error message when the autoconf OpenSSL header check fails (bz#3668) * Improve detection of broken toolchain -fzero-call-used-regs support (bz3645). * Fix regress/misc/fuzz-harness fuzzers and make them compile without warnings when using clang16 Status: Vendor Tag: OPENSSH Release Tags: v97-20240311 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/packet.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/LICENCE U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.certkeys U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.key U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.krl C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.mux U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.sshsig U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.u2f U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addrmatch.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkeyfile.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/ope
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Tue Jun 25 16:30:51 UTC 2024 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv3615 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-9.7 (previous was 9.6) Future deprecation notice = OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025 and compile-time disable it later this year. DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated security level is only 80 bits symmetric equivalent. OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained run-time optional support for them. DSA was the only mandatory-to- implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs[3], mostly because alternative algorithms were encumbered by patents when the SSHv2 protocol was specified. This has not been the case for decades at this point and better algorithms are well supported by all actively-maintained SSH implementations. We do not consider the costs of maintaining DSA in OpenSSH to be justified and hope that removing it from OpenSSH can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography libraries. This release makes DSA support in OpenSSH compile-time optional, defaulting to on. We intend the next release to change the default to disable DSA at compile time. The first OpenSSH release of 2025 will remove DSA support entirely. Changes since OpenSSH 9.6 = This release contains mostly bugfixes. New features * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a "global" ChannelTimeout type that watches all open channels and will close all open channels if there is no traffic on any of them for the specified interval. This is in addition to the existing per-channel timeouts added recently. This supports situations like having both session and x11 forwarding channels open where one may be idle for an extended period but the other is actively used. The global timeout could close both channels when both have been idle for too long. * All: make DSA key support compile-time optional, defaulting to on. Bugfixes * sshd(8): don't append an unnecessary space to the end of subsystem arguments (bz3667) * ssh(1): fix the multiplexing "channel proxy" mode, broken when keystroke timing obfuscation was added. (GHPR#463) * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix spurious configuration parsing errors when options that accept array arguments are overridden (bz3657). * ssh-agent(1): fix potential spin in signal handler (bz3670) * Many fixes to manual pages and other documentation, including GHPR#462, GHPR#454, GHPR#442 and GHPR#441. * Greatly improve interop testing against PuTTY. Portability --- * Improve the error message when the autoconf OpenSSL header check fails (bz#3668) * Improve detection of broken toolchain -fzero-call-used-regs support (bz3645). * Fix regress/misc/fuzz-harness fuzzers and make them compile without warnings when using clang16 Status: Vendor Tag: OPENSSH Release Tags: v97-20240311 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/packet.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/LICENCE U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.certkeys U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.key U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.krl C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.mux U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.sshsig U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.u2f U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addrmatch.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkeyfile.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/ope
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Wed Dec 20 17:11:31 UTC 2023 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv13410 Log Message: Import OpenSSH 9.6/9.6p1 (2023-12-18) Last was 9.5 Changes since OpenSSH 9.5 = This release contains a number of security fixes, some small features and bugfixes. Security This release contains fixes for a newly-discovered weakness in the SSH transport protocol, a logic error relating to constrained PKCS#11 keys in ssh-agent(1) and countermeasures for programs that invoke ssh(1) with user or hostnames containing invalid characters. * ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian B�umer, Marcus Brinkmann and J�rg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server would not be able to detect that messages were deleted. While cryptographically novel, the security impact of this attack is fortunately very limited as it only allows deletion of consecutive messages, and deleting most messages at this stage of the protocol prevents user user authentication from proceeding and results in a stuck connection. The most serious identified impact is that it lets a MITM to delete the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO message sent before authentication starts, allowing the attacker to disable a subset of the keystroke timing obfuscation features introduced in OpenSSH 9.5. There is no other discernable impact to session secrecy or session integrity. OpenSSH 9.6 addresses this protocol weakness through a new "strict KEX" protocol extension that will be automatically enabled when both the client and server support it. This extension makes two changes to the SSH transport protocol to improve the integrity of the initial key exchange. Firstly, it requires endpoints to terminate the connection if any unnecessary or unexpected message is received during key exchange (including messages that were previously legal but not strictly required like SSH2_MSG_DEBUG). This removes most malleability from the early protocol. Secondly, it resets the Message Authentication Code counter at the conclusion of each key exchange, preventing previously inserted messages from being able to make persistent changes to the sequence number across completion of a key exchange. Either of these changes should be sufficient to thwart the Terrapin Attack. More details of these changes are in the PROTOCOL file in the OpenSSH source distribition. * ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied. Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys are unaffected. * ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand, LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1) could potentially perform command injection depending on what quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive. This situation could arise in the case of git submodules, where a repository could contain a submodule with shell characters in its user/hostname. Git does not ban shell metacharacters in user or host names when checking out repositories from untrusted sources. Although we believe it is the user's responsibility to ensure validity of arguments passed to ssh(1), especially across a security boundary such as the git example above, OpenSSH 9.6 now bans most shell metacharacters from user and hostnames supplied via the command-line. This countermeasure is not guaranteed to be effective in all situations, as it is infeasible for ssh(1) to universally filter shell metacharacters potentially relevant to user-supplied commands. User/hostnames provided via ssh_config(5) are not subject to these restrictions, allowing configurations that use strange names to continue to be used, under the assumption that the user knows what they are doing in their own configuration files. Potentially incompatible changes * ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this limit was exceeded by a non-conforming peer SSH i
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Wed Dec 20 17:11:31 UTC 2023 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv13410 Log Message: Import OpenSSH 9.6/9.6p1 (2023-12-18) Last was 9.5 Changes since OpenSSH 9.5 = This release contains a number of security fixes, some small features and bugfixes. Security This release contains fixes for a newly-discovered weakness in the SSH transport protocol, a logic error relating to constrained PKCS#11 keys in ssh-agent(1) and countermeasures for programs that invoke ssh(1) with user or hostnames containing invalid characters. * ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian B�umer, Marcus Brinkmann and J�rg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server would not be able to detect that messages were deleted. While cryptographically novel, the security impact of this attack is fortunately very limited as it only allows deletion of consecutive messages, and deleting most messages at this stage of the protocol prevents user user authentication from proceeding and results in a stuck connection. The most serious identified impact is that it lets a MITM to delete the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO message sent before authentication starts, allowing the attacker to disable a subset of the keystroke timing obfuscation features introduced in OpenSSH 9.5. There is no other discernable impact to session secrecy or session integrity. OpenSSH 9.6 addresses this protocol weakness through a new "strict KEX" protocol extension that will be automatically enabled when both the client and server support it. This extension makes two changes to the SSH transport protocol to improve the integrity of the initial key exchange. Firstly, it requires endpoints to terminate the connection if any unnecessary or unexpected message is received during key exchange (including messages that were previously legal but not strictly required like SSH2_MSG_DEBUG). This removes most malleability from the early protocol. Secondly, it resets the Message Authentication Code counter at the conclusion of each key exchange, preventing previously inserted messages from being able to make persistent changes to the sequence number across completion of a key exchange. Either of these changes should be sufficient to thwart the Terrapin Attack. More details of these changes are in the PROTOCOL file in the OpenSSH source distribition. * ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied. Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys are unaffected. * ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand, LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1) could potentially perform command injection depending on what quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive. This situation could arise in the case of git submodules, where a repository could contain a submodule with shell characters in its user/hostname. Git does not ban shell metacharacters in user or host names when checking out repositories from untrusted sources. Although we believe it is the user's responsibility to ensure validity of arguments passed to ssh(1), especially across a security boundary such as the git example above, OpenSSH 9.6 now bans most shell metacharacters from user and hostnames supplied via the command-line. This countermeasure is not guaranteed to be effective in all situations, as it is infeasible for ssh(1) to universally filter shell metacharacters potentially relevant to user-supplied commands. User/hostnames provided via ssh_config(5) are not subject to these restrictions, allowing configurations that use strange names to continue to be used, under the assumption that the user knows what they are doing in their own configuration files. Potentially incompatible changes * ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this limit was exceeded by a non-conforming peer SSH i
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Wed Oct 25 20:14:36 UTC 2023 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv5266 Log Message: Import OpenSSH 9.5 (Last was OpenSSH 9.3) OpenSSH 9.5/9.5p1 (2023-10-04) OpenSSH 9.5 was released on 2023-10-04. It is available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More information on donations may be found at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.4 = This release fixes a number of bugs and adds some small features. Potentially incompatible changes * ssh-keygen(1): generate Ed25519 keys by default. Ed25519 public keys are very convenient due to their small size. Ed25519 keys are specified in RFC 8709 and OpenSSH has supported them since version 6.5 (January 2014). * sshd(8): the Subsystem directive now accurately preserves quoting of subsystem commands and arguments. This may change behaviour for exotic configurations, but the most common subsystem configuration (sftp-server) is unlikely to be affected. New features * ssh(1): add keystroke timing obfuscation to the client. This attempts to hide inter-keystroke timings by sending interactive traffic at fixed intervals (default: every 20ms) when there is only a small amount of data being sent. It also sends fake "chaff" keystrokes for a random interval after the last real keystroke. These are controlled by a new ssh_config ObscureKeystrokeTiming keyword. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Introduce a transport-level ping facility. This adds a pair of SSH transport protocol messages SSH2_MSG_PING/PONG to implement a ping capability. These messages use numbers in the "local extensions" number space and are advertised using a "p...@openssh.com" ext-info message with a string version number of "0". * sshd(8): allow override of Subsystem directives in sshd Match blocks. Bugfixes * scp(1): fix scp in SFTP mode recursive upload and download of directories that contain symlinks to other directories. In scp mode, the links would be followed, but in SFTP mode they were not. bz3611 * ssh-keygen(1): handle cr+lf (instead of just cr) line endings in sshsig signature files. * ssh(1): interactive mode for ControlPersist sessions if they originally requested a tty. * sshd(8): make PerSourceMaxStartups first-match-wins * sshd(8): limit artificial login delay to a reasonable maximum (5s) and don't delay at all for the "none" authentication mechanism.cw bz3602 * sshd(8): Log errors in kex_exchange_identification() with level verbose instead of error to reduce preauth log spam. All of those get logged with a more generic error message by sshpkt_fatal(). * sshd(8): correct math for ClientAliveInterval that caused the probes to be sent less frequently than configured. * ssh(1): fix regression in OpenSSH 9.4 (mux.c r1.99) that caused multiplexed sessions to ignore SIGINT under some circumstances. Portability --- * Avoid clang zero-call-used-regs=all bug on Apple compilers, which for some reason have version numbers that do not match the upstream clang version numbers. bz#3584 * Fix configure test for zlib 1.3 and later/development versions. bz3604 Checksums: == - SHA1 (openssh-9.5.tar.gz) = 8a0bd3a91fac338d97d91817af58df731f6509a3 - SHA256 (openssh-9.5.tar.gz) = sVMxeM3d6g65qBMktJIofxmK4Ipg9dblKif0VnhPeO0= - SHA1 (openssh-9.5p1.tar.gz) = 35c16dcc6e7d0a9465faa241476ef24f76b196cc - SHA256 (openssh-9.5p1.tar.gz) = 8Cbnt5un+1QPdRgq+W3IqPHbOV+SK7yfbKYDZyaGCGs= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is available from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: === - Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs should be reported directly to open...@openssh.com OpenSSH 9.4/9.4p1 (2023-08-10) OpenSSH 9.4 was released on 2023-08-10. It is available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More information on donations may be found at: https://www.openssh.com/donat
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Wed Oct 25 20:14:36 UTC 2023 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv5266 Log Message: Import OpenSSH 9.5 (Last was OpenSSH 9.3) OpenSSH 9.5/9.5p1 (2023-10-04) OpenSSH 9.5 was released on 2023-10-04. It is available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More information on donations may be found at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.4 = This release fixes a number of bugs and adds some small features. Potentially incompatible changes * ssh-keygen(1): generate Ed25519 keys by default. Ed25519 public keys are very convenient due to their small size. Ed25519 keys are specified in RFC 8709 and OpenSSH has supported them since version 6.5 (January 2014). * sshd(8): the Subsystem directive now accurately preserves quoting of subsystem commands and arguments. This may change behaviour for exotic configurations, but the most common subsystem configuration (sftp-server) is unlikely to be affected. New features * ssh(1): add keystroke timing obfuscation to the client. This attempts to hide inter-keystroke timings by sending interactive traffic at fixed intervals (default: every 20ms) when there is only a small amount of data being sent. It also sends fake "chaff" keystrokes for a random interval after the last real keystroke. These are controlled by a new ssh_config ObscureKeystrokeTiming keyword. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Introduce a transport-level ping facility. This adds a pair of SSH transport protocol messages SSH2_MSG_PING/PONG to implement a ping capability. These messages use numbers in the "local extensions" number space and are advertised using a "p...@openssh.com" ext-info message with a string version number of "0". * sshd(8): allow override of Subsystem directives in sshd Match blocks. Bugfixes * scp(1): fix scp in SFTP mode recursive upload and download of directories that contain symlinks to other directories. In scp mode, the links would be followed, but in SFTP mode they were not. bz3611 * ssh-keygen(1): handle cr+lf (instead of just cr) line endings in sshsig signature files. * ssh(1): interactive mode for ControlPersist sessions if they originally requested a tty. * sshd(8): make PerSourceMaxStartups first-match-wins * sshd(8): limit artificial login delay to a reasonable maximum (5s) and don't delay at all for the "none" authentication mechanism.cw bz3602 * sshd(8): Log errors in kex_exchange_identification() with level verbose instead of error to reduce preauth log spam. All of those get logged with a more generic error message by sshpkt_fatal(). * sshd(8): correct math for ClientAliveInterval that caused the probes to be sent less frequently than configured. * ssh(1): fix regression in OpenSSH 9.4 (mux.c r1.99) that caused multiplexed sessions to ignore SIGINT under some circumstances. Portability --- * Avoid clang zero-call-used-regs=all bug on Apple compilers, which for some reason have version numbers that do not match the upstream clang version numbers. bz#3584 * Fix configure test for zlib 1.3 and later/development versions. bz3604 Checksums: == - SHA1 (openssh-9.5.tar.gz) = 8a0bd3a91fac338d97d91817af58df731f6509a3 - SHA256 (openssh-9.5.tar.gz) = sVMxeM3d6g65qBMktJIofxmK4Ipg9dblKif0VnhPeO0= - SHA1 (openssh-9.5p1.tar.gz) = 35c16dcc6e7d0a9465faa241476ef24f76b196cc - SHA256 (openssh-9.5p1.tar.gz) = 8Cbnt5un+1QPdRgq+W3IqPHbOV+SK7yfbKYDZyaGCGs= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is available from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: === - Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs should be reported directly to open...@openssh.com OpenSSH 9.4/9.4p1 (2023-08-10) OpenSSH 9.4 was released on 2023-08-10. It is available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More information on donations may be found at: https://www.openssh.com/donat
Re: CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
On Fri, Jul 28, 2023 at 1:08 PM Rin Okuyama wrote: > > Module Name:src > Committed By: rin > Date: Fri Jul 28 04:08:02 UTC 2023 > > Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist > In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv28752 > > Log Message: > openssh: Re-import files only exist for portable versions into OPENSSH branch. > > Status: > > Vendor Tag: OPENSSH > Release Tags: v93p2-20230719 This import is for: > C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-pam.c > C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-pam.h > C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/moduli > C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/moduli.5 Other files are not touched. Thanks, rin
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: rin Date: Fri Jul 28 04:08:02 UTC 2023 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv28752 Log Message: openssh: Re-import files only exist for portable versions into OPENSSH branch. Status: Vendor Tag: OPENSSH Release Tags: v93p2-20230719 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/LICENCE U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.certkeys U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.key U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.krl U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.mux U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.sshsig U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.u2f U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addrmatch.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkeyfile.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfd.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfile.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfile.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bitmap.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bitmap.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/canohost.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/canohost.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/chacha.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/chacha.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/channels.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/channels.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cleanup.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/clientloop.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/clientloop.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/compat.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/compat.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/crypto_api.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dh.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dh.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/digest-libc.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/digest-openssl.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/digest.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dispatch.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dispatch.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dns.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dns.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ed25519.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ed25519.sh U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/fatal.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/groupaccess.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/groupaccess.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/gss-genr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/gss-serv-krb5.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/gss-serv.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/hash.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/hmac.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/hmac.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/hostfile.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/hostfile.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kex.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kex.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexc25519.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexdh.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexecdh.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexgen.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexgex.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexgexc.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexgexs.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexsntrup761x25519.c U src/crypto/ext
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: rin Date: Fri Jul 28 04:08:02 UTC 2023 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv28752 Log Message: openssh: Re-import files only exist for portable versions into OPENSSH branch. Status: Vendor Tag: OPENSSH Release Tags: v93p2-20230719 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/LICENCE U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.certkeys U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.key U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.krl U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.mux U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.sshsig U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.u2f U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addrmatch.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkeyfile.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfd.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfile.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfile.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bitmap.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bitmap.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/canohost.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/canohost.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/chacha.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/chacha.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/channels.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/channels.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cleanup.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/clientloop.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/clientloop.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/compat.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/compat.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/crypto_api.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dh.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dh.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/digest-libc.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/digest-openssl.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/digest.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dispatch.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dispatch.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dns.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dns.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ed25519.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ed25519.sh U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/fatal.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/groupaccess.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/groupaccess.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/gss-genr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/gss-serv-krb5.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/gss-serv.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/hash.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/hmac.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/hmac.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/hostfile.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/hostfile.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kex.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kex.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexc25519.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexdh.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexecdh.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexgen.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexgex.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexgexc.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexgexs.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/kexsntrup761x25519.c U src/crypto/ext
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Wed Jul 26 17:31:35 UTC 2023 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv26208 Log Message: Import OpenSSH 9.3 + the fix from p2 for the PKCS#11 remote provider The previous version was OpenSSH 9.1 OpenSSH 9.3p2 (2023-07-19) OpenSSH 9.3p2 was released on 2023-07-19. It is available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More information on donations may be found at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.3 = This release fixes a security bug. Security Fix CVE-2023-38408 - a condition where specific libaries loaded via ssh-agent(1)'s PKCS#11 support could be abused to achieve remote code execution via a forwarded agent socket if the following conditions are met: * Exploitation requires the presence of specific libraries on the victim system. * Remote exploitation requires that the agent was forwarded to an attacker-controlled system. Exploitation can also be prevented by starting ssh-agent(1) with an empty PKCS#11/FIDO allowlist (ssh-agent -P '') or by configuring an allowlist that contains only specific provider libraries. This vulnerability was discovered and demonstrated to be exploitable by the Qualys Security Advisory team. In addition to removing the main precondition for exploitation, this release removes the ability for remote ssh-agent(1) clients to load PKCS#11 modules by default (see below). Potentially-incompatible changes * ssh-agent(8): the agent will now refuse requests to load PKCS#11 modules issued by remote clients by default. A flag has been added to restore the previous behaviour "-Oallow-remote-pkcs11". Note that ssh-agent(8) depends on the SSH client to identify requests that are remote. The OpenSSH >=8.9 ssh(1) client does this, but forwarding access to an agent socket using other tools may circumvent this restriction. Checksums: == - SHA1 (openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz) = 219cf700c317f400bb20b001c0406056f7188ea4 - SHA256 (openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz) = IA6+FH9ss/EB/QzfngJEKvfdyimN/9n0VoeOfMrGdug= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is available from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: === - Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs should be reported directly to open...@openssh.com OpenSSH 9.3/9.3p1 (2023-03-15) OpenSSH 9.3 was released on 2023-03-15. It is available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More information on donations may be found at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.2 = This release fixes a number of security bugs. Security This release contains fixes for a security problem and a memory safety problem. The memory safety problem is not believed to be exploitable, but we report most network-reachable memory faults as security bugs. * ssh-add(1): when adding smartcard keys to ssh-agent(1) with the per-hop destination constraints (ssh-add -h ...) added in OpenSSH 8.9, a logic error prevented the constraints from being communicated to the agent. This resulted in the keys being added without constraints. The common cases of non-smartcard keys and keys without destination constraints are unaffected. This problem was reported by Luci Stanescu. * ssh(1): Portable OpenSSH provides an implementation of the getrrsetbyname(3) function if the standard library does not provide it, for use by the VerifyHostKeyDNS feature. A specifically crafted DNS response could cause this function to perform an out-of-bounds read of adjacent stack data, but this condition does not appear to be exploitable beyond denial-of- service to the ssh(1) client. The getrrsetbyname(3) replacement is only included if the system's standard library lacks this function and portable OpenSSH was not compiled with the ldns library (--with-ldns). getrrsetbyname(3) is only invoked if using VerifyHostKeyDNS to fetch SSHFP records. This problem was found by the Coverity static analyzer. New fea
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Wed Jul 26 17:31:35 UTC 2023 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv26208 Log Message: Import OpenSSH 9.3 + the fix from p2 for the PKCS#11 remote provider The previous version was OpenSSH 9.1 OpenSSH 9.3p2 (2023-07-19) OpenSSH 9.3p2 was released on 2023-07-19. It is available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More information on donations may be found at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.3 = This release fixes a security bug. Security Fix CVE-2023-38408 - a condition where specific libaries loaded via ssh-agent(1)'s PKCS#11 support could be abused to achieve remote code execution via a forwarded agent socket if the following conditions are met: * Exploitation requires the presence of specific libraries on the victim system. * Remote exploitation requires that the agent was forwarded to an attacker-controlled system. Exploitation can also be prevented by starting ssh-agent(1) with an empty PKCS#11/FIDO allowlist (ssh-agent -P '') or by configuring an allowlist that contains only specific provider libraries. This vulnerability was discovered and demonstrated to be exploitable by the Qualys Security Advisory team. In addition to removing the main precondition for exploitation, this release removes the ability for remote ssh-agent(1) clients to load PKCS#11 modules by default (see below). Potentially-incompatible changes * ssh-agent(8): the agent will now refuse requests to load PKCS#11 modules issued by remote clients by default. A flag has been added to restore the previous behaviour "-Oallow-remote-pkcs11". Note that ssh-agent(8) depends on the SSH client to identify requests that are remote. The OpenSSH >=8.9 ssh(1) client does this, but forwarding access to an agent socket using other tools may circumvent this restriction. Checksums: == - SHA1 (openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz) = 219cf700c317f400bb20b001c0406056f7188ea4 - SHA256 (openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz) = IA6+FH9ss/EB/QzfngJEKvfdyimN/9n0VoeOfMrGdug= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is available from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: === - Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs should be reported directly to open...@openssh.com OpenSSH 9.3/9.3p1 (2023-03-15) OpenSSH 9.3 was released on 2023-03-15. It is available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More information on donations may be found at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.2 = This release fixes a number of security bugs. Security This release contains fixes for a security problem and a memory safety problem. The memory safety problem is not believed to be exploitable, but we report most network-reachable memory faults as security bugs. * ssh-add(1): when adding smartcard keys to ssh-agent(1) with the per-hop destination constraints (ssh-add -h ...) added in OpenSSH 8.9, a logic error prevented the constraints from being communicated to the agent. This resulted in the keys being added without constraints. The common cases of non-smartcard keys and keys without destination constraints are unaffected. This problem was reported by Luci Stanescu. * ssh(1): Portable OpenSSH provides an implementation of the getrrsetbyname(3) function if the standard library does not provide it, for use by the VerifyHostKeyDNS feature. A specifically crafted DNS response could cause this function to perform an out-of-bounds read of adjacent stack data, but this condition does not appear to be exploitable beyond denial-of- service to the ssh(1) client. The getrrsetbyname(3) replacement is only included if the system's standard library lacks this function and portable OpenSSH was not compiled with the ldns library (--with-ldns). getrrsetbyname(3) is only invoked if using VerifyHostKeyDNS to fetch SSHFP records. This problem was found by the Coverity static analyzer. New fea
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Wed Oct 5 22:35:37 UTC 2022 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv7511 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-9.1 (previously we were on OpenSSH-9.0) This release is focused on bug fixing. Security This release contains fixes for three minor memory safety problems. None are believed to be exploitable, but we report most memory safety problems as potential security vulnerabilities out of caution. * ssh-keyscan(1): fix a one-byte overflow in SSH- banner processing. Reported by Qualys * ssh-keygen(1): double free() in error path of file hashing step in signing/verify code; GHPR333 * ssh-keysign(8): double-free in error path introduced in openssh-8.9 Potentially-incompatible changes * The portable OpenSSH project now signs commits and release tags using git's recent SSH signature support. The list of developer signing keys is included in the repository as .git_allowed_signers and is cross-signed using the PGP key that is still used to sign release artifacts: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc * ssh(1), sshd(8): SetEnv directives in ssh_config and sshd_config are now first-match-wins to match other directives. Previously if an environment variable was multiply specified the last set value would have been used. bz3438 * ssh-keygen(8): ssh-keygen -A (generate all default host key types) will no longer generate DSA keys, as these are insecure and have not been used by default for some years. New features * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a RequiredRSASize directive to set a minimum RSA key length. Keys below this length will be ignored for user authentication and for host authentication in sshd(8). ssh(1) will terminate a connection if the server offers an RSA key that falls below this limit, as the SSH protocol does not include the ability to retry a failed key exchange. * sftp-server(8): add a "users-groups-by...@openssh.com" extension request that allows the client to obtain user/group names that correspond to a set of uids/gids. * sftp(1): use "users-groups-by...@openssh.com" sftp-server extension (when available) to fill in user/group names for directory listings. * sftp-server(8): support the "home-directory" extension request defined in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. This overlaps a bit with the existing "expand-p...@openssh.com", but some other clients support it. * ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): allow certificate validity intervals, sshsig verification times and authorized_keys expiry-time options to accept dates in the UTC time zone in addition to the default of interpreting them in the system time zone. MMDD and YYMMDDHHMM[SS] dates/times will be interpreted as UTC if suffixed with a 'Z' character. Also allow certificate validity intervals to be specified in raw seconds-since-epoch as hex value, e.g. -V 0x1234:0x4567890. This is intended for use by regress tests and other tools that call ssh-keygen as part of a CA workflow. bz3468 * sftp(1): allow arguments to the sftp -D option, e.g. sftp -D "/usr/libexec/sftp-server -el debug3" * ssh-keygen(1): allow the existing -U (use agent) flag to work with "-Y sign" operations, where it will be interpreted to require that the private keys is hosted in an agent; bz3429 Bugfixes * ssh-keygen(1): implement the "verify-required" certificate option. This was already documented when support for user-verified FIDO keys was added, but the ssh-keygen(1) code was missing. * ssh-agent(1): hook up the restrict_websafe command-line flag; previously the flag was accepted but never actually used. * sftp(1): improve filename tab completions: never try to complete names to non-existent commands, and better match the completion type (local or remote filename) against the argument position being completed. * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): several fixes to FIDO key handling, especially relating to keys that request user-verification. These should reduce the number of unnecessary PIN prompts for keys that support intrinsic user verification. GHPR302, GHPR329 * ssh-keygen(1): when enrolling a FIDO resident key, check if a credential with matching application and user ID strings already exists and, if so, prompt the user for confirmation before overwriting the credential. GHPR329 * sshd(8): improve logging of errors when opening authorized_keys files. bz2042 * ssh(1): avoid multiplexing operations that could cause SIGPIPE from causing the client to exit early. bz3454 * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): clarify that the RekeyLimit directive applies to both transmitted and received data. GHPR328 * ssh-keygen(1): avoid double fclose() in error path. * sshd(8): log an error if pip
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Wed Oct 5 22:35:37 UTC 2022 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv7511 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-9.1 (previously we were on OpenSSH-9.0) This release is focused on bug fixing. Security This release contains fixes for three minor memory safety problems. None are believed to be exploitable, but we report most memory safety problems as potential security vulnerabilities out of caution. * ssh-keyscan(1): fix a one-byte overflow in SSH- banner processing. Reported by Qualys * ssh-keygen(1): double free() in error path of file hashing step in signing/verify code; GHPR333 * ssh-keysign(8): double-free in error path introduced in openssh-8.9 Potentially-incompatible changes * The portable OpenSSH project now signs commits and release tags using git's recent SSH signature support. The list of developer signing keys is included in the repository as .git_allowed_signers and is cross-signed using the PGP key that is still used to sign release artifacts: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc * ssh(1), sshd(8): SetEnv directives in ssh_config and sshd_config are now first-match-wins to match other directives. Previously if an environment variable was multiply specified the last set value would have been used. bz3438 * ssh-keygen(8): ssh-keygen -A (generate all default host key types) will no longer generate DSA keys, as these are insecure and have not been used by default for some years. New features * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a RequiredRSASize directive to set a minimum RSA key length. Keys below this length will be ignored for user authentication and for host authentication in sshd(8). ssh(1) will terminate a connection if the server offers an RSA key that falls below this limit, as the SSH protocol does not include the ability to retry a failed key exchange. * sftp-server(8): add a "users-groups-by...@openssh.com" extension request that allows the client to obtain user/group names that correspond to a set of uids/gids. * sftp(1): use "users-groups-by...@openssh.com" sftp-server extension (when available) to fill in user/group names for directory listings. * sftp-server(8): support the "home-directory" extension request defined in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. This overlaps a bit with the existing "expand-p...@openssh.com", but some other clients support it. * ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): allow certificate validity intervals, sshsig verification times and authorized_keys expiry-time options to accept dates in the UTC time zone in addition to the default of interpreting them in the system time zone. MMDD and YYMMDDHHMM[SS] dates/times will be interpreted as UTC if suffixed with a 'Z' character. Also allow certificate validity intervals to be specified in raw seconds-since-epoch as hex value, e.g. -V 0x1234:0x4567890. This is intended for use by regress tests and other tools that call ssh-keygen as part of a CA workflow. bz3468 * sftp(1): allow arguments to the sftp -D option, e.g. sftp -D "/usr/libexec/sftp-server -el debug3" * ssh-keygen(1): allow the existing -U (use agent) flag to work with "-Y sign" operations, where it will be interpreted to require that the private keys is hosted in an agent; bz3429 Bugfixes * ssh-keygen(1): implement the "verify-required" certificate option. This was already documented when support for user-verified FIDO keys was added, but the ssh-keygen(1) code was missing. * ssh-agent(1): hook up the restrict_websafe command-line flag; previously the flag was accepted but never actually used. * sftp(1): improve filename tab completions: never try to complete names to non-existent commands, and better match the completion type (local or remote filename) against the argument position being completed. * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): several fixes to FIDO key handling, especially relating to keys that request user-verification. These should reduce the number of unnecessary PIN prompts for keys that support intrinsic user verification. GHPR302, GHPR329 * ssh-keygen(1): when enrolling a FIDO resident key, check if a credential with matching application and user ID strings already exists and, if so, prompt the user for confirmation before overwriting the credential. GHPR329 * sshd(8): improve logging of errors when opening authorized_keys files. bz2042 * ssh(1): avoid multiplexing operations that could cause SIGPIPE from causing the client to exit early. bz3454 * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): clarify that the RekeyLimit directive applies to both transmitted and received data. GHPR328 * ssh-keygen(1): avoid double fclose() in error path. * sshd(8): log an error if pip
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src
Committed By: christos
Date: Fri Apr 15 13:58:21 UTC 2022
Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv22729
Log Message:
Import OpenSSH-9.0
Changes since OpenSSH 8.9
=
This release is focused on bug fixing.
Potentially-incompatible changes
This release switches scp(1) from using the legacy scp/rcp protocol
to using the SFTP protocol by default.
Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard expansion of remote filenames (e.g.
"scp host:* .") through the remote shell. This has the side effect of
requiring double quoting of shell meta-characters in file names
included on scp(1) command-lines, otherwise they could be interpreted
as shell commands on the remote side.
This creates one area of potential incompatibility: scp(1) when using
the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting,
and attempts to use it may cause transfers to fail. We consider the
removal of the need for double-quoting shell characters in file names
to be a benefit and do not intend to introduce bug-compatibility for
legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol.
Another area of potential incompatibility relates to the use of remote
paths relative to other user's home directories, for example -
"scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to
expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later
support a protocol extension "expand-p...@openssh.com" to support
this.
In case of incompatibility, the scp(1) client may be instructed to use
the legacy scp/rcp using the -O flag.
New features
* ssh(1), sshd(8): use the hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime + x25519 key
exchange method by default ("sntrup761x25519-sha...@openssh.com").
The NTRU algorithm is believed to resist attacks enabled by future
quantum computers and is paired with the X25519 ECDH key exchange
(the previous default) as a backstop against any weaknesses in
NTRU Prime that may be discovered in the future. The combination
ensures that the hybrid exchange offers at least as good security
as the status quo.
We are making this change now (i.e. ahead of cryptographically-
relevant quantum computers) to prevent "capture now, decrypt
later" attacks where an adversary who can record and store SSH
session ciphertext would be able to decrypt it once a sufficiently
advanced quantum computer is available.
* sftp-server(8): support the "copy-data" extension to allow server-
side copying of files/data, following the design in
draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. bz2948
* sftp(1): add a "cp" command to allow the sftp client to perform
server-side file copies.
Bugfixes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): upstream: fix poll(2) spin when a channel's output
fd closes without data in the channel buffer. bz3405 and bz3411
* sshd(8): pack pollfd array in server listen/accept loop. Could
cause the server to hang/spin when MaxStartups > RLIMIT_NOFILE
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid NULL deref via the find-principals and
check-novalidate operations. bz3409 and GHPR307 respectively.
* scp(1): fix a memory leak in argument processing. bz3404
* sshd(8): don't try to resolve ListenAddress directives in the sshd
re-exec path. They are unused after re-exec and parsing errors
(possible for example if the host's network configuration changed)
could prevent connections from being accepted.
* sshd(8): when refusing a public key authentication request from a
client for using an unapproved or unsupported signature algorithm
include the algorithm name in the log message to make debugging
easier.
Portability
---
* sshd(8): refactor platform-specific locked account check, fixing
an incorrect free() on platforms with both libiaf and shadow
passwords (probably only Unixware) GHPR284,
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix possible integer underflow in scan_scaled(3)
parsing of K/M/G/etc quantities. bz#3401.
* sshd(8): provide killpg implementation (mostly for Tandem NonStop)
GHPR301.
* Check for missing ftruncate prototype. GHPR301
* sshd(8): default to not using sandbox when cross compiling. On most
systems poll(2) does not work when the number of FDs is reduced
with setrlimit, so assume it doesn't when cross compiling and we
can't run the test. bz#3398.
* sshd(8): allow ppoll_time64 in seccomp sandbox. Should fix sandbox
violations on some (at least i386 and armhf) 32bit Linux platforms.
bz#3396.
* Improve detection of -fzero-call-used-regs=all support in
configure script.
Status:
Vendor Tag: OPENSSH
Release Tags: v90-20220408
U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/LICENCE
U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW
C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL
U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent
U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PRO
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src
Committed By: christos
Date: Fri Apr 15 13:58:21 UTC 2022
Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv22729
Log Message:
Import OpenSSH-9.0
Changes since OpenSSH 8.9
=
This release is focused on bug fixing.
Potentially-incompatible changes
This release switches scp(1) from using the legacy scp/rcp protocol
to using the SFTP protocol by default.
Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard expansion of remote filenames (e.g.
"scp host:* .") through the remote shell. This has the side effect of
requiring double quoting of shell meta-characters in file names
included on scp(1) command-lines, otherwise they could be interpreted
as shell commands on the remote side.
This creates one area of potential incompatibility: scp(1) when using
the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting,
and attempts to use it may cause transfers to fail. We consider the
removal of the need for double-quoting shell characters in file names
to be a benefit and do not intend to introduce bug-compatibility for
legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol.
Another area of potential incompatibility relates to the use of remote
paths relative to other user's home directories, for example -
"scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to
expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later
support a protocol extension "expand-p...@openssh.com" to support
this.
In case of incompatibility, the scp(1) client may be instructed to use
the legacy scp/rcp using the -O flag.
New features
* ssh(1), sshd(8): use the hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime + x25519 key
exchange method by default ("sntrup761x25519-sha...@openssh.com").
The NTRU algorithm is believed to resist attacks enabled by future
quantum computers and is paired with the X25519 ECDH key exchange
(the previous default) as a backstop against any weaknesses in
NTRU Prime that may be discovered in the future. The combination
ensures that the hybrid exchange offers at least as good security
as the status quo.
We are making this change now (i.e. ahead of cryptographically-
relevant quantum computers) to prevent "capture now, decrypt
later" attacks where an adversary who can record and store SSH
session ciphertext would be able to decrypt it once a sufficiently
advanced quantum computer is available.
* sftp-server(8): support the "copy-data" extension to allow server-
side copying of files/data, following the design in
draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. bz2948
* sftp(1): add a "cp" command to allow the sftp client to perform
server-side file copies.
Bugfixes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): upstream: fix poll(2) spin when a channel's output
fd closes without data in the channel buffer. bz3405 and bz3411
* sshd(8): pack pollfd array in server listen/accept loop. Could
cause the server to hang/spin when MaxStartups > RLIMIT_NOFILE
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid NULL deref via the find-principals and
check-novalidate operations. bz3409 and GHPR307 respectively.
* scp(1): fix a memory leak in argument processing. bz3404
* sshd(8): don't try to resolve ListenAddress directives in the sshd
re-exec path. They are unused after re-exec and parsing errors
(possible for example if the host's network configuration changed)
could prevent connections from being accepted.
* sshd(8): when refusing a public key authentication request from a
client for using an unapproved or unsupported signature algorithm
include the algorithm name in the log message to make debugging
easier.
Portability
---
* sshd(8): refactor platform-specific locked account check, fixing
an incorrect free() on platforms with both libiaf and shadow
passwords (probably only Unixware) GHPR284,
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix possible integer underflow in scan_scaled(3)
parsing of K/M/G/etc quantities. bz#3401.
* sshd(8): provide killpg implementation (mostly for Tandem NonStop)
GHPR301.
* Check for missing ftruncate prototype. GHPR301
* sshd(8): default to not using sandbox when cross compiling. On most
systems poll(2) does not work when the number of FDs is reduced
with setrlimit, so assume it doesn't when cross compiling and we
can't run the test. bz#3398.
* sshd(8): allow ppoll_time64 in seccomp sandbox. Should fix sandbox
violations on some (at least i386 and armhf) 32bit Linux platforms.
bz#3396.
* Improve detection of -fzero-call-used-regs=all support in
configure script.
Status:
Vendor Tag: OPENSSH
Release Tags: v90-20220408
U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/LICENCE
U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW
C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL
U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent
U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PRO
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Wed Feb 23 19:04:30 UTC 2022 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv4572 Log Message: Import OpenSSH 8.9. Future deprecation notice = A near-future release of OpenSSH will switch scp(1) from using the legacy scp/rcp protocol to using SFTP by default. Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard expansion of remote filenames (e.g. "scp host:* .") through the remote shell. This has the side effect of requiring double quoting of shell meta-characters in file names included on scp(1) command-lines, otherwise they could be interpreted as shell commands on the remote side. This creates one area of potential incompatibility: scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting, and attempts to use it may cause transfers to fail. We consider the removal of the need for double-quoting shell characters in file names to be a benefit and do not intend to introduce bug-compatibility for legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol. Another area of potential incompatibility relates to the use of remote paths relative to other user's home directories, for example - "scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later support a protocol extension "expand-p...@openssh.com" to support this. Security Near Miss == * sshd(8): fix an integer overflow in the user authentication path that, in conjunction with other logic errors, could have yielded unauthenticated access under difficult to exploit conditions. This situation is not exploitable because of independent checks in the privilege separation monitor. Privilege separation has been enabled by default in since openssh-3.2.2 (released in 2002) and has been mandatory since openssh-7.5 (released in 2017). Moreover, portable OpenSSH has used toolchain features available in most modern compilers to abort on signed integer overflow since openssh-6.5 (released in 2014). Thanks to Malcolm Stagg for finding and reporting this bug. Potentially-incompatible changes * sshd(8), portable OpenSSH only: this release removes in-built support for MD5-hashed passwords. If you require these on your system then we recommend linking against libxcrypt or similar. * This release modifies the FIDO security key middleware interface and increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR. Changes since OpenSSH 8.8 = This release includes a number of new features. New features * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): add a system for restricting forwarding and use of keys added to ssh-agent(1) A detailed description of the feature is available at https://www.openssh.com/agent-restrict.html and the protocol extensions are documented in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.agent files in the source release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): add the sntrup761x25519-sha...@openssh.com hybrid ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the default KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the prime-group DH ones). The next release of OpenSSH is likely to make this key exchange the default method. * ssh-keygen(1): when downloading resident keys from a FIDO token, pass back the user ID that was used when the key was created and append it to the filename the key is written to (if it is not the default). Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple resident keys with the same application string but different user IDs. * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): better handling for FIDO keys on tokens that provide user verification (UV) on the device itself, including biometric keys, avoiding unnecessary PIN prompts. * ssh-keygen(1): add "ssh-keygen -Y match-principals" operation to perform matching of principals names against an allowed signers file. To be used towards a TOFU model for SSH signatures in git. * ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added to ssh-agent(1). $SSH_ASKPASS will be used to request the PIN at authentication time. * ssh-keygen(1): allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time (either sha512 (default) or sha256). * ssh(1), sshd(8): read network data directly to the packet input buffer instead indirectly via a small stack buffer. Provides a modest performance improvement. * ssh(1), sshd(8): read data directly to the channel input buffer, providing a similar modest performance improvement. * ssh(1): extend the PubkeyAuthentication configuration directive to accept yes|no|unbound|host-bound to allow control over one of the protocol extensions used to implement agent-restricted keys. Bugfixes * sshd(8): document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and Pu
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Wed Feb 23 19:04:30 UTC 2022 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv4572 Log Message: Import OpenSSH 8.9. Future deprecation notice = A near-future release of OpenSSH will switch scp(1) from using the legacy scp/rcp protocol to using SFTP by default. Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard expansion of remote filenames (e.g. "scp host:* .") through the remote shell. This has the side effect of requiring double quoting of shell meta-characters in file names included on scp(1) command-lines, otherwise they could be interpreted as shell commands on the remote side. This creates one area of potential incompatibility: scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting, and attempts to use it may cause transfers to fail. We consider the removal of the need for double-quoting shell characters in file names to be a benefit and do not intend to introduce bug-compatibility for legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol. Another area of potential incompatibility relates to the use of remote paths relative to other user's home directories, for example - "scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later support a protocol extension "expand-p...@openssh.com" to support this. Security Near Miss == * sshd(8): fix an integer overflow in the user authentication path that, in conjunction with other logic errors, could have yielded unauthenticated access under difficult to exploit conditions. This situation is not exploitable because of independent checks in the privilege separation monitor. Privilege separation has been enabled by default in since openssh-3.2.2 (released in 2002) and has been mandatory since openssh-7.5 (released in 2017). Moreover, portable OpenSSH has used toolchain features available in most modern compilers to abort on signed integer overflow since openssh-6.5 (released in 2014). Thanks to Malcolm Stagg for finding and reporting this bug. Potentially-incompatible changes * sshd(8), portable OpenSSH only: this release removes in-built support for MD5-hashed passwords. If you require these on your system then we recommend linking against libxcrypt or similar. * This release modifies the FIDO security key middleware interface and increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR. Changes since OpenSSH 8.8 = This release includes a number of new features. New features * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): add a system for restricting forwarding and use of keys added to ssh-agent(1) A detailed description of the feature is available at https://www.openssh.com/agent-restrict.html and the protocol extensions are documented in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.agent files in the source release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): add the sntrup761x25519-sha...@openssh.com hybrid ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the default KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the prime-group DH ones). The next release of OpenSSH is likely to make this key exchange the default method. * ssh-keygen(1): when downloading resident keys from a FIDO token, pass back the user ID that was used when the key was created and append it to the filename the key is written to (if it is not the default). Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple resident keys with the same application string but different user IDs. * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): better handling for FIDO keys on tokens that provide user verification (UV) on the device itself, including biometric keys, avoiding unnecessary PIN prompts. * ssh-keygen(1): add "ssh-keygen -Y match-principals" operation to perform matching of principals names against an allowed signers file. To be used towards a TOFU model for SSH signatures in git. * ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added to ssh-agent(1). $SSH_ASKPASS will be used to request the PIN at authentication time. * ssh-keygen(1): allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time (either sha512 (default) or sha256). * ssh(1), sshd(8): read network data directly to the packet input buffer instead indirectly via a small stack buffer. Provides a modest performance improvement. * ssh(1), sshd(8): read data directly to the channel input buffer, providing a similar modest performance improvement. * ssh(1): extend the PubkeyAuthentication configuration directive to accept yes|no|unbound|host-bound to allow control over one of the protocol extensions used to implement agent-restricted keys. Bugfixes * sshd(8): document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and Pu
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Mon Sep 27 17:01:01 UTC 2021 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv4363 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-8.8: Future deprecation notice = A near-future release of OpenSSH will switch scp(1) from using the legacy scp/rcp protocol to using SFTP by default. Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard expansion of remote filenames (e.g. "scp host:* .") through the remote shell. This has the side effect of requiring double quoting of shell meta-characters in file names included on scp(1) command-lines, otherwise they could be interpreted as shell commands on the remote side. This creates one area of potential incompatibility: scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting, and attempts to use it may cause transfers to fail. We consider the removal of the need for double-quoting shell characters in file names to be a benefit and do not intend to introduce bug- compatibility for legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol. Another area of potential incompatibility relates to the use of remote paths relative to other user's home directories, for example - "scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later support a protocol extension "expand-p...@openssh.com" to support this. Security sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.2 through 8.7 failed to correctly initialise supplemental groups when executing an AuthorizedKeysCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, where a AuthorizedKeysCommandUser or AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser directive has been set to run the command as a different user. Instead these commands would inherit the groups that sshd(8) was started with. Depending on system configuration, inherited groups may allow AuthorizedKeysCommand/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand helper programs to gain unintended privilege. Neither AuthorizedKeysCommand nor AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand are enabled by default in sshd_config(5). Potentially-incompatible changes This release disables RSA signatures using the SHA-1 hash algorithm by default. This change has been made as the SHA-1 hash algorithm is cryptographically broken, and it is possible to create chosen-prefix hash collisions for https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Changes since OpenSSH 8.7 = This release is motivated primarily by the above deprecation and security fix. New features * ssh(1): allow the ssh_config(5) CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs directive to accept a "none" argument to specify the default behaviour. Bugfixes * scp(1): when using the SFTP protocol, continue transferring files after a transfer error occurs, better matching original scp/rcp behaviour. * ssh(1): fixed a number of memory leaks in multiplexing, * ssh-keygen(1): avoid crash when using the -Y find-principals command. * A number of documentation and manual improvements, including bz#3340, PR#139, PR#215, PR#241, PR#257 Portability --- * ssh-agent(1): on FreeBSD, use procctl to disable ptrace(2) * ssh(1)/sshd(8): some fixes to the pselect(2) replacement compatibility code. bz#3345 Status: Vendor Tag: OPENSSH Release Tags: v88-20210926 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/LICENCE U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.certkeys U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.key U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.krl U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.mux U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.sshsig U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.u2f U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addrmatch.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c U src/crypto/external
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Mon Sep 27 17:01:01 UTC 2021 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv4363 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-8.8: Future deprecation notice = A near-future release of OpenSSH will switch scp(1) from using the legacy scp/rcp protocol to using SFTP by default. Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard expansion of remote filenames (e.g. "scp host:* .") through the remote shell. This has the side effect of requiring double quoting of shell meta-characters in file names included on scp(1) command-lines, otherwise they could be interpreted as shell commands on the remote side. This creates one area of potential incompatibility: scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting, and attempts to use it may cause transfers to fail. We consider the removal of the need for double-quoting shell characters in file names to be a benefit and do not intend to introduce bug- compatibility for legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol. Another area of potential incompatibility relates to the use of remote paths relative to other user's home directories, for example - "scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later support a protocol extension "expand-p...@openssh.com" to support this. Security sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.2 through 8.7 failed to correctly initialise supplemental groups when executing an AuthorizedKeysCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, where a AuthorizedKeysCommandUser or AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser directive has been set to run the command as a different user. Instead these commands would inherit the groups that sshd(8) was started with. Depending on system configuration, inherited groups may allow AuthorizedKeysCommand/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand helper programs to gain unintended privilege. Neither AuthorizedKeysCommand nor AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand are enabled by default in sshd_config(5). Potentially-incompatible changes This release disables RSA signatures using the SHA-1 hash algorithm by default. This change has been made as the SHA-1 hash algorithm is cryptographically broken, and it is possible to create chosen-prefix hash collisions for https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Changes since OpenSSH 8.7 = This release is motivated primarily by the above deprecation and security fix. New features * ssh(1): allow the ssh_config(5) CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs directive to accept a "none" argument to specify the default behaviour. Bugfixes * scp(1): when using the SFTP protocol, continue transferring files after a transfer error occurs, better matching original scp/rcp behaviour. * ssh(1): fixed a number of memory leaks in multiplexing, * ssh-keygen(1): avoid crash when using the -Y find-principals command. * A number of documentation and manual improvements, including bz#3340, PR#139, PR#215, PR#241, PR#257 Portability --- * ssh-agent(1): on FreeBSD, use procctl to disable ptrace(2) * ssh(1)/sshd(8): some fixes to the pselect(2) replacement compatibility code. bz#3345 Status: Vendor Tag: OPENSSH Release Tags: v88-20210926 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/LICENCE U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.certkeys U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.key U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.krl U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.mux U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.sshsig U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.u2f U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addr.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addrmatch.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c U src/crypto/external
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Thu Sep 2 11:22:34 UTC 2021 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv15920 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-8.7: Imminent deprecation notice === OpenSSH will disable the ssh-rsa signature scheme by default in the next release. In the SSH protocol, the "ssh-rsa" signature scheme uses the SHA-1 hash algorithm in conjunction with the RSA public key algorithm. It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for less than USD$50K. Note that the deactivation of "ssh-rsa" signatures does not necessarily require cessation of use for RSA keys. In the SSH protocol, keys may be capable of signing using multiple algorithms. In particular, "ssh-rsa" keys are capable of signing using "rsa-sha2-256" (RSA/SHA256), "rsa-sha2-512" (RSA/SHA512) and "ssh-rsa" (RSA/SHA1). Only the last of these is being turned off by default. This algorithm is unfortunately still used widely despite the existence of better alternatives, being the only remaining public key signature algorithm specified by the original SSH RFCs that is still enabled by default. The better alternatives include: * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These algorithms have the advantage of using the same key type as "ssh-rsa" but use the safe SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the client and server support them. * The RFC8709 ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in OpenSSH since release 6.5. * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These have been supported by OpenSSH since release 5.7. To check whether a server is using the weak ssh-rsa public key algorithm, for host authentication, try to connect to it after removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list: ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host If the host key verification fails and no other supported host key types are available, the server software on that host should be upgraded. OpenSSH recently enabled the UpdateHostKeys option by default to assist the client by automatically migrating to better algorithms. [1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Potentially-incompatible changes This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing configurations: * scp(1): this release changes the behaviour of remote to remote copies (e.g. "scp host-a:/path host-b:") to transfer through the local host by default. This was previously available via the -3 flag. This mode avoids the need to expose credentials on the origin hop, avoids triplicate interpretation of filenames by the shell (by the local system, the copy origin and the destination) and, in conjunction with the SFTP support for scp(1) mentioned below, allows use of all authentication methods to the remote hosts (previously, only non-interactive methods could be used). A -R flag has been added to select the old behaviour. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): both the client and server are now using a stricter configuration file parser. The new parser uses more shell-like rules for quotes, space and escape characters. It is also more strict in rejecting configurations that include options lacking arguments. Previously some options (e.g. DenyUsers) could appear on a line with no subsequent arguments. This release will reject such configurations. The new parser will also reject configurations with unterminated quotes and multiple '=' characters after the option name. * ssh(1): when using SSHFP DNS records for host key verification, ssh(1) will verify all matching records instead of just those with the specific signature type requested. This may cause host key verification problems if stale SSHFP records of a different or legacy signature type exist alongside other records for a particular host. bz#3322 * ssh-keygen(1): when generating a FIDO key and specifying an explicit attestation challenge (using -Ochallenge), the challenge will now be hashed by the builtin security key middleware. This removes the (undocumented) requirement that challenges be exactly 32 bytes in length and matches the expectations of libfido2. * sshd(8): environment="..." directives in authorized_keys files are now first-match-wins and limited to 1024 discrete environment variable names. Changes since OpenSSH 8.6 = This release contains a mix of new features and bug-fixes. New features - scp(1): experimental support for transfers using the SFTP protocol as a replacement for the venerable SCP/RCP protocol that it has traditionally used. S
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Thu Sep 2 11:22:34 UTC 2021 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv15920 Log Message: Import OpenSSH-8.7: Imminent deprecation notice === OpenSSH will disable the ssh-rsa signature scheme by default in the next release. In the SSH protocol, the "ssh-rsa" signature scheme uses the SHA-1 hash algorithm in conjunction with the RSA public key algorithm. It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for less than USD$50K. Note that the deactivation of "ssh-rsa" signatures does not necessarily require cessation of use for RSA keys. In the SSH protocol, keys may be capable of signing using multiple algorithms. In particular, "ssh-rsa" keys are capable of signing using "rsa-sha2-256" (RSA/SHA256), "rsa-sha2-512" (RSA/SHA512) and "ssh-rsa" (RSA/SHA1). Only the last of these is being turned off by default. This algorithm is unfortunately still used widely despite the existence of better alternatives, being the only remaining public key signature algorithm specified by the original SSH RFCs that is still enabled by default. The better alternatives include: * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These algorithms have the advantage of using the same key type as "ssh-rsa" but use the safe SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the client and server support them. * The RFC8709 ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in OpenSSH since release 6.5. * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These have been supported by OpenSSH since release 5.7. To check whether a server is using the weak ssh-rsa public key algorithm, for host authentication, try to connect to it after removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list: ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host If the host key verification fails and no other supported host key types are available, the server software on that host should be upgraded. OpenSSH recently enabled the UpdateHostKeys option by default to assist the client by automatically migrating to better algorithms. [1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Potentially-incompatible changes This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing configurations: * scp(1): this release changes the behaviour of remote to remote copies (e.g. "scp host-a:/path host-b:") to transfer through the local host by default. This was previously available via the -3 flag. This mode avoids the need to expose credentials on the origin hop, avoids triplicate interpretation of filenames by the shell (by the local system, the copy origin and the destination) and, in conjunction with the SFTP support for scp(1) mentioned below, allows use of all authentication methods to the remote hosts (previously, only non-interactive methods could be used). A -R flag has been added to select the old behaviour. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): both the client and server are now using a stricter configuration file parser. The new parser uses more shell-like rules for quotes, space and escape characters. It is also more strict in rejecting configurations that include options lacking arguments. Previously some options (e.g. DenyUsers) could appear on a line with no subsequent arguments. This release will reject such configurations. The new parser will also reject configurations with unterminated quotes and multiple '=' characters after the option name. * ssh(1): when using SSHFP DNS records for host key verification, ssh(1) will verify all matching records instead of just those with the specific signature type requested. This may cause host key verification problems if stale SSHFP records of a different or legacy signature type exist alongside other records for a particular host. bz#3322 * ssh-keygen(1): when generating a FIDO key and specifying an explicit attestation challenge (using -Ochallenge), the challenge will now be hashed by the builtin security key middleware. This removes the (undocumented) requirement that challenges be exactly 32 bytes in length and matches the expectations of libfido2. * sshd(8): environment="..." directives in authorized_keys files are now first-match-wins and limited to 1024 discrete environment variable names. Changes since OpenSSH 8.6 = This release contains a mix of new features and bug-fixes. New features - scp(1): experimental support for transfers using the SFTP protocol as a replacement for the venerable SCP/RCP protocol that it has traditionally used. S
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Sat Oct 12 15:14:22 UTC 2019 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv21796 Log Message: OpenSSH 8.1 was released on 2019-10-09. It is available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More information on donations may be found at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Security * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): an exploitable integer overflow bug was found in the private key parsing code for the XMSS key type. This key type is still experimental and support for it is not compiled by default. No user-facing autoconf option exists in portable OpenSSH to enable it. This bug was found by Adam Zabrocki and reported via SecuriTeam's SSD program. * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): add protection for private keys at rest in RAM against speculation and memory side-channel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown and Rambleed. This release encrypts private keys when they are not in use with a symmetric key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of random data (currently 16KB). Potentially-incompatible changes This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing configurations: * ssh-keygen(1): when acting as a CA and signing certificates with an RSA key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH versions prior to 7.2 unless the default is overridden (using "ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa -s ..."). Status: Vendor Tag: OPENSSH Release Tags: v81-20191009 C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/match.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/LICENCE U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.certkeys U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.key U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.krl U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.mux N src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.sshsig U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addrmatch.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/krl.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfd.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfd.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfile.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfile.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bitmap.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bitmap.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/canohost.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/canohost.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/chacha.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/chacha.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/channels.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/channels.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cleanup.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/clientloop.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/clientloop.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/compat.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/compat.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/crypto_api.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dh.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dh.h
CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
Module Name:src Committed By: christos Date: Sat Oct 12 15:14:22 UTC 2019 Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv21796 Log Message: OpenSSH 8.1 was released on 2019-10-09. It is available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More information on donations may be found at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Security * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): an exploitable integer overflow bug was found in the private key parsing code for the XMSS key type. This key type is still experimental and support for it is not compiled by default. No user-facing autoconf option exists in portable OpenSSH to enable it. This bug was found by Adam Zabrocki and reported via SecuriTeam's SSD program. * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): add protection for private keys at rest in RAM against speculation and memory side-channel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown and Rambleed. This release encrypts private keys when they are not in use with a symmetric key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of random data (currently 16KB). Potentially-incompatible changes This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing configurations: * ssh-keygen(1): when acting as a CA and signing certificates with an RSA key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH versions prior to 7.2 unless the default is overridden (using "ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa -s ..."). Status: Vendor Tag: OPENSSH Release Tags: v81-20191009 C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/match.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/LICENCE U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.certkeys U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.key U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.krl U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.mux N src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.sshsig U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addrmatch.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/krl.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfd.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfd.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfile.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfile.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bitmap.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bitmap.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/canohost.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/canohost.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/chacha.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/chacha.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/channels.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/channels.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cleanup.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/clientloop.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/clientloop.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/compat.c U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/compat.h U src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/crypto_api.h C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dh.c C src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/dh.h
Re: CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
In message <20141023010616.ecdc117f...@rebar.astron.com> on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 21:06:16 -0400, chris...@zoulas.com (Christos Zoulas) wrote: > On Oct 23, 9:41am, t...@netbsd.org (Takahiro Kambe) wrote: > -- Subject: Re: CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist > > | It is also good news for me, but where can I find out from commit > | messages?? > > The commit messages are the changes upstream. Most of the changes are > merged. This is an exception. IC and thanks for your quick clarification. -- Takahiro Kambe /
Re: CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
On Oct 23, 9:41am, t...@netbsd.org (Takahiro Kambe) wrote: -- Subject: Re: CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist | It is also good news for me, but where can I find out from commit | messages?? The commit messages are the changes upstream. Most of the changes are merged. This is an exception. christos
Re: CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
In message on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 13:03:11 + (UTC), chris...@astron.com (Christos Zoulas) wrote: > In article <20141022.125753.108286502...@uninett.no>, > Havard Eidnes wrote: Potentially-incompatible changes >>> [ ... ] * sshd(8): Support for tcpwrappers/libwrap has been removed. >>> [ ... ] >>> Are there any plans to re-introduce this support locally in the >>> NetBSD code base? "Permanently" or as part of a transition (to what?) >>> period? >> >>Wowza! If I understand correctly, this renders py-denyhosts >>ineffective, and is IMHO a step in the wrong direction. > > Well, they removed it but we did not. It is also good news for me, but where can I find out from commit messages?? -- Takahiro Kambe /
Re: CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
> In article <20141022.125753.108286502...@uninett.no>, > Havard Eidnes wrote: Potentially-incompatible changes >>> [ ... ] * sshd(8): Support for tcpwrappers/libwrap has been removed. >>> [ ... ] >>> Are there any plans to re-introduce this support locally in the >>> NetBSD code base? "Permanently" or as part of a transition (to what?) >>> period? >> >>Wowza! If I understand correctly, this renders py-denyhosts >>ineffective, and is IMHO a step in the wrong direction. > > Well, they removed it but we did not. Good, thanks, that restores some peace of mind. Regards, - Håvard
Re: CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
In article <20141022.125753.108286502...@uninett.no>, Havard Eidnes wrote: >>> Potentially-incompatible changes >> [ ... ] >>> * sshd(8): Support for tcpwrappers/libwrap has been removed. >> [ ... ] >> Are there any plans to re-introduce this support locally in the >> NetBSD code base? "Permanently" or as part of a transition (to what?) >> period? > >Wowza! If I understand correctly, this renders py-denyhosts >ineffective, and is IMHO a step in the wrong direction. Well, they removed it but we did not. christos
Re: CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
>> Potentially-incompatible changes > [ ... ] >> * sshd(8): Support for tcpwrappers/libwrap has been removed. > [ ... ] > Are there any plans to re-introduce this support locally in the > NetBSD code base? "Permanently" or as part of a transition (to what?) > period? Wowza! If I understand correctly, this renders py-denyhosts ineffective, and is IMHO a step in the wrong direction. Regards, - Håvard
Re: CVS import: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
"Christos Zoulas" writes: > Module Name: src > Committed By: christos > Date: Sun Oct 19 16:28:40 UTC 2014 > > Update of /cvsroot/src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist > In directory ivanova.netbsd.org:/tmp/cvs-serv3513 > > Log Message: > Changes since OpenSSH 6.6 > = > > Potentially-incompatible changes [ ... ] > * sshd(8): Support for tcpwrappers/libwrap has been removed. [ ... ] Are there any plans to re-introduce this support locally in the NetBSD code base? "Permanently" or as part of a transition (to what?) period? -jarle -- There are only two hard things in Computer Science: cache invalidation, naming things, and off-by-one errors.
