On Sunday 11 Dec 2011 21:36:53 Chris wrote: > > On Sun, 11 Dec 2011 01:04:09 -0500, Chris wrote: > >> [...] > >> I would put money on them taking advantage of zero day exploits > >> and/or the courts to force the Tor project, the Freenet project, the > >> i2p project, or any other similar project to modify the code and > >> insert a back door. Germany did this many years ago with one project > >> and successfully identified a user. It was none of the above projects > >> although the ability to force upon developers code changes that go > >> out to all users has occurred. They were targeting one individual too > >> that appeared to be a fairly low-value target. The only thing that > >> might stop this from happening to other projects is where the > >> developers are operating in one country and the government attempting > >> to force the change is in another. > > > > Another thing that might stop this from happening is open source > > software, and at least a bunch of coders reviewing and signing any code > > before it gets released. (I'm actually not sure how many coders have to > > currently sign -- surely it's not just Toad?) > > It mitigates it to a degree although the concern still exists. For a few > reasons. The party who distributes the binary is going to be ordered not > to reveal the modifications. The main page/download page isn't going to > warn users and that is likely the only information they are going to see > before updating. It becomes newsworthy information though so there is a > slight chance a user who keeps up on this stuff would notice prior to > installation. > > The court could order the source code not be released for the new binary > too. At least not the code that matches the new binary. Then users would > need to actually notice the binary differs from the source code and > disassemble it to find the bug. How many users actually compile it > themselves? How many examine the diffs?
There has been some work towards a way to automatically verify the binary against the source (fortunately java compilation is deterministic!). If this is run by enough people (and assuming people actually review the code!) it could provide a strong safeguard against corrupt release managers. This is a genuine problem because laws likely to be passed in the UK, could well compromise me. If you are interested in running said script let me know and I will give details. I believe it is in the maintenance scripts repository.
signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part.
_______________________________________________ Support mailing list Support@freenetproject.org http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.support Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/support Or mailto:support-requ...@freenetproject.org?subject=unsubscribe
