Sam,
The following paragraphs are on how well different authentications address
the security threats for syslog. Masquerade, modification and disclosure are
identified in the draft as primary threats and message stream modification
as secondary threat.
Mutual Authentication:
Masquerade: fully
- Original Message -
From: Sam Hartman [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: tom.petch [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: David Harrington [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 10:44 PM
Subject: Re: [Syslog] An early last call comment on protocol-19
What part of 4646 allows non-ASCII
The description of non-ascii characters in the registry refers to
non-ascii characters in the description field, etc. The subtags are
ascii.
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So, I shouldn't have asked my question and tom shouldn't have replied:
the answer is in the charter.
The threats that this WG will primarily address are modification,
disclosure, and masquerading. A secondary threat is message stream
modification. Threats that will not be addressed by
I recommend that you drop message stream modification if my analysis
[At this point, we're still figuring out what we want to say.
I'm speaking as an individual not an AD.]
of the charter is a correct analysis and we meant for that to apply to
syslog-sign.
I recommend you split out peer entity
