On Thu, 2017-06-01 at 10:18 +0200, intrigeri wrote:
> hi!
>
> anonym:
> > intrigeri:
> > > I'll make the call as the 3.0 release manager if no consensus
> > > emerges,
>
> After re-reading this discussion, it appears that the only people
> substantially affected by this decision (apart of Tails
On Wed, 2013-12-25 at 21:34 +0100, intrigeri wrote:
Hi,
Marco Calamari wrote (24 Dec 2013 11:42:36 GMT) :
After readint the descritpion of this attack (injection attack type
against LUKS-CBC volumes)
http://www.jakoblell.com/blog/2013/12/22/practical-malleability-attack-against-cbc
After readint the descritpion of this attack (injection attack type
against LUKS-CBC volumes)
http://www.jakoblell.com/blog/2013/12/22/practical-malleability-attack-against-cbc-encrypted-luks-partitions/
I check that my persistent partition (built a lot of TAILS
version ago) is of CBC type.
On Sat, 2013-10-05 at 22:17 +0200, intrigeri wrote:
Marco Calamari wrote (05 Oct 2013 17:58:09 GMT) :
One doubt; a corrupted encrypted volume id a really bad thing; is
this feature stable from this standpoint?
At least it's not documented as experimental. I suggest asking the
cryptsetup
On Mon, 2013-10-07 at 12:28 +0200, intrigeri wrote:
Hi Marco,
Marco Calamari wrote (07 Oct 2013 09:38:32 GMT) :
OK, but then GNOME Disks and Nautilus could have a way to this is
a TC volume, please unlock it.
I suspect that I'm wasting the time of list readers.
What I said is in favour
On Sat, 2013-10-05 at 14:43 +0200, intrigeri wrote:
Hi,
irregula...@riseup.net wrote (05 Oct 2013 12:12:09 GMT) :
I made some simple tests in Debian testing to review desktop integration.
Great, thanks! This was enough to motivate me to (procrastinate and)
create tickets for the next
As a fanatic supporter of Tails, I just want to
rememebr how Truecrypt is widely diffused as
easy crossplaform tool.
I do not want to open another big thread about story, doubts,
finding and opinions about Truecrypt, but just to point one question.
We agree that the not-torified browser was
On Sun, 2013-06-30 at 12:54 +0200, intrigeri wrote:
Hi Marco all,
Marco Calamari wrote (27 Jun 2013 05:01:25 GMT) :
We are interested to make preloaded usb keys for use of Globaleaks
application for whisteblowers thru Tails.
I'm glad I read this :)
We simply need to autoconnect
can make changes and prepare a customized version of Tails,
but I woul prefere a lot to stick with the official version
using persistence to do that
Including GlobaLeaks acces in Tails should be, IMHO, a good
enhancement for both application.
May you help in some way?
Thanks. Marco Calamari
When using persistence on USB stick, is there
any automatic or easy way to store preferences like
interface language, keyboard language keymap
in a way they are restored at next reboot?
Thanks. Marco
--
+--- http://www.winstonsmith.org ---+
| il Progetto Winston
On Mon, 2012-11-26 at 15:20 +0200, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
On Mon, Nov 26, 2012 at 3:03 PM, Marco Calamari mar...@marcoc.it wrote:
2) adding a change persistence password in Utility menu
would be a probably cheap but really useful feature.
It would be a misleading feature, since due
On Mon, 2012-11-26 at 14:41 +0100, intrigeri wrote:
2) adding a change persistence password in Utility menu
would be a probably cheap but really useful feature.
Doesn't the GNOME Disk Utility allow to change the LUKS volume
passphrase already? Perhaps what's needed is some
Apart from remembering it (more difficult with age) or reasoning
starting from kernel version, is there any way to know what version of
Tails is in use?
I think that should be evident somewhere; is the base of the
warning system..
But maybe is already there, so pls help me to find ...
On Wed, 2011-07-27 at 12:22 +0200, intrigeri wrote:
Hi,
a...@boum.org wrote (27 Jul 2011 07:36:55 GMT) :
I think it makes a lot of sense to actually switch the devel branch
to the current Tor beta version when it's available. By doing so, we
might notice bugs that other Tor users would
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