Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Dear all,

Congratulations on the 6.2 release. You will find its arm64 port in the usual 
MEGA directory. The images are built on my 6.2-{arm64,asahi,raspi} tags 
(6.2/{arm64,asahi,raspi} branches). This time around the only big changes 
involve the Raspberry images. Let me take a step back first, I'll come back to 
RPi in a moment.


Recently, I came across this issue: 
https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20347. Starting from v6.6 of 
Debian's linux kernel, the kernel modules will be compressed using xz, and as a 
result two build-time hooks (plus one initramfs hook) will misbehave. Now, the 
failure of one of them, 80-block-network, has security implications: since 
80-block-network is unable to find the network drivers' modules anymore (they 
are renamed from *.ko to *.ko.xz), it fails (silently!) to populate 
/etc/modprobe.d/all-net-blocklist.conf - that is, the blocklist used to disable 
networking at Tails's boot. As a result, neither network blocking at boot, nor 
e.g. disabling networking using the Welcome screen, work. Patching this is 
quite simple, and I've already submitted a MR 
(https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/merge_requests/1499). To be very 
clear, x86_64 Tails uses linux 6.1, so it is not affected by this issue.


On the other hand, it so happens that the Raspberry kernel uses module 
compression already in linux 6.1, which is currently in the arm64 images. Thus 
the Raspi 6.1 Tails images are affected by this security issue. To fix it in 
Tails/RPi 6.2, I've already merged !1499 to all my branches (together with the 
uBlock patch which was the subject of previous emails), including those (arm64 
and asahi) which do not use module compression (yet).


For the record, the test suite would have detected this issue easily. In fact, 
it actually did: I came across it while testing (unreleased, unpublished) 
Tails/Asahi builds with linux 6.6 in place of the currently installed 6.5. 
However, the Raspberry images use a non-virtualizable kernel, so I can't run 
the test suite on them. As I said previously, this is unfortunate since the RPi 
images include a decent number of custom Raspberry packages which - as you can 
see - makes testing a necessity.


Best,

NC


P.S.: I believe that an earlier version of the Asahi images was also affected 
by the same issue: it used a non-Debian kernel with compressed modules which 
would trigger the hooks' failure. At that time (before 6.1) I was not using the 
test suite yet. Avoiding these kind of things is the main reason why I switched 
to my own kernel builds, which are just the regular Debian kernel with the 
Asahi patches.
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[Tails-dev] problem with downloading tails

[Dillon Arlo via Tails-dev]

Hi goats,

Just a FYI that there seems to be issues flashing to the drive with 
BalenaEtcher from windows.

I tried with about 5 different UBS - some of different sizes and make.
I tried to use different USB slots.
Then I tried using a different computer.
Same results always. The flash fails right at the end. The USB installs Tails 
partially (you can't use the USB anymore) but can't run it.

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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hi n9iu7pk,

Good to know you were able to build the images! The nvme will surely help, I/O 
is terrible on RPis (but then, this is expected).


So first of all, no, you don't have new images to compare the shasums at the 
moment. I think from now on, unless there are major new features from my part 
which merit early sharing, I will only upload pre-built images on new Tails 
point releases (uploading takes quite some time and a single upload of 2x3 
images takes away around half my available space).


In general, only images built on tagged commits are reproducible. In case you 
don't know (if you do I apologize, I have little knowledge of the Tails 
community), when the commit is not tagged, the /etc/apt/sources.list and 
/etc/apt/sources.list.d/bullseye.list files contain entries like

```
deb http://time-based.snapshots.deb.tails.boum.org/debian-security/2024041403 
bookworm-security main contrib non-free non-free-firmware
```

with last-snapshot timestamps which change multiple times a day (4, I believe). 
However, I must have been lucky enough to start a new 6.2/arm64 build while the 
debian-security snapshot was the same as yours so I got the same sha256sums as 
you! Not so lucky with asahi and raspi, which you had built earlier and I built 
later. Nonetheless, I compared today's contents with yesterday's and can 
confirm that the only difference is precisely those timestamps.


"tests: on raspi image -> 206 fails, 1460 skipped, 342 passed -> 
reproduceable." As you can see, most of the tests are skipped: the raspi image 
never boots (it cannot be virtualized), so it fails early and skips the other 
steps. arm64 and asahi, on the other hand, should work.


Thanks for the estimate. I initially thought that Tails was snapshotting the 
whole debian archive, but soon realized that they don't need to do so since 
when booted the images use the actual live debian archive instead of snapshots. 
Making arm64 snapshots would be far less costly than I initially thought 
(nonetheless, I have no plans to set up my own: the images already contain far 
too many binaries provided by myself!)


Best,

NC


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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Because the issue already has an assignee and I didn't want to be unpolite! :-) 
If groente is reading us and needs it, the patch is in attachment.
>From 8928015f4189fc2bb307343619b5d22bfaf7b28d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: NoisyCoil 
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 20:03:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Refresh uBlock-disable-autoUpdate.diff

---
 .../usr/share/tails/uBlock-disable-autoUpdate.diff  | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/tails/uBlock-disable-autoUpdate.diff b/config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/tails/uBlock-disable-autoUpdate.diff
index 35d1da8229..be244ee7ed 100644
--- a/config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/tails/uBlock-disable-autoUpdate.diff
+++ b/config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/tails/uBlock-disable-autoUpdate.diff
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- /usr/share/mozilla/extensions/{ec8030f7-c20a-464f-9b0e-13a3a9e97384}/ublo...@raymondhill.net/js/background.js	2023-09-27 10:13:51.634749105 +0200
 +++ /usr/share/mozilla/extensions/{ec8030f7-c20a-464f-9b0e-13a3a9e97384}/ublo...@raymondhill.net/js/background.js	2023-08-19 01:01:05.0 +0200
-@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
  const userSettingsDefault = {
  advancedUserEnabled: false,
  alwaysDetachLogger: true,
-- 
2.39.2

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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hi n9iu7pk,

It looks like fixing uBlock is quite trivial, actually, so I did it myself. 
When an upstream patch becomes available I will revert my changes and apply 
that instead. The wip/* branches can now build the images.

I also uploaded the 6.2/* branches. These have exactly the same content as the 
corresponding wip/* branches, the difference being that the arm64/asahi/raspi 
patches are applied directly on top of stable instead of being buried below the 
newer commits, so they're easily identifiable. As stable gets updated I will 
keep rebasing them onto it (and merging the changes to wip/*) until the 6.2 
release, at which point I will freeze them.

Best,

NC
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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hi n9iu7pk,

I can confirm that everything's still alright with DNS redirection. I can 
successfully get the build to the point where it installs the debian packages 
on 6.1/raspi. The error you see is typical of when you're trying to install the 
packages from the original Tails repo. Since I disabled Tail's APT key 
verification, you'll only be able to install packages from the Debian archive 
(or, on the 6.1/raspi branch, from Raspberry's own repo, of which I added the 
key), and if you're not correctly hijacking the DNS and actually connecting to 
the Tails repo the build will fail with that error, it sees the repo is signed 
by Tails and rejects it. Since you said you previously built on the 6.1/raspi 
branch, I assume you are now correctly redirecting 
tagged.snapshots.deb.tails.boum.org as well, like I wrote before. Then I'm not 
sure what your issue could be. Perhaps you could try deleting the apt cache 
like you did the last time you had similar issues?


Asides from this, unfortunately the 6.1 branches will never build again due to 
https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20327. Debian sid's package 
webext-ublock-origin-firefox got updated to v1.57 some time after April 6th and 
the 10-tbb local hook (config/chroot_local-hooks/10-tbb) does not apply one 
patch cleanly anymore. As a result, the 99-zzz_check-for-dot-orig-files local 
hook makes the build fail with the error

```
Checking for .orig files
E: Some patches are fuzzy and leave .orig files around:
/usr/sbin/start-stop-daemon.orig
/usr/share/mozilla/extensions/{ec8030f7-c20a-464f-9b0e-13a3a9e97384}/ublo...@raymondhill.net/js/background.js.orig
E: config/chroot_local-hooks/99-zzz_check-for-dot-orig-files failed (exit 
non-zero). You should check for errors.
```

Since the arm64 builds don't use snapshots, there's no way for me to prevent 
this kind of things. Unfortunately, if packages in Debian get upgraded, old 
builds may well fail. Since the 6.1/* branches are essentially frozen in time, 
I will not patch them. What I can and will do is keep an eye on the 
aforementioned issue and update the wip/* branches so that the fix gets picked 
up ASAP (I already have 6.2/* branches locally, but they will fail to build too 
until the ublock thing is fixed upstream).

BTW a package upgrade, I believe, is also the reason why you didn't obtain the 
same sha256sums when you  built 6.1/raspi. Again due to the lack of arm64 
snapshots, builds are reproducible only if packages are not subject to upgrades 
between an earlier and a later build, unfortunately. I'd bet if you'd compared 
your *.packages file with mine you'd have found differences.


If going ahead you have suggestions on how to improve the patchset feel free to 
tell me! If you find it useful you may even send me MRs on Gitlab, otherwise 
write here or send me a direct email.


En passing, do you happen to know how much space the amd64 Debian snapshots in 
use by Tails take up?


Best,

NC
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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hi n9iu7pk,

Thank you! Happy to hear you were able to build the other images as well.


Talking of reproducibility, I just added two fixup commits to the various 
branches to make the images more reproducible (in the sense of reproducible 
builds). The first one adds timestamps to the contents of /EFI/debian/efi.img 
(efi.img is a FAT image that contains the grub binary and its config file; 
these are responsible for UEFI boot on ISO hybrid images). The second one fixes 
(or rather removes) the BCJ filter used when building the squashfs with xz 
compression. It turns out that the filter which I had selected ("arm") is 
specific to 32-bit arm, cannot be used for 64-bit arm64 (I had never actually 
used xz compression!), and that the "arm64" BCJ filter is not available yet 
neither to mksquashfs nor to the kernel decompression routines (it is in 
xz-utils though, AFAICS). Fun fact: adding kernel support for the arm64 filter 
seems to be part of a recent patchset whose merge is now frozen due to the 
compromise of xz-utils (see https://lkml.org/lkml/2024/3/20/1010).


Thanks to the second commit one can now build tagged arm64 images using the 
following nginx configuration for DNS hijacking + URL redirection:


server {
    server_name time-based.snapshots.deb.tails.boum.org;

    rewrite ^/(debian|debian-security)/[0-9]+(/?.*) http://deb.debian.org/$1$2;
    rewrite ^/torproject/[0-9]+(/?.*) 
http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org$1;
    rewrite ^/[0-9.]+(/?.*) http://deb.debian.org$1;

    location ~ 
^/(debian|debian-security|tails|torproject)/project/trace/(debian|debian-security|tails|torproject)
 {
proxy_pass http://204.13.164.63:80;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Protocol $scheme;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $http_host;
    }

    location ~ ^/tails {
proxy_pass http://204.13.164.63:80;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Protocol $scheme;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $http_host;
    }

    listen *:80;
}

server {
    server_name tagged.snapshots.deb.tails.boum.org;

    rewrite ^/[0-9a-z.-]+/(debian|debian-security)/(.*) 
http://deb.debian.org/$1/$2;
    rewrite ^/[0-9a-z.-]+/torproject/(.*) 
http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/$1;

    listen *:80;
}


Note the addition of tagged.snapshots.deb.tails.boum.org, which you must 
redirect to your webserver too (e.g. via /etc/hosts) to be able to build tagged 
images. Also, as I've already told you in a private email, I am now also 
redirecting to Tor's debian repository, which does support arm64.


Non-tagged images have snapshot timestamps in their apt sources, which spoils 
reproducibility (debian-security's snapshot timestamp, in particular, gets 
updated every day AFAICS). Thanks also to the timestamping of efi.img's 
contents, tagged arm64 images should on the other hand be reproducible during 
the time frame in which the packages downloaded from the Debian archive don't 
change: if you're lucky enough to build two arm64 images with the same package 
versions, then those images should be identical byte-for-byte. Of course, this 
is not actual reproducibility (which would need actual snapshots for the arm64 
component of the Debian archive so that the images are forever reproducible), 
but still, it's better than nothing.

I created three new branches, 6.1/arm64, 6.1/asahi and 6.1/raspi, which contain 
the same source code as their current wip/* analogue, but with the commits 
squashed and a tag (6.1-arm64, 6.1-asahi and 6.1-raspi) applied at the end of 
them. I do not plan to modify the content of those branches, which you may thus 
consider as arm64 6.1 "releases" of my developer preview. The binary images 
built on the 6.1-* tags are in the usual MEGA folder. If you happen to build 
images on those tags in the near future, and the contents of the *.packages 
files are the same (which is essential to reproducibility), please let me know 
if you obtain the same sha256sums!


The tagged arm64 and asahi images don't pass one more test scenario, "APT 
sources are configured correctly", because of a failure in the very last step, 
where it is checked that the deb.tails.boum.org distribution in its 
apt.sources.d list file ("6.1", in our case) matches the build's git tag 
("6.1-arm64" or "6.1-asahi" or "6.1-raspi"). In theory I could make it so that 
the contents of the apt sources file match the git tag (e.g. by actually 
defining a new release version), but I believe this would make things works 
since deb.tails.boum.org does not provide "6.1-arm64" or "6.1-asahi" or 
"6.1-raspi&

Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

I forgot to say that you must also build your own Tor Browser for arm64, since 
the one which you'll find in the images is built by myself as well. These are 
the 3 Tor Browser for arm64 repos I'm aware of:

- Heikki Lindholm's: https://notabug.org/holin/tor-browser-build (he's been 
building arm64 releases for years now)
- my fork of Heikki Lindholm's repository: 
https://gitlab.com/NoisyCoil/tor-browser-build (very similar to the above 
except for minor technical differences; this is the one which I use for the 
13.0.x series in the Tails images)
- another one by me: https://gitlab.torproject.org/NoisyCoil/tor-browser-build 
(rewritten from scratch, only builds 13.5 alphas and nightlies, so this is not 
in use in Tails at the moment. There is an ongoing attempt to merge this 
upstream to provide official arm64 builds, see here: 
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/merge_requests/920)

Best,

NC
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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hi there.

If I were to speak as if I didn't build the images, I would tell you that you 
should NOT consider the prebuilt images as secure. Those are developer 
previews, not (yet) reproducible, uploaded by a random person on the internet. 
Even if that person is me, it would make no sense to trust me. What you can do 
to trust the images is building them yourself from source after reviewing the 
latter. Building the generic arm64 and Raspberry images is fairly easy 
(although it will take some time and you will need to hack your own DNS 
resolution to redirect from the Tails debian repository to the Debian archive, 
in order to obtain the arm64 packages), not quite so for the asahi images, 
because those use custom-built kernel and mesa drivers which are not available 
upstream. This means you must

1. build the kernel and mesa drivers
2. create your own debian repository (the image building process uses my own 
debian repository), upload them there and modify the Tails source code to use 
your own repository (the last part being the easiest one)
3. most importantly, the toolchain (compilers and the likes) for building the 
kernel and mesa drivers is NOT available in the Debian archive because both the 
asahi kernel and mesa drivers use versions of rust and the likes which are not 
available for bookworm, so you must also build the toolchain first. This means 
building roughly half of the debian packages hosted at 
https://gitlab.com/debian-asahi-nc (the other half is for debian testing) and 
then use those to compile the kernel and mesa drivers.

To be clear, the source code for building the arm64 Tails images is 100% 
publicly available. It is hosted at:

- https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/noisycoil/tails (wip/arm64, wip/asahi and 
wip/raspi branches: the actual arm64 Tails source code)
- https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/ 
<https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/noisycoil/gdm>noisycoil/gdm (a patched version 
of GNOME's GDM which is needed to make the automated test suite work on arm64 
and is installed in all recent images)
- https://deb.tails.boum.org/ (contains the debian source packages for various 
binary packages which have been modified for Tails itself and I rebuild 
verbatim for arm64. This is from Tails itself)
- https://gitlab.com/debian-asahi-nc (asahi kernel, mesa drivers and toolchain 
to build them)


But to set up the build infrastructure (DNS redirection, custom Tails packages, 
and Asahi packages if you need those) you'll need to work a bit. If you are 
interested you can write to me either here on the mailing list or in private.

At some point I think I will document the build process step-by-step, which I 
somewhat did on the mailing list, but in a non-systematic way.

Best,

NC
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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Ah, alright, I was made aware of the retagging by reading on xmpp, where it was 
also mentioned that there had been a last-minute commit, so I thought the two 
things were one-off and related. It's the first time I follow a release almost 
live, the next time I'll know I must wait! No problem by the way.

31 mar 2024, 13:40 da ano...@riseup.net:

> On 29/03/2024 20.53, NoisyCoil via Tails-dev wrote:
>
>> en passing, to whoever caused the 6.1 retagging fuzz, I lost a full day
>> of testing work because of that, I hate you. Kidding <3
>>
>
> Actually this happens every single release, where there is a ~1 hour window 
> where you can fetch this to-be-overwritten tag. We know this isn't ideal, and 
> have been lazy about fixing this for years, but I just filed an issue 
> describing a pretty simple fix that I think we can put in use for Tails 6.2: 
> https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20314
>
> Sorry for the inconvenience! <3
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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hi n9iu7pk,

I had no issues rebuilding the Tails packages for arm64 from the source 
packages in the Tails debian repository, at least for the very few packages 
that are currently there. If I had modified the sources I think I would have 
remembered (and I would have published the modified sources), so I don't think 
I did. If you need help with a specific package just ask away.

Yes, I don't think hosting arm64 snapshots would be much different from x86_64. 
Versions would already coincide, as Debian usually builds the same versions for 
all archs at a given time.

I'm not sure I understand what you were saying about base_branch, all I did is 
I rebased the arm64 patchset onto the stable branch, and more specifically over 
the 6.1 tag (en passing, to whoever caused the 6.1 retagging fuzz, I lost a 
full day of testing work because of that, I hate you. Kidding <3). Those have 
stable as their base_branch. Previously the arm64 patches were applied to "a" 
devel branch (not even "the" devel branch), namely feature/bookworm, which is 
not there anymore having long been merged to stable.

Best,

NC
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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Dear all,

I rebased the arm64 patches onto v6.1, marking the first build of the Tails for 
arm64 developer preview that's aligned with a stable release (you can find the 
images in the usual MEGA shared folder). In addition to the rebase, there are a 
number of new additions to the patchset, the most important being that I 
implemented the changes needed to run the automated test suite on the arm64 
proper (wip/arm64 branch) and asahi (wip/asahi branch) builds. So I'm happy to 
announce that the arm64 and asahi builds pass each and every single test 
scenario, except (of course) for those which depend on Tails infrastructure. 
Unfortunately, the Raspberry kernels are not virtualizable in the usual way 
(for starters, they lack every virtio driver), so I could not get the test 
suite to run on those.

More details and a description of the other changes in what follows.


*** Automated test suite ***

In order to run the automated test suite on the arm64 images, I had to overcome 
quite a few obstacles.

- First, I had to make the ISO images bootable via UEFI, which I hadn't done 
yet. For the record, I don't think ISO images are of much use in the arm64 
world.

- Second, it turns out that systems which boot via UEFI (like virtualized arm64 
systems) do not support internal snapshots, so I had to come up with an 
implementation of external snapshots for the Tails test suite. External 
snapshots can be activated via the undocumented `--external-snapshots` option 
to `run_test_suite`, and they completely replace internal snapshots when 
activated. Be warned that new step definitions that make creative use of 
snapshots may well break my implementation of external snapshots, as this is 
only guaranteed to work with the step definitions which are currently defined.

- Third, there is an annoying bug in GDM that makes arm64 VMs logout whenever 
`udevadm settle` or the likes is called. I had already noted this behavior in a 
previous email, but hadn't identified the cause yet (again, the behavior is 
specific to arm64 VMs only, although the bug itself exists for every arch and 
all hardware). Since the logouts heavily interfere with the tests' flow, I had 
to install a patched version of GDM in the images. The patch was fortunately 
already available in GDM v45, so I just had to backport it to v43. The source 
code for the patched GDM is at https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/noisycoil/gdm, and 
you can find the debian source and binary packages in the usual MEGA shared 
folder.

- Fourth, there is another annoying bug in arm64 qemu that makes it so plymouth 
doesn't work on arm64 VMs. Again this conflicts with the tests' flow. 
Fortunately, adding a couple of kernel parameters at boot time (within the 
testing logic itself, i.e. along with "autotest_never_use_this_option" etc.) 
fixes this.

- Fifth, arm64 VMs apparently cannot be booted via SATA CDROM drives, but only 
via SCSI CDROM drives, so on the one hand I had to define a domain for SCSI 
CDROM drives and use that for arm64, and on the other hand I had to include the 
virtio_scsi kernel module in the image's initramfs.

- Sixth, a number of checks, especially those related to syslinux and to 
installing Tails upgrades, do not apply to arm64. I had to disable those for 
arm64. Also, Tails tests only use UEFI boot, never MBR.

- Seventh, I found a bug and a soon-to-become bug in the test suite which 
directly impacted the arm64 tests (more precisely the wip/asahi tests). I have 
filed related bug reports and fixes have already been worked out by segfault. 
They will be probably released in v6.2 (one of them was already merged into 
stable), but in the meantime I backported them to the v6.1 arm64 build 
branches. These are https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20277 
and the now closed https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20276.

- Finally, I had to rebuild Tails' patched version of virt-viewer for arm64 and 
install it in my testing machines, which I did, and, again, you can find the 
source and binary debian packages in the usual MEGA shared folder.


You will find further details and references about these issues in the commit 
messages themselves. The Tails arm64 tests can be run by passing the `--arm64` 
option to `run_test_suite`, which makes the test suite use the correct default 
machine (features/domains/default-arm64.xml) and CDROM domains, implicitly 
enables `--external-snapshots`, disables the syslinux and Tails upgrade checks, 
enables UEFI unconditionally, passes the correct boot parameters, etc. These 
are technical changes which are essential to make the test suite run in the 
first place.

Beware that an 8GB RPi5 is already not quite powerful enough to run the tests 
cleanly (because of slow I/O, I would guess). The tests will indeed run 
(provided you set the GIC version to 2 in features/domains/default-arm64.xml) 
and most of them will pass, but for each run you can expect ~ 5-10% scenarios 
to ran

[Tails-dev] Release schedule for Tails 6.2

[groente via Tails-dev]

Hi,

Anonym will be the RM for Tails 6.2

The current plan is:
 - Monday, April 22nd: build images, start testing
 - Tuesday, April 23rd: releasing

@testers, please let the RM know how much time you'll have for manual QA
from Monday 17:00 to Tuesday 11:00 (Europe/Berlin)

Cheers,
groente
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[Tails-dev] Tails report for February 2024

[bokonon via Tails-dev]

*Tails report for February 2024* <https://tails.net/news/report_2024_02/>


 Highlights

Despite the bonus day this year, February flew by pretty quickly! Here's 
what we were up to:


 *

   We ended February more resilient and collaborative than when we
   started. We have new tooling to make it easier to work on shared
   documents, and use XMPP more effectively. We also worked to
   strengthen our front-end services and set up the back-end
   infrastructre to build redundancies into our services.

 *

   In 2021 and 2022, our usability tests with human rights defenders in
   Mexico and Brazil
   <https://tails.net/news/improving_in_latam/index.en.html> prompted
   several improvements in the installation instructions for Tails.
   Fixing 16 of the identified usability issues were remaining, and we
   fixed them all this month. These tests, experiences, and
   improvements will greatly shape our future trainings.

 *

   We finished updating our website for Tails 6.0. Check out the
   rewritten recommendation on secure deletion
   <https://tails.net/doc/encryption_and_privacy/secure_deletion/index.en.html>.



 Releases

 Tails 6.0 is out <https://tails.net/news/version_6.0/index.en.html>!

Tails 6.0 is the first version of Tails based on Debian 12 ("bookworm"), 
and is the sexiest, slickest, and sleekest Tails yet. It brings:


 *

   several important security updates: more robust error detection for
   the Persistent Storage, protections against malicious USB devices,
   and Diceware word lists in Catalan, German, Italian, Portuguese, and
   Spanish

 *

   some more usability features: new light modes—dark, night, and a
   combination of both; easier screenshoting and screencasting; and
   easier Gmail configuration in Thunderbird

 *

   and, updated version of most of the applications in Tails

To know more, check out the Tails 6.0 release notes 
<https://tails.net/news/version_6.0/index.en.html> and the changelog 
<https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog>. 
Thank you to everyone who helped us out by testing the release candidate 
<https://tails.net/news/test_6.0-rc1/>.



 Metrics

Tails was started more than 806,714 times this month. That's a daily 
average of over 27,817 boots.
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Re: [Tails-dev] Release schedule for Tails 6.1

[groente via Tails-dev]

Hey,

> We have no yet decided who will be the RM for Tails 6.1.

That will be me!

> The current plan is:
>  - Monday,  2024-03-25: build images, start testing
>  - Tuesday, 2024-03-26: releasing

This is still the plan.

The code freeze starts on Mon Mar 25 06:00:00 UTC 2024, and will end once the
release is public. During the code freeze, please do not merge anything into
the `stable` branch unless I have agreed to it!

Cheers,

groente
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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hi N9iu7pk!

Good to know you managed to build the image, you're the first person to confirm 
it works! While I finish working on some quite exciting new features (I'm 
almost there but need to polish some stuff), let me give you some advice and 
provide some comment.

- If you are running the image on a RPi5, then you could as well build it there 
(unless you have a good reason not to). This is what I am doing right now, as 
natively building Tails on a 8GB RPi5 is MUCH faster than building it on a 
16-core 32-threads 64GB AMD machine. I'm talking 1.5hr tops (often less) on 
RPi5 vs. even 13 hrs on amd64.

- What you're saying about debian-security sounds weird to me. I never had 
issues accessing the debian-security repo via http, neither in general nor 
during Tails builds. E.g. a plain `curl 
http://deb.debian.org:80/debian-security/dists/bookworm-security/Release 
<http://deb.debian.org/debian-security/dists/bookworm-security/Release>` works.

- Yes, you picked the right branch. I am working on rebasing everything on 
stable (with new features), so a big rebase is coming soon, but the new branch 
names will still be wip/arm64, wip/asahi and wip/raspi. 'stable' and 'devel' 
are just (probably non-up-to-date versions of) Tails' regular stable and devel, 
with no arm64-related changes.

- I never had certificate/sources issues, but I've been building on the stable 
branch (see above) for at least a couple of weeks now, so it may be that 
something broke in the meantime on the old devel-based branches.

- arm64 builds are not supposed to work on x86_64 without any build options. In 
theory not having build options on x86_64 machines would simply build an x86_64 
version of Tails. However,

    1. the Asahi and RPi branches need changes that are so relevant (e.g. to 
the apt sources) that would require a big re-write of auto/config to maintain 
compatibility with x86_64 builds, and I didn't want to do those re-writes 
arbitrarily (i.e. without the prospect of actually merging those changes)

    2. x86_64 builds on the arm64 branches could be broken in other ways, e.g. 
by the packages in config/chroot_local-packages, or even because I overlooked 
something while enabling cross-builds. Before uploading the stable-based 
branches I'll try and see if something needs to and can be fixed in this 
respect (in theory the wip/arm64 branch could build regular x86_64 images). In 
any case, keep in mind that the arm64 changes are nowhere near to be merged 
(neither from my part nor from the Tails side), so it's fine if they break 
x86_64 builds for now, so long as they don't do so intentionally, and if the 
breakage is fixed when possible

- systemd-sysctl.service failing: this is a known (by me) issue. It is due to 
the "CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX" kernel configuration variable. For Debian's 
standard arm64 (and amd64) kernel it equals 32, for Asahi 16k pages kernels 
it's 31, it's 30 for the 4k pages 64-bit RPi kernel, and it's 24 for the RPi5 
16k pages kernel. systemd-sysctl.service tries to set `mmap_rnd_bits` to 32 as 
specified in /etc/sysctl.d/mmap_aslr.conf, so it fails on every kernel except 
for vanilla Debian's standard arm64 kernel (i.e. on the wip/arm64 branch). I've 
already fixed this in the Asahi images (not pushed yet) but not in the RPi 
ones. Thanks for letting me know so I could look into it! A fix will be coming 
soon.

- I noticed the freezing issue too. It only happens on RPi, never saw that on 
Apple Silicon nor on arm64 VMs (wip/arm64 branch). Also, it doesn't happen 
always. This makes me think the freeze may be due to some sort of race 
condition triggered e.g. by RPi being overload at boot time. Also it looks like 
this: https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20227. If it was 
already fixed in mainline Tails, then the fix is probably not merged to my 
public branches yet (but will soon be).


I agree that a double image (two squashfs) is very appealing, but making it 
would require a full re-write of the image-building process, so I'm not sure 
I'm willing to waste time on that at this time. I explicitly talk about waste 
not because it is useless in principle (it is not, of course), but because the 
changes would be so radical that making them arbitrarily, without the 
involvement of Tails maintainers and/or without actual plans for merging them, 
would essentially amount to a waste.

Instead, for the time being, I'd like to make sure that everything works 
properly and that whatever needs to be upstreamed is upstreamed. Do I hear 
official support for the Tor Browser on arm64 
(https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/merge_requests/920)?
 Do I hear Tails automatic test suite?

More to come soon.

NC
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[Tails-dev] E-mails from our GitLab are not being delivered correctly

[tails-sysadmins]

Hello, dear contributors!

You may all be affected by this and may not be notified in other ways,
so I decided to post here:

E-mails from our GitLab are not being delivered correctly
https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/sysadmin/-/issues/18071

Big thanks for your time, efforts and patience! <3

-- 


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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails-dev Digest, Vol 165, Issue 13

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hi Ben,

I thought it was understood we're talking about two separate squashfs 
filesystems - one for each architecture -, hence double the size. I don't see 
how the binaries for two different architectures could coexist on the same 
root. Perhaps you could heavily tweak live-boot (again, I think this is the 
right component but I'm not sure) so as to overlay the content of different 
squashfs's over the same root? Of course, you should also heavily tweak 
live-build to build such an image.

For the record, I like the idea too, I think it's cool. But perhaps we should 
first focus on if and how to bring Tails on arm64 :-)

NC
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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails-dev Digest, Vol 165, Issue 13

[Ben Westgate via Tails-dev]

> - It would double the size of the image, uselessly or almost so for most users

This is unlikely. The uncompressed `/usr/share` folder in Tails is 1.2 GB this 
is architecture independent data.
 
https://refspecs.linuxfoundation.org/FHS_3.0/fhs/ch04s11.html

The total unsquashed size is 4.1 GB, so possible image size increases 70%, but 
likely arch-dependent software compresses well with its other arch pair.

> Create a lot of issues as soon as, e.g., the system starts to store 
> arch-dependent files as dotfiles (think of caches or binary config files!), 
> and good luck to who has to deal with that.

Arch-dependent application files and dotfiles could be written to the 
Persistent Storage with permissions so only the current arch can read them.
Applications complying with XDG Base Directory Specification or FHS 3.0 will 
require no intervention, besides needing to install the software for both 
arches during separate sessions, although installing both (if both exist) could 
be automated.
https://specifications.freedesktop.org/basedir-spec/basedir-spec-latest.html

I quite like the cross-arch medium, it's ambitious but very useful.

Sent with Proton Mail secure email.

On Tuesday, February 20th, 2024 at 1:10 PM, tails-dev-requ...@boum.org 
 wrote:

> Send Tails-dev mailing list submissions to
> tails-dev@boum.org
> 
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> https://www.autistici.org/mailman/listinfo/tails-dev
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> tails-dev-requ...@boum.org
> 
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> tails-dev-ow...@boum.org
> 
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Tails-dev digest..."
> 
> 
> Today's Topics:
> 
> 1. Re: Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)
> (noisyc...@tutanota.com)
> 2. Tor Browser 13.0.10 (Android, Windows, macOS, Linux)
> (Richard Pospesel)
> 3. Re: Release schedule for Tails 6.0 (anonym)
> 
> 
> --
> 
> Message: 1
> Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 20:21:48 +0100 (CET)
> From: noisyc...@tutanota.com
> To: "David A. Wheeler via Tails-dev" tails-dev@boum.org
> 
> Cc: The Tails public development discussion list tails-dev@boum.org,
> 
> "David A. Wheeler" dwhee...@dwheeler.com
> 
> Subject: Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple
> Silicon)
> Message-ID: nr1oieq--...@tutanota.com
> 
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Hi David,
> 
> Yes, I thought you'd already mentioned that. The quite long email I sent last 
> week detailing some of the differences between the Apple Silicon and 
> Raspberry Pi builds was also in response to you.
> 
> Something which I didn't address there is the possibility of cross-arch (!) 
> images. Although I believe literally no distribution in human history has 
> attempted something like this, I think that, paradoxically, building an 
> arm64+x86_64 live image of Tails might be easier than building an image that 
> works properly on two arm64 platforms with conflicting software requirements. 
> If two platforms, one x86_64 and one arm64, boot via grub-efi at?UEFI's 
> removable path, then the latter is different for the two architectures 
> (EFI/BOOT/BOOTAA64.EFI for arm64 and EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI for x86_64), so the 
> two boot paths wouldn't conflict with each other and could coexist on the 
> same medium. Each version of grub could then be configured to load the kernel 
> and initramfs for its architecture, and live-boot (I think this is the right 
> component) could be configured (or tweaked) to load the squashfs filesystem 
> from an arch-specific path.
> 
> As for persistence, one could keep the behavior of arch-dependent and 
> arch-independent files separate. For instance, one could share dotfiles, 
> network configurations, greeter settings, etc. between architectures and 
> create two separate "additional software" repositories on persistence 
> storage, one for each arch.
> 
> 
> A few downsides to this approach:
> 
> - It would double the size of the image, uselessly or almost so for most users
> - It would require an almost-complete rewrite of the image-building process 
> (live-build is unable to build this kind of arch-hybrid image)
> - It still doesn't solve the issue of software incompatibilities between 
> different arm64 hardware (see one of my previous emails for details on this), 
> which of course has a higher priority and may not have a solution at all
> - Sure as hell it would create a lot of issues as soon as, e.g., the system 
> starts to store arch-dependent files as dotfiles (think of caches or binary 
> con

Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hi David,

Yes, I thought you'd already mentioned that. The quite long email I sent last 
week detailing some of the differences between the Apple Silicon and Raspberry 
Pi builds was also in response to you.

Something which I didn't address there is the possibility of cross-arch (!) 
images. Although I believe literally no distribution in human history has 
attempted something like this, I think that, paradoxically, building an 
arm64+x86_64 live image of Tails might be easier than building an image that 
works properly on two arm64 platforms with conflicting software requirements. 
If two platforms, one x86_64 and one arm64, boot via grub-efi at UEFI's 
removable path, then the latter is different for the two architectures 
(EFI/BOOT/BOOTAA64.EFI for arm64 and EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI for x86_64), so the 
two boot paths wouldn't conflict with each other and could coexist on the same 
medium. Each version of grub could then be configured to load the kernel and 
initramfs for its architecture, and live-boot (I think this is the right 
component) could be configured (or tweaked) to load the squashfs filesystem 
from an arch-specific path.

As for persistence, one could keep the behavior of arch-dependent and 
arch-independent files separate. For instance, one could share dotfiles, 
network configurations, greeter settings, etc. between architectures and create 
two separate "additional software" repositories on persistence storage, one for 
each arch.


A few downsides to this approach:

- It would double the size of the image, uselessly or almost so for most users
- It would require an almost-complete rewrite of the image-building process 
(live-build is unable to build this kind of arch-hybrid image)
- It still doesn't solve the issue of software incompatibilities between 
different arm64 hardware (see one of my previous emails for details on this), 
which of course has a higher priority and may not have a solution at all
- Sure as hell it would create a lot of issues as soon as, e.g., the system 
starts to store arch-dependent files as dotfiles (think of caches or binary 
config files!), and good luck to who has to deal with that


In the end it would probably be easier to make "Backup Persistent Storage" 
selective and allow the user to backup arch-independent files to a USB drive 
hosting a version of Tails for a different arch.

Best,

NC
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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[David A. Wheeler via Tails-dev]

> On Feb 18, 2024, at 9:03 AM, NoisyCoil via Tails-dev  
> wrote:
> TLDR; All Tails-specific apps now work on arm64 (with two minor "not-my-bug" 
> caveats). You can now cross-build Tails for arm64 on an x86_64 machine.

I think it'd be nice to have an ARM version of Tails, at least one that ran on 
Raspberry Pis & ARM Macs.
Bonus points if the same image could run on that *or* x86, as then people would 
be able to use
"the machine available to them". Then users could use a wide variety of 
machines.
(You might have to re-download any specialized apps installed on the
Persistent Storage for the "not currently loaded architecture.)

Whether or not doing that is *worth* the effort is obviously debatable, but I 
thought I'd raise it.

--- David A. Wheeler
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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Dear all,

I have some exciting news.

TLDR; All Tails-specific apps now work on arm64 (with two minor "not-my-bug" 
caveats). You can now cross-build Tails for arm64 on an x86_64 machine.


First, as of my last commits, Tails Cloner now works on all my arm64 branches. 
This means that, with two exceptions (see ahead), all user-facing 
Tails-specific applications - namely Tails Cloner, Persistent Storage, Back Up 
Persistent Storage, Tails Documentation, WhisperBack -, plus the Tor Browser 
(the unofficial build) and OnionShare (factoring out the known bugs) now work 
on arm64. As for the other applications, I have not spent much time checking 
them one-by-one yet, so I can't promise anything, but in general they seem in 
good state.

The two exceptions to the above could be classified as "not my bug":

1. WhisperBack crashes at startup on Apple Silicon only. I believe this should 
be fixed upstream (I mean in the main Tails repos) so I've filed a bug 
(https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20200) and drafted a quick 
fix (https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/merge_requests/1410).

2. Creation of persistent storage misbehaves when running Tails in an arm64 VM. 
Hardware platforms (i.e. Apple Silicon and RPi) are not affected by this issue, 
nor are x86_64 VMs (I tested your Tails 6.0-rc1 build).
More precisely, when running in a VM, GDM restarts while creating persistent 
storage. The Tails greeter thus re-appears, and if you try to get past that the 
GNOME session doesn't go back to where it was. Persistent storage is still 
created correctly (the application runs to completion in the background!), but 
at that point there's not much you can do other than restart the VM. After 
restarting, everything works fine (including persistence).
I have determined that this is due to the "udevadm trigger" command internally 
run by tails-persistent-storage, and that this is not Tails specific: even on a 
vanilla Debian Bookworm arm64 installation, a VM will log out of the user 
session when "udevadm trigger" is called (but there's no Tails greeter workflow 
in vanilla Debian, so there you can just re-login). Since you already have 
https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20020, I will not address 
this issue at this moment.


The second and most exciting news is you can now cross-build Tails for arm64 on 
an x86_64 machine! Keeping in mind that you still need to hijack your DNS to 
download the arm64 packages, to build an arm64 version of Tails on x86_64:

- install the "binfmt-support", "qemu-user-static", "qemu-system-arm" and 
"qemu-efi-aarch64" Debian packages: sudo apt-get install -y binfmt-support 
qemu-user-static qemu-system-arm qemu-efi-aarch64
- include "crossarm64" in TAILS_BUILD_OPTIONS

Internally, cross-building works as follows. First binfmt-support and 
qemu-user-static automagically turn vmdb2 into a cross-arm64 image builder, so 
that an arm64 Vagrant box is built in place of an am64 one. Then the Vagrant 
box is run in emulation (via qemu proper instead of kvm) and does exactly the 
same job it would during a native build, only MUCH slower. And when I say "much 
slower" I mean it: on a last-generation 32-cores, 64GB x86_64 machine, my first 
build took 13 hours, the second one 6 hours, the third one 3-4 hours (depending 
on pre-existing caches), vs ~ 15 minutes for a native x86_64 build and ~ 1 hour 
on a 4-core 8GB Raspberry Pi 5 for a native arm64 build. So cross-builds should 
only be done when necessary (e.g. in production? ;-) ).

Note that I only attempted to cross-build on a single Ubuntu 23.10 machine, so 
the qemu configuration that's used for emulation may need some tweaks. For 
example, I'm not sure whether the "gic version='3'" feature, which is needed to 
emulate more than 8 cores (and up to 512, see 
https://www.qemu.org/docs/master/system/arm/virt.html) is supported on all 
x86_64 machines. If anybody attempts the cross build and it doesn't work, 
please write to me so we can get it fixed.


Best,

NC

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Re: [Tails-dev] FWD: Re: Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

I've already rebuilt them all for arm64! They are inside 
config/chroot_local-packages so they will get installed automatically in the 
image.
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Re: [Tails-dev] FWD: Re: Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hi there,

I went for a DNS hack precisely so I could keep the patches to a minimum. All 
the relevant downloads are done via plain HTTP+signature verification, so in 
the end it was enough to disable a couple of points in the code where the 
signatures are actually checked.

Note that simply pointing your DNS resolver to Debian's servers is not enough. 
Tails's repository (at least for branches based on devel) is also queried to 
fetch the timestamp of the most recent snapshot to be used, so you must 
redirect both to Debian AND to Tails depending on the URL. To do so, you must:

1. configure your DNS resolver so that the Tails domain resolves to a webserver 
you control
2. use that webserver to redirect some URLs to Debian, and some others to Tails


*** DNS hijacking ***

There are many ways to hijack your DNS resolution. The simplest to set up 
probably (and the one I'm using) is to use systemd-resolved with the stub 
resolver turned on, adding the following line to /etc/hosts in your build 
machine:

x.x.x.x time-based.snapshots.deb.tails.boum.org

where x.x.x.x is the IP address of the webserver you control. This can be 
running on the build machine itself, but if you decide to go this way make sure 
that x.x.x.x is not in 127.0.0.0/8, otherwise the VM that builds the image will 
be redirected to its own localhost!

Some of the options you have here are: using an address (not in 127.0.0.0/8) 
bound to one of your network interfaces, creating a dummy network interface and 
assigning it a new address, or using the address of a remote host you control. 
One special case of the first option is using the address of the gateway for 
the local network that Vagrant will create for the VM (if you know that in 
advance). Personally, I'm using a remote host, because it was simpler to set up 
for me. In any case, make sure that the VM is able to connect to that IP 
address (and that the webserver is listening on port 80 of that address, of 
course).

*** Webserver configuration ***

I'm using an nginx webserver with the following configuration:

server {
    server_name time-based.snapshots.deb.tails.boum.org;
    listen *:80;
    rewrite ^/(debian|debian-security)/[0-9]+(/?.*) http://deb.debian.org/$1$2;
    rewrite ^/[0-9.]+(/?.*) http://deb.debian.org$1;

    location ~ 
^/(debian|debian-security|tails)/project/trace/(debian|debian-security|tails) {
    proxy_pass http://204.13.164.63:80;
    proxy_set_header Host $host;
    proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Protocol $scheme;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $http_host;
    }

    location ~ ^/(tails|torproject) {
    proxy_pass http://204.13.164.63:80;
    proxy_set_header Host $host;
    proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Protocol $scheme;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $http_host;
    }
}

204.13.164.63 <http://204.13.164.63:80> is the real IP address of 
time-based.snapshots.deb.tails.boum.org. URLs that match the regex 
^/(debian|debian-security|tails)/project/trace/(debian|debian-security|tails) 
must be redirected back to Tails to get the timestamp of the most recent 
snapshot. This timestamp however is never actually used: the redirections

http://time-based.snapshots.deb.tails.boum.org/(debian|debian-security)/[0-9]+(/?.*)
    >    http://deb.debian.org/$1$2 <http://deb.debian.org/$1$2>
http://time-based.snapshots.deb.tails.boum.org/[0-9.]+(/?.*)    >    
http://deb.debian.org$1 <http://deb.debian.org$1>

will point the VM to the live Debian archive rather than to a Tails snapshot 
(in practice they will remove the timestamp from the URL and replace the Tails 
domain with the Debian domain). As for ^/(tails|torproject), I'm not sure these 
need to be redirected too, but hey, this way it works so let's keep them. Also, 
it's unlikely that anything is reading the X-Headers, but let's keep those 
configs too.

A corresponding configuration could be written for Apache, but I don't know how 
to do that.


Keep in mind that if you hijack your DNS like above you won't be able to build 
Tails on branches other than my own: the hijacked packages are signed with 
Debian's keys, but the regular branches expect Tails's! So after you are 
finished delete the entry from /etc/hosts and restart systemd-resolved.

If you need more help feel free to write me!

NC
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Re: [Tails-dev] FWD: Re: Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

A couple updates on my last email. I figured out that the issue with OnionShare 
on RPi was due to AppArmor not being enabled by default (it needs an extra 
kernel command line option). I uploaded a new image with the fix and pushed the 
changes to Gitlab.
In the meantime, I modified the repartitioning script so that it updates the 
main partition's UUID in the kernel command line at each boot. This way you no 
longer need manual fixes to boot the RPi image after the first boot.

Also, I can confirm that the RPi image boots from SD cards after removing 
"live-media=removable" from the kernel command line (located at /cmdline.txt). 
It makes sense for the RPi to interpret SD cards as non-removable media.

Best.


P.S.: To Adam Burns, who reached out to me in private: I'm getting Undelivered 
Mail Returned to Sender messages from your mail provider (which is apparently 
blocking Tutamail). So, if you want an answer, write from a different email 
please :-)
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Re: [Tails-dev] FWD: Re: Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hi there!

TLDR; Not much has changed in the last 7 years probably. I think that thanks to 
the Asahi project Tails will be able to run on Apple Silicon on stock Debian 
packages in the foreseeable future (and with far better support than x86_64 
Apple has received until now). Maintaining a unified arm64 image might be more 
of a burden than maintaining separate arm64 images, if at all possible. I 
merged the 6.0~rc1 changes into my branches and rebuilt and uploaded the 
generic arm64, Apple Silicon and Raspberry Pi Tails images.


Let me start by saying that my experience with arm hardware is limited to Apple 
Silicon and Raspberry Pis, so I don't really have an overall picture of how 
things are done in the arm world. Nonetheless, my impression (and the general 
consensus among those who actually develop for arm, AFAIK) is that every vendor 
still does their own thing and usually doesn't take the time to build common 
standards for interoperability. For sure this is the situation I found when 
building those images. Let me give you some examples by going into some 
technical detail.


*** Booting + firmware ***

The plain "wip/arm64" image in the folder I shared is a straightforward 
translation of Tails from x86_64 to arm64 except for some quirks, e.g. the 
directory layout of the initramfs (which is different on arm64 Debian) or the 
absence of unneeded software such as syslinux. This image boots with UEFI and 
runs on standard Debian packages (except for those which I rebuilt from the 
Tails repository). In particular, it can be run as a VM e.g. using native KVM, 
and probably by emulating an arm64 VM on x86_64 too. It won't USB-boot on 
neither RPi nor Apple Silicon though, first and foremost because those do not 
support UEFI out of the box (this is not the only reason, though, more on this 
later).

How do the RPis and arm64 Macs boot? The former actually use different 
mechanisms for different models (just to keep things simple, you know), see 
e.g. 
https://www.raspberrypi.com/documentation/computers/raspberry-pi.html#raspberry-pi-boot-modes
 and the following sections, but also 
https://www.raspberrypi.com/documentation/computers/configuration.html#the-boot-folder
 for details on the firmware files. The bottom line is, if not configured 
otherwise, each model does its thing and ultimately loads a kernel with a 
specific file name from the boot partition (some models load the same kernel, 
others don't), together with a similarly-named initramfs. In that partition you 
thus need to include some /{kernel*,initrd*} files, plus firmware files. Also, 
not all arm64 models can boot from USB (RPi4 and 5 can, I can't remember which 
others can or cannot), and I have not attempted booting Tails from an SD card.

As for the arm64 Macs, as I wrote in my first email, they don't support booting 
from external media. However, the (internal) bootloader used by Asahi Linux - 
which actually is a chain of bootloaders, see e.g. 
https://github.com/AsahiLinux/docs/wiki/Distro:Boot-process-guide - is actually 
able to boot from USB with UEFI, and can be installed stand-alone. So if your 
user is willing to waste ~ 3GB of disk space on a separate partition just to be 
able to boot Tails, they are good to go. And if they already have an Asahi 
Linux distro installed, they actually already have the bootloader/chain 
installed.

Interestingly, the on-disk files (the kernel, initramfs and firmware) needed to 
boot a live OS on RPi and Apple Silicon do not conflict with each other: they 
can be included side by side. For the record, while you do need to include the 
RPi firmware in the image, on Apple Silicon that comes preloaded by the Asahi 
bootchain. No proprietary Apple firmware needs to be included in the image.

I will mention here that there's a chance that the RPis <= 4 could also be 
booted via GRUB/UEFI, either by first loading U-Boot and then grub (U-Boot 
seems to support RPis <= 4, see e.g. 
https://hechao.li/2021/12/20/Boot-Raspberry-Pi-4-Using-uboot-and-Initramfs/, 
and U-Boot is able to load grub-efi), or by using stuff like that in 
https://github.com/pftf. I didn't try any of those mainly because I own a 
Raspberry 5, which is not supported (yet?) by those projects.


*** The kernel and initramfs ***

It is likely that most bare-metal arm64 platforms Tails wants to support will 
need a dedicated kernel in order for them to work properly (or at all), at 
least in the near future. This is certainly true at this very moment in time 
for Apple Silicon: these machines will not work with the current stock Debian 
kernel, and Linux's support for Apple Silicon - though quite mature at this 
stage - hasn't been fully upstreamed yet (the main repo lives at 
https://github.com/AsahiLinux/linux), even if this is the ultimate goal of the 
Asahi project. I was recently told by the Debian Bananas team that official 
support for Apple Silicon will likely only come from Debian after the Asahi 
patches 

[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Test Tails 6.0~rc1

[Tails - News]

# [Test Tails 6.0~rc1](https://tails.net/news/test_6.0-rc1/)

We are very excited to present you a release candidate of the upcoming Tails
6.0.

We plan to release Tails 6.0 officially on February 27. You can help us by
testing already a release candidate of Tails 6.0 before February 18.

Tails 6.0 will be the first version of Tails based on Debian 12 (Bookworm) and
GNOME 43. It will bring new versions of most of the software included in Tails
as well as several important security and usability improvements.

We will provide security upgrades for Tails 6.0~rc1 like we do for regular
versions of Tails.

# New features

## Mount external devices automatically

When you plug in an external storage device, a USB stick or an external hard
disk, Tails 6.0~rc1 mounts it automatically. If the storage device contains an
encrypted partition, Tails 6.0~rc1 offers you to unlock the encryption
automatically.

![Authentication Required. A

passphrase is needed to access encrypted
data.](https://tails.net/news/test_6.0-rc1/unlock.png)

## Protection against malicious USB devices

If an attacker manages to plug a [malicious USB
device](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BadUSB) in your computer, they could run
software that breaks the security built in Tails without your knowledge.

To protect from such attacks while you are away from your computer, Tails
6.0~rc1 ignores any USB device that is plugged in while your screen is locked.

You can only use new USB devices if they are plugged in while the screen is
unlocked.

![Notification: Reconnect

USB device. New device has been detected while you were away. Please
disconnect

and reconnect the device to start using
it.](https://tails.net/news/test_6.0-rc1/usbguard.png)

## Dark Mode and Night Light

>From the system menu of Tails 6.0~rc1, you can now switch between:

  * The default _light_ mode with colder colors and more brightness

![](https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/desktop/light.png)

  * A _dark_ mode

![](https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/desktop/dark.png)

  * A _night light_ mode with warmer colors and less brightness

![](https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/desktop/night.png)

  * A combination of both the _dark_ mode and _night light_ mode

![](https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/desktop/dark_night.png)

## Easier screenshots and screencasts

GNOME 43 introduces a new ![Take Screenshot](https://tails.net/lib/camera-
photo.png) shortcut in the system menu that makes it easier to take a
screenshot or record a screencast.

![](https://tails.net/doc/sensitive_documents/screenshot_and_screencast/camera.png)

## Easier Gmail in Thunderbird

Thanks to changes in both Thunderbird and Gmail, it's much easier to configure
a Gmail account in Thunderbird in Tails 6.0~rc1.

  * You don't have to configure anything special in your Gmail account, other 
than the usual 2-Step Verification.

  * You can sign in to your Gmail account directly when configuring it in 
_Thunderbird_.

![Gmail: Sign in to continue

to Mozilla Thunderbird](https://tails.net/news/test_6.0-rc1/gmail.png)

## Diceware passphrases in 5 more languages

When creating a Persistent Storage, suggested passphrases are now also
generated in Catalan, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish.

Thanks to [jawlensky](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/jawlensky) who created the
word lists for Catalan, Italian, and Spanish for Tails, but also made them
available to all users of `diceware`.

![](https://tails.net/news/test_6.0-rc1/diceware.png)

# Changes and updates

## Included software

Tails 6.0~rc1 updates many of the applications included in Tails, among
others:

  * _Electrum_ from 4.0.9 to 4.3.4

* Improve support for the Lightning protocol and hardware wallets.
  * _KeePassXC_ from 2.6.2 to 2.7.4

* Add entry tags.
* Support dark mode.
* Redesign history view.
  * _Metadata Cleaner_ from 1.0.2 to 2.4.0

* Redesign the whole user interface.
* Support dark mode.
* Add support for AIFF and HEIC files.
  * _OnionShare_ from 2.2-3 to 2.6-5

* Redesign the whole user interface.
* Allow creating chat rooms.
* Allow hosting static websites.
  * _Text Editor_ from `gedit` to `gnome-text-editor`

* Support dark mode.
  * _Inkscape_ from 1.0.2 to 1.2.2

  * _Audacity_ from 2.4.2 to 3.2.4

  * _Gimp_ from 2.10.22 to 2.10.34

  * _Kleopatra_ from 4:20.08 to 4:22.12

## Removed features

  * Remove the item **Remove metadata** from the shortcut menu of the _Files_ 
browser.

The developers of MAT2, the metadata removal library used by _Metadata
Cleaner_ are not providing this option anymore.

  * Remove the item **Wipe** and **Wipe available disk space** from the 
shortcut menu of the _Files_ browser.

Secure deletion is not reliable enough on USB sticks and SSDs for us to keep
advertising this feature. We are still discussing which alternatives to
explain in our documentation on [secure
deletion](https://tails.net/doc/encryption_and_privacy/secure_deletion/index.en.html).
([#19121](ht

[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.22

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.22](https://tails.net/news/version_5.22/index.en.html)

# New features

  * In _Tor Browser_ , you can now save files to more folders: Documents, 
Downloads, Music, Pictures, and Videos. You can also upload files from these 
folders.

  * When your Persistent Storage is broken, Tails now tries to repair its file 
system when you unlock it in the Welcome Screen.

# Changes and updates

  * Report the write speed after cloning a Persistent Storage from _Tails 
Cloner_.

  * Do not try to unlock or delete a Persistent Storage on a read-only USB 
stick.

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[13.0.9](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1309/).

  * Update _Thunderbird_ to 
[115.7](https://www.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/115.7.0/releasenotes/).

# Fixed problems

  * Stop leaking the first-level domain of visited websites in _WhisperBack_ 
reports. The problem was first introduced in Tails 5.15.1 (July 2023). 
([!1344](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/merge_requests/1344))

  * Make installing Tails with _Tails Cloner_ more robust by fixing occasional 
errors `AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'props'`. Thanks to 
Ben Westgate! 
([!1312](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/merge_requests/1312))

  * Fix saving the Additional Software configuration when creating a Persistent 
Storage. 
([!1350](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/merge_requests/1350))

  * Fix help link when resizing the system partition fails the first time Tails 
is started. 
([!1341](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/merge_requests/1341))

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Get Tails 5.22

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.22.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.net/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.net/install/windows/index.en.html)

  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.net/install/mac/index.en.html)

  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.net/install/linux/index.en.html)

  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.net/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.22 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.net/install/download/index.en.html)

  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.net/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

URL: <https://tails.net/news/version_5.22/index.en.html>

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Re: [Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Hey there,

Thank you! I actually maintain my own private fork of Heikki Lindholm's arm64 
Tor Browser, but in the arm64 port of Tails I included Lindholm's own builds 
because those have been around for years now and are definitely more trusted 
than mine. They work perfectly, are well maintained and are as close as can be 
to the official x86_64 builds.

As for armhf, I'm not going to attempt building neither the Tor Browser nor 
Tails for that platform for a number of reasons, the first of which being I 
just don't own the required hardware. However, I'd expect that somebody else 
could take on if they are interested, as much of the work that goes into 
porting to arm64 could probably be translated to armhf (not all of it though!).

Also, thanks for the support! In the near future, when I find the time, I'm 
going to answer the other devs with some notes on how I made Tails boot on 
Apple Silicon and on the Raspberry 5. It was not rocket science, to be fair, 
but still worth documenting. I expect that - together with platform-specific 
quirks - to give the devs the bigger headaches if Tails will ever support arm64.

Best,

NC


Jan 28, 2024, 13:18 by n9iu...@posteo.net:

> Hi NoisyCoil,
>
>> ... This makes the Tor Browser
>> the single blocker for Tails on arm64 AFAICS (more on this later).
>>
> that helped me years ago to get Tor Browser running on a rpi -> 
> https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/12631
>
> Best Regards
> n9iu7pk
>
> Am 20.01.2024 16:43 schrieb NoisyCoil via Tails-dev:
>
>> *** For the casual reader: please do not use this version of Tails.
>> This is just a developer preview, it won't protect you like official
>> releases do ***
>>
>> Hey there,
>>
>> During the last few weeks I've been working on porting Tails to the
>> arm64 architecture, with the aim to ultimately being able to run Tails
>> on Apple hardware again. If anyone is interested in a developer
>> preview, you will find two USB images at
>> https://mega.nz/folder/BrJFGQyR#8rsN06I_pC_YV6spqATeBA. The code is
>> hosted at https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/noisycoil/tails in the
>> "wip/arm64" and "wip/asahi" branches. The former enables general arm64
>> support, while the latter contains additional, currently
>> non-upstreamable patches that make Tails run on Apple Silicon with
>> M1/M2 processors (no M3 support yet). In both cases, the builds are
>> native (you must build the arm64 version of Tails on arm64 hardware;
>> I've been building it on Apple Silicon (Asahi Debian) and on a
>> Raspberry Pi (Raspberry Pi OS) interchangeably).
>> The wip/asahi patches currently break amd64 builds due to a new entry
>> in the APT preferences file, but this can be fixed  (I didn't do so
>> yet because, as I said, the Asahi patches cannot be upstreamed anyway,
>> more on this later).
>>
>> Both the wip/arm64 and the wip/asahi images use GRUB for arm64 as a
>> boot loader. For the former, this is all there is at the moment,
>> meaning that the image can run in a VM, but may not run on hardware
>> that needs special firmware or arrangements to make it boot. As for
>> the latter, GRUB is all that's needed to boot on bare metal Apple
>> Silicon (from the Tails side, that is).
>> For those unfamiliar with the boot process on arm64 Apple hardware,
>> here's a quick recap. Out of the box, Apple Silicon does not support
>> booting from external media, nor of course booting Linux. It does,
>> however, support booting multiple macOSes from internal storage. The
>> smart folks at Asahi Linux (https://asahilinux.org/) came up with a
>> process to boot Linux both from internal and external storage (there
>> may be issues with booting from large external hard drives, but this
>> is not relevant to Tails). What they do is they install a fake macOS
>> on the hard drive, which after a couple of intermediate steps runs the
>> U-Boot boot loader (https://docs.u-boot.org/en/latest/), which is then
>> able to run GRUB both from internal and from external storage. This
>> mechanism is currently in use to run, among others, the official remix
>> of Fedora for Apple Silicon (https://asahilinux.org/fedora/), and -
>> except for the part where you actually have to install the boot loader
>> and for a second small exception, see below - is 100% transparent to
>> the user.
>>
>>
>> So how do you boot Tails on Apple Silicon?
>>
>> 1) Install U-Boot on your Apple Silicon Mac. This can be done using
>> the official Asahi installer (see https://asahilinux.org/):
>>
>> curl https://alx.sh | sh
>>
>> The correct option, which should only require around 3GB of

[Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

*** For the casual reader: please do not use this version of Tails. This is 
just a developer preview, it won't protect you like official releases do ***

Hey there,

During the last few weeks I've been working on porting Tails to the arm64 
architecture, with the aim to ultimately being able to run Tails on Apple 
hardware again. If anyone is interested in a developer preview, you will find 
two USB images at https://mega.nz/folder/BrJFGQyR#8rsN06I_pC_YV6spqATeBA. The 
code is hosted at https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/noisycoil/tails in the 
"wip/arm64" and "wip/asahi" branches. The former enables general arm64 support, 
while the latter contains additional, currently non-upstreamable patches that 
make Tails run on Apple Silicon with M1/M2 processors (no M3 support yet). In 
both cases, the builds are native (you must build the arm64 version of Tails on 
arm64 hardware; I've been building it on Apple Silicon (Asahi Debian) and on a 
Raspberry Pi (Raspberry Pi OS) interchangeably).
The wip/asahi patches currently break amd64 builds due to a new entry in the 
APT preferences file, but this can be fixed  (I didn't do so yet because, as I 
said, the Asahi patches cannot be upstreamed anyway, more on this later).

Both the wip/arm64 and the wip/asahi images use GRUB for arm64 as a boot 
loader. For the former, this is all there is at the moment, meaning that the 
image can run in a VM, but may not run on hardware that needs special firmware 
or arrangements to make it boot. As for the latter, GRUB is all that's needed 
to boot on bare metal Apple Silicon (from the Tails side, that is).
For those unfamiliar with the boot process on arm64 Apple hardware, here's a 
quick recap. Out of the box, Apple Silicon does not support booting from 
external media, nor of course booting Linux. It does, however, support booting 
multiple macOSes from internal storage. The smart folks at Asahi Linux 
(https://asahilinux.org/) came up with a process to boot Linux both from 
internal and external storage (there may be issues with booting from large 
external hard drives, but this is not relevant to Tails). What they do is they 
install a fake macOS on the hard drive, which after a couple of intermediate 
steps runs the U-Boot boot loader (https://docs.u-boot.org/en/latest/), which 
is then able to run GRUB both from internal and from external storage. This 
mechanism is currently in use to run, among others, the official remix of 
Fedora for Apple Silicon (https://asahilinux.org/fedora/), and - except for the 
part where you actually have to install the boot loader and for a second small 
exception, see below - is 100% transparent to the user.


So how do you boot Tails on Apple Silicon?

1) Install U-Boot on your Apple Silicon Mac. This can be done using the 
official Asahi installer (see https://asahilinux.org/):

curl https://alx.sh | sh

The correct option, which should only require around 3GB of storage space on a 
separate partition, is "EFI environment only (m1n1 + U-Boot + ESP)" and, 
crucially, does not require you to install a fully-fledged Linux OS like 
Fedora. Once you do so, the U-Boot partition will be set as the default boot 
partition. This can be reverted at any time if you want to boot macOS by 
default instead (as you probably do in the context of Tails). Also, the U-Boot 
partition can be deleted at any moment if you don't need it anymore

2) Burn the Asahi Tails image onto a USB drive as usual

3) Plug the USB drive into your Mac. If the U-Boot partition is the default 
boot partition, just turn on your Mac. If it isn't, turn it on by keeping the 
power button pressed until it says "Entering startup options..." and then 
releasing it. At that point you can select the U-Boot partition (similarly, if 
the U-Boot partition is the default and you want to boot macOS, do the same but 
select the macOS partition)

4) Hit ESC when U-Boot says you can do so in order to interrupt the boot 
process and get dropped to a command line. Now you must tell U-Boot you want to 
boot from an external USB (this is the second small exception mentioned above): 
on the command line, execute

env set boot_efi_bootmgr
run bootcmd_usb0

This is the officially supported way to boot from an external USB drive. Maybe 
at some point U-Boot will support doing so without the user entering any 
command, but that's not possible at the moment AFAIK.

5) That's it. You're in

If you happen to already have Asahi Linux installed on your arm64 Mac, you 
don't need to follow Step 1 as U-Boot comes installed with the OS. Just choose 
your Asahi Linux boot partition in Step 3.


As for the arm64 port itself, i.e. what's in the images. Both wip/arm64 and 
wip/asahi are forked from feature/bookworm. The arm64 packages that are 
available from the official Debian repositories are installed from there (more 
on this later), whereas the Tails-specific packages (notably: live-boot, 
cryptsetup, fontconfig and n

[Tails-dev] FWD: Re: Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

Resending this so it reaches the whole mailing list.

---

*** For the casual reader: please do not use this version of Tails. This is 
just a developer preview, it won't protect you like official releases do ***


Hi David,

At https://mega.nz/folder/BrJFGQyR#8rsN06I_pC_YV6spqATeBA you will find a third 
image, based on the "wip/raspi" branch at 
https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/noisycoil/tails, that boots and works on a 
Raspberry Pi 5 via USB (but should also work on other arm64 Raspberrys - I have 
none to test it at the moment). This image did not undergo much testing: it 
boots and connects to the internet via Tor, and the Tor Browser works as well; 
this is most of what I can say.

I already see it needs some tweaks. For instance, after the first boot - which 
changes the main partition's UUID -, you need to manually edit the 
"cmdline.txt" file and write in the new UUID (you need to do this only once). 
In production this could be dealt with via an initramfs hook that checks if 
there's a mismatch and fixes it automatically.

Also, Onionshare doesn't work and the initramfs-shutdown service fails due to 
/usr/local/bin/tails-get-bootinfo knowing nothing about how booting on the Pi 
works.

In principle, making a universal arm64 image could be possible, but asides from 
the firmware (storing different firmware for different platforms on the same 
image may be feasible), the software and drivers may need different tweaks for 
different platforms. Quite a few Debian-based distros are providing different 
arm images for different platforms.

Best,

NC
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[Tails-dev] Tails for arm64 (with support for Apple Silicon)

[NoisyCoil via Tails-dev]

*** For the casual reader: please do not use this version of Tails. This is 
just a developer preview, it won't protect you like official releases do ***

Hey there,

During the last few weeks I've been working on porting Tails to the arm64 
architecture, with the aim to ultimately being able to run Tails on Apple 
hardware again. If anyone is interested in a developer preview, you will find 
two USB images at https://mega.nz/folder/BrJFGQyR#8rsN06I_pC_YV6spqATeBA. The 
code is hosted at https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/noisycoil/tails in the 
"wip/arm64" and "wip/asahi" branches. The former enables general arm64 support, 
while the latter contains additional, currently non-upstreamable patches that 
make Tails run on Apple Silicon with M1/M2 processors (no M3 support yet). In 
both cases, the builds are native (you must build the arm64 version of Tails on 
arm64 hardware; I've been building it on Apple Silicon (Asahi Debian) and on a 
Raspberry Pi (Raspberry Pi OS) interchangeably).
The wip/asahi patches currently break amd64 builds due to a new entry in the 
APT preferences file, but this can be fixed  (I didn't do so yet because, as I 
said, the Asahi patches cannot be upstreamed anyway, more on this later).

Both the wip/arm64 and the wip/asahi images use GRUB for arm64 as a boot 
loader. For the former, this is all there is at the moment, meaning that the 
image can run in a VM, but may not run on hardware that needs special firmware 
or arrangements to make it boot. As for the latter, GRUB is all that's needed 
to boot on bare metal Apple Silicon (from the Tails side, that is).
For those unfamiliar with the boot process on arm64 Apple hardware, here's a 
quick recap. Out of the box, Apple Silicon does not support booting from 
external media, nor of course booting Linux. It does, however, support booting 
multiple macOSes from internal storage. The smart folks at Asahi Linux 
(https://asahilinux.org/) came up with a process to boot Linux both from 
internal and external storage (there may be issues with booting from large 
external hard drives, but this is not relevant to Tails). What they do is they 
install a fake macOS on the hard drive, which after a couple of intermediate 
steps runs the U-Boot boot loader (https://docs.u-boot.org/en/latest/), which 
is then able to run GRUB both from internal and from external storage. This 
mechanism is currently in use to run, among others, the official remix of 
Fedora for Apple Silicon (https://asahilinux.org/fedora/), and - except for the 
part where you actually have to install the boot loader and for a second small 
exception, see below - is 100% transparent to the user.


So how do you boot Tails on Apple Silicon?

1) Install U-Boot on your Apple Silicon Mac. This can be done using the 
official Asahi installer (see https://asahilinux.org/):

curl https://alx.sh | sh

The correct option, which should only require around 3GB of storage space on a 
separate partition, is "EFI environment only (m1n1 + U-Boot + ESP)" and, 
crucially, does not require you to install a fully-fledged Linux OS like 
Fedora. Once you do so, the U-Boot partition will be set as the default boot 
partition. This can be reverted at any time if you want to boot macOS by 
default instead (as you probably do in the context of Tails). Also, the U-Boot 
partition can be deleted at any moment if you don't need it anymore

2) Burn the Asahi Tails image onto a USB drive as usual

3) Plug the USB drive into your Mac. If the U-Boot partition is the default 
boot partition, just turn on your Mac. If it isn't, turn it on by keeping the 
power button pressed until it says "Entering startup options..." and then 
releasing it. At that point you can select the U-Boot partition (similarly, if 
the U-Boot partition is the default and you want to boot macOS, do the same but 
select the macOS partition)

4) Hit ESC when U-Boot says you can do so in order to interrupt the boot 
process and get dropped to a command line. Now you must tell U-Boot you want to 
boot from an external USB (this is the second small exception mentioned above): 
on the command line, execute

env set boot_efi_bootmgr
run bootcmd_usb0

This is the officially supported way to boot from an external USB drive. Maybe 
at some point U-Boot will support doing so without the user entering any 
command, but that's not possible at the moment AFAIK.

5) That's it. You're in

If you happen to already have Asahi Linux installed on your arm64 Mac, you 
don't need to follow Step 1 as U-Boot comes installed with the OS. Just choose 
your Asahi Linux boot partition in Step 3.


As for the arm64 port itself, i.e. what's in the images. Both wip/arm64 and 
wip/asahi are forked from feature/bookworm. The arm64 packages that are 
available from the official Debian repositories are installed from there (more 
on this later), whereas the Tails-specific packages (notably: live-boot, 
cryptsetup, fontconfig and n

[Tails-dev] Tails report for December 2023

[bokonon via Tails-dev]

 Tails report for December 2023 <https://tails.net/news/report_2023_12/>

Happy 2024, Tails-y folks! We wish you a year full of nourishing 
energies, forceful resistance, and great health ✊



 Highlights

 *

   2023 was an eventful year at Tails. We kicked off the 1st year of
   our 3-year strategic plan with 16 releases of Tails, significant
   improvements to core Tails features like the new Persistent Storage,
   and researched cool, new features we want to bring to you. In
   parallel, we started moving into a new home <https://tails.net/> and
   made investments to become a more sustainable project and a
   healthier workplace. Read more about 2023 at Tails here
   <https://tails.net/news/achievements_in_2023/index.en.html>. If
   you'd rather listen, check out our presentation
   <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TtgTwho1wfQ=784s> at State of the
   Onion 2023!

 *

   We are raising funds for our work in 2024 but our annual fundraising
   campaign has fallen short of our goal. So, we've extended our
   fundraiser till January 20, 2024. If you find our work useful and
   can contribute, we'd appreciate your help. Every contribution, no
   matter the size, makes a big difference. Donate now!
   <https://tails.net/donate/>

 *

   Talking about contributions that make a difference, we remain ever
   so grateful to our sponsors! Last month, wordsolver.co
   <https://wordsolver.co/> renewed their sponsorship of Tails. This is
   the 3rd year of their support for Tails' mission! Thank you 


 Releases

We released Tails 5.21 
<https://tails.net/news/version_5.21/index.en.html>. In 5.21:


 *

   /Tor client/ and /Tor Browser/ are up-to-date

 *

   we improved Tails's handling of date and time: you'll find localised
   dates in the top navigation, and separately, we replaced the
   unpunctual web servers in our htpdate pool

 *

   the backup feature of /Tails Cloner/ is friendlier to use. Thanks
   @BenWestgate <https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/BenWestgate>!

And lots more 
<https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog>.



 Metrics

Tails was started more than 815,559 times this month. That's a daily 
average of over 26,300 boots.


--
bokonon

Fundraising Director
Tails —https://tails.boum.org/



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[Tails-dev] patch to fix #20079

[g4kw via Tails-dev]

Hi,
I guess I don't have write access to the repo, so I can not create a MR...
So I will do as stated on your website:

"

"You can submit small, easy changes as Git patches (prepared with the git 
format-patch command) over email to 
[tails-dev@boum.org](https://tails.net/about/contact/index.en.html#tails-dev)."
"

here is a patch to fix

https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20079

Cheers,
g4kw

Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.From 09f25ab2a64f3bfe488d4c9c02f3e51583b1f9e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: g4kw 
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 17:56:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] adding PyQt5 - needed for Electrum

---
 config/chroot_local-packageslists/tails-common.list | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/config/chroot_local-packageslists/tails-common.list b/config/chroot_local-packageslists/tails-common.list
index 79d3d5074e..d560e42e4d 100644
--- a/config/chroot_local-packageslists/tails-common.list
+++ b/config/chroot_local-packageslists/tails-common.list
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ eject
 # Needed by Additional Software
 python3-apt
 python3-atomicwrites
+# Needed for Electrum
+python3-pyqt5
 # Needed by the Greeter
 console-setup
 gir1.2-accountsservice-1.0
-- 
2.39.2

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.21

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.21](https://tails.net/news/version_5.21/index.en.html)

# Changes and updates

  * Help troubleshoot when resizing the system partition fails the first time 
Tails is started.

![Error message: Resizing System Partition Failed - It will be impossible to
create a Persistent Storage or apply automatic
upgrades.](https://tails.net/news/version_5.21/resizing.png)

  * Translate the date displayed in the top navigation bar.

![Clock showing date in
Spanish](https://tails.net/news/version_5.21/clock.png)

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[13.0.7](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1307).

  * Update the _Tor_ client to 0.4.8.10.

# Fixed problems

  * Fix _Tor Browser_ crashing when clicking on the _UBlock_ icon. 
([#20061](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20061))

  * Make time synchronization more reliable. 
([#19923](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19923))

  * [@BenWestgate](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/@BenWestgate) fixed several 
issues in the backup feature of _Tails Cloner_ :

* Remove message about doing a backup when no USB stick is plugged in. 
([#20063](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20063))

* Update available options when plugging in another USB stick. 
([#20042](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/20042))

* Point to backup instructions when choosing to clone the Persistent 
Storage. 
([!1305](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/merge_requests/1305))

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Get Tails 5.21

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.21.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.net/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.net/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.net/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.net/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.net/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.net/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.21 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.net/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.net/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

URL: <https://tails.net/news/version_5.21/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] 2023 at Tails: a new home, small steps, and giant leaps

[Tails - News]

# [2023 at Tails: a new home, small steps, and giant
leaps](https://tails.net/news/achievements_in_2023/index.en.html)

**Malicious actors upped the ante in 2023.**

So-called artificial intelligence systems soared in popularity, supercharging
political [disinformation](https://www.wired.com/story/slovakias-election-
deepfakes-show-ai-is-a-danger-to-democracy/)
[programs](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jul/19/ai-generated-
disinformation-us-elections). Internet shutdowns and slowdowns became [firmly
entrenched](https://www.accessnow.org/publication/internet-shutdowns-
in-2023-mid-year-update/) in authoritarian toolkits to censor progressive
speech. And the [continuing
revelations](https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2023/11/serbia-civil-
society-threatened-by-spyware/) of zero-click attacks drove home the perilous
omnipotence of the military-digital complex.

**But, we also made plans to call their ante.**

We built a state-of-the-art 3-year strategy to make Tails a formidable
adversary to these powerful, repressive forces. We made plans to better
understand the use of Tails by journalists and activists, and understand and
improve the use of Tails in the [majority
world](https://www.harvarddesignmagazine.org/articles/shahidul-alam-on-the-
majority-world/). All this while introducing new features and improvements to
existing features that make Tails even more relevant.

Here's the progress we made in the first year of the plan.

## Product development

**The Persistent Storage got even better at storing encrypted data.**

[Tails 5.8](https://tails.net/news/version_5.8/index.en.html) was one of the
most important Tails releases in years. In Tails 5.8, we unveiled a brand new
Persistent Storage. The new Persistent Storage doesn't require restarting
after creation or any time after you activate a new feature. It also made it
easier to persist more settings. The icing on the cake: a dashing makeover for
the Persistent Storage!

But the new Persistent Storage wasn't all fun and games for Tails users. It
was buggy and we worked extra hard to fix the issues our users faced.

We didn't stop there. We also continued to add functionality to the Persistent
Storage. Now, it is easier to both do [backups of the whole Persistent
Storage](https://tails.net/news/version_5.14/index.en.html) and [delete the
data of a each feature](https://tails.net/news/version_5.12/index.en.html).

New button to delete the data of a Persistent Storage
feature[![](https://tails.net/news/version_5.12/delete-
data.png)](https://tails.net/news/version_5.12/delete-data.png)  
---  
Option to clone the current Persistent Storage in Tails
Installer[![](https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/backup/clone.png)](https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/backup/clone.png)
  
---  
  
We also introduced better password practices for securing the Persistent
Storage. Randomly generated [diceware](https://diceware.dmuth.org/)
passphrases and an upgraded encryption format make the Persistent Storage
[exponentially more
secure](https://tails.net/security/argon2id/index.en.html).

![](https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/password_strength.png)

**Improvements to the[Tor
Connection](https://tails.net/news/version_4.20/index.en.html) make it easier
to circumvent censorship.**

The Tor Connection Assistant is slicker. We improved the error messaging when
connecting automatically to the Tor network and the handling of captive
portals.

Connecting to Tor is only part of the story. At times, Tails users may find
themselves on slow Tor circuits. And worse, unable to troubleshoot issues. So,
we've made it easier to close pesky Tor circuits that we can sometimes land
on.

Option to close a circuit in Onion
Circuits[![](https://tails.net/news/version_5.19/close_circuit.png)](https://tails.net/news/version_5.19/close_circuit.png)
  
---  
  
**Tails remains one of the most secure operating systems in the world.**

This year, we released 15 versions of Tails, ensuring users had the latest Tor
Browser and Thunderbird. Yes, FIFTEEN!

We also asked [Radically Open
Security](https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/) to do a security audit of
Tails. Their [findings](https://tails.net/news/audit_by_ROS/index.en.html)
affirmed our cutting-edge security.

PS: Keeping Tails updated is your best defense against online surveillance and
censorship!

**And we started moving to our new home!**

 ✨ tails.net ✨ 

We completed a bunch of home improvement projects. So our new home is even
more welcoming to folks speaking different languages, we overhauled the
language switcher. We just added Catalan translations too. _Gr acies per ser
aqui!_

[![](https://tails.net/news/achievements_in_2023/language_switcher.png)](https://tails.net/news/achievements_in_2023/language_switcher.png)

High footfall areas of the website got a new carpet too. Check out our new
[Contribute](https://tails.net/contribute/index.en.html),
[Support](https://tails.net/support/index.en.html), and [Contact
us

[Tails-dev] Technical Issue

[Logan Moon via Tails-dev]

Hello, I sent a message ten days ago and never got a response. Is this a good 
email to ask about technical issues?___
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[Tails-dev] Tails report for November 2023

[bokonon via Tails-dev]

Hello :)
*
Tails report for November 2023 <https://tails.net/news/report_2023_11/>*


 Highlights

 *

   We had asked Radically Open Security
   <https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/> to audit Tails. The results
   of the audit <https://tails.net/news/audit_by_ROS/index.en.html>
   reinforced Tails credentials as a "solid" operating system for
   preserving anonymity.

   We were super proactive with addressing the reported
   vulnerabilities, fixing them all within 3 weeks of being reported.
   This is a reminder that as good as Tails is, it needs to be updated
   regularly!

 *

   We undertook a bunch of home improvement projects for our new
   address <https://tails.net/news/new_domain/index.en.html>. Highlights:

 o the language switcher on the website is more prominent, and also
   in the website footer,
 o warning buttons display warnings better - in a new colour, and
   with wrapped text,
 o our redesigned security page
   <https://tails.net/security/index.en.html> better showcases the
   history of our security advisories.
 *

   We have a new sponsor: igaming.com <https://www.igaming.com/> joined
   our mission! Our donors also received the quarterly newsletter with
   early insights into upcoming Tails features. You, too, could
   subscribe while making your next donation
   <https://tails.net/donate/index.en.html>. Help make our ongoing
   fundraiser <https://tails.net/news/gift_of_privacy/index.en.html> a
   success!


 Releases

November featured 2 new versions of Tails: 5.19.1 and 5.20.

5.19.1 <https://tails.net/news/version_5.19.1/index.en.html> was an 
emergency release. We updated the Tor client to bring the fix to the 
TROVE-2023-006 vulnerability 
<https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/team/-/wikis/NetworkTeam/TROVE> 
to Tails users.


And in 5.20 <https://tails.net/news/version_5.20/index.en.html>, we:

 *

   brought the usual, latest updates to Tor Browser and Thunderbird,

 *

   fixed a security vulnerability in uBlock Origin to protect Tails
   users from advanced browser fingerprinting techniques, and

 *

   continued making Persistent Storage more usable, and made it even
   easier to report issues when it doesn't work through improvements to
   WhisperBack.


 Metrics

Tails was started more than 825,741 times this month. That's a daily 
average of over 27,520 boots


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Re: [Tails-dev] Randomize full MAC address feature option in welcome screen

[Ethan Krasner via Tails-dev]

>phone oui vendors resources to form oui list:

It would make more sense for full mac randomization to copy how android does it 
wouldn't it?

https://source.android.com/docs/core/connect/wifi-mac-randomization-behavior

>The MAC randomization feature randomizes the address by setting the locally 
>administered bit to 1, and the unicast bit to 0. The other 46 bits are 
>randomized.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:MAC-48_Address.svg

So to implement that like the Android feature does:

0X:00:00:00:00:00

^

X would have to be 26ae

reasoning is XX:00:00:00:00:00 would have to equal an 8 digit binary ending in 
10

xx10

^ determines the locally administered bit which has to be 1

^ determines the unicast which has to be 0

https://richardatkin.com/post/2022/01/14/MAC-Address-Randomisation.html

If you use this calculator u can see that 26ae are the only possible outcomes 
for this bit to end in 10

0X:00:00:00:00:00

^ the first part can equal anything between 0-9 and a-f as it doesn’t change 
the binary ending in 10

X = 2 or 6 or a or e [26ae]

https://www.compscilib.com/calculate/mac-address-to-binary?

The first part could be anything [0-9a-f] but the the second part would have to 
be [26ae] then the rest (10) randomized.

[0-9a-f][26ae]:00:00:00:00:00

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[Tails-dev] Set Tor Browser homepage to offline html of tails.net

[Ethan Krasner via Tails-dev]

Tor Browser pings tails.net every time the browser is launched.

This could lead to fingerprinting tails users more on a circuit.

Tca from my understanding already sends requests to tails.net every time tails 
is booted to check for updates and for feedback to understand how many people 
are booting/using tails.

Changing the startup homepage to `/usr/share/doc/tails/website/index.en.html` 
would make it so users can still see the Tails News and Documentation while 
also avoiding pinging tails.net more then needed on a circuit.

The only downside would be that users would only see the latest news regarding 
their current version as the offline documentation is only current with the 
version users are on.

(Offline documentation is updated every new update.)

What are your thoughts on setting this pref?

user_pref("browser.startup.homepage", 
"/usr/share/doc/tails/website/index.en.html");

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[Tails-dev] want to stop tails going into sleep mode when I close lid

[J B via Tails-dev]

Hi, I have tried for some time to find a working answer to this issue - to no 
avail.

The issue is that I want to be able to leave tails running various processes 
when I close the lid of my laptop, or turn off my monitor, or simply leave it 
untouched for a while. There doesn't seem to be a way of doing this, not that I 
have been able to find anyway.

I would be very grateful if you could please help me with this.

Kind regards,

J___
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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.19.1

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.19.1](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.19.1/index.en.html)

This release is an emergency release to fix an important security
vulnerability in Tor.

# Changes and updates

  * Update the _Tor_ client to 0.4.8.9, which fixes the TROVE-2023-006 
vulnerability.

The details of TROVE-2023-006 haven't been disclosed by the Tor Project to
leave time for users to upgrade before revealing more. We only know that the
Tor Project describes TROVE-2023-006 as a "[ _remote triggerable assert on
onion
services_](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/team/-/wikis/NetworkTeam/TROVE)".

Our team thinks that this vulnerability could affect Tails users who are
creating onion services from their Tails, for example when sharing files or
publishing a website using _OnionShare_.

This vulnerability might allow an attacker who already knows your _OnionShare_
address to make your Tor client crash. A powerful attacker might be able to
further exploit this crash to reveal your IP address.

This analysis is only a hypothesis because our team doesn't have access to
more details about this vulnerability. Still, we are releasing this emergency
release as a precaution.

_OnionShare_ is the only application included in Tails that creates onion
services. You are not affected by this vulnerability if you don't use
_OnionShare_ in Tails and only use Tails to connect to onion services and
don't create onion services using Additional Software.

More details about TROVE-2023-006 will be available on the [Tor issue
#40883](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40883) sometime
after the release.

# Fixed problems

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.19.1

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.19.1.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.19.1 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.19.1/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Security audit of Persistent Storage and Tor integration

[Tails - News]

# [Security audit of Persistent Storage and Tor
integration](https://tails.boum.org/news/audit_by_ROS/index.en.html)

In March 2023, [Radically Open
Security](https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/) conducted a security audit
on the major improvements that we released in [Tails
5.8](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.8/index.en.html) (December 2022) on
the Persistent Storage, the Unsafe Browser, and the Wayland integration.

To better protect our users, we addressed most of the security vulnerabilities
as soon as they were discovered and reported to us, without waiting for the
audit to be complete and public. We can now share with your the [final
report](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/uploads/df935595f41faa687805136a6bfa2910/tails-
ros-penetration-test-report-1-2.pdf).

We are proud of the conclusion of the auditors:

> **_Overall, the Tails operating system left a solid impression and addressed
> most of the concerns of an average user in need of anonymity._**
>
> _This is particularly evident in the isolation of various components by the
> developers. For example, the configured AppArmor rules often prevented a
> significant impact of the found vulnerabilities. Shifting to Wayland was a
> good decision, as it provides more security by isolating individual GUI
> applications._
>
> _All in all, no serious vulnerabilities were found through the integration
> into Wayland. Unsafe Browser and Persistent Storage should now be less
> vulnerable to attack, as all vulnerabilities have been fixed._

The auditors found 6 _High_ , 1 _Moderate_ , 3 _Low_ -severity issues. Another
issue was fixed before the actual impact was assessed and so marked as having
_Unknown_ severity.

We fixed all these issues as soon as possible and before making them public on
our GitLab. The last issue was fixed in 5.14, 3 weeks after it was reported to
us.

As good as the results of this audit are, they also serve as a reminder that
no software is ever 100% secure and that every release of Tails can fix
critical security vulnerabilities. Your best protection against all kinds of
attack is to keep your Tails up-to-date.

Because at Tails we believe that transparency is key to building trust, all
the code of our software is public and the results of this audit as well. You
can find below a summary of all the issues and their fixes.

# Detailed findings

## Tor integration

ID| Issue| Description| Impact| Status| Release  
---|---|---|---|---|---  
TLS-012| [#19585](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19585)|
Leak clear IP as low-privileged user amnesia| High| Fixed| 5.12  
TLS-013| [#19594](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19594)|
Local privilege escalation to Tor Connection sandbox| High| Fixed| 5.12  
TLS-014| [#19595](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19595)|
Local privilege escalation to Tor Browser sandbox| Moderate| Fixed| 5.13  
TLS-017| [#19610](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19610)|
Insecure permissions of chroot overlay| Unknown| Fixed| 5.13  
  
## Persistent Storage

ID| Issue| Description| Impact| Status| Release  
---|---|---|---|---|---  
TLS-003| [#19546](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19546)|
Local privilege escalation in Persistent folder activation hook| High| Fixed|
5.11  
TLS-004| [#19547](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19547)|
Symlink attack in Persistent folder deactivation hook| Low| Fixed| 5.11  
TLS-005| [#19548](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19548)|
Local privilege escalation in GnuPG feature activation hook| High| Fixed| 5.11  
  
## Core

ID| Issue| Description| Impact| Status| Release  
---|---|---|---|---|---  
TLS-001| [#19464](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19464)|
Local privilege escalation in tails-shell-library| High| Fixed| 5.11  
TLS-009| [#19599](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19599)|
Man-in-the-middle attack on onion-grater service| Low| Fixed| 5.13  
TLS-011| [#19576](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19576)|
Limited path traversal in tails-documentation| Low| Fixed| 5.13  
TLS-019| [#19677](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19677)|
Local privilege escalation in tailslib leads to arbitrary file read| High|
Fixed| 5.14  
  
URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/audit_by_ROS/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] Tails default encryption app - Zulucrypt an option?

[Charlie Hustle via Tails-dev]

Hi there,
Firstly sincere apologies if this is the wrong way to go about this.
I wasn't able to create a Gitlab account anonymously to post a request there.

I have a feature request for Tails 6.0 (or roadmap) I hope merits discussion:

It would be ideal for Tails to replace the "Unlock Veracrypt Volumes" 
application with another app already offered in the package manager - 
Zulucrypt, OR a analagous app that offers similar features.

My main reasons are:

* Functionality. The "Unlock Veracrypt Volumes" only allows you to unlock 
volumes first created on other systems. I believe this creates a potential 
security threat for users who might use an insecure, non-amensiac platform to 
create this volume and leave traces behind. Zulucrypt allows both the creation 
AND unlocking of many types of encryption volumes, not just Veracrypt - 
enhancing the OOTB usefulness of Tails without adding large filesize or a steep 
learning curve for most features.
* Stenanography (and plausible deniability). An popular encryption method of 
hiding in plain sight, steganography is great (though not a silver bullet) - 
however in the current versions of Tails, you have to manually install 
Zulucrypt in order to use it (that is, unless you invest the time into becoming 
a CLI expert, most users won't). The mere existence of Zulucrypt being 
installed on a user's Tails today can alert an adversary to the potential 
existence of a hidden container created via steganography. By having Zulucrypt 
installed for all users by default (like Parrot OS has) in place of the current 
app, everyone benefits from the potential to use steganography in addition to 
other encryption formats, without raising suspicion from the adversary. If they 
can force you to unlock your persistent storage, that doesn't necessarily have 
to be the end of your defenses against prying eyes - in fact the appearance of 
compliance might be useful.

It appears the last time I could see this discussed was in 2016-17.
Could this be reviewed afresh and considered for a future Tails update?

Regards,Charlie___
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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.19

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.19](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.19/index.en.html)

# New features

## Closing a Tor circuit from _Onion Circuits_

You can now close a given Tor circuit from the _Onion Circuits_ interface.
This can help replace a particularly slow Tor circuit or troubleshoot issues
on the Tor network.

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.19/close_circuit.png)

To close a Tor circuit:

  1. [Connect to the Tor 
network.](https://tails.boum.org/doc/anonymous_internet/tor/index.en.html)

  2. Choose ![Tor status 
menu](https://tails.boum.org/lib/symbolic/tor-connected.png) ▸ **Open Onion 
Circuits** in the top navigation bar.

  3. Right-click (on Mac, click with two fingers) on the circuit that you want 
to close.

  4. Choose **Close this circuit** in the shortcut menu.

When you close a circuit that is being used by an application, your
application gets disconnected from this destination service.

For example, when you close a circuit while _Tor Browser_ is downloading a
file, the download fails.

  5. If you connect to the same destination server again, Tor uses a different 
circuit to replace the circuit that you closed.

For example, if you download the same file again, Tor uses a new circuit.

## Addition of sq-keyring-linter

At the request of people who use [SecureDrop](https://securedrop.org/) to
provide secure whistleblowing platforms across the world, we added the [`sq-
keyring-linter`](https://tracker.debian.org/pkg/rust-sequoia-keyring-linter)
package. `sq-keyring-linter` improves the cryptographic parameters of PGP keys
stored in their airgapped machines.

# Changes and updates

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[13.0.1](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1301).

  * Update the _Tor_ client to 0.4.8.7.

  * Update _Thunderbird_ to 
[115.4.1](https://www.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/115.4.1/releasenotes/).

  * Update the _Linux_ kernel to 6.1.55.

# Fixed problems

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.19

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.19.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.19 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.19/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Make the gift of privacy!

[Tails - News]

# [Make the gift of
privacy!](https://tails.boum.org/news/gift_of_privacy/index.en.html)

With malicious actors' intrusions into human rights growing in sophistication
and scale, Tails offers hope for those seeking refuge in a more secure digital
environment. We stand on the precipice of a future where digital privacy
should be a fundamental right, not a luxury.

![](https://tails.boum.org/donate/godzilla.png)

Since we started in 2008, millions of people around the world have used Tails
to be more secure, autonomous, and anonymous in their digital lives.

We have come so far thanks to you, and need your support to continue to do
what we do best: deliver the world's most privacy-preserving operating system!

Your donations a lion's share [of our
income](https://tails.boum.org/donate/index.en.html#income). But, this share
has reduced in the last couple of years. Globally, philanthropic giving has
fallen, in what is yet another symptom of the challenging political and
economic conditions we find ourselves in. But this hasn't tempered our
ambitions. Despite these challenges, Tails has gotten bigger and better over
the past year. We have spent more time improving Tails this year than any
previous year. But to achieve this, we have relied a bit more on support from
large, institutional donors.

While we are grateful for the support and generosity of our "large" donors, we
want to keep our reliance on them to a minimum. We are betting on having
diversified income streams as our insurance from economic volatility and
assurance of growing Tails sustainably and with complete decisional autonomy.
Although, this means that we rely on you even more. And hence this fundraiser!

Our goal is clear: to make Tails even more useful for vulnerable people in
high-risk environments. And we want to do this while remaining as autonomous
as our users are.

The proceeds from this fundraiser will drive initiatives that will make Tails
even more usable and secure. We want to add new, big features to Tails,
enhance user experience with even more usability tests, and increase Tails'
use in more geographies around the world.

Every donation, no matter how small, makes a difference. Please donate today
and help us keep Tails alive and well in 2024 and beyond! Here are 5 ways you
can get involved:

  1. **By making a recurring donation.** [Recurring 
donations](https://tails.boum.org/donate/index.en.html) are the best insurance 
for Tails' mission. These help us weather economic uncertainties and plan our 
work sustainably.

  2. **With a one-time gift.** If you can't set-up a recurring donation, you 
can make a [one-time donation](https://tails.boum.org/donate/index.en.html). 
Donate via PayPal, bank transfers, mail in your checks, or just send us good, 
old cash. Here's a pro-tip: donations of over $1 000 entitle you to some neat 
[sponsorship benefits](https://tails.boum.org/sponsors/become/).

  3. **Through cryptocurrency.** We accept [crypto 
donations](https://tails.boum.org/donate/index.en.html) in Bitcoin, Ethereum, 
and Monero.

  4. **Gift matching.** If your employer runs gift-matching programmes, 
consider looking up **Riseup Labs** and donate to **Tails via Riseup Labs**. 
Riseup Labs is our fiscal sponsor in the United States of America.

  5. **Spread the word.** And finally, please share this fundraiser with your 
network, friends, and colleagues. Help us amplify our impact by reaching a 
wider audience!

Thank you for being part of this journey and a toast to our future adventures
together! Oh, and in case you have somehow managed to skip over all the links
to our donations page so far, here it is: <https://tails.net/donate/>.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/gift_of_privacy/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] Would like to join the Turkish translation team

[Mert Kara via Tails-dev]

Hello, I'd like to share my interest on joining the Turkish translation team 
for the tails project. I've worked on and contributed to many Open source 
projects, games and have worked under professional settings.


publickey - EmailAddress(s=efemertkara06@proton.me) - 0x4255D998.asc
Description: application/pgp-keys


signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
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[Tails-dev] protection from remote viewing?

[David via Tails-dev]

Good day,

What about protection against remote take over programs that intrude into 
smartphones and other devices and gain access, such as programs like Peg_ a 
_sus?

Does this prohibit?

Gracias.

Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.___
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[Tails-dev] Please add firefox to Tails

[radio3399--- via Tails-dev]

Dear developers,

I cannot check my email accounts in email.cz, yahoo, gmail.com because they 
refuse Tor browsers (Robot detected).
For this reason, please add a standard Firefox to Tails to check email accounts.

Sincerely,
Tails user___
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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.16.1

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.16.1](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.16.1/index.en.html)

This release is an emergency release to fix a critical vulnerability in the
_Linux_ kernel.

# Changes and updates

  * Update the _Linux_ kernel to 6.1.38.

This updates fixes:

* [Downfall](https://downfall.page/) on Intel processors 
([CVE-2022-40982](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-40982))
* 
[Inception](https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7005.html)
 on AMD processors 
([CVE-2023-20569](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-20569))

These vulnerability could allow a malicious application running in Tails to
access and steal data from another application in Tails, for example passwords
stored in _KeePassXC_ or private keys stored in _Electrum_.

This attack is unlikely, but could be performed by a strong attacker, such as
a government or a hacking firm. We are not aware of this attack being used in
the wild.

# Fixed problems

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.16.1

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.16.1.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.16.1 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.16.1/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] thanks for the hard work

[smirnoff2023--- via Tails-dev]

dear tails developers,
i'm emailing yaw just to let yaw know that yaw did a really great job on
devevolping tails, it's nice to have it installed on a USB so i can be
able to go online without being harrased by constant ads, i want to thank
yaw for the hard work, because tails is the best linux OS that ive used so
far.
thank you. happy tails user
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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.15.1

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.15.1](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.15.1/index.en.html)

# Changes and updates

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[12.5](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-125).

[Tor Browser 12.5](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-125)
has a new circuit view and better information about onion services.

![](https://tails.boum.org/doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser/circuit-
view.png)

  * Support onion service authentication in _Tor Browser_.

For example, onion service authentication is used by _OnionShare_ outside of
Tails.

![Tor Browser asking for a private key to connect to an onion
service](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.15.1/authentication.png)

  * Display the version of Tails in the Boot Loader

![SYSLINUX Boot Loader displaying 'Tails
5.15.1'](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.15.1/version.png)

# Fixed problems

  * Fix the search of some languages and keyboard layouts. 
([#19200](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19200))

![Searching for 'esp' now returns
'Español'](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.15.1/language.png)

  * Make the upgrade of the Persistent Storage more reliable:

* On some systems, the message " _Upgrading the persistent storage_ " was 
displayed every time in Tails 5.14 when Tails failed to upgrade one of the 
cryptographic parameters. 
([#19734](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19734))

* On some USB sticks, upgrading the Persistent Storage was too slow and 
failed with the error message " _Upgrade of persistent storage failed_ ". 
([#19728](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19728))

  * Fix opening documentation links from _Tails Installer_. 
([#19870](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19870))

  * Prevent _Tor Browser_ to access information about other Tor circuits. 
([#19740](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19740))

  * Make the error when scanning the QR code of a bridge more consistent. 
([#19737](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19737))

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

[#19728](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19728) was
affecting 5.14, and it might still be present. If you encounter this bug,
please [send us a _WhisperBack_
report](https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/bug_reporting/index.en.html#whisperback).

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.15.1

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.15.1.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.15.1 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.15.1/index.en.html>

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Re: [Tails-dev] Moving to a new domain: tails.net

[tails-sysadmins]

Hello! Below is an update of the move to tails.net.

"Tails Sysadmins"  writes:
> Hello, dear Tails contributors!
>
> Last year we acquired the "tails.net" domain and, since then, we started
> taking incremental steps to implement it throughout the Tails OS and
> infra[1][2].
>
> We'd like to announce two big changes on this front:
>
>   - Tails 5.14 (just released a few moments ago) is the first release to
> use the new "tails.net" domain in its internals (except for the
> included doc which is a copy of the current website).
>
>   - In a couple of weeks we'll change the hardcoded links in the Tails
> website source to start using the new domain. The updated
> website/doc will be included in the next Tails release.

This happened:


https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/commit/49082bd5b077b182a77a7fdad3ba15c566b31e36

> For fellow translators: When we do the website source change, we'll try
> to minimize the impact it'll have on the invalidation of current
> translations. But, please, beware that you may find parts that will
> need to be manually updated after the change is effective.

This also happened, and I tried to avoid all invalidations, but please
keep an eye and make sure to use the new tails.net domain from now
on. :)

These were the changes made to .po files:


https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/commit/512e9ba37c009d6ffbbcfdd397ab0e94581e4376

https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/commit/c5518d57b505786ef3566d78d7a264dfbab58946

https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/commit/14de266b236b60ccff74fc1cbbdc15d577d195a6

> Thank you very much for all your support!

Yes, thanks!

The Tails Sysadmins

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.14

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.14](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.14/index.en.html)

# New features

## Automatic migration to LUKS2 and Argon2id

The cryptographic parameters of LUKS from Tails 5.12 or earlier are weak
against a state-sponsored attacker with physical access to your device.

To use stronger encryption parameters, Tails 5.14 automatically converts your
Persistent Storage to use LUKS2 encryption with Argon2id.

Still, we recommend you change the passphrase of your Persistent Storage and
other LUKS encrypted volumes unless you use a long passphrase of 5 random
words or more.

[Read our security advisory and upgrade
guide.](https://tails.boum.org/security/argon2id/index.en.html)

## Full backups from Tails Installer

You can now do a backup of your Persistent Storage from _Tails Installer_ by
cloning your Persistent Storage to your backup Tails entirely.

![](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/backup/clone.png)

You can still use the backup utility to go faster while [updating your
backup](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/backup/index.en.html#updating).

## Captive portal detection

Tails now detects if you have to sign in to the network using a captive portal
if you choose to connect to Tor automatically.

The error screen appears more quickly and recommends you try to sign in to the
network as the first option.

## Incentive to donate from _Electrum_

Many people use Tails to secure their Bitcoin wallet and donations in Bitcoin
are key to the survival of our project, so we integrated a way to donate from
_Electrum_ in Tails.

![Popup when starting Electrum with

button to donate](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.14/electrum.png)

# Changes and updates

## Included software

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[12.0.7](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1207).

## Usability improvements to the Persistent Storage

  * Change the button to create a Persistent Storage from the Welcome Screen to 
be a switch. 
([#19673](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19673))

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.14/create.png)

  * Add back the description of some of the Persistent Storage features and 
mention _Kleopatra_ in the _GnuPG_ feature. 
([#19642](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19642) and 
[#19675](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19675))

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.14/descriptions.png)

  * Hide the duplicated _Persistent_ bookmark in the _Files_ browser. 
([#19646](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19646))

# Fixed problems

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

  * Avoid restarting the desktop environment when creating a Persistent 
Storage. ([#19667](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19667))

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.14

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.14.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.14 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.14/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] Moving to a new domain: tails.net

[tails-sysadmins]

Hello, dear Tails contributors!

Last year we acquired the "tails.net" domain and, since then, we started
taking incremental steps to implement it throughout the Tails OS and
infra[1][2].

We'd like to announce two big changes on this front:

  - Tails 5.14 (just released a few moments ago) is the first release to
use the new "tails.net" domain in its internals (except for the
included doc which is a copy of the current website).

  - In a couple of weeks we'll change the hardcoded links in the Tails
website source to start using the new domain. The updated
website/doc will be included in the next Tails release.

For fellow translators: When we do the website source change, we'll try
to minimize the impact it'll have on the invalidation of current
translations. But, please, beware that you may find parts that will
need to be manually updated after the change is effective.

Note that the full migration of the website will still take some time,
as it involves several details and steps[3], and that the old domain
will continue to be used in different parts of the infra until we
eventually have the means to phase it out[4].

Thank you very much for all your support!

The Tails Sysadmins

--

[1] https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/sysadmin/-/issues/17952
[2] https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18263
[3] https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/sysadmin/-/issues/17985
[4] https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/sysadmin/-/issues/17987

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Improving Tails for human rights defenders in Latin America

[Tails - News]

# [Improving Tails for human rights defenders in Latin
America](https://tails.boum.org/news/improving_in_latam/index.en.html)

Between 2021 and 2023 Tails, [Tor](https://torproject.org/), and the [Guardian
Project](https://guardianproject.info/) partnered to organize training and
usability tests in Ecuador, Mexico, and Brazil. Our goals were to:

  * Promote our digital security tools and train human rights defenders in the 
Global South.
  * Learn from their experiences and needs to help us prioritize future work.
  * Improve the usability of our tools based on their feedback.

# Usability tests and improvements

We conducted 4 rounds of in-person moderated usability tests in Mexico,
Brazil, and Ecuador to identify usability issues in the features of Tails that
are most important to new users:

  * Installation
  * Tor Connection
  * Persistent Storage

The DesignOps tools that we used to organize these usability tests are all
[publicly available on our
website](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/how/user_experience/).

The detailed methodology for each of the usability tests is explained in the
corresponding GitLab issues, linked below.

### Installation

In December 2021 in Mexico, we learned that the tools for new users to install
Tails worked well, but several people got lost while navigating the
instructions on the website.

Based on these findings, we restructured our installation pages and fixed 30
usability issues on the website.

We tested these improvements in August 2022 in Brazil and confirmed that the
new installation pages were much easier to follow. Only 1 out of 4
participants had trouble installing Tails on their own. All participants could
start Tails and connect to the Tor network easily.

Details:

  * Usability tests of first-time use in Mexico 
([#18074](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18074))

* [Summary of 
findings](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18074#note_210738)
* [Detailed 
findings](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/ux/-/raw/master/first-time/rainbow_table.fods?inline=false)
  * Usability tests of first-time use in Brazil 
([#18784](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18784))

* [Summary of 
findings](https://lists.autistici.org/message/20221012.181235.a673efeb.en.html)
* [Detailed 
findings](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/ux/-/blob/master/first-time/rainbow_table_installation_2022_08_Sao_Paulo.fods?inline=false)

### Tor Connection

In July 2021, we released the Tor Connection assistant to completely redesign
how to connect Tails to the Tor network. The new assistant is most useful to
people who are at high risk of physical surveillance, under heavy network
censorship, or on a poor Internet connection.

In August 2022 in Brazil, we tested the usability of Tor Connection when
accessing the Tor network is blocked by censorship or by a captive portal.

Despite the many usability issues that we fixed since the first release of Tor
Connection, 3 test participants out of 4 failed to connect when access to the
Tor network was blocked.

Since then we fixed 14 usability issues affecting Tor Connection: to
understand better why connecting to Tor fails, to make it easier to configure
a Tor bridge, and to make it easier to sign in to a network using a captive
portal.

  * Usability tests of Tor Connection 
([#18762](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18762)) 
* [Summary of 
findings](https://lists.autistici.org/message/20221012.140611.7e58f067.en.html)
* [Detailed 
findings](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/ux/-/raw/master/network/rainbow_table_tor_connection_2022_08_Sao_Paulo.fods?inline=false)

### Persistent Storage

In March 2023 in Ecuador, we tested the usability of the new Persistent
Storage, which was released in Tails in December 2022.

We didn't find any serious usability issues in the new Persistent Storage. The
fact that people don't have to restart to create and enable the Persistent
Storage and that their data (eg. Wi-Fi password) is stored on creation were
huge improvements compared to the old Persistent Storage.

  * March 2023: Usability tests of the new Persistent Storage 
([#18648](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18648)) 
* [Summary of 
findings](https://lists.autistici.org/message/20230510.091842.23ed75ba.en.html)
* [Detailed 
findings](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/ux/-/raw/master/persistent%20storage/rainbow_table_persistent_storage_2023_03_Ecuador.fods?inline=false)

# Trainings

Through our combined efforts we reached 47 organizations and trained 433 human
rights defenders on our family of tools based on the Tor network. For Tails
only, we conducted 8 workshops and trained 84 people on using Tails:
journalists, activists, feminists, lawyers, and human rights defenders.

The material used for these Tails workshops is available on our website in
[English](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/how/promote/material/slides

[Tails-dev] [PATCH] Fix incorrect usage of "discrete"

[Steve Dougherty via Tails-dev]

This doesn't retroactively fix news posts. Via Wiktionary:

discrete (comparative more discrete, superlative most discrete)

  1. Separate; distinct; individual; non-continuous.

   a government with three discrete divisions

  2. That can be perceived individually, not as connected to, or part of, 
something else.

discreet (comparative more discreet or discreeter, superlative most discreet or 
discreetest)

  1. Respectful of privacy or secrecy; exercising caution in order to
 avoid causing embarrassment; quiet; diplomatic.

   With a discreet gesture, she reminded him to mind his manners.

   John just doesn't understand that laughing at Mary all day is not
   very discreet.

  2. Not drawing attention, anger or challenge; inconspicuous.

Although cognate and identical in the Middle English period, the term
has become distinct from discrete.
---
 config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/tails/tca/main.ui.in | 2 +-
 po/tails.pot| 2 +-
 wiki/src/doc/anonymous_internet/tor.mdwn| 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/tails/tca/main.ui.in 
b/config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/tails/tca/main.ui.in
index f77be556cd..59ca2b8e5b 100644
--- a/config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/tails/tca/main.ui.in
+++ b/config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/tails/tca/main.ui.in
@@ -1498,7 +1498,7 @@ Choose this option if you already know that you need a 
bridge. Otherwise, Tails
 12
 Tails will only connect 
to Tor after you configured a Tor bridge. Bridges are secret Tor relays that 
hide that you are connecting to Tor.
 
-Our team is doing its best to help you connect to Tor using the most discrete 
types of Tor bridges.
+Our team is doing its best to help you connect to Tor using the most discreet 
types of Tor bridges.
 
 You will have to do extra configuration if you don't know any Tor bridges yet, 
if you connect from a public Wi-Fi network, or if you are in the Eastern 
Hemisphere.
 True
diff --git a/po/tails.pot b/po/tails.pot
index 82f80aaa9f..29b9a2243a 100644
--- a/po/tails.pot
+++ b/po/tails.pot
@@ -3000,7 +3000,7 @@ msgid ""
 "are secret Tor relays that hide that you are connecting to Tor.\n"
 "\n"
 "Our team is doing its best to help you connect to Tor using the most "
-"discrete types of Tor bridges.\n"
+"discreet types of Tor bridges.\n"
 "\n"
 "You will have to do extra configuration if you don't know any Tor bridges "
 "yet, if you connect from a public Wi-Fi network, or if you are in the "
diff --git a/wiki/src/doc/anonymous_internet/tor.mdwn 
b/wiki/src/doc/anonymous_internet/tor.mdwn
index a8c2e4f16d..96741a60a6 100644
--- a/wiki/src/doc/anonymous_internet/tor.mdwn
+++ b/wiki/src/doc/anonymous_internet/tor.mdwn
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ of exit nodes of the Tor network is public.
 
 
 
-Our team is doing its best to help you connect to Tor using the most discrete
+Our team is doing its best to help you connect to Tor using the most discreet
 types of Tor bridges. That is why, when you decide to hide that you are 
connecting to Tor:
 
 
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ types of Tor bridges. That is why, when you decide to hide 
that you are connecti
  Even someone who knows your bridge cannot know what you are doing online
  from Tails.
 
-- You can only use the types of bridges that our team considers discrete 
enough.
+- You can only use the types of bridges that our team considers discreet 
enough.
 
   Currently in Tails, only *obfs4* bridges hide that you are using Tor.
 
-- 
2.34.1

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.12 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.12 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.12/index.en.html)

# New features

## Data deletion when deactivating a feature of the Persistent Storage

After you turn off a feature of the Persistent Storage, you can now click the
**Delete Data** button to delete the data stored for this feature.

![Persistent Storage settings with message:

Persistent Folder. The data of this feature is still saved. Delete
Data?](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.12/delete-data.png)

## Passphrase suggestion when creating the Persistent Storage

When creating the Persistent Storage, a random and very secure passphrase is
now displayed as a suggestion:

![We recommend a long passphrase of 5 to 7 random words. For example:
XXX](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.12/diceware.png)

This passphrase uses the diceware method to give very strong security
guarantees while being possible to memorize.

For example, a six-word passphrase like we suggest would take 3 505 years to
crack at a trillion guesses a second.

Learn more about the maths in [The Intercept: Passphrases That You Can
Memorize -- But That Even the NSA Can't
Guess](https://theintercept.com/2015/03/26/passphrases-can-memorize-attackers-
cant-guess/).

# Changes and updates

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[12.0.5](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1205/).

  * Update the _Linux_ kernel to 6.1.20. This improves the support for newer 
hardware: graphics, Wi-Fi, and so on.

  * Use a new icon for the backup utility for the Persistent Storage.

![](https://tails.boum.org/lib/apps/backup.png)

# Fixed problems

We fixed several reliability issues with the Persistent Storage:

  * We improved the error message when a feature of the Persistent Storage 
fails to activate from the Welcome Screen to clarify which feature is affected.

![Welcome Screen with error

message: Failed to activate some features of the Persistent Storage:

Persistent Folder.](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.12/failure-to-
activate.png)

After starting Tails, the feature that failed to activate is marked as such in
the Persistent Storage settings. You can try turning the feature off and on
again or deleting its data to reset it entirely.

![Persistent Storage settings with

error message: Persistent Folder. Activation failed. Try
again.](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.12/activation-failed.png)

  * We made the activation of the Persistent Storage more reliable in 2 error 
cases. ([#19376](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19376) and 
[#19331](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19331))

  * We added a progress indicator while turning on a new feature to clarify 
that it can take some time. 
([#19291](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19291))

  * We made sure that all data that is already available in Tails is really 
copied to the USB stick when turning on a feature. 
([#19368](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19368))

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.12

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.12.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.12 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.12/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.11 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.11 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.11/index.en.html)

# New features

  * Tails now uses the [`zram` Linux kernel 
module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zram) to extend the capacity of the 
computer's memory.

You can run more applications or use your session for longer periods of time.
Tails will handle more load before freezing and become slow more
progressively.

  * You can record screencasts using the integrated feature of GNOME. We 
configured this feature to allow unlimited screencasts. See [screenshot and 
screencast](https://tails.boum.org/doc/sensitive_documents/screenshot_and_screencast/index.en.html).

# Changes and updates

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[12.0.4](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1204).

  * Update _Thunderbird_ to 
[102.9.0](https://www.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/102.9.0/releasenotes/).

  * Redesigned the unlocking section of the Welcome Screen.

![](https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/welcome_screen/unlock_persistent_storage.png)

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.11

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.11.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.11 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 5.12 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for
April 18.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.11/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.10 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.10 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.10/index.en.html)

# Changes and updates

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[12.0.3](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1203).

  * Ask for confirmation when starting without unlocking the Persistent Storage.

![Do you really want to start Tails without unlocking your Persistent
Storage?](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.10/unlock.png)

  * Update our [documentation on the Persistent 
Storage](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html).

# Fixed problems

  * Avoid crashing when the download of an upgrade is stopped and resumed. 
([#18435](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18435))

  * Solve a possible privilege escalation through a symlink attack. 
([#19424](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19424))

Dennis Brinkrolf discovered that an adversary who could already run arbitrary
code as the amnesia user in Tails 5.9, could have escalated their privileges
to reading arbitrary files on the system. It might have been possible to use
this as part of an exploit chain to gain root privileges.

## Persistent Storage

  * Avoid opening the Persistent Storage settings each time after login. 
([#19410](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19410))

  * Solve some cases of failure to activate the Persistent Storage by bumping 
the unlocking timeout to 120 seconds. 
([#19432](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19432))

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.10

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.10.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.10 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 5.11 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for
March 14.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.10/index.en.html>

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Re: [Tails-dev] Question: Intel SGX disabled in BIOS

[Bung via Tails-dev]

SGX is unsecure
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[Tails-dev] Little support question

[neal caffrey via Tails-dev]

Hi I’m new to tails and am having some trouble? A. It won’t connect to Wi-Fi 
with the right password I dk why? Connects to my phone hotspot fine though. B. 
I can’t find anything about the clip board icon that’s supposed to be on the 
top menu bar for pgp keys, I’ve searched for how to do it but can’t find 
anything online about it. 


Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPhone
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[Tails-dev] Critical Usability Issue due to which I Haven't Used Tails in Years

[Anti-OOM in Tails via Tails-dev]

Hello, I've decided to forward my unanswered query to the public mailing list. 
Tails developers and Tails Foundations team, please check this. I welcome 
opinion from anyone though.
Thank you in advance.
(I sent this a few days ago, and saw new mail appear 
[here](https://lists.autistici.org/list/tails-dev.html) and 
[here](https://www.mail-archive.com/tails-dev@boum.org/) without this message 
listed, so now I created this email address and am resending this.)

-- Original message -
From: 
Date: Tue, Dec 19, 2022 at 10:42 PM UTC
Subject: Fwd: Critical Usability Issue due to which I Haven't Used Tails in 
Years
To: 

Hello, (I don't need PGP, please don't ignore this,)
I sent the email message reproduced below and forwarding it to you since I 
didn't get any reply yet as of writing. I have issues that I request that 
you'll forward to the Tails developers. TL;DR: I wrote about three things, in 
this order: (1) Firstly, I wrote about the OOM-killing situation in Tails, 
which needs to be addressed directly by the Tails developers or the Tails 
Foundations team dealing with Debian/distribution work; (2) secondly, I 
mentioned my personal stance regarding VRAM wiping on shutdown; (3) finally, I 
asked whether I can do a manual upgrade of Tails from a very old version to the 
latest stable version.

Please don't reply with instructions for debugging or troubleshooting, as 
they're unnecessary -- but you're free to express your disagreement with me on 
this, provided that you don't jump to hasty conclusions and have read my 
message.
I'm sorry if this sounds rude, but after various email messages and WhisperBack 
reports over the past six or seven years or so, it feels like you're actively 
ignoring me.

Thank you.

-- Original message -
From: 
Date: Mon, Dec 5, 2022 at 2:41 AM UTC
Subject: Critical Usability Issue due to which I Haven't Used Tails in Years
To: ta...@boum.org , 

Hello. First of all, do not dismiss this email please. I live in a free, 
democratic country where my human rights are respected; I don't use PGP but I 
don't require its use for this matter. If you're not an official member of the 
Tails developers team, then please forward this email to them! In the past, 
when I used to use Tails, I used both WhisperBack and the helpdesk mailing list 
to contact you regarding this matter; either you did nothing about the issue, 
or the helpdesk person dismissed my report as if I should do more 
troubleshooting or my hardware is faulty or whatever (don't remember, but it 
doesn't matter actually).

The issue is this:
Tails runs without any swap space (obviously, to maintain amnesia), the entire 
system may lock up at any moment due to heavy memory usage and opening of many 
Web browser tabs (which I usually do), the Magic Sysrq functionality of 
manually invoking the OOM killer in such emergency situations is disabled by 
default in Tails (and there's no way to enable without rebooting, and it's not 
recommended to enable it when connecting to the Internet as it's insecure), and 
Tails bundles no userspace early OOM daemon enabled out-of-the-box (such as 
systemd-oomd).
The very least you can do is ship a new version of Tails with a slightly 
modified configuration value under /proc to enable the Magic Sysrq-F key 
combination. I request that you also consider shipping systemd-oomd enabled by 
default in the next major release of Tails (i.e. version 6.0).

(I want to use this opportunity to express my stance regarding video RAM 
erasure during reboot: I don't think that the fact that something cannot be 
done perfectly is a good excuse to refrain from doing it at all, i.e. if 
something cannot be done 100% well, it's better to do even 20% of the job 
rather than 0%; at the same time, I don't ever expect you to ship spaghetti 
code, so I don't expect you to write a half-assed implementation that does 20% 
of the job, despite what I said earlier. I request that you research solutions 
that you can implement in the short term to at least try to erase the VRAM 
during reboot.)

Related to this:
I have a USB flash drive with Tails, installed using Tails installer, with an 
encrypted persistence, up-to-date as of around 2019-2020, with an early 
(stable) version of Tails 4.x if I remember right. My question is this: Can I 
do a manual upgrade to the latest stable version of Tails 5? (Could I do a 
manual upgrade to 6.x when it would be released?) When doing manual upgrades, 
what are the earliest versions supported? Is such an old version of Tails 
supported for manual upgrades using Tails installer in the latest stable Tails? 
Should I back up my encrypted persistence before doing anything, or do you not 
expect such a manual upgrade from Tails 4.x to the latest Tails 5 to cause data 
loss?

Tails developers: please acknowledge that you received this email ASAP, at 
least so I would know that you got it, even if you have no answers yet.
Thank you very much

[Tails-dev] Privacy

[jakob.brannstrom via Tails-dev]

Hi there,

If an adversary controls all three hops in a tor circuit. Will my traffic still 
be private?

Thank you.

Best regards
Jakob Brannstrom___
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[Tails-dev] Tor

[jakob.brannstrom via Tails-dev]

Dear sirs and ladies!

Please, if I have questions about the tor hops and circuits, whom would you 
direct me to?

Thank you.

Best regards
Jakob Brannstrom___
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[Tails-dev] obfs4 not work in Iran

[Trojan via Tails-dev]

Hi Tails thank you for your hard work for freedom it's been more then 4 years 
we use Tails and donated too. recently in Iran we faced heavy censorship 
because we the people of Iran fight for (woman) freedom life in Iran and the 
great Dictator decided to ban the internet so we can't use obfs4 bridges on 
Tails any more and tails default ports are banned. the only way is snowflake 
bridges that Tails not support it. snowflake works well on Tor browser so 
Please allow snowflake bridge on Tails. Again thank you for your great works
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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.8 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.8 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.8/index.en.html)

Tails 5.8 is the most important release of Tails in years. It includes both
major redesign of existing features, important usability improvements, and
hardened security.

This work has been made possible by donations from users like you. If you like
these changes and want more, donate now to fund our work in 2023.

[**Donate now to fund our work in
2023.**](https://tails.boum.org/donate/index.en.html)

# New features

## New Persistent Storage

After 2 years of hard work, we are extremelly proud to present you a complete
redesign of the Persistent Storage.

The Persistent Storage hasn't changed much since its first release in 2012
because the code was hard to modify and improve. But, we learned from users
that the Persistent Storage could do a lot more for you if it had more
features and was easier to use.

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.8/create.png)

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.8/configure.png)

  * You don't have to restart anymore after creating the Persistent Storage or 
each time you activate a new feature.

  * You can change the password of your Persistent Storage from this new 
application.

  * You can choose to create a Persistent Storage directly from the Welcome 
Screen, if you don't have one already.

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.8/onboard.png)

## Wayland and better Unsafe Browser

We replaced the deprecated X.Org display system with Wayland.

Even if you won't notice any visual difference, Wayland brings more security
in depth to Tails by making it harder for a compromised application in Tails
to compromise or misuse another application.

For example, since [Tails
4.8](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_4.8/index.en.html), the _Unsafe
Browser_ was disabled by default because a security vulnerability in another
application in Tails could start an invisible _Unsafe Browser_ , reveal your
IP address, and [deanonymize
you](https://tails.boum.org/doc/anonymous_internet/unsafe_browser/index.en.html#security).

Wayland fixes this vulnerability and makes it safe to reenable the _Unsafe
Browser_ by default. You can still disable the _Unsafe Browser_ in the Welcome
Screen.

Wayland also brings in other features that were not working yet in the _Unsafe
Browser_ :

  * Sound
  * Uploads and downloads
  * Alternative input methods for Chinese and other non-Latin languages
  * Accessibility features like the screen reader and virtual keyboard

## QR code scanning of Tor bridges

We made it easier to enter new Tor bridges in Tails by scanning a QR code.

To get a QR code, you can either:

  * Send an empty email to 
[brid...@torproject.org](mailto:brid...@torproject.org) from a Gmail or Riseup 
email address.

  * Get bridges from <https://bridges.torproject.org/> and print the QR code on 
paper.

We are aware that the QR codes that are currently provided are too big to be
easy to scan. We are [working with
Tor](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-
censorship/bridgedb/-/issues/40052) to make them smaller and easier to scan.

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/test_5.8-beta1/qr_code.png)

# Changes and updates

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[12.0.1](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1201).

  * Update _Thunderbird_ to 
[102.6.0](https://www.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/102.6.0/releasenotes/).

  * Update _Tor_ to 0.4.7.12.

# Fixed problems

We fixed 3 usability issues in the _Tor Connection_ assistant:

  * Display a percentage on the connection progress bar. 
([#19208](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19208))

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.8/progress.png)

  * Fix links to documentation. 
([#19172](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19172))

  * Add a **Bridge** label in front of the line to enter a custom bridge. 
([#19169](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19169))

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

  * The switches that turn on and off the different features of the Persistent 
Storage are very slow to respond on some USB sticks. Please report on 
[#19291](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19291) if this 
happens to you.

  * The top of the Welcome Screen is cut out on small displays (800×600), like 
virtual machines. 
([#19324](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19324))

You can press **Alt+S** to start Tails.

  * When using a custom Tor `obfs4` bridge, the progress bar of _Tor 
Connection_ sometimes gets stuck halfway through and becomes extremelly slow. 
([#19173](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19173))

To fix this, you can either:

* Close and reopen _Tor Connection_ to speed up the initial connection.

* Try a different `obfs4` bridge.

This issue only affects outdated obfs4 bridges and does not happen with obfs4
bridges that run version 

[Tails-dev] Add pass for more ways of password managment

[hag_rat via Tails-dev]

By any change would y'all add [pass](https://www.passwordstore.org/)___
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[Tails-dev] KeepassXC

[deleeete via Tails-dev]

Dear Tails Boum.

## Request to update existing KeepassXC to a Later Version.

Issue I'm having is the Version of KeepassXC included in the latest Releases is 
just one version too old (it's from *Oct 22, 2020*)

I'd like to natively open Keepass 2 (.KDBX Databases.)
This option is included as standard in all eight subsequent versions of 
[KeepassXC](https://keepassxc.org/blog/)

Maybe you can suggest it and pop it in the pipeline for the next version of 
Tails?

Many thanks for your time and consideration
Kind Regards
(This is a Temp email, no reply is expected or necessary)

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Test the new Persistent Storage and Wayland support

[Tails - News]

# [Test the new Persistent Storage and Wayland
support](https://tails.boum.org/news/test_5.8-beta1/)

We are extremelly proud to present you a beta of 2 new major features of
Tails: a complete redesign of the Persistent Storage and the migration to
Wayland, which brings a better _Unsafe Browser_.

This beta also includes an easier way to enter Tor bridges in Tails by
scanning a QR code.

This work has been made possible by donations from users like you. If you like
these changes and want more, [donate now to fund our work in
2023](https://tails.boum.org/donate/index.en.html).

We will only release these features officially in Tails 5.8 (December 20), but
you can try Tails 5.8~beta1 already!

# New Persistent Storage

Since January 2021, we have been working on a complete redesign of the
Persistent Storage.

The Persistent Storage hasn't changed much since its first release in 2012
because the code was hard to modify and improve. But, we learned from users
that the Persistent Storage could do a lot more for you if it had more
features and was easier to use.

We've worked hard since 2021 to implement a [new
design](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/blueprints/-/wikis/Persistent-
Storage-redesign) and completely rewrite the code in Python.

The new Persistent Storage doesn't require restarting after creating it or
each time you activate a new feature.

It will also make it easier for us to persist more settings in the future.

And finally, it's looks so much better!

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/test_5.8-beta1/create.png)

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/test_5.8-beta1/features.png)

# Wayland and better Unsafe Browser

Tails 5.8~beta1 replaces the deprecated X.Org display system with Wayland.

Wayland brings more security in depth to Tails by making it harder for a
compromised application in Tails to compromise or misuse another application.

For example, since [Tails
4.8](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_4.8/index.en.html), the _Unsafe
Browser_ is disabled by default because a security vulnerability in another
application in Tails could start an invisible _Unsafe Browser_ , reveal your
IP address, and [deanonymize
you](https://tails.boum.org/doc/anonymous_internet/unsafe_browser/index.en.html#security).

Wayland fixes this vulnerability and makes it safe to reenable the _Unsafe
Browser_ by default.

Wayland also brings in other features that were not working yet in the _Unsafe
Browser_ :

  * Sound
  * Uploads and downloads
  * Alternative input methods for Chinese and other non-Latin languages
  * Accessibility features like the screen reader and virtual keyboard

Enjoy!

# QR code scanning for Tor bridges

Tails 5.8~beta1 makes it easier to enter new Tor bridges in Tails by scanning
a QR code.

To get a QR code, you can either:

  * Send an empty email to 
[brid...@torproject.org](mailto:brid...@torproject.org) from a Gmail or Riseup 
email address.

  * Get bridges from <https://bridges.torproject.org/> and print the QR code on 
paper.

We are aware that the QR codes that are currently provided are too big to be
easy to scan. We are [working with
Tor](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-
censorship/bridgedb/-/issues/40052) to make them smaller and easier to scan.

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/test_5.8-beta1/qr_code.png)

# How to test Tails 5.8~beta1?

You can either install Tails 5.8~beta1 on a new USB stick or upgrade your
Tails USB stick with an existing Persistent Storage to Tails 5.8~beta1.

Keep in mind that this is a test image. We tested that it is not broken in
obvious ways, but it might still contain undiscovered issues.

Please, report any new problem to [tails-test...@boum.org](mailto:tails-
test...@boum.org) (public mailing list).

# Get Tails 5.8~beta1

## To download 5.8~beta1

### Direct download

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](http://dl.amnesia.boum.org/tails/alpha/tails-amd64-5.8~beta1/tails-amd64-5.8~beta1.img)
 ([OpenPGP 
signature](https://tails.boum.org/torrents/files/tails-amd64-5.8~beta1.img.sig))

  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](http://dl.amnesia.boum.org/tails/alpha/tails-amd64-5.8~beta1/tails-amd64-5.8~beta1.iso)
 ([OpenPGP 
signature](https://tails.boum.org/torrents/files/tails-amd64-5.8~beta1.iso.sig))

### BitTorrent download

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/torrents/files/tails-amd64-5.8~beta1.img.torrent)

  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/torrents/files/tails-amd64-5.8~beta1.iso.torrent)

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost 

[Tails-dev] Installing Tails as a Virtual Machine

[nibs123 via Tails-dev]

I downloaded the Tails iso in order to run Tails as a virtual machine. What 
version of Debian Linux does Tails currently use?

V/R,
Race Jones
702-265-5826

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.6 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.6 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.6/index.en.html)

# Changes and updates

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[11.5.5](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1155).

  * Update the _Linux_ kernel to 5.10.149. This should improve the support for 
newer hardware: graphics, Wi-Fi, and so on.

# Fixed problems

  * When a manual upgrade is required, Tails now always points to the release 
notes of the latest version, instead of pointing sometimes to a deprecated 
version. ([#17069](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/17069))

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.6

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.6.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.6 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 5.7 is scheduled for November 22.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.6/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.5 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.5 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.5/index.en.html)

# Changes and updates

This section will be updated soon. Sorry for the inconvenience!

# Known issues

Recently, a [serious kernel vulnerability](https://lwn.net/Articles/911062/)
has been discovered in the Linux kernel. This is currently exploitable in
Tails.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.5

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.5.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.5 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 5.6 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for
October 25.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.5/index.en.html>

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Re: [Tails-dev] Consider adding -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3 to some applications (e.g., web browser)?

[jvoisin via Tails-dev]

>> Has anyone looked into adding -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3 to some
>> It's unclear how much the performance impact is; probably the only way to 
>> know is to try it.

I'd argue that it's also unclear what security benefits it would bring
to a web-browser :P

But having it enabled in Debian by default would indeed by sweet. Do you
have a link to the bug you opened intrigeri?

o/
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[Tails-dev] Javascript question

[Ahmed Chakik via Tails-dev]

Hi, if I connect to VPN first then start Tor browser with javascript enabled to 
visit a clearnet website, can javascript see my true IP address? Thanks

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[Tails-dev] Tails Safety

[stopcensorship5 via Tails-dev]

Hi there

I am writing to find out if tails is a safe platiform to use for political 
activists or dissidents? I am not an expert on the Tails system itself but I 
did some research and came accross an article that said Tails was compromised 
by Facebook by exploiting a vulnerability in the video player in Tails which 
was used to expose users of the system. Has Tails patched that 
vulnerability/exploit and is the system safe to use now or can governments use 
the same or similar exploit to that of Facebook to find out the identity of 
Tails users?
Best regards.

Link:
https://www.vice.com/en/article/dyz3jy/privacy-focused-os-tails-wants-to-know-how-facebook-and-the-fbi-hacked-it___
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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.4 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.4 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.4/index.en.html)

# Changes and updates

  * Harden several aspects of our _Linux_ kernel. 
([#18302](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18302), 
[#18858](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18858), and 
[#18886](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18886))

  * Disable HTTPS-only mode in the _Unsafe Browser_ to make it easier to sign 
in to Wi-Fi networks.

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[11.5.2](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1152).

  * Update _tor_ to 0.4.7.10.

  * Update the _Linux_ kernel to 5.10.136. This should improve the support for 
newer hardware: graphics, Wi-Fi, and so on. It will also fix an important 
vulnerability 
([19081](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/19081))

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.4

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.4.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.4 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 5.5 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for
September 20.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.4/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] Realtek™ RTL8812AU WiFi 5 (802.11ac) chipset

[thegrimmnoob via Tails-dev]

Is it possible to add drivers for the Alfa ac1200 wifi adapter, Realtek™ 
RTL8812AU WiFi 5 (802.11ac) chipset? Many of us with poor wifi reception need 
these long range adapters to aquire a strong signal. Failing that, is it 
possible to install the Realtek™ RTL8812AU WiFi 5 (802.11ac) chipset drivers 
during a Tails instance?

Thanks very much, Cherrs!
Grimm

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.3.1 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.3.1 is
out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.3.1/index.en.html)

This release is an emergency release to fix a security vulnerability in the
_Linux_ kernel.

# Changes and updates

  * Update the _Linux_ kernel to 5.10.127-2, which fixes 
[CVE-2022-34918](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-34918),
 a vulnerability that allows applications in Tails to gain administration 
privileges.

For example, if an attacker was able to exploit other unknown security
vulnerabilities in _Tor Browser_ , they might then use CVE-2022-34918 to take
full control of your Tails and deanonymize you.

This attack is very unlikely, but could be performed by a strong attacker,
such as a government or a hacking firm. We are not aware of this attack being
used in the wild.

  * Update _Thunderbird_ to 
[91.12.0](https://www.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/91.12.0/releasenotes/).

# Fixed problems

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.3.1

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.3.1.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.3.1 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 5.4 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for
August 23.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.3.1/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.3 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.3 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.3/index.en.html)

# Changes and updates

## Included software

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 11.5.1]

# Fixed problems

This section will be updated soon. Sorry for the inconvenience!

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.3

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.3.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.3 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 5.4 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for
August 23.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.3/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.2 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.2 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.2/index.en.html)

# Changes and updates

## Included software

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[11.5](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-115a13/).

  * Update _Thunderbird_ to 
[91.11.0](https://www.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/91.11.0/releasenotes/).

# Fixed problems

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.2

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0 or later to 5.2.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.2 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 5.3 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for July
26.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.2/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.1.1 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.1.1 is
out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.1.1/index.en.html)

This release fixes a [high severity security issue in
tor](https://forum.torproject.net/t/stable-release-0-4-7-8/3679), that affects
performance and possibly anonymity.

# Changes and updates

## Included software

  * Update _tor_ to 0.4.7.8.

  * Update _Thunderbird_ to 
[91.10](https://www.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/91.10.0/releasenotes/).

  * Update the _Linux_ kernel to 5.10.120. This fixes important security issues.

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.1.1

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.x.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.1.1 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 5.2 is [tentatively
scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for July 5, but it
will likely be released later than that.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.1.1/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.1 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.1 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.1/index.en.html)

This release fixes the security vulnerability in the JavaScript engine of
_Firefox_ and _Tor Browser_ announced on [May
24](https://tails.boum.org/security/prototype_pollution/index.en.html).

This release was delayed from May 31 to June 5 because of a delay in the
release of _Tor Browser_ [11.0.14](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-
tor-browser-11014/).

# Changes and updates

## Tor Connection assistant

Tails 5.1 includes many improvements to the Tor Connection assistant:

  * The _Tor Connection_ assistant now automatically fixes the computer clock 
if you choose to connect to Tor automatically.

This makes is much easier for people in Asia to circumvent censorship.

Tails learns the current time by connecting to the captive portal detection
service of [Fedora](https://getfedora.org/), which is used by most Linux
distributions. This connection does not go through the Tor network and is an
exception to our policy of only making Internet connections through the Tor
network.

You can learn more about our security assessment of this time synchronization
in our [design documentation about non-Tor
traffic](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/Tor_enforcement/#non-tor-
traffic).

  * The time displayed in the top navigation uses the time zone selected when 
fixing the clock in the _Tor Connection_ assistant.

In the future, we will make it possible to change the displayed time zone for
everybody from the desktop
([#10819](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/10819)) and store
it in the Persistent Storage
([#12094](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/12094)).

  * The last screen of the _Tor Connection_ assistant makes it clear whether 
you are connected using Tor bridges or not.

![Connected to Tor successfully with
bridges](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.1/bridges.png)

## _Unsafe Browser_ and captive portals

  * We wrote a new homepage for the _Unsafe Browser_ when you are not connected 
to the Tor network yet. This new version makes it easier to understand how to 
sign in to the network using a captive portal.

![Example of captive portal: Free Wi-Fi
hotspot](https://tails.boum.org/doc/anonymous_internet/unsafe_browser/captive_portal.svg)

  * Tails now asks for confirmation before restarting when the _Unsafe Browser_ 
was not enabled in the Welcome Screen. This prevents losing work too easily.

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.1/confirmation.png)

## Kleopatra

  * Associate OpenPGP files with _Kleopatra_ in the _Files_ browser.

You can now double-click on `.gpg` files to decrypt them.

  * Add _Kleopatra_ to the Favorites applications.

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.1/favorites.png)

## Included software

  * Update _tor_ to 0.4.7.7.

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[11.0.14](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-11014/).

  * Update _Thunderbird_ to 
[91.9](https://www.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/91.9.0/releasenotes/).

  * Update the _Linux_ kernel to 5.10.113. This should improve the support for 
newer hardware: graphics, Wi-Fi, and so on.

# Fixed problems

  * Remove the automatic selection of the option **Configure a bridge** when 
rolling back from the option to hide that you are connecting to Tor. 
([#18546](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18546))

  * Give the same instructions on both screens where you have to configure a 
bridge. ([#18596](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18596))

  * Help rename the default _KeePassXC_ database to open it automatically in 
the future. ([#18966](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18966))

  * Fix sharing files using _OnionShare_ from the _Files_ browser. 
([#18990](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18990))

![Share via
OnionShare](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.1/onionshare.png)

  * Disable search providers in the Activities overview: files, calculator, and 
terminal. ([#18952](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18952))

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.1

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 5.0.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org

Re: [Tails-dev] Tails GitLab down since Fri May 13th 2022

[tails-sysadmins]

> This is a short notice to let you know that Tails' GitLab is down
> since Fri May 13th 2022.

It's back!


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[Tails-dev] Tails GitLab down since Fri May 13th 2022

[tails-sysadmins]

This is a short notice to let you know that Tails' GitLab is down since
Fri May 13th 2022.

Sysadmins are aware since then and the problem is being worked on. Not
much more info to provide right now.

Sorry for the disruption!


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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 5.0 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 5.0 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.0/index.en.html)

We are especially proud to present you Tails 5.0, the first version of Tails
based on Debian 11 (Bullseye). It brings new versions of a lot of the software
included in Tails and new OpenPGP tools.

# New features

## Kleopatra

We added
[_Kleopatra_](https://tails.boum.org/doc/encryption_and_privacy/kleopatra/index.en.html)
to replace the _OpenPGP Applet_ and the _Password and Keys_ utility, also
known as _Seahorse_.

The _OpenPGP Applet_ was not actively developped anymore and was complicated
for us to keep in Tails. The _Password and Keys_ utility was also poorly
maintained and Tails users suffered from too many of its issues until now,
like [#17183](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/17183).

_Kleopatra_ provides equivalent features in a single tool and is more actively
developed.

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.0/kleopatra.png)

# Changes and updates

  * The Additional Software feature of the Persistent Storage is enabled by 
default to make it faster and more robust to configure your first additional 
software package.

  * You can now use the Activities overview to access your windows and 
applications. To access the Activities overview, you can either:

* Click on the **Activities** button.
* Throw your mouse pointer to the top-left hot corner.
* Press the **Super** (![](https://tails.boum.org/lib/start.png)) key on 
your keyboard.

You can see your windows and applications in the overview. You can also start
typing to search your applications, files, and folders.

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.0/desktop.png)

## Included software

Most included software has been upgraded in Debian 11, for example:

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[11.0.11](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-11011).

  * Update _GNOME_ from 3.30 to 3.38, with lots of small improvements to the 
desktop, the core _GNOME_ utilities, and the locking screen.

  * Update _MAT_ from 0.8 to 0.12, which adds support to clean metadata from 
SVG, WAV, EPUB, PPM, and Microsoft Office files.

  * Update _Audacity_ from 2.2.2 to 2.4.2.

  * Update _Disk Utility_ from 3.30 to 3.38.

  * Update _GIMP_ from 2.10.8 to 2.10.22.

  * Update _Inkscape_ from 0.92 to 1.0.

  * Update _LibreOffice_ from 6.1 to 7.0.

## Hardware support

  * The new support for driverless printing and scanning in Linux makes it 
easier to make recent printers and scanners work in Tails.

# Fixed problems

  * Fix unlocking _VeraCrypt_ volumes that have very long passphrases. 
([#17474](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/17474))

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

  * _Additional Software_ sometimes doesn't work when restarting for the first 
time right after creating a Persistent Storage. 
([#18839](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18839))

To solve this, install the same additional software package again after
restarting with the Persistent Storage for the first time.

  * _Thunderbird_ displays a popup to choose an application when opening links. 
([#18913](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18913))

  * _Tails Installer_ sometimes fails to clone. 
([#18844](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18844))

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 5.0

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are not available to 5.0.

All users have to do a [manual
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
5.0 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 5.1 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for May
31.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_5.0/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] veracrypt issue

[test10007 via Tails-dev]

Hello

Your current included version of Veracrypt supports 64 numbers and letters in 
the password field

The new version of Veracrypt has upgraded to 128 numbers and letters

So I cannot decrypt my files using your old version

Could you update pls

thanks very much

rgds

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[Tails-dev] [PATCH] update vm-install instructions

[kwadronaut via Tails-dev]

Hi,

see attached patch for a minor update to the documentation. Screenshot 
of what I meant:

https://cloud.systemli.org/s/bWgo8qq6yZxzRzM
https://cloud.systemli.org/s/EFyjRaggL5tCEL7

Warmly
kwadronaut
From 3ba86fc98daa043524f14298853c61dd943c7cde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: kwadronaut 
Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 11:52:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] update vm-install instructions
To: tails-dev@boum.org

---
 .../advanced_topics/virtualization/virt-manager.mdwn | 12 
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/wiki/src/doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/virt-manager.mdwn b/wiki/src/doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/virt-manager.mdwn
index 2689c8bad2..7b301d5fd9 100644
--- a/wiki/src/doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/virt-manager.mdwn
+++ b/wiki/src/doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/virt-manager.mdwn
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ image|virt-manager#usb_image]].
 
 
 
-The following instructions have been tested on Debian 10 (Buster).
+The following instructions have been tested on Debian 11 (Bullseye).
 
 Please, [[let us know|about/contact#tails-dev]] if they do not apply
 to Debian 11 (Bullseye).
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ command:
 Running Tails from an ISO image
 ===
 
+1. [[Download an ISO image|install/dvd]]
+
 1. Start *virt-manager*.
 
 1. Double-click on **localhost (QEMU)** to connect to the *QEMU*
@@ -80,9 +82,11 @@ Running Tails from an ISO image
 1. In *step 2*, choose:
 
- **Use ISO image**, then **Browse...**, and **Browse Local** to
- browse for the ISO image that you want to start from
+ browse for the ISO image that you want to start from. 
- **OS type**: **Linux**
-   - **Version**: **Debian Buster**
+   - **Version**: **Debian 10**  
+   Note: in Debian stable (11 Bullseye), the osinfo-db doesn't contain Debian
+   11. If it is more recent, you should choose Debian 11 (debian11)
 
 1. In *step 3*, allocate at least 2048 MB of RAM.
 
@@ -167,7 +171,7 @@ allows you to use a Persistent Storage in a virtual machine.
 
- Expand the **Advanced options** and set **Disk bus** to **USB**.
- Click **Apply**.
-   - Check the **Removable** check box which should appear in the same view.
+   - Click advanced, check the **Removable** check box which should appear in the same view.
- Click **Apply** again.
- Click **Begin Installation** in the top left corner to start the virtual machine.
 
-- 
2.30.2



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Description: OpenPGP public key


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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Tails 4.29 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 4.29 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_4.29/index.en.html)

# New features

# Changes and updates

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[11.0.10](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-11010).

  * Update _Thunderbird_ to 
[91.7.0](https://www.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/91.7.0/releasenotes/).

  * Update _obfs4_ to 0.0.12 to provide more discrete Tor bridges. 
([#18800](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18800))

  * Update the _Linux_ kernel to 5.10.103.

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 4.29

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are broken from Tails 4.18 and earlier.

Follow our instructions to do an [automatic upgrade from Tails 4.15, Tails
4.16, Tails 4.17, or Tails
4.18](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/error/check/index.en.html#4.18).

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 4.19 or later to 4.29.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and 
GnuPG](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
4.29 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 4.30 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for May
3.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_4.29/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails News] Call for testing: 5.0~beta1

[Tails - News]

# [Call for testing: 5.0~beta1](https://tails.boum.org/news/test_5.0-beta1/)

We plan to release Tails 5.0 on May 3 or May 31. It will be the first version
of Tails based on Debian 11 (Bullseye). It brings new versions of most of the
software included in Tails and some important usability improvements.

You can help Tails by testing the beta for Tails 5.0 before the end of April.

# Changes and upgrades

  * Update to Debian 11 (Bullseye)

In particular this updates software included in Tails to:

* GNOME 3.38
* Audacity 2.4.2
* GIMP 2.20.22
* Inkscape 1.0.2
* LibreOffice 7.0.4
* OnionCircuits 0.7
* Pidgin 2.14.1
* Thunderbird 91.7.0-2~deb11u1
  * Upgrade Tor Browser to 11.0.10

  * Enable driverless printing and scanning 
([#18521](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18521))

# Fixed problems

  * Fix locales translation in the Welcome Screen 
([#18199](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18199))

  * Fix opening a Veracrypt volume with a long passphrase 
([#17474](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/17474))

# Changelog

For more details about what has changed in Tails 5.0~beta1, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/raw/5.0-beta1/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

  * _WhisperBack_ fails to send error reports 
([#18908](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18908)).

  * _Tails Installer_ sometimes fails to install or upgrade Tails 
([#18844](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18844), 
[#18841](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18841)). If this 
happens to you, please retry.

  * _Additional Software_ sometimes fails to install packages on first startup 
after configuring it 
([#18839](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18839)). To fix 
this problem, install your _Additional Software_ manually again, then restart 
Tails.

  * _OpenPGP Applet_ is not usable: its icon is not displayed 
([#18845](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18845)).

  * Tails 5.0~beta1 takes more time to start than previous versions 
([#18906](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18906)).

  * [Open issues for Tails 
5.0](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/boards/4?label_name%5B%5D=Core%20Work%3AFoundations%20Team_title=Tails_5.0)

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# How to test Tails 5.0~beta1?

Keep in mind that this is a test image. We tested that it is not broken in
obvious ways, but it might still contain undiscovered issues.

Please, report any new problem to [tails-test...@boum.org](mailto:tails-
test...@boum.org) (public mailing list) before the end of April.

# Get Tails 5.0~beta1

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

No automatic upgrade is available, so do a [manual
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To download 5.0~beta1

### Direct download

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](http://dl.amnesia.boum.org/tails/alpha/tails-amd64-5.0~beta1/tails-amd64-5.0~beta1.img)
 ([OpenPGP 
signature](https://tails.boum.org/torrents/files/tails-amd64-5.0~beta1.img.sig))

  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](http://dl.amnesia.boum.org/tails/alpha/tails-amd64-5.0~beta1/tails-amd64-5.0~beta1.iso)
 ([OpenPGP 
signature](https://tails.boum.org/torrents/files/tails-amd64-5.0~beta1.iso.sig))

### BitTorrent download

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/torrents/files/tails-amd64-5.0~beta1.img.torrent)

  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/torrents/files/tails-amd64-5.0~beta1.iso.torrent)

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * 
[?](https://tails.boum.org/ikiwiki.cgi?do=create=news%2Ftest_5.0-beta1=install%2Fwin%2Fusb)Install
 from Windows
  * 
[?](https://tails.boum.org/ikiwiki.cgi?do=create=news%2Ftest_5.0-beta1=install%2Fmac%2Fusb)Install
 from macOS
  * 
[?](https://tails.boum.org/ikiwiki.cgi?do=create=news%2Ftest_5.0-beta1=install%2Flinux%2Fusb)Install
 from Linux

All the data on this USB stick will be lost.

# What's coming up?

We will keep our [calendar](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/)
updated regarding the planned release date of Tails 5.0.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

We need your help and there are many ways to [contribute to
Tails](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/index.en.html)
([donating](https://tails.boum.org/donate/?r=5.0-beta1) is only one of them).
Come [talk to us](https://tails.boum.org/about/contact/index.en.html#tails-
dev)!

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/test_5.0-beta1/>

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Re: [Tails-dev] Tor on Tails issue

[syster via Tails-dev]

check if this is really a Tor connection issue, or if this is caused by 
mac randomization.


On 3/24/22 01:31, gunsales--- via Tails-dev wrote:


I've been having technical issues with using Tor on Tails. When I try to 
connect to Tor on Tails with obsf4 bridges on my university's wifi Tor 
gets blocked. This isn't an issue when I use Tor on windows with the 
university's wifi so I'm not sure why this occurs. I'm not sure if I 
need a specific bridge that can by pass the firewall or if its a problem 
with the OS itself or the usb I am using. If you could tell me what 
might being going on and what I could do about it I'd be very glad to know.

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[Tails-dev] Tor on Tails issue

[gunsales--- via Tails-dev]

I've been having technical issues with using Tor on Tails. When I try to 
connect to Tor on Tails with obsf4 bridges on my university's wifi Tor gets 
blocked. This isn't an issue when I use Tor on windows with the university's 
wifi so I'm not sure why this occurs. I'm not sure if I need a specific bridge 
that can by pass the firewall or if its a problem with the OS itself or the usb 
I am using. If you could tell me what might being going on and what I could do 
about it I'd be very glad to know.-- 
 Sent with Tutanota, the secure & ad-free mailbox. 
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[Tails-dev] I lost all my data on my back SSD drive

[Imnotgivingyoumyinfo via Tails-dev]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

I made a huge mistake uploaded the .img on my personal 500GB Samsung SSD with 
all my personal belonging. I'm freaking out. I didn't pay attention to what I 
was doing. There has to be a way to recover the lost data but my MAC isn't even 
reading my SSD. Please, I beg you to help me!

Blue

Sent with ProtonMail secure email.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: ProtonMail

wnUEARYKAAYFAmI6oxAAIQkQGEpSDLOaD9QWIQQPErugIDwDzkQkFCUYSlIM
s5oP1B3QAP42io5+ssBZuObx/qz4fZZGojRDcxMcQFUS9mV1wCczjwEAgAGX
7g4G8iok9+8OR2CY2+aN7LyIUcYHQQOP4CG3SwM=
=2QOL
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


publickey - Imnotgivingyoumyinfo@protonmail.com - 0x0F12BBA0.asc
Description: application/pgp-keys


publickey - Imnotgivingyoumyinfo@protonmail.com - 0x0F12BBA0.asc.sig
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Re: [Tails-dev] [Tails-news] Tails 4.28 is out

[jvoisin via Tails-dev]

I successfully reproduced it: https://rebuilderd.dustri.org/api/v0/pkgs/list

Congratz :)
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[Tails-dev] [Tails-news] Tails 4.28 is out

[Tails - News]

# [Tails 4.28 is out](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_4.28/index.en.html)

# Changes and updates

This section will be updated soon. Sorry for the inconvenience!

# Fixed problems

This section will be updated soon. Sorry for the inconvenience!

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 4.28

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are broken from Tails 4.18 and earlier.

Follow our instructions to do an [automatic upgrade from Tails 4.15, Tails
4.16, Tails 4.17, or Tails
4.18](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/error/check/index.en.html#4.18).

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 4.19 or later to 4.28.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/windows/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
4.28 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 4.29 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for
April 5.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.

URL: <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_4.28/index.en.html>

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[Tails-dev] [Tails-news] Ciclo de Autodefensa Digital no Brasil

[Tails - News]

Esse e um chamado aberto feito pelo Projeto Tor, Tails e Guardian Project para
todos e todas as defensoras de direitos humanos, jornalistas, ativistas,
feministas, defensoras de territorio, etc.

Em meio a crescente ameaça a nossa segurança e liberdade digital no Brasil,
sabemos que e cada vez mais importante compartilhar taticas contra a
vigilancia, para a nossa autodefesa digital, escutar e empoderar as pessoas
que lutam pela mudança social.

**Inscreva-se at e 28 de fevereiro!**

Por favor, compartilhe esse chamado com todas as pessoas que possam se
interessar :)

![](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/ux/research/uploads/1c51538dfe0a1fa4961e7db129525358/cfp-
training.jpg)

# Se quiser aprender mais sobre autodefesa digital

Estamos organizando algumas oficinas online em março e em abril:

  * **[Tor Browser](https://torproject.org/)** : Como navegar na Internet de 
maneira anonima e sem censura (para computadores).

  * **[Tor Browser Android](https://torproject.org/)** e **[Onion 
Browser](https://onionbrowser.com/)** : Como navegar na Internet de maneira 
anonima e sem censura (para celulares).

  * **[Orbot](https://guardianproject.info/apps/org.torproject.android/)** : 
Aumente a sua privacidade quando usa as aplicaçoes do seu celular.

  * **[Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)** : seu computador seguro em qualquer 
lugar.

As oficinas sao gratuitas, mas as vagas sao limitadas. Para participar,
preencha o seguinte formulario:

<https://survey.tails.boum.org/index.php/146737?lang=pt-BR>

Voce podera participar das oficinas de forma anonima e nao havera gravaçao.

# Se quiser compartilhar a sua experiencia conosco para melhorar as nossas
ferramentas

Estamos interessadas em aprender como melhorar nossas ferramentas para que
sejam mais uteis para o seu trabalho e suas lutas no Brasil.

Organizaremos entrevistas, testes de usabilidade, questionarios e outras
atividades para aprender sobre os problemas que encontram nossas usuarias no
Brasil.

Se quiser falar com a gente sobre o seu uso do Navegador Tor, Orbot, Onion
Browser ou Tails, por favor preencha o formulario abaixo:

<https://survey.tails.boum.org/index.php/146737?lang=pt-BR>



URL: 
https://tails.boum.org/news/ciclo_de_autodefensa_digital_brasil/index.en.html
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[Tails-dev] [Tails-news] Tails 4.27 is out

[Tails - News]

# Changes and updates

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[11.0.6](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1106).

  * Update _Thunderbird_ to 
[91.5](https://www.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/91.5.0/releasenotes/).

  * Update the _Linux_ kernel to 5.10.92. This should improve the support for 
newer hardware: graphics, Wi-Fi, and so on.

# Fixed problems

  * Fix connecting to a Wi-Fi network when choosing **Open Wi-Fi Settings** in 
the Tor Connection assistant. 
([#18587](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18587))

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 4.27

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are broken from Tails 4.14 and earlier.

Follow our instructions to do an [automatic upgrade from Tails 4.15, Tails
4.16, Tails 4.17, or Tails
4.18](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/error/check/index.en.html#4.18).

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 4.19 or later to 4.27.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/win/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
4.27 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 4.28 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for
March 8.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.



URL: https://tails.boum.org/news/version_4.27/index.en.html
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[Tails-dev] Hello

[k0dard via Tails-dev]

Hello,

I would like to participate in making Tails better. I passed LFCS (Linux 
Foundation Certified System Administrator) and LFCE (LF Certified System 
Engineer) exams last year. I also have decent knowledge of java script, node, 
react... Since for the moment I don't have a job I thought I put some of my 
time to a good cause and get some experience in the meantime :)

I modified the java script code (toggle.js) in the [top starter 
issue](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18469) so that one 
menu item hides the other... How can I submit the code proposal ?

Thanks in advance

Milos

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[Tails-dev] Tor Browser Mystery

[lvfk19 via Tails-dev]

Sirs,

I’ve noticed a problem that started right when your Tor Connection utility came 
out (~ 4.20), and I hope you can ease my fears about it.

Because I use a cellular hotspot for internet access, I need to be careful 
about their monthly data limt. To that end, I have a habit of using your System 
Monitor/Resources/Network History to monitor my “sent” and “received” data. As 
you may know, the data sent when browsing is normally just a small fraction of 
data received, maybe 10%.

MYSTERY: Ever since you launched the Tor Connection utility, every page I visit 
with Tor Browser adds that data count to both the “received” AND “sent” totals… 
as if a copy of all I view is being sent to a third party. For example, if I 
visit Amazon.com and browse 46.3 Mb worth of pages, then exactly 46.3 Mb of 
data is ALSO added to the outgoing data total. Why?? I am very concerned as to 
why my incoming data would need to be mirrored ANYWHERE, and am hoping you can 
tell me why I should not be worried about it. I’ve been using Tails for years 
and Tor Browser has never acted this way before, and fyi the Unsafe Browser is 
not affected by this, only Tor. As a work-around, I’ve been using Tails 4.19 to 
avoid the apparent “mirroring”.

I thank you for your time, and look forward to your reply.

Fred

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[Tails-dev] [Tails-news] Tails 4.26 is out

[Tails - News]

# Changes and updates

  * Update _Tor Browser_ to 
[11.0.4](https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1104).

  * Add a shortcut to open the _Tor Connection_ assistant when starting _Tor 
Browser_ if Tails is not connected to the Tor network yet.

![](https://tails.boum.org/news/version_4.26/open-tor-connection.png)

For more details, read our
[changelog](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog).

# Known issues

None specific to this release.

See the list of [long-standing
issues](https://tails.boum.org/support/known_issues/index.en.html).

# Get Tails 4.26

## To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your persistent storage

  * Automatic upgrades are broken from Tails 4.14 and earlier.

Follow our instructions to do an [automatic upgrade from Tails 4.15, Tails
4.16, Tails 4.17, or Tails
4.18](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/error/check/index.en.html#4.18).

  * Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 4.19 or later to 4.26.

You can [reduce the size of the
download](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#reduce) of future
automatic upgrades by doing a manual upgrade to the latest version.

  * If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an 
automatic upgrade, please try to do a [manual 
upgrade](https://tails.boum.org/doc/upgrade/index.en.html#manual).

## To install Tails on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

  * [Install from Windows](https://tails.boum.org/install/win/index.en.html)
  * [Install from macOS](https://tails.boum.org/install/mac/index.en.html)
  * [Install from Linux](https://tails.boum.org/install/linux/index.en.html)

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of
upgrading.

## To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails
4.26 directly:

  * [For USB sticks (USB 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download/index.en.html)
  * [For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO 
image)](https://tails.boum.org/install/download-iso/index.en.html)

# What's coming up?

Tails 4.27 is [scheduled](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/calendar/) for
February 8.

Have a look at our [roadmap](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap) to see
where we are heading to.



URL: https://tails.boum.org/news/version_4.26/index.en.html
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