Re: [swinog] cablecom antispam strategy

2004-02-12 Thread Markus Wild
Using the existence or non-existence of an PTR RR for the legitimacy of sending email is completely bogus. Ack. There's _tons_ of cable/DSL links with correct RR pointers that are utter SPAM engines, and judging from the recent reaction to CCs move, a _lot_ of valid MTAs that don't have

Re: [swinog] cablecom antispam strategy

2004-02-12 Thread julien mabillard
Hopefully we will come to some cooperating directions. One that might be the *trust* way, where we deal with x.509 certificate to manage a trust of mta (sharing the policies regarding spam) Kind of mail *peering*. One might be the credit way, where we score mta's, and longer they prove their

Re: [swinog] cablecom antispam strategy

2004-02-12 Thread Daniel Lorch
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 hi | One that might be the *trust* way, where we deal with | x.509 certificate to manage a trust of mta | (sharing the policies regarding spam) | Kind of mail *peering*. Ever looked into Advogato's trust metric? ~