* on the Thu, Nov 11, 2010 at 11:17:43AM +0100, JIm Romaguera wrote:
Seriously, cert authorities have often delayed outing security holes
from buggy software/hardware manufacturers until they have time to patch
the bug. This has taken sometimes a very long time.
Indeed. This (and the NDA)
Dear Serge
On 11/11/2010 08:22 AM, Serge Droz wrote:
From different third parties we receive a fairly large number of URLs in
.ch/.li ccTLDs which distribute malware. We're talking a few hundred URLs per
week. In a first step SWITCH verifies that this claim is true.
On the first glance, this
On 11.11.2010 09:01, Daniel Kamm wrote:
Dear Serge
On 11/11/2010 08:22 AM, Serge Droz wrote:
From different third parties we receive a fairly large number of URLs in
.ch/.li ccTLDs which distribute malware. We're talking a few hundred URLs per
week. In a first step SWITCH verifies that this
Hello Serge, hello all without Serge,
On Thursday 11 November 2010 08:22:53 Serge Droz wrote:
On 25 November 2010 SWITCH will launch an new initiative to maintain the
high security standards of Swiss websites.
Let me briefly explain what we will do, as it is relevant to the SWINOG
Hi Andre
You did mention AEFV SR784.104. Art 14bis requires Switch to do this:
Die Registerbetreiberin muss einen Domain-Namen blockieren und die
diesbezügliche Zuweisung zu einem Namenserver aufheben:
a.
wenn der begründete Verdacht besteht, dass dieser Domain-Name benutzt wird:
1.
um mit
Hello
Im Auftrag von Andre Oppermann
Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. November 2010 09:55
On 11.11.2010 09:01, Daniel Kamm wrote:
Dear Serge
On 11/11/2010 08:22 AM, Serge Droz wrote:
On the first glance, this seems to be a neat thing. But
then again, who
decides if 'something' is considered
Im Auftrag von Martin Jaggi
Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. November 2010 11:01
You did mention AEFV SR784.104. Art 14bis requires Switch to do this:
Die Registerbetreiberin muss einen Domain-Namen blockieren
und die diesbezügliche Zuweisung zu einem Namenserver aufheben:
a.
wenn der
Hi Serge,
Gotta agree with Olivier, Andre Mike. This is a strange decision and a
strange process (2 weeks to react to this new world order???). Makes me
wonder why such a strange strategy couldn't be extrapolated to where .ch
is disconnected unless some subdomain spreading malware stops
On 11/11/2010 11:01 AM, Martin Jaggi wrote:
You did mention AEFV SR784.104. Art 14bis requires Switch to do this:
Die Registerbetreiberin muss einen Domain-Namen blockieren und die
diesbezügliche Zuweisung zu einem Namenserver aufheben:
a.
wenn der begründete Verdacht besteht, dass
On Thursday 11 November 2010 11:08:16 mailinglis...@p-guhl.ch
wrote:
Besides that: How do you make sure (legally) that any of your
e-mails really got through?
Quite a challenge to send an E-Mail to a domain with non-existent
NS and therefor no MX RRs... Or does switch give me a call? Or
On 11.11.2010 11:36, Daniel Kamm wrote:
On 11/11/2010 11:01 AM, Martin Jaggi wrote:
You did mention AEFV SR784.104. Art 14bis requires Switch to do this:
Die Registerbetreiberin muss einen Domain-Namen blockieren und die
diesbezügliche Zuweisung zu einem Namenserver aufheben:
a.
wenn der
On Thursday 11 November 2010 11:08:16 mailinglis...@p-guhl.ch
wrote:
Besides that: How do you make sure (legally) that any of your
e-mails really got through?
Quite a challenge to send an E-Mail to a domain with non-existent
NS and therefor no MX RRs... Or does switch give me a call? Or
Am 11.11.2010 um 11:36 schrieb Daniel Kamm:
On 11/11/2010 11:01 AM, Martin Jaggi wrote:
You did mention AEFV SR784.104. Art 14bis requires Switch to do this:
Die Registerbetreiberin muss einen Domain-Namen blockieren und die
diesbezügliche Zuweisung zu einem Namenserver aufheben:
a.
Hello Swinogers,
On 25 November 2010 SWITCH will launch an new initiative to maintain the high
security standards of Swiss websites.
Let me briefly explain what we will do, as it is relevant to the SWINOG
community:
From different third parties we receive a fairly large number of URLs in
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