Re: Re[2]: Identifier portability: the fundamental issue

2006-10-17 Thread Kevin Turner
On Tue, 2006-10-17 at 13:29 +1000, Chris Drake wrote:
 Now - how comfortable are you with
 the idea of letting 1.5 billion Chinese people use OpenID

Ideally we'd have the input of the SocialBrain Foundation on that.
Those are the folks who put together OpenID.cn.  Has anyone on this list
talked to them at all?


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RE: Re[2]: Identifier portability: the fundamental issue

2006-10-16 Thread Drummond Reed
Chris,

I think you may have me mistaken for somebody else on the list (DR is also
David Recordon). I'm a big fan of IdP-initiated login and privacy protection
in OpenID.

However as much as I think that's an important use case, there's also many
use cases around using a public, omnidirectional identifier. So OpenID
should accommodate both.

=Drummond 

-Original Message-
From: Chris Drake [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Monday, October 16, 2006 8:29 PM
To: Drummond Reed
Cc: 'Martin Atkins'; specs@openid.net
Subject: Re[2]: Identifier portability: the fundamental issue

Hi Drummond,

DR ... if there is any record at all of any association between these
DR two identities, ...

double-blind anonymous authentication solves this problem.  The RP
knows nothing more about you besides:
A) you're authenticated, and/or
B) you've been here before (eg: have signed up for an account)
The IdP knows merely
C) That you wanted to log in somewhere

The RP does not know your ID or even your IdP, and your IdP does not
know what site you logged in to.

I have a working proof-of-concept that I demonstrated to a few people
some months back, let me know if you've not seen it, and I'll send
over the URL

In a nutshell - this relies on uniform nonce formats and asymmetric
cryptography (so the RP and IdP can talk between one another without
making any actual contact - the browser and/or user carry the
authentication payloads forth and back without referrer URLs or any
other info that can link the 2 sites (RP/IdP) together).

Besides all that - the normal use case for an IdP in OpenID world
(remember: decentralized) will be someone running some open-source
code on their own server, so trust in this instance *is* boolean: at
least in so far as if there's anything for someone to not be
trustworthy about themselves for - it won't be the fault of their IdP
code PROVIDING their IdP has provided them with IdP-initiated logins
in order to allow this user to protect their own privacy in the first
place.

Court orders are what I termed 3.5. Authorized exploitation in my
threat list, and insider leaks I called 1.3.6. physical attack of
server resources (eg: server/hosting-facility compromise) - there's
another 98 other threats to keep in mind here as well:-
http://chrisdrake.com/Comprehensive_list_of_Threats_to_Authentication_Proced
ures_and_Data.html

While your example might seem extreme, the consequences are also
extreme (or fatal, if you live someplace like China) - which is why I
take privacy so seriously.  Stick Himalayas video into google news
if you want to watch what Chinese do to their own people when found
trying to visit the Dalai Lama.  Now - how comfortable are you with
the idea of letting 1.5 billion Chinese people use OpenID without
making it easy to help them protect their own privacy ?

There's a big picture here, and it's not about meeting some arbitrary
deadline or saving a day or two of coding work - it's about producing
something that works, and can be deployed ethically.

Take a long hard look at that Nun lying dead in the snow, then tell me
you still believe there's no need for IdP-initiated privacy protection
in OpenID.

Kind Regards,
Chris Drake,
=1id.com


Tuesday, October 17, 2006, 7:29:00 AM, you wrote:

DR +1. Trust is not a boolean. Martin, that's very quotable. Can I
attribute
DR it to you?

DR =Drummond 

DR -Original Message-
DR From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
DR [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf
DR Of Martin Atkins
DR Sent: Monday, October 16, 2006 12:25 PM
DR To: specs@openid.net
DR Subject: Re: Identifier portability: the fundamental issue

DR Chris Drake wrote:
 
 There seem to be a lot of people on this list who want to hate and
 loathe the IdP, and grant all power to the RP.  I do not understand
 this reasoning:  our users will select the IdP they trust and like,
 then they will be using a multitude of possibly hostile RPs
 thereafter: the reverse is simply not true.
 

DR If I'm using one IdP to assert my primary public identity, they can
DR hypothetically develop quite a profile about me. I probably don't mind
DR too much in most cases, because I researched them and found that they
DR are a good provider and won't sell my data out to the bad guys.

DR However, there might be some things I want to do (for example, posting
DR locally-prohibited speech on a public forum) that I don't want attached
DR in any way, shape or form to my public identity. The trust relationship
DR I have with that IdP probably isn't enough for this; if there is any
DR record at all of any association between these two identities, as 
DR friendly as my IdP may be, there is a chance that it will be ceased by
DR court order, or leaked by an insider, which might lead to me getting in
DR serious legal trouble.

DR This is just one (perhaps extreme) example of why my trust in my IdP is
DR not universal and all-encompassing. Trust is not a boolean.


DR ___
DR specs mailing list

Re: Re[2]: Identifier portability: the fundamental issue

2006-10-14 Thread Dick Hardt
On 14-Oct-06, at 7:28 AM, Chris Drake wrote:
 JH Where is power being granted to the RP? It has pretty much none.
 JH It *does* have responsibility, but only as much as is necessary to
 JH make the protocol work.

 If RPs are allowed to build up linked portfolios of everyones
 identifiers, they can get together with other RPs (or sniff IDs in
 google) to snoop on and conspire against our users behind their backs.
 If the true spirit of OpenID is to empower users, it's seriously
 neglectful to block users from protecting their own privacy.

NOTE: There are instances when the user will WANT the RPs to know  
they are the same user across sites. Right now my reputation on a  
site is locked into that site. No other site can know that I have  
done things on other sites, so that I can go to a new site and take  
my reputation with me.

Real world example: when I give a talk, I use the same identifier so  
that people know it is me. I use the same email on different mailing  
lists so people know it is the same person.



 Can we not adopt my earlier suggestion: just ensure OpenID can  
 permit
 IdP-initiated logins.  This permits every scenario of portability  
 (and
 privacy) that everyone wants, without us having to continue to  
 debate
 it ?

 JH Huh? How is IdP-initiated login related to privacy or portability?

 It is ** NONE OF THE RPs BUSINESS ** how the OpenID that got presented
 to it was originally selected by, or resolved for, our Users.  Letting
 the IdP initiate a login allows the IdP to PRIVATELY negotiate with
 the user over which identity to present (which for anyone who cares
 about privacy, will usually be a per-site identity not linked to their
 main OpenID or vanity domain or whathaveyou.).

I completely agree. This was the major issue Sxip had with OpenID  
1.x. The user had to identify themselves with no assistance from  
their IdP, and hence no support for directed identity.

 The beauty of this suggestion is that we don't even need to debate it:
 so long as IdP initiated logins are supported, market forces will then
 decide whether or not privacy and security become widespread in
 OpenID.

As we are building and testing software, it is interesting as to what  
become the common cases. More later. :-)

 I notice the current spec:
 http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0-10.html
 does not even *mention* privacy? (besides the allusion in the
 abstract: It does this without the Relying Party needing access to
 password, email address, or other sensitive information. - but
 somehow nobody's understanding that the users OpenID *itself* is
 sensitive information, especially in the way google will in future
 let anyone troll back through our users online tracks using this
 ID...)

 Also missing are

 16.  Security Considerations

 and

 16.1.  Preventing Attacks

 Perhaps someone should add a section on privacy, and someone should
 take a crack at the security aspects!  Who is in charge of writing
 this stuff?  I've submitted 102 (one hundred and two!!!) security
 considerations in the posts I've made to this list so far:  Shouldn't
 someone be documenting this?

Yes, these things do need to be addressed. Would be great to get  
additional seasoned security gurus to review and comment.

-- Dick
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