Since strv_* functions handle null arguments, this warning is actually
valid.
src/strv.c: In function ‘strv_copy’:
src/strv.c:68:21: warning: ‘k’ may be used uninitialized in this function
[-Wuninitialized]
---
src/strv.c |4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git
On Fri, 22.04.11 19:55, Josh Triplett (j...@joshtriplett.org) wrote:
The systemd-nspawn manpage lists the various mechanisms used to isolate
the container, and then says Note that even though these security
precautions are taken systemd-nspawn is not suitable for secure
container setups. Many
On Fri, 22.04.11 21:16, Josh Triplett (j...@joshtriplett.org) wrote:
On Sat, Apr 23, 2011 at 11:28:58AM +0800, microcai wrote:
于 2011年04月23日 10:55, Josh Triplett 写道:
The systemd-nspawn manpage lists the various mechanisms used to isolate
the container, and then says Note that even though
On Sat, 23.04.11 13:29, microcai (micro...@fedoraproject.org) wrote:
Ah, good point. So, root inside the container can trivially circumvent
the container that way. Any way to prevent that with current kernel
support, or would fixing this require additional kernel changes to lock
down
On Fri, 22.04.11 15:04, fykc...@gmail.com (fykc...@gmail.com) wrote:
Hi all,
plymouth in Ubuntu 10.04 supports fsck progress report, and also
provides a chance for user to cancel running fsck. How to implement
this feature with systemd and plymouth?
It's actually a really hard problem. For
2011/4/25 Lennart Poettering lenn...@poettering.net:
On Fri, 22.04.11 15:04, fykc...@gmail.com (fykc...@gmail.com) wrote:
Hi all,
plymouth in Ubuntu 10.04 supports fsck progress report, and also
provides a chance for user to cancel running fsck. How to implement
this feature with systemd
]] Lennart Poettering
[...]
| (Consider the container blocking all ports 6000 thus making it
| impossible to run X on the host). But this one is actually not a big
| issue in the end I guess, so let's ignore it here.
X doesn't listen on tcp by default those days, so this shouldn't be a
