On Tue, Jan 17, 2023 at 04:12:10PM +1100, Jonathan Gray wrote:
> AMD Elan SC520 (found on soekris net45xx) has a 486 class processor
> We require at least a 586/pentium class processor
>
if you do, there's a little cleanup:
/usr/src/share/man/man4/gpio.4:.Cd "gpio* at elansc?" Pq i386
On Mon, Jan 16, 2023 at 10:03:03PM +, Klemens Nanni wrote:
> SYNOPSIS and usage say [NAME=value] while multiple assigments are fine:
>
> $ make -p FOO=1 BAR=2 | grep -e^FOO -e^BAR
> BAR = 2
> FOO = 1
>
> I'm sure ports(7) wouldn't work if only one
AMD Elan SC520 (found on soekris net45xx) has a 486 class processor
We require at least a 586/pentium class processor
diff --git share/man/man4/man4.i386/Makefile share/man/man4/man4.i386/Makefile
index 3fae7fbbe42..55d52939e28 100644
--- share/man/man4/man4.i386/Makefile
+++
SYNOPSIS and usage say [NAME=value] while multiple assigments are fine:
$ make -p FOO=1 BAR=2 | grep -e^FOO -e^BAR
BAR = 2
FOO = 1
I'm sure ports(7) wouldn't work if only one was accepted, hence it suprises
me that none of the BSDs document it
Hi folks,
I'm writing manual pages for the libevent variant bundled with OpenBSD,
this is a documentation project that I started in something like 2012
but got pulled away from due to life circumstances. I've returned to
it after reading an old Things to Do - *urgent* list I left in a binder
over
For this xonly work, we are having to one-by-one find .S files that
are putting data tables into the .text segment
I am hoping to find someone who can do c++ well enough, and maybe
has some familiarity with the clang code, to add a warning message
for this
if a .long, .quad, .byte are placed
On Mon, Jan 16, 2023 at 08:57:25AM -0700, Theo de Raadt wrote:
> I propose to relink sshd on every boot, before it gets started.
>
> This is like kernel, libc.so, libcrypto, and ld.so relinking.
>
> The sshd design self-protects itself quite well, but this kind of
> address space secrecy is
I propose to relink sshd on every boot, before it gets started.
This is like kernel, libc.so, libcrypto, and ld.so relinking.
The sshd design self-protects itself quite well, but this kind of
address space secrecy is still a good addition.
Since the sshd binary becomes unique on every openbsd
Hi,
The final OpenSSH key revocation list (KRL) diff for now :)
This extends the existing krl.sh regression test to exercise signing and
verification. (This depends on the last two diffs)
ok?
Index: krl.sh
===
RCS file:
Hi,
This is another OpenSSH key revocation list (KRL) change: to support KRL
signing and verification in ssh-keygen(1).
The KRL format has supported signing of KRLs and verification of KRL
signatures for a long time, but there is currently no way to generate a
signed KRL or check the signature
Hi,
This is the second of the OpenSSH key revocation list (KRL) diffs.
This one refactors KRL parsing, and particularly signature verification.
It splits the KRL parsing logic into three phases: signature
verification, key trust verification and everything else. The idea is
to make this easier
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