Hi Christian,
Any update on this? Tails 2.0 (jessie) has entered beta.
On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 2:59 PM, Christian Medel
wrote:
> I got it to work shortly, and this is the result :
>
>
>
> 2015-10-27 15:36 GMT-04:00 Christian Medel :
>>
>> I get a SHELL crash everytime I activate this extension.
Hi,
[please drop tails-dev@ from the list of recipients when
replying -- thanks!]
Please consider answering the call for testing there:
https://tails.boum.org/news/test_2.0-beta1/
Your help will be very much appreciated :)
Cheers!
--
intrigeri
___
Patrick Schleizer:
> Tails' current implementation...
>
> only spoof the NIC part: yes [1]
> OUI part unchanged: yes [2]
>
> quu9ohch [1]:
>> [...] It is not possible to "blend into the crowd" with a
> "typical-looking" mac address when so many users allow themselves to be
> uniquely fingerprinte
Patrick Schleizer:
> Active probe fingerprinting
> https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/MAC_address/#index6h1
>
> says, No - "No protection against this is implemented yet".
This is still the case.
> but https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/6453 says "yes", 100 % done.
That's just Redmine's
[Sorry for the delay :S]
Patrick Schleizer:
> Tails does verify, that randomly chosen MAC does not equal the real MAC
> by chance.
>
> From tails-spoof-mac [1] (code: [A])
>
>> # There is a 1/2^24 chance macchanger will randomly pick the real MAC
>> # address. We try to making it really unlikely
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Hello
I have reviewed the branch - very nice work; plain and simple. From my
point of view it's perfect, explicit and also in reasonable length.
I just have one single addition to make sure we avoid confusion and
panic among the less techy users. O
[Sorry for the delay :S]
Patrick Schleizer:
> I understand Tails' MAC 'leak prevention' [1] [2] as this... Without
> 'leak prevention', things would happen like this:
>
> a)
>
> 1) system boots
> 2) kernel module loaded
> 3) MAC leaked
> 4) macchanger started
> 5) MAC changed
> 6) NetworkManager