Re: [Tails-dev] [Freepto] Let's share username, /etc/hostname and /etc/host among all anonymity distributions

2016-03-12 Thread intrigeri
Patrick Schleizer wrote (25 Feb 2016 23:00:22 GMT) :
> As agreed back then.

Thanks!
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Re: [Tails-dev] [Freepto] Let's share username, /etc/hostname and /etc/host among all anonymity distributions

2016-02-25 Thread Patrick Schleizer
intrigeri:
> Hi,
> 
> I've just stumbled upon an issue [1] open by Jake on Subgraph OS bug
> tracker, about this topic, so I thought I would close this thread
> that's still lying in my inbox, and sum up the process that lead us to
> a (not implemented) conclusion.
> 
> Last time we discussed it over 2013 and 2014, first on this list
> (threads start at [2] and [3]), we ended up deciding [4] that we
> preferred a shared username+hostname among anonymity/privacy-related
> distributions.
> 
> The username that was settled upon is "user".
> 
> The hostname that was settled upon was "host" initially, and then most
> of us preferred "debian"; but since the goal is to _share_ a common
> hostname with other distros, prior art counts.
> 
> Patrick, what does Whonix use currently?

Sorry for the delay, this slipped through my inbox and I just now found
this by chance.

As agreed back then.

username: user

hostname: host

127.0.0.1 host.localdomain host

(Implemented in https://github.com/Whonix/anon-base-files - which is a
package supposed to be shared among privacy focused distributions.)

Cheers,
Patrick

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Re: [Tails-dev] [Freepto] Let's share username, /etc/hostname and /etc/host among all anonymity distributions

2014-08-22 Thread sajolida
Tobias Frei wrote:
 I wonder if the idea of using a random username has a serious problem:
 It makes every [Tails / anonymity distribution] session uniquely
 identifiable if the username gets sent in any way. And we *do* assume
 that it gets sent, because that's basically the idea behind the
 question what username should be used.

Thanks for following up on this. I'll quote your message fully because
it seems like you didn't forward it to Freepto, Subgraph, Whonix, and
Guardian.

 Maybe I completely misunderstand this, but using a random username for
 every session basically sounds like creating a random (and unique!)
 stamp for every session. Not for every connection, but for every
 session, so that multiple connections in one session will share one
 unique username.
 
 Patrick Schleizer mentioned IRC idents as an example; maybe that's a
 good way to explain the problem:
 
 - John Doe starts Tails. His username for this session will be
 ombbjp8GTE.
 - John Doe starts an IRC client. He says something that should
 absolutely remain anonymous.
 - John Doe closes the IRC client and surfs a bit.
 - John Doe starts an IRC client again, this time on another network
 where he happily chats with some friends next to his Iceweasel window.
 
 == Anyone who sees both the happy chatting on network 2 and the
 anonymous information on network 1 knows that it has been sent by the
 same user, and probably even who this user is.
 
 With one default nick for all users, this could not have happened.
 
 I'm unsure how severe this issue is, but it would make me suggest
 *not* using a random username.

Note that in the case of Tails, we recommend our users against doing
this. Which is mix different identities in a same working session:

https://tails.boum.org/doc/about/warning/#index8h1

If you don't take care about this yourself, there are probably other
ways that you can fuck it up (through the browser, the Tor config, etc.).

But still, I totally understand your point and I'm wondering whether the
same assumption not mixing identities apply to all the distros that we
are talking about. For example to Whonix?

And also, it's not because we recommend our users against doing
something that we should take for granted that they will handle their
contextual identities in perfect way (given this can be a really
subjective topic). And we should still try our best to limit the
consequences in case they do mix them or simply commit a mistake.

-- 
sajolida
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Re: [Tails-dev] [Freepto] Let's share username, /etc/hostname and /etc/host among all anonymity distributions

2014-08-22 Thread Patrick Schleizer
Hi!

sajol...@pimienta.org:
 Note that in the case of Tails, we recommend our users against doing
 this. Which is mix different identities in a same working session:
 
 https://tails.boum.org/doc/about/warning/#index8h1

Whonix has a similar warning:
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Warning#Whonix_doesn.27t_magically_separate_your_different_contextual_identities

 If you don't take care about this yourself, there are probably other
 ways that you can fuck it up (through the browser, the Tor config, etc.).

 But still, I totally understand your point and I'm wondering whether the
 same assumption not mixing identities apply to all the distros that we
 are talking about. For example to Whonix?

Applies to Whonix as well.

 And also, it's not because we recommend our users against doing
 something that we should take for granted that they will handle their
 contextual identities in perfect way (given this can be a really
 subjective topic). And we should still try our best to limit the
 consequences in case they do mix them or simply commit a mistake.

That's the thing. Realistically only a small fraction of users reads,
remembers and really applies what is recommended in documentation.
Murphy's law also agrees. So the best way is to work towards solutions
that assume, that the user didn't apply that advice.

Having that said and after thinking about Tobias Frei's reasoning, I am
now more convinced that shared values should be preferred over random
values.

Cheers,
Patrick

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Re: [Tails-dev] [Freepto] Let's share username, /etc/hostname and /etc/host among all anonymity distributions

2014-08-16 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

[dropping Patrick from Cc, as he obviously reads tails-dev@.]

Patrick Schleizer wrote (15 Aug 2014 21:17:17 GMT) :
 Let's think again of examples where this might happen. And then
 determine with which strategy users would be better off in
 which case.

I think it's a useful approach.

 - ssh uses username for login if not explicitly told otherwise
 - server knows you're a Tor user anyway - better off with shared value

Note that the Tor user anonymity set is much larger currently than
user of an anonymity-focussed distro, so your conclusion (about this
example and others) is not *that* obvious to me.

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri
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Re: [Tails-dev] [Freepto] Let's share username, /etc/hostname and /etc/host among all anonymity distributions

2014-08-16 Thread Tobias Frei
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

Hi,

I wonder if the idea of using a random username has a serious problem:
It makes every [Tails / anonymity distribution] session uniquely
identifiable if the username gets sent in any way. And we *do* assume
that it gets sent, because that's basically the idea behind the
question what username should be used.

Maybe I completely misunderstand this, but using a random username for
every session basically sounds like creating a random (and unique!)
stamp for every session. Not for every connection, but for every
session, so that multiple connections in one session will share one
unique username.

Patrick Schleizer mentioned IRC idents as an example; maybe that's a
good way to explain the problem:

- - John Doe starts Tails. His username for this session will be
ombbjp8GTE.
- - John Doe starts an IRC client. He says something that should
absolutely remain anonymous.
- - John Doe closes the IRC client and surfs a bit.
- - John Doe starts an IRC client again, this time on another network
where he happily chats with some friends next to his Iceweasel window.

== Anyone who sees both the happy chatting on network 2 and the
anonymous information on network 1 knows that it has been sent by the
same user, and probably even who this user is.

With one default nick for all users, this could not have happened.



I'm unsure how severe this issue is, but it would make me suggest
*not* using a random username.

Best regards,
Tobias Frei
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Re: [Tails-dev] [Freepto] Let's share username, /etc/hostname and /etc/host among all anonymity distributions

2014-08-15 Thread Patrick Schleizer
Hi!

intrigeri:
 I'm coming back on the shared username/hostname thing, that was
 rediscussed a bit lately, with input from Freepto and pointers to
 Subgraph OS code, on a Tails ticket:
 
 https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5655
 
 As you can see in my comment #6 there, it's unclear to me what's best,
 between sharing fixed values and randomizing it. Each solution has
 pros and cons. What do you think?

It is indeed a hard decision.

Let's think again of examples where this might happen. And then
determine with which strategy users would be better off in which case.

- ssh uses username for login if not explicitly told otherwise
- server knows you're a Tor user anyway - better off with shared value

- username (as part of the path) is sometimes encoded into user
created content (images, firefox screenshot addon). Maybe only in user
installed extra packages.
- when you upload them, server knows you're a Tor user anyway - better
off with shared value
- when you send the file to a third party (a journalist or so) who
hides the users use of Tor - you might prefer a random value over a
shared one?

- mixmaster (postfix) leaks host_name.domain_name to the mailserver.
- server knows you're a Tor user anyway - better off with shared value

- IRC clients not (pre)configured for privacy leak ident = username
- server knows you're a Tor user anyway - better off with shared value

- Please don't nail me for other examples. These are just a few I observed.

Having these cases in mind, I slightly prefer shared value.

Cheers,
Patrick

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