Re: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm?
z wrote: I don't see why a realm shouldn't be able to delegate to a return_to URL the same way that a user id can delegate to an OP endpoint. This includes delegating from http to https, or even to a different domain altogether. Over on the XRI TC we've been talking about how to do this securely, e.g., by signing the XRD that does the delegation: http://wiki.oasis-open.org/xri/XrdOne/XmlDsigProfile Dirk. On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 7:43 PM, John Bradley wrote: > Luke, > Realm was called trust_root in 1.1, and is a bit like audience restriction > in SAML. > It is the display version of the return_to, and also used for RP discovery > by the OP. > I am not certain what the problem is with it being https: if the return_to > is https:. > There is explicitly no connection to be inferred by DNS authority between > URI differing in scheme. > Differentiating TLS by its own scheme is a decision we have to live with. > The user should consent to authentication for the site they are logging > into. > http://open.lukesheppard.com and https://open.lukesheppard.com could > be different sites. > If the RP has both HTTP and HTTPS the best practice would be to always use > the https: version for realm so that RP discovery cant be spoofed via DNS. > Regards > John B. > On 13-May-09, at 2:10 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 23:10:38 -0700 > From: Luke Shepard > Subject: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What > about realm? > To: OpenID Specs Mailing List > Message-ID: mailto:c62fb26e.bce7%[email protected]> > > Content-Type: multipart/related; > boundary="_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_"; > type="multipart/alternative" > > --_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: multipart/alternative; > boundary="_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_" > > --_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > > In testing my relying party, it seems clear that the return_to url SHOULD a= > lways be HTTPS. Therefore, then, the realm will always need to be HTTPS as = > well. > > If the return_to is HTTP, then if the response comes in the form of a POST = > from a provider that supports SSL, then the user will see a browser warning= > for posting to an insecure form. > > Here's an example: > > - realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ > - return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php > - provider endpoint: https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/ud > > Let's suppose that the response is too long for a GET redirect, so the prov= > ider chooses to POST (as Google and others sometimes do). > > The user would see a warning like this: > > [cid:3325014638_6495490] > > To preserve the user experience and avoid that popup, relying parties would= > want to make sure their receiver is HTTPS. > > Alternative > > What do you think about loosening the realm/return_to protocol/domain match= > requirements? > > This kinda sucks though, since it means the REALM also must be HTTPS, even = > though the HTTP version would seem to be "canonical". I wonder, would we al= > low an HTTPS return_to if the realm was HTTP? It seems that the HTTP versio= > n of the realm would be better, and should be able to mean "accept either p= > rotocol". Or better yet, you should be able to specify a realm without a pr= > otocol at all. > > Thoughts? > > ___ > specs mailing list > [email protected] > http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs > > = ___ specs mailing list [email protected] http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs ___ specs mailing list [email protected] http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm?
covery > by the OP. > I am not certain what the problem is with it being https: if the return_to > is https:. > There is explicitly no connection to be inferred by DNS authority between > URI differing in scheme. > Differentiating TLS by its own scheme is a decision we have to live with. > The user should consent to authentication for the site they are logging > into. > http://open.lukesheppard.com and https://open.lukesheppard.com could > be different sites. > If the RP has both HTTP and HTTPS the best practice would be to always use > the https: version for realm so that RP discovery cant be spoofed via DNS. > Regards > John B. > On 13-May-09, at 2:10 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 23:10:38 -0700 > From: Luke Shepard > Subject: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What > about realm? > To: OpenID Specs Mailing List > Message-ID: mailto:c62fb26e.bce7%[email protected]> > > Content-Type: multipart/related; > boundary="_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_"; > type="multipart/alternative" > > --_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: multipart/alternative; > boundary="_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_" > > --_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > > In testing my relying party, it seems clear that the return_to url SHOULD a= > lways be HTTPS. Therefore, then, the realm will always need to be HTTPS as = > well. > > If the return_to is HTTP, then if the response comes in the form of a POST = > from a provider that supports SSL, then the user will see a browser warning= > for posting to an insecure form. > > Here's an example: > > - realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ > - return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php > - provider endpoint: https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/ud > > Let's suppose that the response is too long for a GET redirect, so the prov= > ider chooses to POST (as Google and others sometimes do). > > The user would see a warning like this: > > [cid:3325014638_6495490] > > To preserve the user experience and avoid that popup, relying parties would= > want to make sure their receiver is HTTPS. > > Alternative > > What do you think about loosening the realm/return_to protocol/domain match= > requirements? > > This kinda sucks though, since it means the REALM also must be HTTPS, even = > though the HTTP version would seem to be "canonical". I wonder, would we al= > low an HTTPS return_to if the realm was HTTP? It seems that the HTTP versio= > n of the realm would be better, and should be able to mean "accept either p= > rotocol". Or better yet, you should be able to specify a realm without a pr= > otocol at all. > > Thoughts? > > ___ > specs mailing list > [email protected] > http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs > > = ___ specs mailing list [email protected] http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ specs mailing list [email protected] http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm?
Breno, I agree completely RP discovery over https: or with dsig is the best option. I have been pushing people to take RP discovery seriously for some time. Some day we should stop talking about 2.1 and start work. Until then we have to live with a number of "bone-headed" things in 2.0. John B. On 14-May-09, at 1:18 PM, Breno de Medeiros wrote: The realm and return_to URL matching is the most bone-headed part of the whole 2.0 spec. If discovery on the realm were to produce an XRDS document that contains a return_to URL and the return_to URL discovered matches the one present in the authentication request, than this should be considered a match. Prefix matching should be optional in general (MAY) and only mandatory (MUST) _if_ the realm does not support XRDS discovery. We can then separate algorithmic considerations of correctness from security considerations. The current approach in OpenID discovery is not particularly secure and very inflexible. Opening up this issue for discussion by making the above-suggested minimal change can only be a good thing. On Thu, May 14, 2009 at 9:29 AM, John Bradley wrote: Luke, From a URI point of view the two URI are different and it can't be considered steeping up security. I understand that is what would normally happen but it violates some basic principals. It also compromises RP discovery. A wijldcard in the realm may be the better solution. Though you may not want to include matching all protocols. In the other thread we are discussing PPID like identifiers. If they are based on the realm as people are discussing, introducing wildcards etc introduces the question of realm normalization on that side. John Bradley On 14-May-09, at 11:25 AM, Luke Shepard wrote: So, RP delegation sounds like a very general solution to the problem, and seems okay to push for. But I think there’s a much simpler solution that solves the specific problem I described below: RULE: If the realm is http, then the return_to can be either http or https. So this would be legal: realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ return_to: https://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php This would NOT be legal – you can’t go the other way. realm: https://open.lukeshepard.com/ return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php So, the receiver should be allowed to INCREASE its security level from the realm, but not decrease. This is analogous to wildcards for the protocol instead of just subdomain. Another alternative would be to have explicit wildcards for the protocol, or to allow realms with relative protocols, like: explicit wildcard: *://open.lukeshepard.com relative protocol: //open.lukeshepard.com On 5/14/09 7:19 AM, "John Bradley" wrote: I agree that RP delegation should be possible and even desirable. To do that safely the OP needs to do RP discovery over SSL or discover a XRD with detached sig for the RP. Otherwise you open up Man in the Middle attacks. My point was that in the existing spec to prevent interception of tokens and attributes, the Realm that is displayed by the OP to the user needs to match where the assertion is sent. I agree that this is something that should be addressed in openID 2.1 ether for XRD with dsig or via XRDS with TLS. John B. On 14-May-09, at 12:24 AM, Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't see why a realm shouldn't be able to delegate to a return_to URL the same way that a user id can delegate to an OP endpoint. This includes delegating from http to https, or even to a different domain altogether. Over on the XRI TC we've been talking about how to do this securely, e.g., by signing the XRD that does the delegation: http://wiki.oasis-open.org/xri/XrdOne/XmlDsigProfile Dirk. On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 7:43 PM, John Bradley wrote: Luke, Realm was called trust_root in 1.1, and is a bit like audience restriction > in SAML. It is the display version of the return_to, and also used for RP discovery by the OP. I am not certain what the problem is with it being https: if the return_to is https:. > There is explicitly no connection to be inferred by DNS authority between URI differing in scheme. Differentiating TLS by its own scheme is a decision we have to live with. The user should consent to authentication for the site they are logging > into. http://open.lukesheppard.com and https://open.lukesheppard.com could be different sites. If the RP has both HTTP and HTTPS the best practice would be to always use > the https: version for realm so that RP discovery cant be spoofed via DNS. Regards John B. On 13-May-09, at 2:10 AM, [email protected] wrote: > Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 23:10:38 -0700 From: Luke Shepard Subject: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What > about realm? To: OpenID Specs Mailing List Message-ID: mailto:c62fb26e.bce7%25lshep...@face
Re: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm?
The realm and return_to URL matching is the most bone-headed part of the whole 2.0 spec. If discovery on the realm were to produce an XRDS document that contains a return_to URL and the return_to URL discovered matches the one present in the authentication request, than this should be considered a match. Prefix matching should be optional in general (MAY) and only mandatory (MUST) _if_ the realm does not support XRDS discovery. We can then separate algorithmic considerations of correctness from security considerations. The current approach in OpenID discovery is not particularly secure and very inflexible. Opening up this issue for discussion by making the above-suggested minimal change can only be a good thing. On Thu, May 14, 2009 at 9:29 AM, John Bradley wrote: > Luke, > From a URI point of view the two URI are different and it can't > be considered steeping up security. > I understand that is what would normally happen but it violates some basic > principals. > It also compromises RP discovery. > A wijldcard in the realm may be the better solution. Though you may not > want to include matching all protocols. > In the other thread we are discussing PPID like identifiers. If they are > based on the realm as people are discussing, introducing wildcards etc > introduces the question of realm normalization on that side. > John Bradley > > On 14-May-09, at 11:25 AM, Luke Shepard wrote: > > So, RP delegation sounds like a very general solution to the problem, and > seems okay to push for. But I think there’s a much simpler solution that > solves the specific problem I described below: > > RULE: > If the realm is http, then the return_to can be either http or https. > > So this would be legal: > > realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ > return_to: https://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php > > This would NOT be legal – you can’t go the other way. > > realm: https://open.lukeshepard.com/ > return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php > > So, the receiver should be allowed to INCREASE its security level from the > realm, but not decrease. > > This is analogous to wildcards for the protocol instead of just subdomain. > Another alternative would be to have explicit wildcards for the protocol, or > to allow realms with relative protocols, like: > > explicit wildcard: *://open.lukeshepard.com > relative protocol: //open.lukeshepard.com > > > > On 5/14/09 7:19 AM, "John Bradley" wrote: > > I agree that RP delegation should be possible and even desirable. > > To do that safely the OP needs to do RP discovery over SSL or discover a XRD > with detached sig for the RP. > > Otherwise you open up Man in the Middle attacks. > > My point was that in the existing spec to prevent interception of tokens and > attributes, the Realm that is displayed by the OP to the user needs to > match where the assertion is sent. > > I agree that this is something that should be addressed in openID 2.1 ether > for XRD with dsig or via XRDS with TLS. > > John B. > > On 14-May-09, at 12:24 AM, Dirk Balfanz wrote: > > I don't see why a realm shouldn't be able to delegate to a return_to URL the > same way that a user id can delegate to an OP endpoint. This includes > delegating from http to https, or even to a different domain altogether. > Over on the XRI TC we've been talking about how to do this securely, e.g., > by signing the XRD that does the delegation: > http://wiki.oasis-open.org/xri/XrdOne/XmlDsigProfile > > Dirk. > > On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 7:43 PM, John Bradley wrote: >> Luke, >> Realm was called trust_root in 1.1, and is a bit like audience restriction > > in SAML. >> It is the display version of the return_to, and also used for RP discovery >> by the OP. >> I am not certain what the problem is with it being https: if the return_to >> is https:. > > There is explicitly no connection to be inferred by DNS authority between >> URI differing in scheme. >> Differentiating TLS by its own scheme is a decision we have to live with. >> The user should consent to authentication for the site they are logging > > into. >> http://open.lukesheppard.com and https://open.lukesheppard.com could >> be different sites. >> If the RP has both HTTP and HTTPS the best practice would be to always use > > the https: version for realm so that RP discovery cant be spoofed via > DNS. >> Regards >> John B. >> On 13-May-09, at 2:10 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > >> Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 23:10:38 -0700 >> From: Luke Shepard >> Subject: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What > > about realm? >>
Re: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm?
John, By PPID do you mean the InfoCard unique User:RP identifier? Or are you referring to the use of pseudonymous identifiers within OpenID? If the latter, I didn't see the thread that was suggesting that the pseudonymous identifiers match the realm. I would be against that suggestion. The spec requires the RP to do discovery on the pseudonymous identifier to prove that the OP that returned the response is authoritative for the pseudonymous identifier. With this mechanism, the realm should not need to match the identifier. Thanks, George John Bradley wrote: Luke, From a URI point of view the two URI are different and it can't be considered steeping up security. I understand that is what would normally happen but it violates some basic principals. It also compromises RP discovery. A wijldcard in the realm may be the better solution. Though you may not want to include matching all protocols. In the other thread we are discussing PPID like identifiers. If they are based on the realm as people are discussing, introducing wildcards etc introduces the question of realm normalization on that side. John Bradley On 14-May-09, at 11:25 AM, Luke Shepard wrote: So, RP delegation sounds like a very general solution to the problem, and seems okay to push for. But I think there’s a much simpler solution that solves the specific problem I described below: RULE: If the realm is http, then the return_to can be either http or https. So this would be legal: realm: *http*://open.lukeshepard.com/ return_to: *https*://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php This would NOT be legal – you can’t go the other way. realm: *https*://open.lukeshepard.com/ return_to: *http*://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php So, the receiver should be allowed to INCREASE its security level from the realm, but not decrease. This is analogous to wildcards for the protocol instead of just subdomain. Another alternative would be to have explicit wildcards for the protocol, or to allow realms with relative protocols, like: explicit wildcard: *://open.lukeshepard.com relative protocol: //open.lukeshepard.com On 5/14/09 7:19 AM, "John Bradley" wrote: I agree that RP delegation should be possible and even desirable. To do that safely the OP needs to do RP discovery over SSL or discover a XRD with detached sig for the RP. Otherwise you open up Man in the Middle attacks. My point was that in the existing spec to prevent interception of tokens and attributes, the Realm that is displayed by the OP to the user needs to match where the assertion is sent. I agree that this is something that should be addressed in openID 2.1 ether for XRD with dsig or via XRDS with TLS. John B. On 14-May-09, at 12:24 AM, Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't see why a realm shouldn't be able to delegate to a return_to URL the same way that a user id can delegate to an OP endpoint. This includes delegating from http to https, or even to a different domain altogether. Over on the XRI TC we've been talking about how to do this securely, e.g., by signing the XRD that does the delegation: http://wiki.oasis-open.org/xri/XrdOne/XmlDsigProfile Dirk. On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 7:43 PM, John Bradley wrote: > Luke, > Realm was called trust_root in 1.1, and is a bit like audience restriction > in SAML. > It is the display version of the return_to, and also used for RP discovery > by the OP. > I am not certain what the problem is with it being https: if the return_to > is https:. > There is explicitly no connection to be inferred by DNS authority between > URI differing in scheme. > Differentiating TLS by its own scheme is a decision we have to live with. > The user should consent to authentication for the site they are logging > into. > http://open.lukesheppard.com and https://open.lukesheppard.com could > be different sites. > If the RP has both HTTP and HTTPS the best practice would be to always use > the https: version for realm so that RP discovery cant be spoofed via DNS. > Regards > John B. > On 13-May-09, at 2:10 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 23:10:38 -0700 > From: Luke Shepard > Subject: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What > about realm? > To: OpenID Specs Mailing List > Message-ID: mailto:c62fb26e.bce7%[email protected]> > > Content-Type: multipart/related; > boundary="_004_C62
Re: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm?
m so that RP discovery cant be spoofed via DNS. > Regards > John B. > On 13-May-09, at 2:10 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 23:10:38 -0700 > From: Luke Shepard > Subject: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What > about realm? > To: OpenID Specs Mailing List > Message-ID: <mailto:c62fb26e.bce7%[email protected]> > > Content-Type: multipart/related; > boundary="_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_"; > type="multipart/alternative" > > --_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: multipart/alternative; > boundary="_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_" > > --_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > > In testing my relying party, it seems clear that the return_to url SHOULD a= > lways be HTTPS. Therefore, then, the realm will always need to be HTTPS as = > well. > > If the return_to is HTTP, then if the response comes in the form of a POST = > from a provider that supports SSL, then the user will see a browser warning= > for posting to an insecure form. > > Here's an example: > > - realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ > - return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php > - provider endpoint: https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/ud > > Let's suppose that the response is too long for a GET redirect, so the prov= > ider chooses to POST (as Google and others sometimes do). > > The user would see a warning like this: > > [cid:3325014638_6495490] > > To preserve the user experience and avoid that popup, relying parties would= > want to make sure their receiver is HTTPS. > > Alternative > > What do you think about loosening the realm/return_to protocol/domain match= > requirements? > > This kinda sucks though, since it means the REALM also must be HTTPS, even = > though the HTTP version would seem to be "canonical". I wonder, would we al= > low an HTTPS return_to if the realm was HTTP? It seems that the HTTP versio= > n of the realm would be better, and should be able to mean "accept either p= > rotocol". Or better yet, you should be able to specify a realm without a pr= > otocol at all. > > Thoughts? > > ___ > specs mailing list > [email protected] > http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs > > ___ specs mailing list [email protected] http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm?
Luke, From a URI point of view the two URI are different and it can't be considered steeping up security. I understand that is what would normally happen but it violates some basic principals. It also compromises RP discovery. A wijldcard in the realm may be the better solution. Though you may not want to include matching all protocols. In the other thread we are discussing PPID like identifiers. If they are based on the realm as people are discussing, introducing wildcards etc introduces the question of realm normalization on that side. John Bradley On 14-May-09, at 11:25 AM, Luke Shepard wrote: So, RP delegation sounds like a very general solution to the problem, and seems okay to push for. But I think there’s a much simpler solution that solves the specific problem I described below: RULE: If the realm is http, then the return_to can be either http or https. So this would be legal: realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ return_to: https://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php This would NOT be legal – you can’t go the other way. realm: https://open.lukeshepard.com/ return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php So, the receiver should be allowed to INCREASE its security level from the realm, but not decrease. This is analogous to wildcards for the protocol instead of just subdomain. Another alternative would be to have explicit wildcards for the protocol, or to allow realms with relative protocols, like: explicit wildcard: *://open.lukeshepard.com relative protocol: //open.lukeshepard.com On 5/14/09 7:19 AM, "John Bradley" wrote: I agree that RP delegation should be possible and even desirable. To do that safely the OP needs to do RP discovery over SSL or discover a XRD with detached sig for the RP. Otherwise you open up Man in the Middle attacks. My point was that in the existing spec to prevent interception of tokens and attributes, the Realm that is displayed by the OP to the user needs to match where the assertion is sent. I agree that this is something that should be addressed in openID 2.1 ether for XRD with dsig or via XRDS with TLS. John B. On 14-May-09, at 12:24 AM, Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't see why a realm shouldn't be able to delegate to a return_to URL the same way that a user id can delegate to an OP endpoint. This includes delegating from http to https, or even to a different domain altogether. Over on the XRI TC we've been talking about how to do this securely, e.g., by signing the XRD that does the delegation: http://wiki.oasis-open.org/xri/XrdOne/XmlDsigProfile Dirk. On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 7:43 PM, John Bradley wrote: > Luke, > Realm was called trust_root in 1.1, and is a bit like audience restriction > in SAML. > It is the display version of the return_to, and also used for RP discovery > by the OP. > I am not certain what the problem is with it being https: if the return_to > is https:. > There is explicitly no connection to be inferred by DNS authority between > URI differing in scheme. > Differentiating TLS by its own scheme is a decision we have to live with. > The user should consent to authentication for the site they are logging > into. > http://open.lukesheppard.com and https://open.lukesheppard.com could > be different sites. > If the RP has both HTTP and HTTPS the best practice would be to always use > the https: version for realm so that RP discovery cant be spoofed via DNS. > Regards > John B. > On 13-May-09, at 2:10 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 23:10:38 -0700 > From: Luke Shepard > Subject: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What > about realm? > To: OpenID Specs Mailing List > Message-ID: mailto:c62fb26e.bce7%[email protected] > > > Content-Type: multipart/related; > boundary="_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_"; > type="multipart/alternative" > > --_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: multipart/alternative; > boundary="_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_" > > --_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > > In testing my relying party, it seems clear that the return_to url SHOULD a= > lways be HTTPS. Therefore, then, the realm will always need to be HTTPS as = > well. > > If the return_to is HTTP, then if the response comes in the form of a POST = > from a provider that supports SSL, then the user will see a browser warning= > for posting to an insecure form. > > Here's an example: > > - realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ > - return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php > - provider endpoint: ht
Re: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm?
So, RP delegation sounds like a very general solution to the problem, and seems okay to push for. But I think there's a much simpler solution that solves the specific problem I described below: RULE: If the realm is http, then the return_to can be either http or https. So this would be legal: realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ return_to: https://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php This would NOT be legal - you can't go the other way. realm: https://open.lukeshepard.com/ return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php So, the receiver should be allowed to INCREASE its security level from the realm, but not decrease. This is analogous to wildcards for the protocol instead of just subdomain. Another alternative would be to have explicit wildcards for the protocol, or to allow realms with relative protocols, like: explicit wildcard: *://open.lukeshepard.com relative protocol: //open.lukeshepard.com On 5/14/09 7:19 AM, "John Bradley" wrote: I agree that RP delegation should be possible and even desirable. To do that safely the OP needs to do RP discovery over SSL or discover a XRD with detached sig for the RP. Otherwise you open up Man in the Middle attacks. My point was that in the existing spec to prevent interception of tokens and attributes, the Realm that is displayed by the OP to the user needs to match where the assertion is sent. I agree that this is something that should be addressed in openID 2.1 ether for XRD with dsig or via XRDS with TLS. John B. On 14-May-09, at 12:24 AM, Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't see why a realm shouldn't be able to delegate to a return_to URL the same way that a user id can delegate to an OP endpoint. This includes delegating from http to https, or even to a different domain altogether. Over on the XRI TC we've been talking about how to do this securely, e.g., by signing the XRD that does the delegation: http://wiki.oasis-open.org/xri/XrdOne/XmlDsigProfile Dirk. On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 7:43 PM, John Bradley wrote: > Luke, > Realm was called trust_root in 1.1, and is a bit like audience restriction > in SAML. > It is the display version of the return_to, and also used for RP discovery > by the OP. > I am not certain what the problem is with it being https: if the return_to > is https:. > There is explicitly no connection to be inferred by DNS authority between > URI differing in scheme. > Differentiating TLS by its own scheme is a decision we have to live with. > The user should consent to authentication for the site they are logging > into. > http://open.lukesheppard.com and https://open.lukesheppard.com could > be different sites. > If the RP has both HTTP and HTTPS the best practice would be to always use > the https: version for realm so that RP discovery cant be spoofed via DNS. > Regards > John B. > On 13-May-09, at 2:10 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 23:10:38 -0700 > From: Luke Shepard > Subject: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What > about realm? > To: OpenID Specs Mailing List > Message-ID: <mailto:c62fb26e.bce7%[email protected]> > > Content-Type: multipart/related; > boundary="_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_"; > type="multipart/alternative" > > --_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: multipart/alternative; > boundary="_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_" > > --_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > > In testing my relying party, it seems clear that the return_to url SHOULD a= > lways be HTTPS. Therefore, then, the realm will always need to be HTTPS as = > well. > > If the return_to is HTTP, then if the response comes in the form of a POST = > from a provider that supports SSL, then the user will see a browser warning= > for posting to an insecure form. > > Here's an example: > > - realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ > - return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php > - provider endpoint: https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/ud > > Let's suppose that the response is too long for a GET redirect, so the prov= > ider chooses to POST (as Google and others sometimes do). > > The user would see a warning like this: > > [cid:3325014638_6495490] > > To preserve the user experience and avoid that popup, relying parties would= > want to make sure their receiver is HTTPS. > > Alternative > > What do you think about loosening the realm/return_to protocol/domain match= > requirements? > > This kinda sucks though, since it means the REALM also must be HTTPS, even = > though the HTTP version would seem to be &q
Re: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm?
I agree that RP delegation should be possible and even desirable. To do that safely the OP needs to do RP discovery over SSL or discover a XRD with detached sig for the RP. Otherwise you open up Man in the Middle attacks. My point was that in the existing spec to prevent interception of tokens and attributes, the Realm that is displayed by the OP to the user needs to match where the assertion is sent. I agree that this is something that should be addressed in openID 2.1 ether for XRD with dsig or via XRDS with TLS. John B. On 14-May-09, at 12:24 AM, Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't see why a realm shouldn't be able to delegate to a return_to URL the same way that a user id can delegate to an OP endpoint. This includes delegating from http to https, or even to a different domain altogether. Over on the XRI TC we've been talking about how to do this securely, e.g., by signing the XRD that does the delegation: http://wiki.oasis-open.org/xri/XrdOne/XmlDsigProfile Dirk. On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 7:43 PM, John Bradley wrote: > Luke, > Realm was called trust_root in 1.1, and is a bit like audience restriction > in SAML. > It is the display version of the return_to, and also used for RP discovery > by the OP. > I am not certain what the problem is with it being https: if the return_to > is https:. > There is explicitly no connection to be inferred by DNS authority between > URI differing in scheme. > Differentiating TLS by its own scheme is a decision we have to live with. > The user should consent to authentication for the site they are logging > into. > http://open.lukesheppard.com and https://open.lukesheppard.com could > be different sites. > If the RP has both HTTP and HTTPS the best practice would be to always use > the https: version for realm so that RP discovery cant be spoofed via DNS. > Regards > John B. > On 13-May-09, at 2:10 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 23:10:38 -0700 > From: Luke Shepard > Subject: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What > about realm? > To: OpenID Specs Mailing List > Message-ID: > Content-Type: multipart/related; > boundary="_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_"; > type="multipart/alternative" > > --_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: multipart/alternative; > boundary="_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_" > > --_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > > In testing my relying party, it seems clear that the return_to url SHOULD a= > lways be HTTPS. Therefore, then, the realm will always need to be HTTPS as = > well. > > If the return_to is HTTP, then if the response comes in the form of a POST = > from a provider that supports SSL, then the user will see a browser warning= > for posting to an insecure form. > > Here's an example: > > - realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ > - return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php > - provider endpoint: https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/ud > > Let's suppose that the response is too long for a GET redirect, so the prov= > ider chooses to POST (as Google and others sometimes do). > > The user would see a warning like this: > > [cid:3325014638_6495490] > > To preserve the user experience and avoid that popup, relying parties would= > want to make sure their receiver is HTTPS. > > Alternative > > What do you think about loosening the realm/return_to protocol/ domain match= > requirements? > > This kinda sucks though, since it means the REALM also must be HTTPS, even = > though the HTTP version would seem to be "canonical". I wonder, would we al= > low an HTTPS return_to if the realm was HTTP? It seems that the HTTP versio= > n of the realm would be better, and should be able to mean "accept either p= > rotocol". Or better yet, you should be able to specify a realm without a pr= > otocol at all. > > Thoughts? > > ___ > specs mailing list > [email protected] > http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs > > smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ specs mailing list [email protected] http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm?
I don't see why a realm shouldn't be able to delegate to a return_to URL the same way that a user id can delegate to an OP endpoint. This includes delegating from http to https, or even to a different domain altogether. Over on the XRI TC we've been talking about how to do this securely, e.g., by signing the XRD that does the delegation: http://wiki.oasis-open.org/xri/XrdOne/XmlDsigProfile Dirk. On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 7:43 PM, John Bradley wrote: > Luke, > Realm was called trust_root in 1.1, and is a bit like audience restriction > in SAML. > It is the display version of the return_to, and also used for RP discovery > by the OP. > I am not certain what the problem is with it being https: if the return_to > is https:. > There is explicitly no connection to be inferred by DNS authority between > URI differing in scheme. > Differentiating TLS by its own scheme is a decision we have to live with. > The user should consent to authentication for the site they are logging > into. > http://open.lukesheppard.com and https://open.lukesheppard.com could > be different sites. > If the RP has both HTTP and HTTPS the best practice would be to always use > the https: version for realm so that RP discovery cant be spoofed via DNS. > Regards > John B. > On 13-May-09, at 2:10 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 23:10:38 -0700 > From: Luke Shepard > Subject: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What > about realm? > To: OpenID Specs Mailing List > Message-ID: > > > Content-Type: multipart/related; > boundary="_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_"; > type="multipart/alternative" > > --_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: multipart/alternative; > boundary="_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_" > > --_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > > In testing my relying party, it seems clear that the return_to url SHOULD a= > lways be HTTPS. Therefore, then, the realm will always need to be HTTPS as = > well. > > If the return_to is HTTP, then if the response comes in the form of a POST = > from a provider that supports SSL, then the user will see a browser warning= > for posting to an insecure form. > > Here's an example: > > - realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ > - return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php > - provider endpoint: https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/ud > > Let's suppose that the response is too long for a GET redirect, so the prov= > ider chooses to POST (as Google and others sometimes do). > > The user would see a warning like this: > > [cid:3325014638_6495490] > > To preserve the user experience and avoid that popup, relying parties would= > want to make sure their receiver is HTTPS. > > Alternative > > What do you think about loosening the realm/return_to protocol/domain match= > requirements? > > This kinda sucks though, since it means the REALM also must be HTTPS, even = > though the HTTP version would seem to be "canonical". I wonder, would we al= > low an HTTPS return_to if the realm was HTTP? It seems that the HTTP versio= > n of the realm would be better, and should be able to mean "accept either p= > rotocol". Or better yet, you should be able to specify a realm without a pr= > otocol at all. > > Thoughts? > > ___ > specs mailing list > [email protected] > http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs > > ___ specs mailing list [email protected] http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm?
Luke, Realm was called trust_root in 1.1, and is a bit like audience restriction in SAML. It is the display version of the return_to, and also used for RP discovery by the OP. I am not certain what the problem is with it being https: if the return_to is https:. There is explicitly no connection to be inferred by DNS authority between URI differing in scheme. Differentiating TLS by its own scheme is a decision we have to live with. The user should consent to authentication for the site they are logging into. http://open.lukesheppard.com and https://open.lukesheppard.com could be different sites. If the RP has both HTTP and HTTPS the best practice would be to always use the https: version for realm so that RP discovery cant be spoofed via DNS. Regards John B. On 13-May-09, at 2:10 AM, [email protected] wrote: Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 23:10:38 -0700 From: Luke Shepard Subject: Should we recommend that return_to url is always HTTPS? What about realm? To: OpenID Specs Mailing List Message-ID: Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary="_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_"; type="multipart/alternative" --_004_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_" --_000_C62FB26EBCE7lshepardfacebookcom_ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In testing my relying party, it seems clear that the return_to url SHOULD a= lways be HTTPS. Therefore, then, the realm will always need to be HTTPS as = well. If the return_to is HTTP, then if the response comes in the form of a POST = from a provider that supports SSL, then the user will see a browser warning= for posting to an insecure form. Here's an example: - realm: http://open.lukeshepard.com/ - return_to: http://open.lukeshepard.com/openid/receiver.php - provider endpoint: https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/ud Let's suppose that the response is too long for a GET redirect, so the prov= ider chooses to POST (as Google and others sometimes do). The user would see a warning like this: [cid:3325014638_6495490] To preserve the user experience and avoid that popup, relying parties would= want to make sure their receiver is HTTPS. Alternative What do you think about loosening the realm/return_to protocol/ domain match= requirements? This kinda sucks though, since it means the REALM also must be HTTPS, even = though the HTTP version would seem to be "canonical". I wonder, would we al= low an HTTPS return_to if the realm was HTTP? It seems that the HTTP versio= n of the realm would be better, and should be able to mean "accept either p= rotocol". Or better yet, you should be able to specify a realm without a pr= otocol at all. Thoughts? smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ specs mailing list [email protected] http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
