Re: OpenID 3.0

[Johannes Ernst]

Amen. Let's build (optional) extensions, and only if that absolutely  
does not work for an essential feature, meekly suggest that the  
smallest possible set of changes be made to an existing spec.

Note that any term such as "OpenID 3.0" is mostly a marketing /  
branding term, just like "OpenID 2.0". What it really means is what  
underlying specs are being "packaged" into a larger term.

On Feb 2, 2008, at 2:36, Martin Atkins wrote:

>
> I apologise that this message doesn't directly address any of the  
> points
> you've made, but others have been doing that.
>
> I just want to make a general point:
> In my opinion, we should resist the urge to start specing "OpenID 3.0"
> (aka OpenID vNext) and try to do everything else that needs to be done
> with extensions now. OpenID 2.0 has laid the framework for  
> decentralized
> extensibility, so it should now be much easier to work within that
> framework.
>
> If it turns out that some particular feature absolutely can't be done
> without making a new Authentication spec release then so be it, but
> ideally I think we want 2.0 to be stable for many years to come to  
> avoid
> repeating all of the current pain of incompatible versions and the  
> poor
> user experience that creates.
>
>
> McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT) wrote:
>> Figured I would ask if anyone is interested in brainstorming the next
>> version of OpenID and how it can be used in Enterprise B2B settings  
>> and
>> not solely focusing on consumerish interactions. Some things that I
>> would like to see in the next version are:
>>
>> 1. A discussion on how AuthZ can converge with OpenID
>> 2. Modeling of relationships
>> 3. Not allowing an OpenID to be a vector for SQL Injection and  
>> putting
>> something around what it should look like
>> 4. A way to indicate to the relying party what level of  
>> authentication
>> has occurred such as did the OP check a password, how did it  
>> validate a
>> user. Without this, there is no way that a trust model could be
>> established in a credible way.
>>
>> 5. A way for OpenID relying parties to filter out Ops. In a business
>> scenario, if I run the Sun employee store, I may only want the Sun  
>> OP to
>> talk with me.
>>
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Re: OpenID 3.0

[James Henstridge]

On 04/02/2008, Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > James Henstridge wrote:
> > Of course, the OP is restricted to returning identities that it is
> > authoritative for.  This is what allows any yahoo user to enter
> > "yahoo.com" as their OpenID identifier while still letting RPs tell
> > them apart.
>
> Right, that's what I thought...What does it have to return however?
> Is it enough to return [openid_identity] => https://somenick.domain.com/,
> [openid_claimed_id] => https://domain.com/ ?

That is possible provided that performing discovery on
https://domain.com/ gives you https://somenick.domain.com/ as the OP
local identifier and uses the given OP.

When selecting an identifier, the OP chooses both the local identifier
(openid.identifier) and claimed ID (openid.claimed_id).


> > My point was that in cases where you do want to limit things to a
> > single OP, it is worth considering this mode, since it does not
> > require the user to enter any credentials (username or password) at
> > the RP site.
>
> Yes, that is rather easy. Somewhat more tricky gets when you want to
> use a group of providers and ban certain providers. All doable, but not
> standardized yete.g. white/black lists.

As Kevin said, you can always apply that kind of policy at the end of
authentication process.  You can do that with either OpenID 1.x or
2.0.

James.
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Re: OpenID 3.0

[Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)]

James Henstridge wrote:

Thanks for your reply...

When used in directed identity mode, the OP can pick the identity:


http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html#responding_to_authentication

Of course, the OP is restricted to returning identities that it is
authoritative for.  This is what allows any yahoo user to enter
"yahoo.com" as their OpenID identifier while still letting RPs tell
them apart.
  
Right, that's what I thought...What does it have to return however? Is 
it enough to return [openid_identity] => https://somenick.domain.com/, 
[openid_claimed_id] => https://domain.com/ ?

My point was that in cases where you do want to limit things to a
single OP, it is worth considering this mode, since it does not
require the user to enter any credentials (username or password) at
the RP site.
Yes, that is rather easy. Somewhat more tricky gets when you want to use 
a group of providers and ban certain providers. All doable, but not 
standardized yete.g. white/black lists.



--
Regards 


Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. 
Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Blog:   Join the Revolution! 
Phone:  +1.213.341.0390


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