Re: OpenID Assertion Quality Extension - Draft
+1 simple and straight forward Just curious about uses cases where the required authentication level changes over time. For instance, a use case where to view my stock portfolio just requires password, but doing a trade requires voicebio. Is the expectation that authentication events can be treated as standalone? or that it's the RP's responsibility to manage the combinations based on the identifier? One final question... Is it valuable to provide a way to request two or more authentication methods be employed in the authentication event? For example, administrators of a site must use both password and hardotp. Everyone else just needs password. Thanks, George ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: [OpenID] OpenID Assertion Quality Extension - Draft
Hi George, for your use case below, why would not the RP just ask for the user to be up-authenticated at the desired higher level when necessary? Are you asking whether the RP should be allowed to ask the user to re-present their URI in order for this to happen? And thereby effectively treating each event as disconnected/standalone? Wrt combinations, I know from experience that the alternative to allowing for RPs to specify combinations is a combinatorial explosion in the number of mechanism identifiers. Paul George Fletcher wrote: +1 simple and straight forward Just curious about uses cases where the required authentication level changes over time. For instance, a use case where to view my stock portfolio just requires password, but doing a trade requires voicebio. Is the expectation that authentication events can be treated as standalone? or that it's the RP's responsibility to manage the combinations based on the identifier? One final question... Is it valuable to provide a way to request two or more authentication methods be employed in the authentication event? For example, administrators of a site must use both password and hardotp. Everyone else just needs password. Thanks, George ___ general mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/general -- Paul Madsen e:paulmadsen @ ntt-at.com NTT p:613-482-0432 m:613-302-1428 aim:PaulMdsn5 web:connectid.blogspot.com ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: [OpenID] OpenID Assertion Quality Extension - Draft
Paul Madsen wrote: Hi George, for your use case below, why would not the RP just ask for the user to be up-authenticated at the desired higher level when necessary? So in the draft... how does the RP ask for the user to be "up-authenticated"? The authentication request parameters do not in any way indicate a previous authentication, and the extension parameters also don't include any way to indicate a previous authentication. That is what I really meant by the authentications being "standalone". The RP may relate the two authentications in some way because it requested both. Maybe that's good enough. Are you asking whether the RP should be allowed to ask the user to re-present their URI in order for this to happen? And thereby effectively treating each event as disconnected/standalone? Ideally, the user would not be able to change their URI when being re-challenged based on max_auth_age but I guess the RP should make sure to code for that edge case. Wrt combinations, I know from experience that the alternative to allowing for RPs to specify combinations is a combinatorial explosion in the number of mechanism identifiers. I agree that the combinations can explode... but they are also useful. For example to hack my account you need both my "password" and my "hardotp". That's two "secrets" that need to be determined for my account to be compromised. (Not that this doesn't stop phishers). Thanks, George Paul George Fletcher wrote: +1 simple and straight forward Just curious about uses cases where the required authentication level changes over time. For instance, a use case where to view my stock portfolio just requires "password", but doing a trade requires "voicebio". Is the expectation that authentication events can be treated as "standalone"? or that it's the RP's responsibility to manage the combinations based on the identifier? One final question... Is it valuable to provide a way to request two or more authentication methods be employed in the authentication event? For example, administrators of a site must use both "password" and "hardotp". Everyone else just needs "password". Thanks, George ___ general mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/general ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
RE: [OpenID] OpenID Assertion Quality Extension - Draft
Avery, Paul's the one to weigh in on this option - he wrote (and lived) the book on SAML AuthN Context. But I do like the looks of what you proposed - seems very elegant. =Drummond _ From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Avery Glasser Sent: Thursday, November 30, 2006 2:22 PM To: George Fletcher Cc: specs@openid.net; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [OpenID] OpenID Assertion Quality Extension - Draft Just to weigh in here... Paul Madsen wrote: Hi George, for your use case below, why would not the RP just ask for the user to be up-authenticated at the desired higher level when necessary? So in the draft... how does the RP ask for the user to be up-authenticated? The authentication request parameters do not in any way indicate a previous authentication, and the extension parameters also don't include any way to indicate a previous authentication. That is what I really meant by the authentications being standalone. The RP may relate the two authentications in some way because it requested both. Maybe that's good enough. Basically, you would require the second method with a max_age of 0 - which, assuming the RP honors the request, would tell the RP to re-authenticate the user with the requested method. Are you asking whether the RP should be allowed to ask the user to re-present their URI in order for this to happen? And thereby effectively treating each event as disconnected/standalone? Ideally, the user would not be able to change their URI when being re-challenged based on max_auth_age but I guess the RP should make sure to code for that edge case. Agreed - it's the RPs choice. Wrt combinations, I know from experience that the alternative to allowing for RPs to specify combinations is a combinatorial explosion in the number of mechanism identifiers. I agree that the combinations can explode... but they are also useful. For example to hack my account you need both my password and my hardotp. That's two secrets that need to be determined for my account to be compromised. (Not that this doesn't stop phishers). Actually, this could be pretty simple to implement: Replace openid.aqe.preferred_auth_mode with the following: openid.aqe.auth_factor1 Optional: The method of authentication the RP would like the OP to perform, or in the case of a multi-factor authentication, the first method that the RP would like the OP to perform. The mode should match one of the advertised values in the XRDS. If this is not specified, then any authentication method is acceptable. Value: Comma-delimited list of none, password, pin, fingerbio, handbio, hardotp, irisbio, otherbio, smartcard, softotp, voicebio Note: The OP should attempt to authenticate the user with the most secure mode requested. For example, if the OP has determined that their voicebio method is stronger than their password method and the RP requests either voicebio or password, the OP should strive to authenticate the user by voicebio when possible. If the two modes are considered equally strong, then it is the choice of the OP regarding which one or ones to authenticate against. OPs should note that authenticating a user by a non-preferred method may result in an RP denying access. openid.aqe.auth_factor2 Optional: In the case of a multi-factor authentication, the second method that the RP would like the OP to perform. The mode should match one of the advertised values in the XRDS. If this is not specified, then any authentication method is acceptable. If this is not specified, it is assumed that the RP is requesting only a single factor for authentication. The OP will not use the same method for this factor as was used in any previous factors. For example, if the first factor is a password, the second factor cannot also be a password. Value: Comma-delimited list of none, password, pin, fingerbio, handbio, hardotp, irisbio, otherbio, smartcard, softotp, voicebio Note: The OP should attempt to authenticate the user with the most secure mode requested. For example, if the OP has determined that their voicebio method is stronger than their password method and the RP requests either voicebio or password, the OP should strive to authenticate the user by voicebio when possible. If the two modes are considered equally strong, then it is the choice of the OP regarding which one or ones to authenticate against. OPs should note that authenticating a user by a non-preferred method may result in an RP denying access. openid.aqe.auth_factor3 ... you can figure how it would continue. There are very few use cases that would use more than two factors. So, in this case, if you want the user to authenticate with two factors, first with a password and second with a securID or voice biometric print... openid.aqe.auth_factor1 = password openid.aqe.auth_factor2 = hardotp, voicebio conversely, if you want two factors, which could
Re: [OpenID] OpenID Assertion Quality Extension - Draft
+1 Avery Glasser wrote: Actually, this could be pretty simple to implement: Replace openid.aqe.preferred_auth_mode with the following: openid.aqe.auth_factor1 Optional: The method of authentication the RP would like the OP to perform, or in the case of a multi-factor authentication, the first method that the RP would like the OP to perform. The mode should match one of the advertised values in the XRDS. If this is not specified, then any authentication method is acceptable. Value: Comma-delimited list of "none", "password", "pin", "fingerbio", "handbio", "hardotp", "irisbio", "otherbio", "smartcard", "softotp", "voicebio" Note: The OP should attempt to authenticate the user with the most secure mode requested. For example, if the OP has determined that their voicebio method is stronger than their password method and the RP requests either "voicebio or password", the OP should strive to authenticate the user by "voicebio" when possible. If the two modes are considered equally strong, then it is the choice of the OP regarding which one or ones to authenticate against. OPs should note that authenticating a user by a non-preferred method may result in an RP denying access. openid.aqe.auth_factor2 Optional: In the case of a multi-factor authentication, the second method that the RP would like the OP to perform. The mode should match one of the advertised values in the XRDS. If this is not specified, then any authentication method is acceptable. If this is not specified, it is assumed that the RP is requesting only a single factor for authentication. The OP will not use the same method for this factor as was used in any previous factors. For example, if the first factor is a password, the second factor cannot also be a password. Value: Comma-delimited list of "none", "password", "pin", "fingerbio", "handbio", "hardotp", "irisbio", "otherbio", "smartcard", "softotp", "voicebio" Note: The OP should attempt to authenticate the user with the most secure mode requested. For example, if the OP has determined that their voicebio method is stronger than their password method and the RP requests either "voicebio or password", the OP should strive to authenticate the user by "voicebio" when possible. If the two modes are considered equally strong, then it is the choice of the OP regarding which one or ones to authenticate against. OPs should note that authenticating a user by a non-preferred method may result in an RP denying access. openid.aqe.auth_factor3 ... you can figure how it would continue. There are very few use cases that would use more than two factors. So, in this case, if you want the user to authenticate with two factors, first with a password and second with a securID or voice biometric print... openid.aqe.auth_factor1 = "password" openid.aqe.auth_factor2 = "hardotp", "voicebio" conversely, if you want two factors, which could be any combination of password, hardotp or voicebio in any combination: openid.aqe.auth_factor1 = "hardotp", "voicebio", "password" openid.aqe.auth_factor2 = "hardotp", "voicebio", "password" the response from the OP, assuming that it followed the request from the RP would look like openid.aqe.auth_factor1 = "password" openid.aqe.auth_factor2 = "hardotp" I would think that this is clear enough that we could make the small change to the spec to allow for this type of methodology. Thoughts? - Avery ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: Mailing List etiquette question.
+1. Don't be shy to speak your mind. On 11/30/06 6:48 PM, Recordon, David [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Gavin, As being one that often floats proposals to the list, I'd encourage people to voice their opinions even if it is just agreeing with someone else. With silence it is hard to know if people agree with you, think you're crazy, don't care, or haven't read it. --David -Original Message- From: Gavin Baumanis [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, November 30, 2006 06:35 PM Pacific Standard Time To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; specs@openid.net Subject:Mailing List etiquette question. Hi everyone, Just a quick question. I was about to send a reply in support of Avery's suggestion, but before I did thought I would ask; Is it appropriate to respond to the list with, Yes - I agree - that seems like a simple / easily implemented solution (in essence adding support to the proposal, allowing all subscribers to gauge the worthiness of the suggestion - yet, not adding in any new information) On the other hand, it almost seems like spamming the list? Thanks. Gavin RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
