Re: [Tails-dev] Installing Tails as a Virtual Machine

2022-11-08 Thread sajolida

nibs123 via Tails-dev:
I downloaded the Tails iso in order to run Tails as a virtual machine. 
What version of Debian Linux does Tails currently use?


Debian 11 (Bullseye) but it should work to configure your virtualization 
software for Debian 10:


https://tails.boum.org/doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/virt-manager/

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[Tails-dev] Installing Tails as a Virtual Machine

2022-11-08 Thread nibs123 via Tails-dev
I downloaded the Tails iso in order to run Tails as a virtual machine. What 
version of Debian Linux does Tails currently use?

V/R,
Race Jones
702-265-5826

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[Tails-dev] Is Tails Linux able to protect Targeted Individuals against government surveillance?

2022-05-27 Thread Turritopsis Dohrnii Teo En Ming
Subject: Is Tails Linux able to protect Targeted Individuals against
government surveillance?

Good day from Singapore,

The home page of Tails Linux says:

"Tails is a portable operating system that protects against
surveillance and censorship."

Excerpt from the following news article.

News article: Tails 5.0 Linux users warned against using it "for
sensitive information"
Link: 
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/tails-50-linux-users-warned-against-using-it-for-sensitive-information/

[QUOTE]

Tails (short for The Amnesic Incognito Live System) is a Linux distro
focused on protecting the users' anonymity (e.g., activists and
journalists) and helping them circumvent censorship by forcing all
connections to and from the Internet through the Tor network.

[/QUOTE]

My question is: Is Tails Linux able to protect Targeted Individuals
against government surveillance? We know governments are able to read
our minds and thoughts using mind control technology (aka synthetic
telepathy or remote neural monitoring).

Looking forward to your reply.

Thank you very much.

Regards,

Mr. Turritopsis Dohrnii Teo En Ming
Targeted Individual in Singapore
27 May 2022 Friday

Blogs:

https://tdtemcerts.blogspot.com/

https://tdtemcerts.wordpress.com/
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Re: [Tails-dev] Build Tails Image: rake build - No artifacts found - No ISO/USB image produced

2022-05-04 Thread Toptin


I opened a bug report:

https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18931

Regards.
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Re: [Tails-dev] using tails on microsoft surface

2021-09-13 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

paul seßbrügger (2021-09-07):
> I hope you’re all good. I’m a big fan of tails and appreciate what
> you guys doing.

Thanks, this is heart-warming!

> Unfortunately tails is not working on my Microsoft surface laptop. I red in 
> reddit that more people have this problem,
> So I wanted to ask if you can help me with that or if I maybe just have to 
> wait until you update tails to make it
> Accessable also for newer computers.

In general we don't have resources to add support ourselves for
specific computers, so we rely on work happening upstream and
in Debian.

However, if you find out what needs to be added/changed in Tails to
fix this, we can certainly check if it's feasible (for example, we
could add missing firmware).

> So in my case my mouse and keyboard is not reacting after rebooting.

In any case, it could be useful to other users to know this is to be
expected (via our known issues page). I'm putting you in touch with
our Help Desk, who will ask you more information we need for this to
happen, starting with… which Microsoft Surface laptop, exactly,
as I see there are plenty:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Surface#Surface_Laptop_line
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[Tails-dev] using tails on microsoft surface

2021-09-07 Thread paul seßbrügger
Hi Tails-development team,

I hope you’re all good. I’m a big fan of tails and appreciate what you guys 
doing.
Unfortunately tails is not working on my Microsoft surface laptop. I red in 
reddit that more people have this problem,
So I wanted to ask if you can help me with that or if I maybe just have to wait 
until you update tails to make it
Accessable also for newer computers. So in my case my mouse and keyboard is not 
reacting after rebooting.
I would appreciate your help a lot and would be happy to a also be able to use 
tails on my computer.
Thank you very much for your help!



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Re: [Tails-dev] Using TAILS

2021-09-07 Thread sajolida
safe-the-planet via Tails-dev:
> Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

Hi,

> 1) There are very good videos on YT how to install TAILS. We have
> already written out the procedure and wanted to install TAILS soon. But
> unfortunately you need two USB sticks for it. Now we have seen on the
> homepage of TAILS that you can also do this directly in Linux - in the
> terminal. This is faster and only one USB stick is needed. Not that we
> only have one USB stick, we find the installation via terminal easier.
> Do we see it right, that you can only copy the commands and paste them
> into the terminal? You have to be a little careful to use the right name
> ... But otherwise we find it easier.

Our official instructions have not required 2 USB sticks since October
2018. That's why we don't recommend YouTube videos: they tend to be very
outdated and confuse more than help.

Please refer only to https://tails.boum.org/install/.

> 2) We always read that you should NOT use TAILS or the TOR browser with
> VPN. What do you recommend? Why is it more insecure to use with VPN,
> should it be the case? Of course, we assume VPN's that have an
> appropriate reputation and can be classified safe. Otherwise, of course,
> the situation is clear.

See our FAQ on VPNs: https://tails.boum.org/support/faq/#vpn.

> 3) Why is the homepage called "tails.boum.org"? Why "boum"?

Our website used to be hosted by boum.org, but not anymore. We've been
looking for a better domain name but haven't got one just yet.

> 4) In the persistent folder the data is secure but the folder is
> visible. Will TAILS eventually come with programs similar to Veracrypt?

Not super likely: https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/5929.

> Or can these invisible folders be displayed with appropriate software?

See https://tails.boum.org/doc/encryption_and_privacy/veracrypt/.

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[Tails-dev] Using TAILS

2021-08-30 Thread safe-the-planet via Tails-dev
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

since a few weeks we are engaged in using TAILS. Many thanks to all those who 
make sure that we can use this great system for free. A small donation is 
guaranteed from our side. :-)

We have already read a lot on the homepage of TAILS and on other sites, but we 
still have a few questions.

1) There are very good videos on YT how to install TAILS. We have already 
written out the procedure and wanted to install TAILS soon. But unfortunately 
you need two USB sticks for it. Now we have seen on the homepage of TAILS that 
you can also do this directly in Linux - in the terminal. This is faster and 
only one USB stick is needed. Not that we only have one USB stick, we find the 
installation via terminal easier.
Do we see it right, that you can only copy the commands and paste them into the 
terminal? You have to be a little careful to use the right name ... But 
otherwise we find it easier.

We try it. Otherwise we can always take the 2-USB stick variant from YT.

2) We always read that you should NOT use TAILS or the TOR browser with VPN. 
What do you recommend? Why is it more insecure to use with VPN, should it be 
the case? Of course, we assume VPN's that have an appropriate reputation and 
can be classified safe. Otherwise, of course, the situation is clear.

3) Why is the homepage called "tails.boum.org"? Why "boum"?

4) In the persistent folder the data is secure but the folder is visible. Will 
TAILS eventually come with programs similar to Veracrypt? This would allow the 
folders to be hidden. Or can these invisible folders be displayed with 
appropriate software? Would you recommend Varacrypt? For us it's not about 
vital documents, but more about not presenting a part of our data completely 
open right away, like on an external hard drive. Without encryption and hiding 
by e.g. Verascrypt our data is completely open and accessible to everyone.

Otherwise we find that there is too much software in TAILS. We are not 
professionals, but we think that some things could be left out.
Thank you for taking the time to read these lines.

Please continue with your excellent work.

Best regards,
Maria and family

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Re: [Tails-dev] Question: Tails in undercover mode?

2021-07-19 Thread Hans
Hi folks,

ok, I have understood, that it is not easy to install a windowmanager looking 
like MacOS or Windows.

Also, you told me, you are using Gnome. 

Well, thinking about this, please allow me a very personal feedback:

1. The choice of using Gnome is IMO not very lucky. Gnome is big, Gnome is 
eating much ressources. 

2. I would use LXDE or better XFCE, because they are very small and tiny. XFCE 
also has the advantage, to use the very fine package "kali-undercover", which 
let XFCE look like Windows10.

3. The lack of TAILS in 32-bit is a great disadvantage, because it can not be 
used on netbooks, like EEEPC or others. I believe, many people are using these 
still. However, I agree, that journalists today might use all 64-Bit 
notebooks.

4. Tails should be for everyone, so it should be small and tiny, so it can be 
run smoothly also on older hardware. I am sure, especially in poorer 
countries, people are not able, to buy the newest hardware. 


Last but not least: Thank you for the documentation, how to build tails. This 
will allow me, to build a tails version according to my own needs. Of course, 
there is also much to learn.

Generally: Thank you all for the hard work - it is really needed and 
appreceated in this corrupt world!

Best regards

Hans

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Re: [Tails-dev] Question: Tails in undercover mode?

2021-07-17 Thread alienpup
All, 

A quick follow-up to suggest that clearing the Tails screen saver/slide show 
require the key-press combination used to invoke it. A passer-by could 
otherwise restore the screen and reveal Tails with a single key press. 

This should perhaps be the case even when an admin password is set, as Tails' 
password entry screen doesn't look very "Windows".

regards,
alienpup

alienpup wrote:
> All,
> 
> I believe hiding Tails' UI would prove too resource intensive and 
> ultimately futile. It just can't be done and maintained well enough to 
> fool sharp-eyed observers. After all, the first thing a passer-by does 
> is study your screen. It's human nature and very hard to resist.
> 
> Tails users could however benefit greatly from a simple slideshow 
> screen saver that can be invoked instantly. Tails could ship with a few 
> uninteresting "stock" images and provide users the option of adding 
> more. Once invoked, Tails could not be distinguished from Windows. 
> Screen locking would remain dependent upon setting an admin password. 
> 
> regards,
> alienpup
> 
> 
> geb wrote:
> > Hello,
> > 
> > Hans:
> > > Dear list,
> > > 
> > > I am wondering, why tails no more get an undercover mode. IMO it is very 
> > > dangerous for users, if their window manager is not looking like the 
> > > normal 
> > > window manager used everywhere, especially in countries, where any 
> > > "strange" 
> > > desktop might cause attention on authorities.
> > > 
> > > This problem could be easily solved. Most users are running either 
> > > windows or 
> > > MacOS. For windows you can just use XFCE + kali-undercover, for 
> > > Mac-design 
> > > there are several windowmanagers available (there is coming ElementaryOS 
> > > in my 
> > > mind).
> > > 
> > > As you do only need the window-manager design, there should be no risk 
> > > change.
> > > 
> > > I might remember, tails got this option some years ago, but somehow this 
> > > is 
> > > gone. Dunno why
> > 
> > This camouflage option has been removed because the theme that proposed
> > this feature was not working anymore, and because of lack of resources
> > to work on it. You can read a bit more about that here :
> > 
> > https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/10830
> > 
> > https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/blueprints/-/wikis/update_camouflage_for_jessie/
> > 
> > Unfortunately, the problem is not that easy to solve. As you can see on
> > the previous links, reintroducing this feature using gnome themes would
> > requires lot of work (at least at the moment these links were updated).
> > 
> > Proposing other desktop-environments may looks simpler, but it would
> > requires even more work, for UX, documentation, testing, ensuring
> > everything works fine, keeping the image small enough etc, not only when
> > integrating these desktop environments, but also for every releases.
> > 
> > That said, maybe things have improved since last updates on the previous
> > links. So if you are interested to give a deeper look of how it could be
> > done in practice, that may be a small but important step :-). I did a
> > quick testing of https://www.gnome-look.org/p/1216281/ (which is nice
> > also because it has been maintained since a few years now). It seems the
> > menus are only for Cinnamon, but maybe I did not tested it enough.
> > 
> > --
> > geb
> > ___
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Re: [Tails-dev] Question: Tails in undercover mode?

2021-07-17 Thread alienpup
All,

I believe hiding Tails' UI would prove too resource intensive and ultimately 
futile. It just can't be done and maintained well enough to fool sharp-eyed 
observers. After all, the first thing a passer-by does is study your screen. 
It's human nature and very hard to resist.

Tails users could however benefit greatly from a simple slideshow screen saver 
that can be invoked instantly. Tails could ship with a few uninteresting 
"stock" images and provide users the option of adding more. Once invoked, Tails 
could not be distinguished from Windows. Screen locking would remain dependent 
upon setting an admin password. 

regards,
alienpup


geb wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> Hans:
> > Dear list,
> > 
> > I am wondering, why tails no more get an undercover mode. IMO it is very 
> > dangerous for users, if their window manager is not looking like the normal 
> > window manager used everywhere, especially in countries, where any 
> > "strange" 
> > desktop might cause attention on authorities.
> > 
> > This problem could be easily solved. Most users are running either windows 
> > or 
> > MacOS. For windows you can just use XFCE + kali-undercover, for Mac-design 
> > there are several windowmanagers available (there is coming ElementaryOS in 
> > my 
> > mind).
> > 
> > As you do only need the window-manager design, there should be no risk 
> > change.
> > 
> > I might remember, tails got this option some years ago, but somehow this is 
> > gone. Dunno why
> 
> This camouflage option has been removed because the theme that proposed
> this feature was not working anymore, and because of lack of resources
> to work on it. You can read a bit more about that here :
> 
> https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/10830
> 
> https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/blueprints/-/wikis/update_camouflage_for_jessie/
> 
> Unfortunately, the problem is not that easy to solve. As you can see on
> the previous links, reintroducing this feature using gnome themes would
> requires lot of work (at least at the moment these links were updated).
> 
> Proposing other desktop-environments may looks simpler, but it would
> requires even more work, for UX, documentation, testing, ensuring
> everything works fine, keeping the image small enough etc, not only when
> integrating these desktop environments, but also for every releases.
> 
> That said, maybe things have improved since last updates on the previous
> links. So if you are interested to give a deeper look of how it could be
> done in practice, that may be a small but important step :-). I did a
> quick testing of https://www.gnome-look.org/p/1216281/ (which is nice
> also because it has been maintained since a few years now). It seems the
> menus are only for Cinnamon, but maybe I did not tested it enough.
> 
> --
> geb
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Re: [Tails-dev] Question: Tails in undercover mode?

2021-07-17 Thread geb
Hello,

Hans:
> Dear list,
> 
> I am wondering, why tails no more get an undercover mode. IMO it is very 
> dangerous for users, if their window manager is not looking like the normal 
> window manager used everywhere, especially in countries, where any "strange" 
> desktop might cause attention on authorities.
> 
> This problem could be easily solved. Most users are running either windows or 
> MacOS. For windows you can just use XFCE + kali-undercover, for Mac-design 
> there are several windowmanagers available (there is coming ElementaryOS in 
> my 
> mind).
> 
> As you do only need the window-manager design, there should be no risk change.
> 
> I might remember, tails got this option some years ago, but somehow this is 
> gone. Dunno why

This camouflage option has been removed because the theme that proposed
this feature was not working anymore, and because of lack of resources
to work on it. You can read a bit more about that here :

https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/10830

https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/blueprints/-/wikis/update_camouflage_for_jessie/

Unfortunately, the problem is not that easy to solve. As you can see on
the previous links, reintroducing this feature using gnome themes would
requires lot of work (at least at the moment these links were updated).

Proposing other desktop-environments may looks simpler, but it would
requires even more work, for UX, documentation, testing, ensuring
everything works fine, keeping the image small enough etc, not only when
integrating these desktop environments, but also for every releases.

That said, maybe things have improved since last updates on the previous
links. So if you are interested to give a deeper look of how it could be
done in practice, that may be a small but important step :-). I did a
quick testing of https://www.gnome-look.org/p/1216281/ (which is nice
also because it has been maintained since a few years now). It seems the
menus are only for Cinnamon, but maybe I did not tested it enough.

--
geb
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[Tails-dev] Question: Tails in undercover mode?

2021-07-17 Thread Hans
Dear list,

I am wondering, why tails no more get an undercover mode. IMO it is very 
dangerous for users, if their window manager is not looking like the normal 
window manager used everywhere, especially in countries, where any "strange" 
desktop might cause attention on authorities.

This problem could be easily solved. Most users are running either windows or 
MacOS. For windows you can just use XFCE + kali-undercover, for Mac-design 
there are several windowmanagers available (there is coming ElementaryOS in my 
mind).

As you do only need the window-manager design, there should be no risk change.

I might remember, tails got this option some years ago, but somehow this is 
gone. Dunno why

Thanks for reading this, any feedback is welcome.

Best regards

Hans 

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Re: [Tails-dev] NSA tails and closed code

2021-06-15 Thread Austin English
On Tue, Jun 15, 2021, 16:42 syster via Tails-dev  wrote:

> What I always thought what would be nice:
>
> Having 2 versions of Tails. One pure and free, and one with proprietary
> code that is needed to run some hardware.
>
> If one has a wifi adapter that runs on free software, most if not all of
> the proprietary code that is included in Tails is of no use for that
> person, at least that's how I understand it. Such an wifi adapter can be
> be bought for the cost of an USB stick.
>

That has the downside of doubling development/testing efforts, and
confusion for users.

>
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Re: [Tails-dev] NSA tails and closed code

2021-06-15 Thread syster via Tails-dev

What I always thought what would be nice:

Having 2 versions of Tails. One pure and free, and one with proprietary 
code that is needed to run some hardware.


If one has a wifi adapter that runs on free software, most if not all of 
the proprietary code that is included in Tails is of no use for that 
person, at least that's how I understand it. Such an wifi adapter can be 
be bought for the cost of an USB stick.



On 6/14/21 10:01 AM, boyska wrote:

Georg Koppen:

anonym:

Romper Stomper via Tails-dev:

and why are there closed codes in “tails”?


I guess you are referring to the firmwares required for hardware
support? If we didn't ship these firmwares Tails would not run on most
hardware. It's a necessary trade-off.


Is there a list of those firmwares somewhere (I couldn't find anything
on the Tails website about that topic after searching a bit) or is it
"just" a Debian package taken 1:1 from upstream?


https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/stable/config/chroot_local-packageslists/tails-common.list#L247 


this is the list of debian packages Tails installs to have firmwares


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Re: [Tails-dev] NSA tails and closed code

2021-06-14 Thread boyska

Georg Koppen:

anonym:

Romper Stomper via Tails-dev:

and why are there closed codes in “tails”?


I guess you are referring to the firmwares required for hardware
support? If we didn't ship these firmwares Tails would not run on most
hardware. It's a necessary trade-off.


Is there a list of those firmwares somewhere (I couldn't find anything
on the Tails website about that topic after searching a bit) or is it
"just" a Debian package taken 1:1 from upstream?


https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/stable/config/chroot_local-packageslists/tails-common.list#L247
this is the list of debian packages Tails installs to have firmwares

--
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Re: [Tails-dev] NSA tails and closed code

2021-06-14 Thread Georg Koppen
anonym:
> Romper Stomper via Tails-dev:
>> Is it true that the “tails” ports are controlled by the NSA?
> 
> I'm not sure what you mean with "ports". However, NSA doesn't control
> anything related to Tails to our knowledge, and we do what we can to
> defend against it, e.g.: https://tails.boum.org/news/reproducible_Tails/
> 
> and why are there closed codes in “tails”?
> 
> I guess you are referring to the firmwares required for hardware
> support? If we didn't ship these firmwares Tails would not run on most
> hardware. It's a necessary trade-off.

Is there a list of those firmwares somewhere (I couldn't find anything
on the Tails website about that topic after searching a bit) or is it
"just" a Debian package taken 1:1 from upstream?

Georg



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Re: [Tails-dev] NSA tails and closed code

2021-06-14 Thread anonym

Romper Stomper via Tails-dev:

Is it true that the “tails” ports are controlled by the NSA?


I'm not sure what you mean with "ports". However, NSA doesn't control anything 
related to Tails to our knowledge, and we do what we can to defend against it, e.g.: 
https://tails.boum.org/news/reproducible_Tails/

and why are there closed codes in “tails”?

I guess you are referring to the firmwares required for hardware support? If we 
didn't ship these firmwares Tails would not run on most hardware. It's a 
necessary trade-off.

Cheers!
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[Tails-dev] NSA tails and closed code

2021-06-14 Thread Romper Stomper via Tails-dev
Hi!
Is it true that the “tails” ports are controlled by the NSA? and why are there 
closed codes in “tails”?
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[Tails-dev] Maintaining Tails relevant Debian packages in Debian - Gitlab role

2020-08-12 Thread nodens
Hey there,

since I'm in charge of maintaining some Debian Packages important to
Tails (supporting Foundation Team on this role),  the Documentation [0]
used to state that if you have an issue with one of those packages, or a
problem in Tails that might be a problem in Debian, you should mention
me (@nodens) on the relevant issue from our Gitlab.

The idea is I to give me a heads up so I can have a look at it and act
accordingly.

The preferred way to do this now, is instead to mention

@debian-packages-maintainers

on our Gitlab.

Right now, I'm still the only person that will get notified. That said,
the rationale behind this change is that if I'm unavailable, if I'm
replaced, or if we end up having more than one person fulfilling this
role, there will be no need to change the documentation and habits of
people.

The said documentation[0] has been updated a while back to reflect this
change.

Cheers!

[0] -
https://tails.boum.org/contribute/working_together/roles/foundations_team/
-
"https://tails.boum.org/contribute/working_together/roles/foundations_team/;

[1] - Tails Project's Gitlab - https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/

-- 
nodens
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[Tails-dev] Releasing Tails 4.7 vs. the GitLab transition

2020-06-02 Thread Cyril Brulebois
Hi folks,

I must say I'm pretty much impressed by the GitLab transition.


I've only started a few days ago to get a feeling what a GitLab world
looks like for us, and there were a few blockers, but with some help
from the sysadmins team, we managed to get around them (basically
cheating by letting me trigger website rebuilds on my own, until we have
appropriate triggers/hooks, so that I wouldn't be relying on other
humans at some critical times).

A few commits are staged in #17746 but mostly orthogonal to the GitLab
transition, and some more work needs to happen as documented in #17747,
but all in all, that was a pretty smooth ride for such an intimidating
transition (you might know by now I'm erring on the conservative side by
nature).


Lots of bugs were filed directly during the release process, since the
interface is so much more fluid and intuitive and responsive than
Redmine's. Of course, we might still improve workflows, metadata, etc.
and get more used to it and fluent and all that, but I really do enjoy
the new GitLab world so far!


Congratulations, everyone! And thanks!


Cheers,
kibi

(done by 18:00 CEST, first time ever — with a new all time low record
regarding hours spent on the release — and no annoying delays for once!)
-- 
Cyril 'kibi' Brulebois (c...@riseup.net)


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Re: [Tails-dev] boot tails iso with grub

2019-09-30 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

the ubuntushop.eu folks told me privately on August 16 that they were
migrating away from Tails, as agreed back in January. Thanks!

For everyone else who's following along, it seems this migration is
not completed yet though:

 - https://www.ubuntushop.be/index.php/en/opensource-notebooks/
   still mentions "Tails live boot option"

 - 
https://www.ubuntushop.be/index.php/en/opensource-notebooks/kodachi-notebooks.html
   still mentions "Tails boot option".

Cheers,
-- 
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Re: [Tails-dev] boot tails iso with grub

2019-08-16 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

linux-service:
> no problem. I will consider ending this onboard tails.

I still see "The Amnesic Incognito Live System notebook" listed:
https://www.ubuntushop.be/index.php/en/opensource-notebooks/tails-notebooks.html

Did anything change, since we discussed this topic in January,
regarding how you ship Tails with these machines?

Cheers,
-- 
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[Tails-dev] To tails-dev

2019-06-01 Thread Lin



Dear tails-dev,
Now i am working in a rfid company,maybe you want purchase our products like Disposable , Fabric , Nylon , Plastic, Silicone Wristband and Tag, Label,  Card, Inlay, Key Fob.
Our products are very popular with customers also stable performance.if you want to try,take one minute to reply my email.
 
Best Wish 



Smartcardchn Co.,Ltd
Mr.Lin
 
 
www.smartcardchn.com
DO NOT SEND SUCH EMAIL 
MORE

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[Tails-dev] Install Tails with persistent storage on VirtualBox

2019-05-08 Thread D.T.

Hello,

I would like to have a Tails installation on VirtualBox with persistent 
storage.


Here is what I did to accomplish this 
https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/517524/install-tails-with-persistent-storage-on-virtualbox


Unfortunately there is an issue I encountered. Would anyone help me to 
resolve it?


Thanx in advance.


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[Tails-dev] Hi Tails-dev

2019-05-06 Thread Mr.Lin
Hello,

This is Haley from Tansoc Co.,Ltd.We are a professional manufacturer and 
solution designer in RFID area in China. 
All our rfid products have been ISO 9001,CE,RoHS, and get a high reputation and 
hot market in europe and north america,and other countries. 
Products mainly include RFID Cards, Labels, Wristbands, Tags and Key fobsetc.
Pls feel free to contact with me if you would like to know more !
Click here to visit our website

Best Regards-Haley LinTansoc Co.,LtdTel: 
0086-594-2618176 Fax: 0086-594-2618176   ___
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Re: [Tails-dev] boot tails iso with grub

2019-01-25 Thread Peter N. Glaskowsky

> On Jan 25, 2019, at 2:10 AM, intrigeri  wrote:
> 
> I'd much rather see us work on
> making "installing and running Tails on an internal hard drive"
> a first-class citizen: it would benefit much more people.

I agree! As I’ve been saying for many years now. :-)

And the other thing I’ve been saying is that HD-resident Tails would be 
especially useful if it works on a Windows tablet, as there are still many of 
these priced around US $100. Such machines are cheap enough and small enough to 
act as companion devices for people who also have laptops.

While I’m thinking about it, it would be useful if Tails, while running from a 
hard disk, could still respond to the sudden removal of a USB flash drive in 
the usual way. The drive shouldn’t have to have anything on it, nor should it 
be necessary to mount it. Ideally, any kind of USB device connected to an 
external port should also be usable (a keyboard or mouse, for example). It 
should be enough to select a USB device from a panel icon so that the memory 
erasure procedure is triggered by a surprise removal.

Best regards,

. png

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Re: [Tails-dev] Working Tails on Mac

2018-12-07 Thread intrigeri
Hi Daniel,

Daniel Rostamloo:
>I've recently discovered your wonderful project and decided to explore
> as much as I could with my MacBook Pro (Early 2015). Of course, I soon
> found out that many users have had difficulty implementing Tails alongside
> their macOS systems. After doing some research and several trials, I've
> found a way to operate the OS without the use of additional boot managers
> -- such as rEFInd -- and I hope your development team can use this
> information to ease the experience for us Mac users.

Good news: Tails 3.12, to be released on January 29, will fix these
problems :)

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri
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[Tails-dev] Working Tails on Mac

2018-12-06 Thread Daniel Rostamloo
Hello,
   I've recently discovered your wonderful project and decided to explore
as much as I could with my MacBook Pro (Early 2015). Of course, I soon
found out that many users have had difficulty implementing Tails alongside
their macOS systems. After doing some research and several trials, I've
found a way to operate the OS without the use of additional boot managers
-- such as rEFInd -- and I hope your development team can use this
information to ease the experience for us Mac users.
   First things first: almost all of the forum pages that provide a
workaround for using Tails next to OSX suggest also using rEFInd. I wasn't
fond of the overhead that installing new software to boot Tails would
create, so I searched for user cases where the extra boot manager was
avoided. I came across this
<https://redmine.tails.boum.org/code/issues/6242> entry on the Tails forum
which redirected me to this project <https://github.com/hellais/TAILS-OSX> on
GitHub. After installing Vagrant, initializing a vagrant environment with
"vagrant up", and several failed trials at running their imaging script, it
was clear that their code was outdated: it no longer fetches for the most
recent Tails distribution, requiring the user to download it independently.
After placing both ver. 3.10.1 and the PGP signature into their "data"
directory, the aforementioned script successfully recognizes the files and
images the Tails ISO onto the chosen volume. Before attempting to boot from
this drive, I had also attempted to install Tails using the instructions
provided by your main website. I imaged the drive multiple times, using a
different file system each attempt. Neither FAT32, macOS Extended, nor APFS
were recognized as bootable volumes by the MacBook Pro's bootloader. After
creating a custom EFI bootloader via the GitHub project, the machine
finally recognized the drive. Tails booted successfully. Tor, however,
failed to setup even after connecting to a network. The intermediate
instance also failed to install Tails to a more "permanent" drive,
displaying an error having to do with the master boot record directory -- I
couldn't attach a photo of the issue, as the boum.org domain rejected the
larger email size. I then transferred the 3.10.1 ISO from my main Mac
volume to a flash drive that I then opened in Tails. I used the Tails
installer and this ISO to image the operating system onto that flash drive
instead of cloning the intermediary. The installation completed
successfully this time around, and this second USB drive successfully
imaged Tails via cloning onto another two drives, both of which are
recognized and boot successfully from the Mac EFI.
   Some additional notes, for what they're worth: the Tails boot menu
differed between the instance that couldn't successfully clone itself and
the one that could. The former was similar to the example provided on the
Tails website, while the other was an entirely gray screen with the boot
options very offset from center. I've taken photos of both if necessary.
Additionally, the instructions at the bottom of the unsuccessful Tails
drive's boot screen which read, "Use the (up) and (down) keys to select a
boot option," or something to that effect, were buggy. What I presume were
supposed to be up and down arrows where the parentheses are in the text
above were missing, and pressing the up and down arrows made the text
disappear entirely.
   I'd be happy to provide more info about my setup and provide more
detailed steps or the photos I took if needed. Again, thanks for all the
great work you guys do! Hope this was helpful.
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Re: [Tails-dev] New Tails Mirror

2018-10-25 Thread u
Hi Adam,

thank you for setting up a mirror.

Please use tails-mirr...@boum.org for future communication about a mirror.

I am forwarding your message there.

Cheers,
u.
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Re: [Tails-dev] New Tails Mirror

2018-10-24 Thread sajolida
Douglas "Hardway" Goncz:
> Hello!

Hi Douglas and welcome :)

> This is my first post to the development list here. I am as usual using
> Google Voice due to some disability. I'd like to suggest the tales be
> released in a netboot version if that suggestion has not been made before.

I'm not sure to understand what you mean by "netboot", do you mean PXE?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preboot_Execution_Environment

Can you elaborate on which user scenarios would benefit from a netboot?

-- 
sajolida
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[Tails-dev] New Tails Mirror

2018-10-20 Thread Adam Quenneville

TAILS,

We've mirrored the TAILS archive and it is available for public use. We 
also seed the torrents.


Organization & Contact Name: The Free Mirror Project
Contact/published e-mail address: ad...@freemirror.org
IPv4: 158.69.189.185
Bandwidth: 250mbps

Mirror URLs:
http://mirror1.freemirror.org/tails/
https://mirror1.freemirror.org/tails/
ftp://mirror1.freemirror.org/tails/

PS: We've had difficulty mirroring your archive. We were able to do so 
after many failed attempts. We succeeded in connecting only once.


We use rsync several times daily with about a dozen other archives, 
however this error occurs only with mirrors.rsync.tails.boum.org (which 
for us is being sent to 198.252.153.59 at Riseup) . Here is the error:


rsync: read error: Connection reset by peer (104)
rsync error: error in socket IO (code 10) at io.c(794) [Receiver=3.1.2]

For this reason, we are currently set to synchronize with 
mirror.kernel.org for the time being.


Please advise,


--

Adam Quenneville
Founder, The Free Mirror Project <https://FreeMirror.org/>
/"Enabling the free exchange of information and ideas."/

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Re: [Tails-dev] Build Tails on MacBook 2015?

2018-06-08 Thread drwhax
On 2018-06-08 15:49, u wrote:
>
> 
> 
>> Any chance to build Tails natively on macOS, without any VM? Unfortunately I 
>> don’t own any other hardware as of now.
> 
> I cannot answer this question, but I believe not.
> 

This is correct, building Tails natively on MacOS is not something that
is supported.

More information on how to build on Debian stretch here:
https://tails.boum.org/contribute/build/

Cheers,
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Re: [Tails-dev] Build Tails on MacBook 2015?

2018-06-08 Thread u
Hi Marco,

Marco Betschart:
> A quick heads up on the „Waiting for IP address…“ issue:
> 
> Seems like this is macOS/VMWare Fusion related. Trying to vagrant up a 
> regular debian/stretch64 shows the same symptoms.
> Conclusion: VirtualBox does not support passing VT-x, VMWare Fusion does not 
> seem to handle vagrant up as it expects.

That's "good" news, or at least we now know what happens.

> Any chance to build Tails natively on macOS, without any VM? Unfortunately I 
> don’t own any other hardware as of now.

I cannot answer this question, but I believe not.

Cheers!
u.
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Re: [Tails-dev] Build Tails on MacBook 2015?

2018-06-06 Thread Marco Betschart
A quick heads up on the „Waiting for IP address…“ issue:

Seems like this is macOS/VMWare Fusion related. Trying to vagrant up a regular 
debian/stretch64 shows the same symptoms.
Conclusion: VirtualBox does not support passing VT-x, VMWare Fusion does not 
seem to handle vagrant up as it expects.

Any chance to build Tails natively on macOS, without any VM? Unfortunately I 
don’t own any other hardware as of now.


> Am 05.06.2018 um 09:59 schrieb intrigeri :
> 
> Marco Betschart:
>> I was able to fix that; VMWare does support passing VT-x to
>> the guest.
> 
> Progress, good!
> 
>> But now I’m stuck with this IP Address issue. For some reason, the
>> vagrant machine is not capable in getting one. Any idea how to fix
>> this? Below the full output I get - the build stucks while waiting
>> for the IP address. Please note: this is the master branch of the
>> repo, no changes made from my end.
> 
>> $: rake build
>> Using HTTP proxy: http://vagrant-stretch:3142
>> Bringing machine 'default' up with 'libvirt' provider...
>> [...]
>> ==> default: Starting domain.
>> ==> default: Waiting for domain to get an IP address...
> 
> I don't know what's going on. I suggest:
> 
> - looking at the logs in /var/log/libvirt/qemu/
>  (probably:
>  tails-builder-amd64-stretch-20180301-2f443fafad_default.log)
> - looking at the systemd Journal with the journalctl command
> - checking that your VMWare VM has enough RAM; I think you should give
>  it at least 1.5 GiB and even that might not be enough so if you can,
>  try with 3 GiB or more
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[Tails-dev] Fwd: Tails on MacBook?

2018-06-04 Thread Marco Betschart
Does anybody know how to fix the never ending „Waiting for domain to get an IP 
Address…“ below?
I’m running a fresh Debian 9.3 in VMWare Fusion on my macOS. VT-x is enabled; 
dependencies according to the Tails guide 
<https://tails.boum.org/contribute/build/> are installed.

Would be awesome if anybody can help out….


> Anfang der weitergeleiteten Nachricht:
> 
> Von: Marco Betschart 
> Betreff: Aw: [Tails-dev] Tails on MacBook?
> Datum: 3. Juni 2018 um 10:51:05 MESZ
> An: The Tails public development discussion list 
> Antwort an: The Tails public development discussion list 
> 
> Hi Intrigeri,
> 
> I was able to fix that; VMWare does support passing VT-x to the guest. But 
> now I’m stuck with this IP Address issue. For some reason, the vagrant 
> machine is not capable in getting one. Any idea how to fix this? Below the 
> full output I get - the build stucks while waiting for the IP address. Please 
> note: this is the master branch of the repo, no changes made from my end.
> 
> $: rake build
> Using HTTP proxy: http://vagrant-stretch:3142 <http://vagrant-stretch:3142/>
> Bringing machine 'default' up with 'libvirt' provider...
> ==> default: Creating image (snapshot of base box volume).
> ==> default: Creating domain with the following settings...
> ==> default:  -- Name:  
> tails-builder-amd64-stretch-20180301-2f443fafad_default
> ==> default:  -- Domain type:   kvm
> ==> default:  -- Cpus:  1
> ==> default:  -- Memory:1024M
> ==> default:  -- Management MAC:
> ==> default:  -- Loader:
> ==> default:  -- Base box:  
> tails-builder-amd64-stretch-20180301-2f443fafad
> ==> default:  -- Storage pool:  default
> ==> default:  -- Image: 
> /var/lib/libvirt/images/tails-builder-amd64-stretch-20180301-2f443fafad_default.img
>  (20G)
> ==> default:  -- Volume Cache:  default
> ==> default:  -- Kernel:
> ==> default:  -- Initrd:
> ==> default:  -- Graphics Type: vnc
> ==> default:  -- Graphics Port: 5900
> ==> default:  -- Graphics IP:   127.0.0.1
> ==> default:  -- Graphics Password: Not defined
> ==> default:  -- Video Type:cirrus
> ==> default:  -- Video VRAM:9216
> ==> default:  -- Keymap:en-us
> ==> default:  -- TPM Path:  
> ==> default:  -- Disks: vdb(qcow2,15G)
> ==> default:  -- Disk(vdb): 
> /var/lib/libvirt/images/apt-cacher-ng-data.qcow2 (Remove only manually) Not 
> created - using existed.
> ==> default:  -- INPUT: type=mouse, bus=ps2
> ==> default:  -- Command line : 
> ==> default: 
> ==> default: Machine id: 3a12845b-e5a6-44c9-9d2a-6833d15b5e0f
> ==> default: Should be mounting folders
> ==> default:  /vagrant, opts: {:type=>:"9p", :readonly=>true, 
> :guestpath=>"/vagrant", :hostpath=>"/home/osboxes/tails/vagrant", 
> :disabled=>false, :__vagrantfile=>true, :target=>"/vagrant", 
> :accessmode=>"passthrough", :mount=>true, 
> :mount_tag=>"2c56346e7960721c6c3f8de5e712c67"}
> ==> default: 
> ==> default: Machine id: 3a12845b-e5a6-44c9-9d2a-6833d15b5e0f
> ==> default: Should be mounting folders
> ==> default:  /amnesia.git, opts: {:type=>:"9p", :readonly=>true, 
> :guestpath=>"/amnesia.git", :hostpath=>"/home/osboxes/tails", 
> :disabled=>false, :__vagrantfile=>true, :target=>"/amnesia.git", 
> :accessmode=>"passthrough", :mount=>true, 
> :mount_tag=>"87850e485a799696ca30413b1dff3e1"}
> ==> default: Creating shared folders metadata...
> ==> default: Starting domain.
> ==> default: Waiting for domain to get an IP address...
> 
> 
>> Am 03.06.2018 um 09:57 schrieb intrigeri > <mailto:intrig...@boum.org>>:
>> 
>> Hi,
>> 
>> Marco Betschart:
>>> Got a local VMWare Fusion setup with Debian 9.3 and VT-x enabled on my 
>>> MacBook
>>> (Downloaded from OS-Boxes <https://www.osboxes.org/debian/ 
>>> <https://www.osboxes.org/debian/>>).
>> 
>>> There was an error in Libvirt. The error is shown below:
>>> Call to virDomainCreateWithFlags failed: internal error: process excited 
>>> while
>>> connecting to monitor: Could not access KVM kernel module: Permission 
>>> denied failed
>>> to initialize KVM: permission denied.
>> 
>> I suspect VMWare does not expose (nested) VT-x capabilities to the
>> Debian guest VM whi

Re: [Tails-dev] Basing Tails on quarterly snapshots of Debian Testing: status update… and next steps?

2017-11-25 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

intrigeri:
> I'm not waiting for feedback anymore on this thread, but I still would
> love to read what you folks think about this.

Ten days later, I have to acknowledge this topic is less exciting to
our community than I thought, and/or everybody is too busy to think
about it.

> Meanwhile:
> sajolida:
>> intrigeri:
>>> When I wrote "I can look into the money aspect more closely" I didn't
>>> mean to put this back on the table. Instead, I meant looking into
>>> re-purposing money that's *already* budgeted elsewhere for purposes
>>> I find questionable at the moment. I'd rather not elaborate on
>>> a public mailing list though.

>> I'm fine with repurposing!

> Cool, I'll look into it.

I've been over-enthusiastic here: there are other, more pressing
discussions I need to have with the same people, so I'll put this on
the backburner until we have a team, plan and budget for the next
years regarding such big migrations.

So with these two above updates in mind, I think the only sensible way
to go is to defer this until April or May. I'll update tickets and
blueprints accordingly, and will then update version numbers for next
year (*if* we eventually decide to release Tails based on Buster at
some point in 2018 Q3 or Q4, then we may have to renumber again, but
meanwhile we do need adequate version numbers).

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri
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Re: [Tails-dev] Basing Tails on quarterly snapshots of Debian Testing: status update… and next steps?

2017-11-11 Thread sajolida
intrigeri:
> sajolida:
>> Speaking as an accountant: I'm worried about taking important money
>> decisions before the end of the fundraising campaign and our budget
>> planning which will happen in February.
>> Because I wouldn't like to commit to paying work on "rolling Tails"
>> (what's the name of your project by the way?) to then realize two
>> months later that we will be very short on other core budget lines.
>> This applies to technical writing as well: I'd rather have more
>> money for core technical writing in 2018 than money for technical
>> writing on "rolling Tails" now.
> 
> Absolutely. We've already discussed this elsewhere and I think
> I already made it clear from the beginning that I agree with all this.
> 
> When I wrote "I can look into the money aspect more closely" I didn't
> mean to put this back on the table. Instead, I meant looking into
> re-purposing money that's *already* budgeted elsewhere for purposes
> I find questionable at the moment. I'd rather not elaborate on
> a public mailing list though.

I'm fine with repurposing!

> Regarding the project name: currently the best we have is "Basing
> Tails on quarterly snapshots of Debian Testing", sorry.
> Improvements are welcome. "rolling" means something different, let's
> not use it.

Ok :)
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[Tails-dev] Errata: Tails contributors meeting: Monday November 03

2017-10-24 Thread sajolida
sajolida:
> The next Tails contributors meeting is scheduled for:
> 
>   Friday 03 November
>       tails-dev on conference.riseup.net (XMPP)
>7 pm in Paris
>6 pm in London
>1 pm in New-York
>   10 am in San Francisco

Errata: It will happen on Monday 6 to avoid Friday nights. Same time.

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Re: [Tails-dev] Changing Tails 3.0 release date?

2017-06-01 Thread Marco Calamari
ar. If you agree, I'll update our
> accounting accordingly, so nobody counts on (paid) RM work that's
> unlikely to happen in practice, first because there's no need for it,
> second because our RMs are not exactly thrilled at the idea of doing
> this work. Fair enough?
> 
> > Yup, I'm quite a lot in favor of option B.
> 
> Got it.
> 
> > > The decision algorithm I intend to use is:
> > > 
> > >  - If the reproducible builds people tell me they can make 3.0
> > >    reproducible and communicate about it _only_ if we pick option B,
> > >    then I'll go this way.
> 
> [...]
> 
> > [I might consider sabotaging option A by pretending, as
> > a reproducible buids person, that "Tails 3.0 will only be
> > reproducible if we pick option B". Will I have to? :)]
> 
> I'm sorry I even asked this question, as it doesn't make any sense:
> the only work option A adds to our reproducible builds developers'
> plate is reviewing'n'merging a branch for Tor Browser 7.0, which
> pretty often we just skip anyway (the RM often has to merge his own
> work at this point of the release process), and if we do it this time,
> the amount of additional work feels totally negligible compared to
> your remaining workload for 3.0. So I really don't see how the option
> A vs. option B decision can affect whether Tails 3.0 is reproducible
> or not.
> 
> > > > The final weeks up to the release
> > > > =
> > > 
> > > [...]
> > > 
> > > > In the last week prior to the freeze, testing will be completely
> > > > frozen and only emergency bug fixes will be considered in this period.
> > > > Please consider Friday the 2017-06-09 at 13:00 UTC the absolute last
> > > > moment for changes to stretch.
> > > 
> > > So I plan to bump our APT snapshots serials on 2017-06-09: #12609.
> > Huh, I thought we would stick with the snapshot we froze for ~rc1
> > as usual.
> 
> Well, usually we freeze for the RC ~10 days before the release.
> This time, if we keep our current snapshots (2017051803) then we would
> lose 3 weeks of updates.
> 
> Given there's no security archive for Debian testing, the only way to
> get security fixes is to bump these snapshots, or manually go through
> the list of updates and go through our freeze exception process for
> a (probably not that small) number of packages that fix security
> issues or bugs that can affect Tails. I'm utterly confident with the
> job the Debian release team is doing wrt. avoiding regressions in
> testing at this stage of the freeze, so I vastly prefer just bumping
> the snapshots compared to spending time cherry-picking a plateful of
> security updates and bugfixes. Sounds reasonable?
> 
> Of course, if we were not during a time when testing is very very
> frozen, I would probably make the opposite decision.
> 
> > I believe this bump will require us to cherry-pick at least these
> > commits from devel into testing: […]


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Re: [Tails-dev] Changing Tails 3.0 release date?

2017-06-01 Thread intrigeri
 as
> a reproducible buids person, that "Tails 3.0 will only be
> reproducible if we pick option B". Will I have to? :)]

I'm sorry I even asked this question, as it doesn't make any sense:
the only work option A adds to our reproducible builds developers'
plate is reviewing'n'merging a branch for Tor Browser 7.0, which
pretty often we just skip anyway (the RM often has to merge his own
work at this point of the release process), and if we do it this time,
the amount of additional work feels totally negligible compared to
your remaining workload for 3.0. So I really don't see how the option
A vs. option B decision can affect whether Tails 3.0 is reproducible
or not.

>>> The final weeks up to the release
>>> =
>> 
>> [...]
>> 
>>> In the last week prior to the freeze, testing will be completely
>>> frozen and only emergency bug fixes will be considered in this period.
>>> Please consider Friday the 2017-06-09 at 13:00 UTC the absolute last
>>> moment for changes to stretch.
>> 
>> So I plan to bump our APT snapshots serials on 2017-06-09: #12609.

> Huh, I thought we would stick with the snapshot we froze for ~rc1
> as usual.

Well, usually we freeze for the RC ~10 days before the release.
This time, if we keep our current snapshots (2017051803) then we would
lose 3 weeks of updates.

Given there's no security archive for Debian testing, the only way to
get security fixes is to bump these snapshots, or manually go through
the list of updates and go through our freeze exception process for
a (probably not that small) number of packages that fix security
issues or bugs that can affect Tails. I'm utterly confident with the
job the Debian release team is doing wrt. avoiding regressions in
testing at this stage of the freeze, so I vastly prefer just bumping
the snapshots compared to spending time cherry-picking a plateful of
security updates and bugfixes. Sounds reasonable?

Of course, if we were not during a time when testing is very very
frozen, I would probably make the opposite decision.

> I believe this bump will require us to cherry-pick at least these
> commits from devel into testing: […]

ACK, added to the ticket.

Cheers!
-- 
intrigeri
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Re: [Tails-dev] Changing Tails 3.0 release date? [Was: Planned release of stretch on 2017-06-17 and the last weeks up to the release]

2017-05-31 Thread anonym
g will be completely
>> frozen and only emergency bug fixes will be considered in this period.
>> Please consider Friday the 2017-06-09 at 13:00 UTC the absolute last
>> moment for changes to stretch.
> 
> So I plan to bump our APT snapshots serials on 2017-06-09: #12609.

Huh, I thought we would stick with the snapshot we froze for ~rc1 as usual. I 
believe this bump will require us to cherry-pick at least these commits from 
devel into testing:

f9941c1c77 Fetch the torbrowser-launcher sources from Debian sid.
fc8d513540 Drop now irrelevant build hook causing FTBFS.
75f1a839eb Drop bilibop patch.

Cheers!

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Re: [Tails-dev] Changing Tails 3.0 release date? [Was: Planned release of stretch on 2017-06-17 and the last weeks up to the release]

2017-05-31 Thread u
Hi!

intrigeri:
> ni...@thykier.net:
>> Release date
>> 
> 
>> We plan to release on 2017-06-17.
> 
> I see two options:
> 
> A. Coordinate Tails 3.0 and Debian Stretch releases
> 
>We can prepare two releases at the same time: 2.12.1 and 3.0.
>Both should be ready (including release notes, uploading ISO,
>manual testing) on June 13. But on June 13 we release 2.12.1 only
>(we have to release _something_ on that day anyway due to the
>Firefox security updates), and we wait until June 17 to publish
>Tails 3.0, at the same time as Debian Stretch.
> 
> B. Don't bother and proceed as our calendar says
> 
>I.e. simply release Tails 3.0 on June 13.
> 
> Pros and cons:
> 
>  - Option A costs us one more "Emergency releases" i.e. 2.25 days
>of work (release management + manual testing).
> 
>  - Option A forces us to integrate Tor Browser 7.0 into Tails 2.x:
>this work has been based on the Tails 3.x codebase so far. I don't
>know if rebasing it onto the stable branch would be trivial, or
>a lot of work. anonym, what's your feeling?
> 
>  - Option B is less work, therefore it increases the chances that we
>manage to make 3.0 build reproducibly, which gives us good
>communication opportunities. So:
> 
> * Ulrike (who committed to handle such communication) and sajolida
>   (who'll likely be needed to review it), do you think you can
>   realistically take advantage of this opportunity?

I think option B being less work in general, for all of us, so IMO we
should go this way instead. I can absolutely take the time to prepare
communication next week so that sajolida would have enough time to
review it.

Cheers!
u.

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Re: [Tails-dev] Changing Tails 3.0 release date? [Was: Planned release of stretch on 2017-06-17 and the last weeks up to the release]

2017-05-29 Thread sajolida
intrigeri:
> ni...@thykier.net:
>> Release date
>> 
> 
>> We plan to release on 2017-06-17.
> 
>> […]
> 
> Yeah! I'm relieved this is now public info and we don't have to
> discuss our plans privately within a tiny Tails release managers
> cabal anymore.
> 
> So, what should we do about it? I'll make the call as the 3.0 release
> manager if no consensus emerges, but I first need some input from
> a few people (at least anonym, Ulrike, and sajolida) to make up my
> mind, so please read on :)

I'm sorry but I have no opinion about this. I think it's a cool idea and
I'm happy that it motivates you so do whatever option you like best and
I'll have the release notes ready by then.

Also, don't count on my for time communicating about this release
outside of writing the release notes (and I will mention the sync with
Debian in there of course).

And yes, I know I should start writing these notes early because they
are going to be long and complex and require a couple of round trips of
reviews :)
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[Tails-dev] Changing Tails 3.0 release date? [Was: Planned release of stretch on 2017-06-17 and the last weeks up to the release]

2017-05-27 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

ni...@thykier.net:
> Release date
> 

> We plan to release on 2017-06-17.

> […]

Yeah! I'm relieved this is now public info and we don't have to
discuss our plans privately within a tiny Tails release managers
cabal anymore.

So, what should we do about it? I'll make the call as the 3.0 release
manager if no consensus emerges, but I first need some input from
a few people (at least anonym, Ulrike, and sajolida) to make up my
mind, so please read on :)

I see two options:

A. Coordinate Tails 3.0 and Debian Stretch releases

   We can prepare two releases at the same time: 2.12.1 and 3.0.
   Both should be ready (including release notes, uploading ISO,
   manual testing) on June 13. But on June 13 we release 2.12.1 only
   (we have to release _something_ on that day anyway due to the
   Firefox security updates), and we wait until June 17 to publish
   Tails 3.0, at the same time as Debian Stretch.

B. Don't bother and proceed as our calendar says

   I.e. simply release Tails 3.0 on June 13.

Pros and cons:

 - Option A costs us one more "Emergency releases" i.e. 2.25 days
   of work (release management + manual testing).

 - Option A forces us to integrate Tor Browser 7.0 into Tails 2.x:
   this work has been based on the Tails 3.x codebase so far. I don't
   know if rebasing it onto the stable branch would be trivial, or
   a lot of work. anonym, what's your feeling?

 - Option B is less work, therefore it increases the chances that we
   manage to make 3.0 build reproducibly, which gives us good
   communication opportunities. So:

* Ulrike (who committed to handle such communication) and sajolida
  (who'll likely be needed to review it), do you think you can
  realistically take advantage of this opportunity?

* anonym (who is our lead developer on the reproducibility front):
  if we go with option B, how confident are you that 3.0 can
  build reproducibly? #12608, #12567 and #12566 should be good
  starting points.

 - Option A gives good opportunities for communication:

* On Tails' side: we can point out that we're releasing on the
  exact same day as Debian (which is a stronger symbol than 4 days
  earlier); I would love to see this happen as a way to re-affirm
  our strong relationship with Debian, which has been very
  important so far in terms of how we fit into the Debian
  community and the broader FOSS world.

* On Debian's side: they can mention our release in
  their communication. But TBH they can probably do it anyway
  even if Tails based on Stretch is out earlier than June 17.

Other pros/cons or thoughts?

The decision algorithm I intend to use is:

 - If the reproducible builds people tell me they can make 3.0
   reproducible and communicate about it _only_ if we pick option B,
   then I'll go this way.

 - Otherwise, if the reproducible builds plans are less clear, then:

if it's not too hard to integrate Tor Browser 7.0 into Tails 2.x,
   and anonym+I find a way to share the additional RM'ing work,
   then I'll pick option A

else, I'll fallback to option B.

> The final weeks up to the release
> =

[...]

> In the last week prior to the freeze, testing will be completely
> frozen and only emergency bug fixes will be considered in this period.
> Please consider Friday the 2017-06-09 at 13:00 UTC the absolute last
> moment for changes to stretch.

So I plan to bump our APT snapshots serials on 2017-06-09: #12609.

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri
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Re: [Tails-dev] Testing Tails 3.0~rc1

2017-05-18 Thread anonym
[Sorry if this is a ~repost -- my MUA crashed while sending the email.]
anonym:
> During mine and intrigeri's upcoming Stretch sprint we plan to build and 
> upload Tails 3.0~rc1 on 2017-05-19 and release it on 2017-05-20. Testers, 
> please let me and intrigeri know:
> 
> * if you are available on 2017-05-19, late CEST
> 
> * if you are available on 2017-05-20, morning to afternoon, CEST.

We have bumped these dates with +1 day, so:

We plan to build and upload Tails 3.0~rc1 on 2017-05-20 and release it on 
2017-05-21.

Testers, please let me and intrigeri know:
 
* if you are available on 2017-05-20, late CEST

* if you are available on 2017-05-21, morning to afternoon, CEST.

Cheers!

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Re: [Tails-dev] Testing Tails 3.0~rc1

2017-05-18 Thread anonym
anonym:
> Hi,
> 
> During mine and intrigeri's upcoming Stretch sprint we plan to build and 
> upload Tails 3.0~rc1 on 2017-05-19 and release it on 2017-05-20. Testers, 
> please let me and intrigeri know:
> 
> * if you are available on 2017-05-19, late CEST
> 
> * if you are available on 2017-05-20, morning to afternoon, CEST.

We have bumped these dates with +1 day, so:

We plan to build and upload Tails 3.0~rc1 on 2017-05-20 and release it on 
2017-05-21.

Testers, please let me and intrigeri know:
 
* if you are available on 2017-05-20, late CEST

* if you are available on 2017-05-21, morning to afternoon, CEST.

Cheers!

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Re: [Tails-dev] Testing Tails 3.0~rc1

2017-05-18 Thread anonym
anonym:
> Hi,
> 
> During mine and intrigeri's upcoming Stretch sprint we plan to build and 
> upload Tails 3.0~rc1 on 2017-05-19 and release it on 2017-05-20. Testers, 
> please let me and intrigeri know:
> 
> * if you are available on 2017-05-19, late CEST
> 
> * if you are available on 2017-05-20, morning to afternoon, CEST.

These dates have been bumped +1 day, so:

We will build and upload Tails on 2017-05-20 and release it on 2017-05-21.

Testers, please let me and intrigeri know:

* if you are available on 2017-05-20, late CEST

* if you are available on 2017-05-21, morning to afternoon, CEST.

Cheers!

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[Tails-dev] Testing Tails 3.0~rc1

2017-04-18 Thread anonym
Hi,

During mine and intrigeri's upcoming Stretch sprint we plan to build and upload 
Tails 3.0~rc1 on 2017-05-19 and release it on 2017-05-20. Testers, please let 
me and intrigeri know:

* if you are available on 2017-05-19, late CEST

* if you are available on 2017-05-20, morning to afternoon, CEST.

Cheers!
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Re: [Tails-dev] Porting Tails to Debian Stretch

2016-11-22 Thread intrigeri
intrigeri:
>  * late August: 1st sprint, only relevant for anonym and intrigeri
>  * November 14-18th: second sprint (in-person, organized by intrigeri)

These did happen! A report will be included in the November monthly report.

>  * late December: third sprint (remotely attended for everybody except
>two of us)

This will happen on December 20-23. Please consider joining!
There will be ways to help regardless of your skills.

>  * January 30 - Febuary 3: fourth sprint (remotely attended)
>  * March 13-17th: fifth sprint (in-person, organized by sajolida)

Some of these dates will likely change, stay tuned.

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri
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Re: [Tails-dev] Modifying Tails-greeter to work outside of Tails

2016-11-15 Thread adrian15
h my changes, the fact that 
tails-greeter
was changed from (Jessie - 1) to Jessie I also had to modify some files from the
Debian Live project itself.



5.1.
https://github.com/rescatux/rescatux/commit/f073ad5cd60fa6e85fe71d7f75f4c494c8dd8c68


I guess we should really include this in the tails-greeter package.
I don't know why we don't. Any clue?

If the tails-greeter package is installed it does not imply that it has 
to be setup to be used by default at the next Xorg login.


So, it makes sense to put the tails-greeter setup in another package as 
you already did.



5.2. And add some new packages:



https://github.com/rescatux/rescatux/commit/e38cc70fa8cd3ddf7701137d1e4c5f28d971b928



which increase the CD size by 60 or 70 MB.



(This is more a Rescatux question than focusing to try to 'port' tails-greeter 
into
Debian)



Do you know by any chance if there are any specific packages asked by 
tails-greeter
dependencies which might not be needed if you only want localisation support ?



5.3. You seem to define metacity as compulsory. Why do we need a window manager 
if
there are no windows involved?
move them.


Unless I'm very mistaken, windows _are_ involved and I'd rather not
handle window management in Tails Greeter itself.
Yes, the final user does not have to manage them (no bar on the top of 
the window) but I, guess, they are tehcnically windows.



Maybe what I am trying to ask you is:



Can I use another window manager such as the default one that comes in Rescatux 
/
LXDE instead of metacity? Or is there anything specific on gdm3 or 
tails-greeter that
needs that specific metacity window manager ?


Wrt. gdm3: well, as a matter of fact Tails Greeter is very deeply
bound to GDM.

I know.


Wrt. WM: I guess that whatever simplistic WM should work just as well as
a gnome-flashback session works on that WM. Feel free to edit
gdm-tails.session to add support for your preferred WM :)
Ok. I will do. I guess the package will have to be edited to OR-depend 
on that package too.


But FYI the revamped branch works in a GNOME Shell session, which is
useful e.g. for accessibility support. I don't know how much it'll be
bound to GNOME Shell technologies, nor whether it'll be doable to
easily switch the WM.
I'm not concerned about accessibility in Rescatux yet. So I don't mind 
breaking that in order to avoid installing metacity. We will see.


Cheers!



--
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Re: [Tails-dev] Update Tails Documentation: JonDo Live-DVD discontinued

2016-10-08 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

lenn...@spambog.de:
> Correspondingly, JonDo Live DVD should be moved to the
> "Discontinued, abandoned or sleeping projects" section.

Done, thanks!

Cheers,
-- 
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Re: [Tails-dev] Modifying Tails-greeter to work outside of Tails

2016-10-07 Thread intrigeri
ils-greeter into
> Debian)

> Do you know by any chance if there are any specific packages asked by 
> tails-greeter
> dependencies which might not be needed if you only want localisation support ?

> 5.3. You seem to define metacity as compulsory. Why do we need a window 
> manager if
> there are no windows involved?
> move them.

Unless I'm very mistaken, windows _are_ involved and I'd rather not
handle window management in Tails Greeter itself.

> Maybe what I am trying to ask you is:

> Can I use another window manager such as the default one that comes in 
> Rescatux /
> LXDE instead of metacity? Or is there anything specific on gdm3 or 
> tails-greeter that
> needs that specific metacity window manager ?

Wrt. gdm3: well, as a matter of fact Tails Greeter is very deeply
bound to GDM.

Wrt. WM: I guess that whatever simplistic WM should work just as well as
a gnome-flashback session works on that WM. Feel free to edit
gdm-tails.session to add support for your preferred WM :)

But FYI the revamped branch works in a GNOME Shell session, which is
useful e.g. for accessibility support. I don't know how much it'll be
bound to GNOME Shell technologies, nor whether it'll be doable to
easily switch the WM.

Cheers!
-- 
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[Tails-dev] Update Tails Documentation: JonDo Live-DVD discontinued

2016-10-07 Thread lenn...@spambog.de
Hi,
 
the tails  documentation page
https://tails.boum.org/doc/about/acknowledgments_and_similar_projects/index.en.html
lists JonDo Live-CD als an active project. Unfortunately, however, the JonDo 
Live-DVD has been discontinued in February 2016. The the developer's statement 
can be found here:
https://anonymous-proxy-servers.net/blog/index.php?user_language=en
https://anonymous-proxy-servers.net/blog/index.php?/archives/438-End-of-Live-DVD.html
Correspondingly, JonDo Live DVD should be moved to the "Discontinued, abandoned 
or sleeping projects" section.
Thanks,
an anonymous tails user.
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Re: [Tails-dev] Does Tails' Connectivity Depend On One OpenDNS server?

2016-10-02 Thread intrigeri
Anonymous:
> According to /etc/ttdnsd.conf:

> # OpenDNS
> 208.67.222.222

ttdnsd is not used by default. It can be used explicitly by the user
(and will go away in Tails 3.0).

See https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/Tor_enforcement/DNS/

Cheers,
-- 
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[Tails-dev] Does Tails' Connectivity Depend On One OpenDNS server?

2016-10-01 Thread Anonymous
According to /etc/ttdnsd.conf:

# OpenDNS
208.67.222.222

Does this mean if that IP goes down, the shit hits the
fan for Tails users and they won't be able to load
clear-net sites? Could there be some other future
unforeseen error/event occur where we really should have
been using not only one OpenDNS IP, but perhaps some
from another provider, MAYBE Google, but probably and most
preferably others like CCC?

I'm also concerned about tracking. Couldn't people who
run exit nodes sign up for an OpenDNS account(s) and
track the [Tails] users and/or compile detailed reports on
usage stats? Couldn't they also control/limit the sites
Tails users visit according to settings on their registered
OpenDNS accounts?
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Re: [Tails-dev] [Was: Tails]

2016-09-20 Thread intrigeri
anonym:
> Of course, the IM landscape is a bit crazy, with tons of protocols and
> accompanying single-protocol clients popping up and disappearing. I'm
> wondering a bit if some improvement over XMPP/IRC + OTR will be the
> preferred way to do secure IM after the dust settles, and whether Tor
> Messenger will add support for such new solutions. That would be ideal
> -- One Client To Rule Them All! :)

Right. In particular, we starting seeing quite some requests to
include OMEMO support. And now I see that
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17457 hints that OTRv4
might be the future wrt. axolotl-based protocols.

Cheers!
-- 
intrigeri
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[Tails-dev] [Was: Tails]

2016-09-19 Thread anonym
Sukhbir Singh:
> In case you missed it, we just released Tor Messenger 0.2.0b2, the first
> release with the secure updater.
> 
> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-messenger-020b2-released
> 
> One of the long-terms goals when we started was to replace Pidgin with Tor
> Messenger as the standard choice for an XMPP/chat client.  (In the context of
> Tails, there is https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/8577 and the discussions
> in #tor-messenger.)
> 
> While we are still in beta and will be before we get an audit, we were
> wondering about the status of Tor Messenger integration in Tails (assuming it
> is planned) and if there is a specific issue(s) that may be blocking this.

Except the ticket you linked to, we have a blueprint for replacing Pidgin:

https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/replace_Pidgin/

My read is that of it is that Tor Messenger is the most promising
candidate given the requirements listed, but I cannot say its
integration is "planned". I suppose the main problem is Tor Messenger's
lack of regular security updates trickling down from Thunderbird. If
this changed and it went stable, and it was clearer that it would remain
maintained for the foreseeable future (I only mention this because IIRC
you talked about this being a problem before, mainly because of lack of
funding), I see very little reason not to migrate ASAP. :)

Of course, the IM landscape is a bit crazy, with tons of protocols and
accompanying single-protocol clients popping up and disappearing. I'm
wondering a bit if some improvement over XMPP/IRC + OTR will be the
preferred way to do secure IM after the dust settles, and whether Tor
Messenger will add support for such new solutions. That would be ideal
-- One Client To Rule Them All! :)

Cheers!

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[Tails-dev] Modifying Tails-greeter to work outside of Tails

2016-08-29 Thread adrian15
  Last year I already tried to make tails-greeter to work with (Jessie 
- 1) and I sent you an email.


https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2015-February/008051.html

  Later on I talked to intrigeri on Debconf15 and he gave me some 
advice on how I was supposed to do this.


  Anyways I'll try to summarize it:

A. I develop Rescatux ( http://www.supergrubdisk.org/rescatux/ and I 
need something at boot so that the final user can select a keyboard in a 
gui so that it gets setup and can be used.
B. tails-greeter among other things let the user choose a keyboard and 
setups it.

C. tails-greeter cannot easily be ported out of Tails.

  So, what I have been trying to do is to tweak minimally tails-greeter 
so that it meets my needs. The final purpose of these tweaks is to 
convince you that some of them are useful for tails-greeter so that you 
include into its upstream code.


  My tweaks are not perfect and thus there are some doubts which I need 
to clarify with you. Let's start.


1. tails-greeter Rescatux branch

The branch can be found here:

https://github.com/rescatux/tails-greeter/tree/rescatux_0.40b8

2. Configuration files for enabling / disabling features. (Python)

When I talked to Intrigeri he pointed me to:
https://git-tails.immerda.ch/whisperback/tree/whisperBack/whisperback.py?h=feature/jessie
which used in turn config.py which was loaded from different places.

As I have noticed that tails-greeter now has config.py I have just 
modified it as you can see in: 
https://github.com/rescatux/tails-greeter/commit/863b13b7378b21af70783d36b61d5a8254a74675 
.


So I have added these boolean variables:

* tails_persistence_support
* tails_show_welcome_message

which are self explanatory.

2.1. Are those names correct or do you prefer them to be written in 
another way? Or with another name?
2.2. I guess I should add more Tails specific features such as the one 
about physical security.
2.3. I personally only use the Keyboard feature. Do you think there are 
other options which could be useful for Debian by default?


3. user user instead of amnesia user .

https://github.com/rescatux/tails-greeter/commit/f04280192440db280d53414e7cde99bc3017e52d
Debian Live default user is 'user', not 'amnesia'.
So that's a clear setting that should be set by Tails.

4. Configuration files for enabling / disabling features. (Bash)

4.1. One important part of tails-greeter is the PostLogin script from 
gdm3 which it's written in bash.


https://github.com/rescatux/tails-greeter/commit/56b6a047f7f01dc09b85578f8df4c1542a0515d9

https://github.com/rescatux/tails-greeter/commit/b7228693581c1a15c6b2ae2dd0bfe59f963d9692

https://github.com/rescatux/tails-greeter/commit/c7c60689602fa7238e1ccc27480ecabd9bd234b6

https://github.com/rescatux/tails-greeter/commit/8735df7017279708eec8c8509be422c6c7c75157

4.2. So as I was advised by intrigeri I rewrote the different tasks into 
functions. I modified the code so that these functions were run 
conditioned to some boolean variables.


4.3. I finally changed their values so that by default only localization 
task was run.


4.4. I guess you would want another bash file to be sourced if someone 
wants to config / modify it to suit their needs. But which filename path 
exactly?


5. Apart from the tails-greeter branch with my changes, the fact that 
tails-greeter was changed from (Jessie - 1) to Jessie I also had to 
modify some files from the Debian Live project itself.


5.1.
https://github.com/rescatux/rescatux/commit/f073ad5cd60fa6e85fe71d7f75f4c494c8dd8c68

5.2. And add some new packages:

https://github.com/rescatux/rescatux/commit/e38cc70fa8cd3ddf7701137d1e4c5f28d971b928

which increase the CD size by 60 or 70 MB.

(This is more a Rescatux question than focusing to try to 'port' 
tails-greeter into Debian)


Do you know by any chance if there are any specific packages asked by 
tails-greeter dependencies which might not be needed if you only want 
localisation support ?


5.3. You seem to define metacity as compulsory. Why do we need a window 
manager if there are no windows involved? I mean... I don't see a bar 
above them to be able to move them.


Maybe what I am trying to ask you is:

Can I use another window manager such as the default one that comes in 
Rescatux / LXDE instead of metacity? Or is there anything specific on 
gdm3 or tails-greeter that needs that specific metacity window manager ?






Well, hopefully, I have not forgotten anything.

Waiting for your feedback.

Thank you.


adrian15
--
Support free software. Donate to Super Grub Disk. Apoya el software 
libre. Dona a Super Grub Disk. http://www.supergrubdisk.org/donate/

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Re: [Tails-dev] Why Tails partition is non-deterministic?

2016-08-28 Thread segfault
Joanna Rutkowska:
> On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 06:54:10PM +, segfault wrote:
> The added value would be ensuring the unused portion of the disk blocks
> (occupied by the Tails partition) are not populated with some random garbage,
> which might be e.g. user's previous (unencrypted) content, such as... family
> pictures ;)

Ok, but data leakage and verification are different problems IMO. In the
tails-verifier I did not try to prevent data leakage or the other
possibility of using unverified parts as a hidden channel (which could
be used by malware), but only focus on modifications which could alter
the behavior of Tails (i.e. changes in boot code or files).
I think preventing data leakage and hidden channels is also desirable,
but because of the behavior of flash drives you mentioned, I think it is
hard to guarantee this.

> Generally, I think the Tails installer should at least ask the user to wipe 
> the
> disk with 'dd if=/dev/zero'. Admittedly, because of wear leveling mechanisms
> this might not be effective, because AFAIU modern flash memories would include
> (X*size) of the actual physical storage in order to expose (size) bytes of
> storage to the host, where X > 1. 

Right, so `dd if=/dev/zero` would not always protect from data leakage.
So I tend to disagree that we should do this in Tails Installer, because
it would make the installation process slower and might give a wrong
feeling of security.

> But perhaps if the wiping were repeated N times, where N = ceiling (X), with
> random content this time (in order to fool any optimizations by the device),
> then it should be fine?

Would this guarantee that every byte was overwritten? Wouldn't it be
possible that the same (size) bytes get overwritten multiple times but
the (X-1)*size other bytes stay the same?

Cheers
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Re: [Tails-dev] Why Tails partition is non-deterministic?

2016-08-28 Thread Joanna Rutkowska
On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 06:54:10PM +, segfault wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> somehow I missed this thread, just noticed it right now.
> 
> intrigeri:
> > Hi,
> >
> > thanks Joanna for raising this topic!
> >
> > I've just thought about it a little bit and I see no technical reason
> > that prevents us from resetting all timestamps in the filesystem to
> > some fixed value that depends only (if at all) on the version of Tails
> > being installed/upgraded, during some late stage of the
> > installation process.
> 
> I think you're right. I did not test if the modification date is indeed
> the only thing that differs, but I think Joanna is right, I don't see
> anything else that should differ. This would also make tails-verifier
> less complex, because we wouldn't have to look at each file but can
> check the whole partition at once, like Joanna suggested (although the
> file verification is not the complex part).
> 

The added value would be ensuring the unused portion of the disk blocks
(occupied by the Tails partition) are not populated with some random garbage,
which might be e.g. user's previous (unencrypted) content, such as... family
pictures ;)

Generally, I think the Tails installer should at least ask the user to wipe the
disk with 'dd if=/dev/zero'. Admittedly, because of wear leveling mechanisms
this might not be effective, because AFAIU modern flash memories would include
(X*size) of the actual physical storage in order to expose (size) bytes of
storage to the host, where X > 1. 

But perhaps if the wiping were repeated N times, where N = ceiling (X), with
random content this time (in order to fool any optimizations by the device),
then it should be fine?

Cheers,
joanna.


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Re: [Tails-dev] Why Tails partition is non-deterministic?

2016-08-27 Thread segfault
Hi,

somehow I missed this thread, just noticed it right now.

intrigeri:
> Hi,
>
> thanks Joanna for raising this topic!
>
> I've just thought about it a little bit and I see no technical reason
> that prevents us from resetting all timestamps in the filesystem to
> some fixed value that depends only (if at all) on the version of Tails
> being installed/upgraded, during some late stage of the
> installation process.

I think you're right. I did not test if the modification date is indeed
the only thing that differs, but I think Joanna is right, I don't see
anything else that should differ. This would also make tails-verifier
less complex, because we wouldn't have to look at each file but can
check the whole partition at once, like Joanna suggested (although the
file verification is not the complex part).

>
> And it would be nice if tails-verifier looked at filesystem metadata
> as well as files content, if it doesn't yet. I bet it's cheaper to add
> this check than to prove that it's not needed :)

I can't find a source which explicitely states this, but I'm pretty sure
the modification date is the only file metadata available in unix' vfat
(beside the size, which is also checked with the hash sum). See for
example the full list of attributes in the FAT32 directory table [1] and
this short paragraph in wikipedia about unix' vfat driver [2].

[1]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Design_of_the_FAT_file_system#Directory_entry
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FAT_filesystem_and_Linux#vfat

Currently I don't compare the dates, because they differ from the ones
on the ISO, so the verification would fail.

Cheers
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Re: [Tails-dev] Why Tails partition is non-deterministic?

2016-08-24 Thread Random User
On Mon, Aug 8, 2016, at 03:32 PM, Joanna Rutkowska wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> Is there any special reason why the partition where Tails installs itself
> is
> non-deterministic? It is thanks to differing timestamps on the
> filesystem.

What you have asked about sounds at least similar to an issue I had
reported on this list a while back. I had reported that the checksums
(sha256, sha1, md5, etc.) of the Tails partition (on USB, created by dd)
no longer matched that of the Tails ISO from which said partition was
written. I say "no longer" because there had been a time when these
values did match. That changed at some point with one of the releases
and the change remained for an extended period, through a number of
releases. Then, I believe with the latest release, Tails 2.5, the hashes
for the ISO and the partition of the installation written from the ISO
(via dd, on USB) once again were the same.

The cause of these changes remains a mystery to me.

> This posses a problem for a prudent user who would like to be able to
> verify
> Tails integrity, e.g. by typing:
> 
> dd if=/dev/sda1 | sha1sum

How is that different from "sha1sum /dev/sdX*"?

Isn't your version just a lengthier and less simple means of achieving
the identical end: obtaining the checksum of a given partition (in this
case, the sha1 of the partition that Tails installed itself on). Perhaps
I am missing something?

*X for the specific device value, which will obviously change

> This might be especially useful if one uses the stick on various
> computers and
> would like to verify if her USB stick holding Tails installs hasn't been
> modified (e.g. by a malicious BIOS). 

Or (and this is obviously applicable even when one always uses his Tails
device on the same computer) that the Tails partition itself was not
altered by a remote attacker (such as while one was online using Tails)
or even a local attacker (such as while one's Tails stick was left
unattended-- even if within a secured space, unless one can somehow be
sure that no one unauthorized entered said space). 

Now, of course, this means of verification is still possible even when
the hash of the (verified) ISO does /not/ match that of the partition
created from same ISO-- providing that one made sure to record the hash
of the Tails partition right after creating it (before using it for the
first time and before leaving the device it is contained-on unattended).
But when the checksums of the Tails partition match those of the ISO
that said partition was created from, then one has the additional
advantage of knowing that the actual writing/installation itself was
completed without error or corruption.   

>Yes, I'm aware that the first sector
> of the
> disk (/dev/sda) would still differ thanks to different partition sizes.

Right, meaning that an attacker in whatever form (including a
compromised BIOS or other hardware component) could leave the Tails
partition itself untouched, yet alter another section of the device.
 
What I therefore do, in addition to recording the checksum of the Tails
partition that I created from the ISO (/dev/sdX), is to /also/ record
the checksum of the /entire device/ (USB stick). In this way, I can
presumably be reasonably certain that my stick has not been tampered
with by verifying, at any given time (such as after using it or after
leaving it unattended) that the checksum for the full-device (/dev/sdX)
still matches the one I recorded just after installing Tails on it.

/Persistence/, of course, presents an exception to this; obviously, one
cannot expect the checksum for the persistence partition not to change
with each and every change, no matter how small and insignificant, that
the user makes to said partition. 

Having noted that, however, I must /also/ mention an experience I recall
with a USB stick that I had created, with a persistence partition, using
Tails Installer. If I recall correctly, I had found that after each use
of this USB stick to boot and run Tails, the hash for the persistence
partition would change-- /even when I had NOT enabled persistence (or
otherwise consciously accessed the persistence partition) for that
session. Although I do not know the reason for this behavior, I suspect
that it somehow may be very much related to the topic that Ms. Rutkowska
created this thread about.
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[Tails-dev] [GSoC] Tails Server - Final status report

2016-08-23 Thread segfault
Hi everone,

the GSoC ends this week. My goal was to implement the basis of the Tails
Server, which should include a GUI and a CLI to install, configure and
start onion services in Tails. I implemented a prototype which meets
this goal. There are nightly images [1] of Tails including this
prototype and the code is available here [2]. This is not yet a call for
testing, but there will be one at some point.

[1]
http://nightly.tails.boum.org/build_Tails_ISO_feature-5688-tails-server/builds/lastSuccessfulBuild/archive/
[2] https://gitlab.com/segfault_/tails/commits/feature/5688-tails-server

The current prototype does not meet all the requirements for shipping it
in Tails yet (which was not the goal of the GSoC), but it won't require
too much additional work.

These are some things that still need to be done before including
Tails Server in Tails IMO:
- Implement client authentication
- Run as non-root user
- Fix some UI issues
- Test performance on low end hardware
- Find and fix bugs
- Improve user documentation
- Write design documentation
- Write tests for Tails' test suite

I will definitely keep on working on this and try to finish it ASAP. I
don't know exactly how much time I will be able to spend on this from
now on, but a first version of Tails Server could be shipped with Tails
in early 2017 or even late 2016.

Cheers
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Re: [Tails-dev] Porting Tails to Debian Stretch

2016-08-20 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

anonym:
> Me and intrigeri have deviced a plan for how we will deal with
> the migration to Debian Stretch, with the details being available
> in this blueprint:

> https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/Debian_Stretch/

We will kick-start this effort next week, and we have scheduled a few
sprints:

 * late August: 1st sprint, only relevant for anonym and intrigeri
 * November 14-18th: second sprint (in-person, organized by intrigeri)
 * late December: third sprint (remotely attended for everybody except
   two of us)
 * January 30 - Febuary 3: fourth sprint (remotely attended)
 * March 13-17th: fifth sprint (in-person, organized by sajolida)

We will need all kinds of skills, including for example testing our
documentation to identify regressions.

If you want to attend some of the sprints, be it remotely or
potentially in-person, please talk to me and we'll see how we can make
it work in a way that suits everyone involved.

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri
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Re: [Tails-dev] Why Tails partition is non-deterministic?

2016-08-10 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

thanks Joanna for raising this topic!

I've just thought about it a little bit and I see no technical reason
that prevents us from resetting all timestamps in the filesystem to
some fixed value that depends only (if at all) on the version of Tails
being installed/upgraded, during some late stage of the
installation process.

And it would be nice if tails-verifier looked at filesystem metadata
as well as files content, if it doesn't yet. I bet it's cheaper to add
this check than to prove that it's not needed :)

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri
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Re: [Tails-dev] Why Tails partition is non-deterministic?

2016-08-10 Thread sajolida
bertagaz:
> [ Ignoring some kind of private answer sent here although it doesn't
> belong to this list. ]
> 
> On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:32:17PM +0200, Joanna Rutkowska wrote:
>> Is there any special reason why the partition where Tails installs itself is
>> non-deterministic? It is thanks to differing timestamps on the filesystem.
>>
>> This posses a problem for a prudent user who would like to be able to verify
>> Tails integrity, e.g. by typing:
>>
>> dd if=/dev/sda1 | sha1sum
>>
>> This might be especially useful if one uses the stick on various computers 
>> and
>> would like to verify if her USB stick holding Tails installs hasn't been
>> modified (e.g. by a malicious BIOS). Yes, I'm aware that the first sector of 
>> the
>> disk (/dev/sda) would still differ thanks to different partition sizes.
> 
> Good question. Did you try and found out that only timestamps were
> different? If it is, good news, means it may not be so hard to fix.
> Would be nice if you could post your data on our bug tracker
> (https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails).
> 
> So far we've been focusing on tails-verifier (ticket #7496, waiting for
> review...) for people to check their install, so I don't remember if we
> explored this.

Exactly. The technicalities of this are way over my head but I think
that segfault <segfa...@riseup.net> already investigated all of this
while working on Tails Verifier [1] so he should be the one to talk to.

But if I remember correctly, he's super busy with other things right now
so maybe don't expect a quick answer (in the meantime, looking at the
code might help).

[1]: https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/7496
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Re: [Tails-dev] Why Tails partition is non-deterministic?

2016-08-08 Thread bertagaz
Hi,

[ Ignoring some kind of private answer sent here although it doesn't
belong to this list. ]

On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:32:17PM +0200, Joanna Rutkowska wrote:
> Is there any special reason why the partition where Tails installs itself is
> non-deterministic? It is thanks to differing timestamps on the filesystem.
>
> This posses a problem for a prudent user who would like to be able to verify
> Tails integrity, e.g. by typing:
> 
> dd if=/dev/sda1 | sha1sum
>
> This might be especially useful if one uses the stick on various computers and
> would like to verify if her USB stick holding Tails installs hasn't been
> modified (e.g. by a malicious BIOS). Yes, I'm aware that the first sector of 
> the
> disk (/dev/sda) would still differ thanks to different partition sizes.

Good question. Did you try and found out that only timestamps were
different? If it is, good news, means it may not be so hard to fix.
Would be nice if you could post your data on our bug tracker
(https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails).

So far we've been focusing on tails-verifier (ticket #7496, waiting for
review...) for people to check their install, so I don't remember if we
explored this.

Bert.
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Re: [Tails-dev] Why Tails partition is non-deterministic?

2016-08-08 Thread Spencer

Hi,



drwhax:
sexual attention.



It is very hurtful to have my intentions decided for me ):

If the snip of code wasn't enough context: I am a fan of dd hacks (:

And as was said to emmapeel privately, love is for everybody XD

I love you, too.

Wordlife,
Spencer



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Re: [Tails-dev] Why Tails partition is non-deterministic?

2016-08-08 Thread drwhax
> Hi,

>>//>>/Joanna Rutkowska: />>/dd if=/dev/sda1 | sha1sum />>//
> I love you XD

> Wordlife,
> Spencer


Spencer,

I'll do this publicly, this is against our code of conduct, see
https://tails.boum.org/contribute/working_together/code_of_conduct/

Please refrain from unwanted sexual attention.

Sorry Joanna :(

Best,
Jurre
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Re: [Tails-dev] Why Tails partition is non-deterministic?

2016-08-08 Thread Spencer

Hi,



Joanna Rutkowska:
dd if=/dev/sda1 | sha1sum



I love you XD

Wordlife,
Spencer



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[Tails-dev] Why Tails partition is non-deterministic?

2016-08-08 Thread Joanna Rutkowska
Hello,

Is there any special reason why the partition where Tails installs itself is
non-deterministic? It is thanks to differing timestamps on the filesystem.

This posses a problem for a prudent user who would like to be able to verify
Tails integrity, e.g. by typing:

dd if=/dev/sda1 | sha1sum

This might be especially useful if one uses the stick on various computers and
would like to verify if her USB stick holding Tails installs hasn't been
modified (e.g. by a malicious BIOS). Yes, I'm aware that the first sector of the
disk (/dev/sda) would still differ thanks to different partition sizes.

Thanks,
joanna.


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[Tails-dev] Fwd: Tails 2.4 Theme Camouflage

2016-07-19 Thread intrigeri
hi, I'm forwarding this to a mailing-list that's more appropriate for
such questions :)

--- Begin Message ---
Greetings,

Is there any possibility to change the Tails Theme, ie Windows 10 or 8?
If yes I would be thankful for an instruction or any link.

Alas I cannot find the pertinent info on the subject.
Thank you in advance.
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-- 
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Re: [Tails-dev] [GSoC] Tails Server - status report 5

2016-07-19 Thread intrigeri
segfault wrote (19 Jul 2016 11:06:49 GMT) :
> I created a PO to translate the strins. But I didn't know how to
> integrate it in Tails, so I just put it in
> `config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/locale/de/LC_MESSAGES/` (but I
> know that's not how it's done). Anyway, you can take a look at it here:

> https://gitlab.com/segfault_/tails/blob/feature/5688-tails-server/config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/locale/de/LC_MESSAGES/tails-server.po

See refresh-translations and po/POTFILES.in :)
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Re: [Tails-dev] [GSoC] Tails Server - status report 5

2016-07-19 Thread segfault
sajolida:
> segfault:
[...]
>> - Write documentation
> 
> Where can I see this?

Currently I only have this documentation for the Mumble server:

https://gitlab.com/segfault_/tails/blob/feature/5688-tails-server/wiki/src/doc/tails_server/mumble.mdwn

>> - Make the application translatable
> 
> I really want to review all your user-visible strings at some point but
> I'll wait until I can see all of them in a PO file.

I created a PO to translate the strins. But I didn't know how to
integrate it in Tails, so I just put it in
`config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/locale/de/LC_MESSAGES/` (but I
know that's not how it's done). Anyway, you can take a look at it here:

https://gitlab.com/segfault_/tails/blob/feature/5688-tails-server/config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/locale/de/LC_MESSAGES/tails-server.po
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Re: [Tails-dev] [GSoC] Tails Server - status report 5

2016-07-17 Thread sajolida
segfault:
> Hi everyone,

Hi!

> Other things I did in the last two weeks:
> 
> - Fix and improve the "clickable label"-widget I implemented
> 
> - Implement the autostart feature
> 
> - Write documentation

Where can I see this?

> - Make the application translatable

I really want to review all your user-visible strings at some point but
I'll wait until I can see all of them in a PO file.
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[Tails-dev] [GSoC] Tails Server - status report 5

2016-07-17 Thread segfault
Hi everyone,

this is the fifth status report on the Tails Server GSoC project.

I did two batches of user tests in the last two weeks, with five
participants each. The results were mixed, more skilled users had a
better user experience than less skilled users. I will try to solve the
problems discovered and make it more user-friendly for less skilled
users. You can read my reports and the following discussions on the
Tails-UX mailinglist [1].

[1] https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-ux/2016-July/thread.html

Other things I did in the last two weeks:

- Fix and improve the "clickable label"-widget I implemented

- Implement the autostart feature

- Write documentation

- Make the application translatable

- Refactor the code

- Fix several bugs


You can still download nightly images from here [2], but the recent
images don't include the latest changes yet. They will be included in
the next few days.

Cheers!
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Re: [Tails-dev] [GSoC] Tails Server - status report 4

2016-07-02 Thread segfault
sajolida:
> segfault:
>> [1]: 
>> http://nightly.tails.boum.org/build_Tails_ISO_feature-5688-tails-server/builds/
> 
> That's super cool! I'm downloading one now (and I hope I'll get to test
> it before long)
> 
>>   * Implement three different approaches to edit the options. Discuss
>> each of them on the tails-ux mailing list. Start conducting short user
>> tests to get some data on which approach provides the best UX.
> 
> Which option is built in the branch?

None of the three we discussed, but simple text entries which are grayed
out when the service is running.

> 
>> Next up is (still) writing a short documentation for the upcoming user
>> tests.
> 
> Is this like writing a prototype of what the final end-user
> documentation would be so that people can refer to it during the tests?

Exactly.
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Re: [Tails-dev] [GSoC] Tails Server - status report 4

2016-07-02 Thread sajolida
segfault:
> [1]: 
> http://nightly.tails.boum.org/build_Tails_ISO_feature-5688-tails-server/builds/

That's super cool! I'm downloading one now (and I hope I'll get to test
it before long).

>   * Implement three different approaches to edit the options. Discuss
> each of them on the tails-ux mailing list. Start conducting short user
> tests to get some data on which approach provides the best UX.

Which option is built in the branch?

> Next up is (still) writing a short documentation for the upcoming user
> tests.

Is this like writing a prototype of what the final end-user
documentation would be so that people can refer to it during the tests?
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[Tails-dev] [GSoC] Tails Server - status report 3

2016-06-17 Thread segfault
Hi everyone,

this is the third status report on the Tails Server GSoC project.

I had to omit the previous report because personal difficulties were
getting in the way.

So here is what I achieved in the last four weeks:

* Revamp the GUI
  * Replace the status panel with a config panel
  * Add a loading window

* Implement the persistence feature

* Refactor the code

* Many more changes in the code, you can look at my commit messages if
you want more details

* Keep discussing the design of the GUI on the Tails-UX mailing list

The prototype is actually working now. The persistence feature works
without dirty hacks now, because anonym kindly implemented a new feature
in  Tails' persistence (regular files can be bind-mounted now). Because
Tails Server now relies on this feature, it will only work properly in
this patched Tails version. I will integrate Tails Server in this branch
and send a link to a nightly ISO image on tor-dev and tails-dev in the
next few days, so you can test it.

Next up is some more polishing of the GUI and writing a short
documentation to be able to do some initial user tests. And then there
are still a lot of features to implement, like autostarting the
services, onion address regeneration, client authentication (not
necessarily in scope of the GSoC, but I want it anyway), and many more.
And I will have to refactor the code some more.

Cheers!
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Re: [Tails-dev] Making Tails 2.4 more accessible

2016-05-31 Thread Spencer

Hi,



Nathan Hale:
It would be nice if the next Tails were distributed
more like the previous versions



This is true and would make for a wonderful experience (:



There's a discussion on USENET



I will try to find it (:



u:
meantime: https://tails.boum.org/install/download.



Forced compliance by threat of the clearnet; this is broken ):

Wordlife,
Spencer



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Re: [Tails-dev] Making Tails 2.4 more accessible

2016-05-27 Thread u
Hi,

Nathan Hale:
> It would be nice if the next Tails were distributed more like the
> previous versions, not the way that Tails 2.3 was done.
> 
> There's a discussion on USENET that might be good for Tails
> developers to look at in alt.privacy.anon-server. Subject: Next
> Tails is scheduled to go live on June 7.
> 
> If anyone would like to comment on USENET that would be
> appreciated. Thanks for all that you do.

this issue has been raised multiple times, see
https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/11269.

You might want to bookmark this easier link for future reference in the
meantime: https://tails.boum.org/install/download.

It has nothing to do with releasing Tails 2.4 though. Changes like that,
made to the website, can be done independently from a ISO relase.

Cheers.
u.
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[Tails-dev] Making Tails 2.4 more accessible

2016-05-26 Thread Nathan Hale
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

It would be nice if the next Tails were distributed more like the
previous versions, not the way that Tails 2.3 was done.

There's a discussion on USENET that might be good for Tails
developers to look at in alt.privacy.anon-server. Subject: Next
Tails is scheduled to go live on June 7.

If anyone would like to comment on USENET that would be
appreciated. Thanks for all that you do.

Paranoid Pete

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Re: [Tails-dev] Improve Tails Installer UX

2016-05-19 Thread kurono
Hi intirgeri

intrigeri:
> hi,
> 
> kurono wrote (18 May 2016 16:22:45 GMT) :
>> Regarding https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/9005 and several related
>> tickets: #8861, #8860, #8859, #9006, I think its time to ask for
>> feedback
> 
> What kind of feedback do you want? (It's not obvious to me given the
> cross-post.)
> 
> Do you want code reviews, or shall we wait for the GUI design bits to
> be reviewed first?

Since these tickets are very related, and mostly about GUI improvement,
then I would like feedback on the GUI design first.

Let me now if I can make it easier (Screen shots, package installer, etc)

> 
> Cheers,
> 

Cheers,
kurono



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Re: [Tails-dev] Improve Tails Installer UX

2016-05-18 Thread intrigeri
hi,

kurono wrote (18 May 2016 16:22:45 GMT) :
> Regarding https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/9005 and several related
> tickets: #8861, #8860, #8859, #9006, I think its time to ask for
> feedback

What kind of feedback do you want? (It's not obvious to me given the
cross-post.)

Do you want code reviews, or shall we wait for the GUI design bits to
be reviewed first?

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri
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[Tails-dev] Improve Tails Installer UX

2016-05-18 Thread kurono
Hi!

Regarding https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/9005 and several related
tickets: #8861, #8860, #8859, #9006, I think its time to ask for
feedback even if I know there still things to do (Like deleting
*-launcher stuff). But anyway, it would be nice to add changes and fixes
before it gets finished.

Thanks,
kurono



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Re: [Tails-dev] Porting Tails to Debian Stretch

2016-03-19 Thread sajolida
intrigeri:
> sajolida wrote (09 Mar 2016 12:19:48 GMT) :
>>> We are in particular looking for one person to be
>>> responsible for the documentation-side of things, since we feel
>>> keeping it sort-of up-to-date will help us identify regressions
>>> early.
> 
>> I can be this person.
> 
> Excellent! I've updated the blueprint accordingly.
> 
>>> Regarding timelines, the freeze for Debian Stretch will be in
>>> early December, so the work has to start early enough so issues
>>> can be identified and fixed before that (post-freeze fixes are
>>> generally much harder). Due to other committments me and
>>> intrigeri will not be able to start this until some time early
>>> August, which will give us almost four months for this work
>>> before the Stretch freeze. We intend to kickstart this effort
>>> with a sprint where we meet face to face, and other participants
>>> will of course be welcome.
> 
>> Now the Stretch freeze has been postponed to 2017-02-05.
> 
>> I don't know what my calendar for the summer and fall will be but I
>> can't guarantee right now that I can also jump from "intrigeri will not
>> be able to start this until some time early August" to "kickstart this
>> effort with a sprint [in August]" (implicit in your email).
> 
> Please let us know when you know more when you can start, then :)

I'd prefer setting the dates of the summit first.

> Note that the very first sprint (that we would like to have in August
> 2016) might not be very exciting to doc people, given what we expect
> to be the goals there. Quoting the blueprint:
> 
> * August 2016 — start working on Tails 3.0 (1 week sprint with
>   all involved people) :intrigeri:anonym:kytv:
>   - get feature/stretch to build and boot
>   - update the automated test suite to test Tails/Stretch ISO images
> 
> … so it's no big deal if you join us for the 2nd sprint only.

Right. Then it might be better for me if I can skip this one :)
And until there's an ISO image it might be hard for me to be helpful.
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[Tails-dev] 2.2 tails-signing-key differs from version before

2016-03-11 Thread Ehrenfried Bethman
Dear Tails-Developers,

 

I use tails since version 1.8 and I repeatedly downloaded the tails-signing-key for verification.

Now I recognized that the tails-signing-key with version 2.2 differs from all the keys I download before.

The 2.2 key seems to be much bigger (about 221kB).

As I did not find any remark about that  within the 2.2 release notes I just want to let you know about that.

 

Don't know if this is important.

 

Greetings and many thanks for your work

 

ehbe
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Re: [Tails-dev] Porting Tails to Debian Stretch

2016-03-09 Thread intrigeri
hey,

sajolida wrote (09 Mar 2016 12:19:48 GMT) :
>> We are in particular looking for one person to be
>> responsible for the documentation-side of things, since we feel
>> keeping it sort-of up-to-date will help us identify regressions
>> early.

> I can be this person.

Excellent! I've updated the blueprint accordingly.

>> Regarding timelines, the freeze for Debian Stretch will be in
>> early December, so the work has to start early enough so issues
>> can be identified and fixed before that (post-freeze fixes are
>> generally much harder). Due to other committments me and
>> intrigeri will not be able to start this until some time early
>> August, which will give us almost four months for this work
>> before the Stretch freeze. We intend to kickstart this effort
>> with a sprint where we meet face to face, and other participants
>> will of course be welcome.

> Now the Stretch freeze has been postponed to 2017-02-05.

> I don't know what my calendar for the summer and fall will be but I
> can't guarantee right now that I can also jump from "intrigeri will not
> be able to start this until some time early August" to "kickstart this
> effort with a sprint [in August]" (implicit in your email).

Please let us know when you know more when you can start, then :)

Note that the very first sprint (that we would like to have in August
2016) might not be very exciting to doc people, given what we expect
to be the goals there. Quoting the blueprint:

* August 2016 — start working on Tails 3.0 (1 week sprint with
  all involved people) :intrigeri:anonym:kytv:
  - get feature/stretch to build and boot
  - update the automated test suite to test Tails/Stretch ISO images

… so it's no big deal if you join us for the 2nd sprint only.

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri
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Re: [Tails-dev] Porting Tails to Debian Stretch

2016-03-09 Thread sajolida
anonym:
> Me and intrigeri have deviced a plan for how we will deal with
> the migration to Debian Stretch, with the details being available
> in this blueprint:
> 
> https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/Debian_Stretch/
> 
> In short, we do not want to repeat the way we did Jessie
> migration -- we think we can do better! The idea is to leverage
> our up-coming freezable APT repo [0] to take snapshots of Debian
> Testing (= Stretch) and have sprints to put Tails into shape
> around these snapshots regularly, without the delta growing too
> big neither against Debian Stretch or Tails/Jessie. We will also
> use this experiment as a benchmark for the idea to make Tails
> into a semi-rolling release based on Debian Testing, which is
> pretty exciting!

All of this sounds good.

> This is an early notice for this plan draft. Our hopes is that
> more people will get involved this time, for a more collective
> effort. We are in particular looking for one person to be
> responsible for the documentation-side of things, since we feel
> keeping it sort-of up-to-date will help us identify regressions
> early.

I can be this person.

> Regarding timelines, the freeze for Debian Stretch will be in
> early December, so the work has to start early enough so issues
> can be identified and fixed before that (post-freeze fixes are
> generally much harder). Due to other committments me and
> intrigeri will not be able to start this until some time early
> August, which will give us almost four months for this work
> before the Stretch freeze. We intend to kickstart this effort
> with a sprint where we meet face to face, and other participants
> will of course be welcome.

Now the Stretch freeze has been postponed to 2017-02-05.

I don't know what my calendar for the summer and fall will be but I
can't guarantee right now that I can also jump from "intrigeri will not
be able to start this until some time early August" to "kickstart this
effort with a sprint [in August]" (implicit in your email).
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[Tails-dev] Porting Tails to Debian Stretch

2016-02-19 Thread anonym
Hi,

Me and intrigeri have deviced a plan for how we will deal with
the migration to Debian Stretch, with the details being available
in this blueprint:

https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/Debian_Stretch/

In short, we do not want to repeat the way we did Jessie
migration -- we think we can do better! The idea is to leverage
our up-coming freezable APT repo [0] to take snapshots of Debian
Testing (= Stretch) and have sprints to put Tails into shape
around these snapshots regularly, without the delta growing too
big neither against Debian Stretch or Tails/Jessie. We will also
use this experiment as a benchmark for the idea to make Tails
into a semi-rolling release based on Debian Testing, which is
pretty exciting!

This is an early notice for this plan draft. Our hopes is that
more people will get involved this time, for a more collective
effort. We are in particular looking for one person to be
responsible for the documentation-side of things, since we feel
keeping it sort-of up-to-date will help us identify regressions
early.

Regarding timelines, the freeze for Debian Stretch will be in
early December, so the work has to start early enough so issues
can be identified and fixed before that (post-freeze fixes are
generally much harder). Due to other committments me and
intrigeri will not be able to start this until some time early
August, which will give us almost four months for this work
before the Stretch freeze. We intend to kickstart this effort
with a sprint where we meet face to face, and other participants
will of course be welcome.

So please let us know if you are interested in joining this
effort, and please also try to keep your excitment in check so
some of it remains in six months when this work will start for
real! :)

Cheers!

[0] https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/freezable_APT_repository/
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Re: [Tails-dev] Is Tails affected by the CVE-2015-7547 glibc getaddrinfo() vulnerability?

2016-02-18 Thread Jurre van Bergen
Hi,

This is an on-going investigation. Indeed, applications using the Tor
socks port for name resolution are not vulnerable for this attack.

An automated test was ran trying to determine (using the public proof of
concept) whether any application was vulnerable, so far, we're on the
safe side but were investigating a couple of applications which returned
an error.

Even if there was an evil exit node, it should be fine since
getaddrinfo() in torsocks resolves it through Tor on the SocksPort. In
addition, applications which are configured to use socks don't use
getaddrinfo() in this case since the resolving will go through Tor's
DNSPort.

We'll keep the mailinglist up-to-date on any progress regarding this matter.

Best,
Jurre

On 02/18/2016 11:34 AM, intrigeri wrote:
> Hi,
>
> my understanding is that clients that use Tor SOCKS port for name
> resolution are fine.
>
> For clients who use the DNSPort, it's not clear to me if an
> attacker-controlled payload can make it's way from the exit node being
> used for the name resolution to the client. Has anyone looked
> into this?
>
> Cheers,


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Re: [Tails-dev] Is Tails affected by the CVE-2015-7547 glibc getaddrinfo() vulnerability?

2016-02-18 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

my understanding is that clients that use Tor SOCKS port for name
resolution are fine.

For clients who use the DNSPort, it's not clear to me if an
attacker-controlled payload can make it's way from the exit node being
used for the name resolution to the client. Has anyone looked
into this?

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri
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[Tails-dev] Is Tails affected by the CVE-2015-7547 glibc getaddrinfo() vulnerability?

2016-02-17 Thread co

https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2016/02/cve-2015-7547-glibc-getaddrinfo-stack.html

https://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2016-02/msg00416.html

especially curl from htpdate, torbrowser, etc. If affected, exits could 
easily do MITM on DNS lookups.

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[Tails-dev] [tails-dev] Fwd: [Tails - Feature #10972] Port Tails to arm platforms

2016-02-11 Thread Tails
Hi developers,

intrigeri asked:
> I don't understand: why are you rebuilding all packages, instead of
> just the Tails -specific ones (that are not in Debian)?
I tried to build only the packages from repository
http://deb.tails.boum.org/.

Am I on the wrong route (or repository)? Or could anybody provide a more
reduced/specific list of tails specific packages? I absolutely agree
with intrigeri and the tails way not to re-invent a prooven wheel ...

-- 
Best Regards!
n9iu7pk

PGP pool.sks-keyservers.net 0x4D12FFCB
7426 4598 B5AD 4D12 1699 C710 D602 E331 4D12 FFCB

 Forwarded Message 
Subject: [Tails - Feature #10972] Port Tails to arm platforms
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 17:11:53 +
From: redm...@labs.riseup.net

Issue #10972 has been updated by intrigeri.


I don't understand: why are you rebuilding all packages, instead of just
the Tails -specific ones (that are not in Debian)?

Do we have Tor Browser for arm?


Feature #10972: Port Tails to arm platforms
https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/10972#change-53852

* Author: N9iu7pk
* Status: New
* Priority: Normal
* Assignee: N9iu7pk
* Category: Hardware support
* Target version:
* QA Check:
* Feature Branch:
* Type of work: Code
* Blueprint:
* Easy: No
* Affected tool:

Forked from #6064

Step 1:

---Files
statPackages.txt (8.84 KB)
statPackages.txt (25.2 KB)
statPackages.txt (26 KB)


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Re: [Tails-dev] [tails-dev] Fwd: [Tails - Feature #10972] Port Tails to arm platforms

2016-02-11 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

Tails wrote (11 Feb 2016 08:04:54 GMT) :
> intrigeri asked:
>> I don't understand: why are you rebuilding all packages, instead of
>> just the Tails -specific ones (that are not in Debian)?
> I tried to build only the packages from repository
> http://deb.tails.boum.org/.

OK, so far, so good :)

> Am I on the wrong route (or repository)? Or could anybody provide a more
> reduced/specific list of tails specific packages?

The attachments you posted on the ticket seem to indicate that you're
trying to build many more packages, including some that we haven't
beeng shipping in Tails for ages.

I think you should focus on packages that are in the "devel" suite of
our APT repository. OK?

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri
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Re: [Tails-dev] Upgrade Tails Bitcoin donation address

2015-12-02 Thread sajolida
Michael English:
> Electrum version 2.0 and higher supports the creation of
> multi-signature wallet types. I recommend that Tails upgrade their
> Bitcoin donation address to a multi-signature address for increased
> security and redundancy. A multi-signature address requires m of n
> signatures from separate wallets in order to spend the corresponding
> Bitcoins. A partially signed transaction is created and sent to one of
> the cosigners for completion. You can setup a 2 of 3 multi-signature
> wallet to protect against one of the cosigners' wallets being lost or
> destroyed. In order to set it up, you need the master public keys of
> the cosigners' wallets. The cosigners are usually other leaders of the
> project or it can be an offline wallet. The resulting multi-signature
> addresses begin with a  3 instead of a 1.
> 
> Please read the Electrum documentation on multisig at
> http://docs.electrum.org/en/latest/multisig.html . If you have any
> further questions, email me.

Hi Michael,

Thanks for the info. I'm forwarding this to our accounting team who's
managing our Bitcoin wallet.
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[Tails-dev] Upgrade Tails Bitcoin donation address

2015-11-14 Thread Michael English
Electrum version 2.0 and higher supports the creation of
multi-signature wallet types. I recommend that Tails upgrade their
Bitcoin donation address to a multi-signature address for increased
security and redundancy. A multi-signature address requires m of n
signatures from separate wallets in order to spend the corresponding
Bitcoins. A partially signed transaction is created and sent to one of
the cosigners for completion. You can setup a 2 of 3 multi-signature
wallet to protect against one of the cosigners' wallets being lost or
destroyed. In order to set it up, you need the master public keys of
the cosigners' wallets. The cosigners are usually other leaders of the
project or it can be an offline wallet. The resulting multi-signature
addresses begin with a  3 instead of a 1.

Please read the Electrum documentation on multisig at
http://docs.electrum.org/en/latest/multisig.html . If you have any
further questions, email me.
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Re: [Tails-dev] Démarrage Tails

2015-06-11 Thread intrigeri
Hi,

[French] tails-dev@ est une liste de discussions dédiée au
 *développement* de Tails. Pour le support utilisateur, cf.
 https://tails.boum.org/support/

[English] tails-dev@ is a mailing-list for Tails *development*.
  For user support, see https://tails.boum.org/support/

Cheers,
-- 
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[Tails-dev] Démarrage Tails

2015-06-10 Thread Guillaume Lemartinet
Bonjour,

Ayant installé Tails sur ma carte SD, j’ai donc éteint mon ordinateur afin de 
lancer le démarrage de Tails mais ne trouve ni « Boot order » ni « boot device 
priorité ». Seulement « Boot option priorities ». S’ensuit une liste : Boot 
option #1, Boot option #2, Boot option #3. Je n’ai pas non plus de « removable 
drive », de USB media » ou de « périphérique amovible » à placer en première 
position.

Je répond aux informations :

1. J’essaie de démarrer la version 1.4 de Tails
2. Oui, j’ai reçu le message jaune.
3. Mon ordinateur est un ASUS N550
4. Il n’y a aucune tentative de démarrage, l’ordinateur démarre normalement 
(Asus puis écran de connexion puis bureau)
5. Carte SD
6. Non je n’ai jamais démarré Tails sur cet ordinateur
7. Je n’ai pas essayé
8. Non
9. La méthode manuel pour PC Windows. Je n’ai pas d’amis ayant essayé 
d’installer Tails et susceptibles de me prêter leur clé.

Je ne sais donc pas si le problème provient de ma manip sur le BIOS ou provient 
de l’installation effectuée auparavant. 
Désolé du dérangement et merci.
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