Re: Use `ps_mtx' mutex(9) to protect `ps_ucred' and unlock setuid(2), ...
The latest diff iteration after guenther@'s feedback.
- The lock grabbing in ddb(4) is wrong, so don't grab it within
db_show_all_procs().
- In the dorefreshcreds() grab the lock only if uc != pr->ps_ucred. Also
move crfree() out of the lock.
- In the pgsigio() store call CANSIGIO() with the lock held and store
result to the local variable. Don't hold the lock when call
prsignal() because kernel lock serialize this path.
- In the sysctl_file() don't grab the lock the lock if `arg' < 0.
Index: sys/kern/kern_acct.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_acct.c,v
retrieving revision 1.47
diff -u -p -r1.47 kern_acct.c
--- sys/kern/kern_acct.c14 Aug 2022 01:58:27 - 1.47
+++ sys/kern/kern_acct.c26 Dec 2022 16:11:43 -
@@ -221,8 +221,10 @@ acct_process(struct proc *p)
acct.ac_io = encode_comp_t(r->ru_inblock + r->ru_oublock, 0);
/* (6) The UID and GID of the process */
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
acct.ac_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_ruid;
acct.ac_gid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_rgid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
/* (7) The terminal from which the process was started */
if ((pr->ps_flags & PS_CONTROLT) &&
Index: sys/kern/kern_exec.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_exec.c,v
retrieving revision 1.240
diff -u -p -r1.240 kern_exec.c
--- sys/kern/kern_exec.c23 Nov 2022 11:00:27 - 1.240
+++ sys/kern/kern_exec.c26 Dec 2022 16:11:43 -
@@ -649,9 +649,11 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, regi
if (pr->ps_ucred != cred) {
struct ucred *ocred;
- ocred = pr->ps_ucred;
crhold(cred);
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
+ ocred = pr->ps_ucred;
pr->ps_ucred = cred;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
crfree(ocred);
}
Index: sys/kern/kern_exit.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_exit.c,v
retrieving revision 1.209
diff -u -p -r1.209 kern_exit.c
--- sys/kern/kern_exit.c19 Dec 2022 00:22:12 - 1.209
+++ sys/kern/kern_exit.c26 Dec 2022 16:11:43 -
@@ -494,7 +494,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != NULL) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
info->si_signo = SIGCHLD;
if (pr->ps_xsig == 0) {
info->si_code = CLD_EXITED;
@@ -531,7 +533,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != NULL) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
info->si_signo = SIGCHLD;
info->si_code = CLD_TRAPPED;
info->si_status = pr->ps_xsig;
@@ -554,7 +558,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != 0) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
info->si_signo = SIGCHLD;
info->si_code = CLD_STOPPED;
info->si_status = pr->ps_xsig;
@@ -573,7 +579,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != NULL) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
info->si_signo = SIGCHLD;
info->si_code = CLD_CONTINUED;
info->si_status = SIGCONT;
Index: sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c,v
retrieving revision 1.109
diff -u -p -r1.109 kern_ktrace.c
--- sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c 5 Dec 2022 23:18:37 - 1.109
+++ sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c 26 Dec 2022 16:11:43 -
@@ -693,7 +693,12 @@ int
ktrcanset(struct proc *callp, struct process *targetpr)
{
struct ucred *caller = callp->p_ucred;
- struct ucred *target = targetpr->ps_ucred;
+ struct ucred *target;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+
Re: Use `ps_mtx' mutex(9) to protect `ps_ucred' and unlock setuid(2), ...
On Sat, Dec 03, 2022 at 08:45:52PM +0300, Vitaliy Makkoveev wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 01, 2022 at 10:50:03PM +0300, Vitaliy Makkoveev wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 01, 2022 at 11:28:59AM -0800, Philip Guenther wrote:
> > > On Thu, Dec 1, 2022 at 10:31 AM Vitaliy Makkoveev
> > > wrote:
> > > ...
> > >
> > > > --- sys/sys/sysctl.h7 Nov 2022 14:25:44 - 1.231
> > > > +++ sys/sys/sysctl.h1 Dec 2022 18:15:06 -
> > > > @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ struct kinfo_vmentry {
> > > >
> > > > #define_FILL_KPROC_MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
> > > >
> > > > -#define FILL_KPROC(kp, copy_str, p, pr, uc, pg, paddr, \
> > > > +#define FILL_KPROC(kp, copy_str, p, pr, pg, paddr, \
> > > > praddr, sess, vm, lim, sa, isthread, show_addresses) \
> > > >
> > > ...
> > >
> > > > - (kp)->p_svgid = (uc)->cr_svgid;
> > > > \
> > > > + PR_LOCK(pr);
> > > > \
> > > > + (kp)->p_uid = (pr)->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
> > > > \
> > > >
> > >
> > > Nope. As the block comment about this notes, FILL_KPROC() is shared
> > > between the kernel and libkvm and takes each structure pointer separately
> > > as, for example, pr->ps_ucred has the kva address, not the address of the
> > > ucred struct that libkvm has separately read into user memory.
> > >
> > > Now, you _could_ have libkvm update pr->ps_ucred to point to its
> > > user-space
> > > copy. However, that would make ucred handling different from the other
> > > sub-structures of struct proc and MOST of those we need the real kva for
> > > the show_address functionality.
> > >
> > > Not sure if this is the yak-shave you want right now...
> > >
> > > (libkvm will obviously also need no-op #defines for PR_LOCK() etc)
> > >
> >
> > I missed this.
> >
> > Since `ps_ucred' is immutable, we could bump it's reference and use it
> > without holding `ps_mtx':
> >
> > mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
> > prucred = crhold(pr->ps_ucred);
> > mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
> >
> > FILL_KPROC(ki, strlcpy, p, pr, prucred, pr->ps_pgrp, ...);
> > crfree(prucred);
> >
> > Otherwise, we could grab `ps_mtx' mutex outside FILL_KPROC(), so dummy
> > PR_LOCK() define will be not required in userland.
> >
> > The diff below follows the first way.
> >
>
> A little update. Kernel lock is not required within dorefreshcreds()
> because `ps_mtx' mutex(9) is taken. Also forgotten makesyscalls.sh
> generated chunks removed.
>
>
Anyone?
The `pr' locking for FILL_KPROC() usage is discussible. We already use
PR_LOCK() for `sa' copying, which is used within FILL_KPROC() as `sa',
but not pr->ps_sigacts. So the same could be done for `uc' copying too:
#define FILL_KPROC(kp, copy_str, p, pr, uc, pg, paddr, \
praddr, sess, vm, lim, sa, isthread, show_addresses) \
do {\
PR_LOCK(pr);\
(kp)->p_uid = (uc)->cr_uid; \
(kp)->p_ruid = (uc)->cr_ruid; \
/* ... */ \
PR_UNLOCK(pr); \
PR_LOCK(pr);\
(kp)->p_sigignore = (sa) ? (sa)->ps_sigignore : 0; \
/* ... */ \
PR_UNLOCK(pr); \
> Index: sys/kern/kern_acct.c
> ===
> RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_acct.c,v
> retrieving revision 1.47
> diff -u -p -r1.47 kern_acct.c
> --- sys/kern/kern_acct.c 14 Aug 2022 01:58:27 - 1.47
> +++ sys/kern/kern_acct.c 3 Dec 2022 17:39:00 -
> @@ -221,8 +221,10 @@ acct_process(struct proc *p)
> acct.ac_io = encode_comp_t(r->ru_inblock + r->ru_oublock, 0);
>
> /* (6) The UID and GID of the process */
> + mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
> acct.ac_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_ruid;
> acct.ac_gid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_rgid;
> + mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
>
> /* (7) The terminal from which the process was started */
> if ((pr->ps_flags & PS_CONTROLT) &&
> Index: sys/kern/kern_exec.c
> ===
> RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_exec.c,v
> retrieving revision 1.240
> diff -u -p -r1.240 kern_exec.c
> --- sys/kern/kern_exec.c 23 Nov 2022 11:00:27 - 1.240
> +++ sys/kern/kern_exec.c 3 Dec 2022 17:39:00 -
> @@ -649,9 +649,11 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, regi
> if (pr->ps_ucred != cred) {
> struct ucred *ocred;
>
> - ocred = pr->ps_ucred;
> crhold(cred);
> + mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
> + ocred = pr->ps_ucred;
>
Re: Use `ps_mtx' mutex(9) to protect `ps_ucred' and unlock setuid(2), ...
On Thu, Dec 01, 2022 at 10:50:03PM +0300, Vitaliy Makkoveev wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 01, 2022 at 11:28:59AM -0800, Philip Guenther wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 1, 2022 at 10:31 AM Vitaliy Makkoveev wrote:
> > ...
> >
> > > --- sys/sys/sysctl.h7 Nov 2022 14:25:44 - 1.231
> > > +++ sys/sys/sysctl.h1 Dec 2022 18:15:06 -
> > > @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ struct kinfo_vmentry {
> > >
> > > #define_FILL_KPROC_MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
> > >
> > > -#define FILL_KPROC(kp, copy_str, p, pr, uc, pg, paddr, \
> > > +#define FILL_KPROC(kp, copy_str, p, pr, pg, paddr, \
> > > praddr, sess, vm, lim, sa, isthread, show_addresses) \
> > >
> > ...
> >
> > > - (kp)->p_svgid = (uc)->cr_svgid; \
> > > + PR_LOCK(pr);\
> > > + (kp)->p_uid = (pr)->ps_ucred->cr_uid; \
> > >
> >
> > Nope. As the block comment about this notes, FILL_KPROC() is shared
> > between the kernel and libkvm and takes each structure pointer separately
> > as, for example, pr->ps_ucred has the kva address, not the address of the
> > ucred struct that libkvm has separately read into user memory.
> >
> > Now, you _could_ have libkvm update pr->ps_ucred to point to its user-space
> > copy. However, that would make ucred handling different from the other
> > sub-structures of struct proc and MOST of those we need the real kva for
> > the show_address functionality.
> >
> > Not sure if this is the yak-shave you want right now...
> >
> > (libkvm will obviously also need no-op #defines for PR_LOCK() etc)
> >
>
> I missed this.
>
> Since `ps_ucred' is immutable, we could bump it's reference and use it
> without holding `ps_mtx':
>
> mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
> prucred = crhold(pr->ps_ucred);
> mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
>
> FILL_KPROC(ki, strlcpy, p, pr, prucred, pr->ps_pgrp, ...);
> crfree(prucred);
>
> Otherwise, we could grab `ps_mtx' mutex outside FILL_KPROC(), so dummy
> PR_LOCK() define will be not required in userland.
>
> The diff below follows the first way.
>
A little update. Kernel lock is not required within dorefreshcreds()
because `ps_mtx' mutex(9) is taken. Also forgotten makesyscalls.sh
generated chunks removed.
Index: sys/kern/kern_acct.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_acct.c,v
retrieving revision 1.47
diff -u -p -r1.47 kern_acct.c
--- sys/kern/kern_acct.c14 Aug 2022 01:58:27 - 1.47
+++ sys/kern/kern_acct.c3 Dec 2022 17:39:00 -
@@ -221,8 +221,10 @@ acct_process(struct proc *p)
acct.ac_io = encode_comp_t(r->ru_inblock + r->ru_oublock, 0);
/* (6) The UID and GID of the process */
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
acct.ac_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_ruid;
acct.ac_gid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_rgid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
/* (7) The terminal from which the process was started */
if ((pr->ps_flags & PS_CONTROLT) &&
Index: sys/kern/kern_exec.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_exec.c,v
retrieving revision 1.240
diff -u -p -r1.240 kern_exec.c
--- sys/kern/kern_exec.c23 Nov 2022 11:00:27 - 1.240
+++ sys/kern/kern_exec.c3 Dec 2022 17:39:00 -
@@ -649,9 +649,11 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, regi
if (pr->ps_ucred != cred) {
struct ucred *ocred;
- ocred = pr->ps_ucred;
crhold(cred);
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
+ ocred = pr->ps_ucred;
pr->ps_ucred = cred;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
crfree(ocred);
}
Index: sys/kern/kern_exit.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_exit.c,v
retrieving revision 1.207
diff -u -p -r1.207 kern_exit.c
--- sys/kern/kern_exit.c3 Nov 2022 04:56:47 - 1.207
+++ sys/kern/kern_exit.c3 Dec 2022 17:39:00 -
@@ -494,7 +494,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != NULL) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
info->si_signo = SIGCHLD;
if (pr->ps_xsig == 0) {
info->si_code = CLD_EXITED;
@@ -530,7 +532,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != NULL) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
Re: Use `ps_mtx' mutex(9) to protect `ps_ucred' and unlock setuid(2), ...
On Thu, Dec 01, 2022 at 11:28:59AM -0800, Philip Guenther wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 1, 2022 at 10:31 AM Vitaliy Makkoveev wrote:
> ...
>
> > --- sys/sys/sysctl.h7 Nov 2022 14:25:44 - 1.231
> > +++ sys/sys/sysctl.h1 Dec 2022 18:15:06 -
> > @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ struct kinfo_vmentry {
> >
> > #define_FILL_KPROC_MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
> >
> > -#define FILL_KPROC(kp, copy_str, p, pr, uc, pg, paddr, \
> > +#define FILL_KPROC(kp, copy_str, p, pr, pg, paddr, \
> > praddr, sess, vm, lim, sa, isthread, show_addresses) \
> >
> ...
>
> > - (kp)->p_svgid = (uc)->cr_svgid; \
> > + PR_LOCK(pr);\
> > + (kp)->p_uid = (pr)->ps_ucred->cr_uid; \
> >
>
> Nope. As the block comment about this notes, FILL_KPROC() is shared
> between the kernel and libkvm and takes each structure pointer separately
> as, for example, pr->ps_ucred has the kva address, not the address of the
> ucred struct that libkvm has separately read into user memory.
>
> Now, you _could_ have libkvm update pr->ps_ucred to point to its user-space
> copy. However, that would make ucred handling different from the other
> sub-structures of struct proc and MOST of those we need the real kva for
> the show_address functionality.
>
> Not sure if this is the yak-shave you want right now...
>
> (libkvm will obviously also need no-op #defines for PR_LOCK() etc)
>
I missed this.
Since `ps_ucred' is immutable, we could bump it's reference and use it
without holding `ps_mtx':
mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
prucred = crhold(pr->ps_ucred);
mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
FILL_KPROC(ki, strlcpy, p, pr, prucred, pr->ps_pgrp, ...);
crfree(prucred);
Otherwise, we could grab `ps_mtx' mutex outside FILL_KPROC(), so dummy
PR_LOCK() define will be not required in userland.
The diff below follows the first way.
Index: sys/kern/kern_acct.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_acct.c,v
retrieving revision 1.47
diff -u -p -r1.47 kern_acct.c
--- sys/kern/kern_acct.c14 Aug 2022 01:58:27 - 1.47
+++ sys/kern/kern_acct.c1 Dec 2022 19:49:15 -
@@ -221,8 +221,10 @@ acct_process(struct proc *p)
acct.ac_io = encode_comp_t(r->ru_inblock + r->ru_oublock, 0);
/* (6) The UID and GID of the process */
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
acct.ac_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_ruid;
acct.ac_gid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_rgid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
/* (7) The terminal from which the process was started */
if ((pr->ps_flags & PS_CONTROLT) &&
Index: sys/kern/kern_exec.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_exec.c,v
retrieving revision 1.240
diff -u -p -r1.240 kern_exec.c
--- sys/kern/kern_exec.c23 Nov 2022 11:00:27 - 1.240
+++ sys/kern/kern_exec.c1 Dec 2022 19:49:15 -
@@ -649,9 +649,11 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, regi
if (pr->ps_ucred != cred) {
struct ucred *ocred;
- ocred = pr->ps_ucred;
crhold(cred);
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
+ ocred = pr->ps_ucred;
pr->ps_ucred = cred;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
crfree(ocred);
}
Index: sys/kern/kern_exit.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_exit.c,v
retrieving revision 1.207
diff -u -p -r1.207 kern_exit.c
--- sys/kern/kern_exit.c3 Nov 2022 04:56:47 - 1.207
+++ sys/kern/kern_exit.c1 Dec 2022 19:49:15 -
@@ -494,7 +494,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != NULL) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
info->si_signo = SIGCHLD;
if (pr->ps_xsig == 0) {
info->si_code = CLD_EXITED;
@@ -530,7 +532,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != NULL) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
info->si_signo = SIGCHLD;
info->si_code = CLD_TRAPPED;
info->si_status = pr->ps_xsig;
@@ -553,7 +557,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != 0) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+
Re: Use `ps_mtx' mutex(9) to protect `ps_ucred' and unlock setuid(2), ...
On Thu, Dec 1, 2022 at 10:31 AM Vitaliy Makkoveev wrote:
...
> --- sys/sys/sysctl.h7 Nov 2022 14:25:44 - 1.231
> +++ sys/sys/sysctl.h1 Dec 2022 18:15:06 -
> @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ struct kinfo_vmentry {
>
> #define_FILL_KPROC_MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
>
> -#define FILL_KPROC(kp, copy_str, p, pr, uc, pg, paddr, \
> +#define FILL_KPROC(kp, copy_str, p, pr, pg, paddr, \
> praddr, sess, vm, lim, sa, isthread, show_addresses) \
>
...
> - (kp)->p_svgid = (uc)->cr_svgid; \
> + PR_LOCK(pr);\
> + (kp)->p_uid = (pr)->ps_ucred->cr_uid; \
>
Nope. As the block comment about this notes, FILL_KPROC() is shared
between the kernel and libkvm and takes each structure pointer separately
as, for example, pr->ps_ucred has the kva address, not the address of the
ucred struct that libkvm has separately read into user memory.
Now, you _could_ have libkvm update pr->ps_ucred to point to its user-space
copy. However, that would make ucred handling different from the other
sub-structures of struct proc and MOST of those we need the real kva for
the show_address functionality.
Not sure if this is the yak-shave you want right now...
(libkvm will obviously also need no-op #defines for PR_LOCK() etc)
Philip
Use `ps_mtx' mutex(9) to protect `ps_ucred' and unlock setuid(2), ...
..., setgid(2), setgroups(2), setreuid(2), setregid(2), sys_setegid(2),
sys_seteuid(2), setresuid(2), setresgid(2).
These syscalls do the same: they overwrite `ps_ucred' by newly allocated
credentials structure, so unlock them all.
Unlocked chgproccnt() call is safe, because `uidinfolk' rwlock(9)
protects `ui_proccnt' modification and `uip' dereference. 'uidinfo'
structure has no locks documentation, so I will do this with separate
diff.
Index: sys/kern/kern_acct.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_acct.c,v
retrieving revision 1.47
diff -u -p -r1.47 kern_acct.c
--- sys/kern/kern_acct.c14 Aug 2022 01:58:27 - 1.47
+++ sys/kern/kern_acct.c1 Dec 2022 18:15:06 -
@@ -221,8 +221,10 @@ acct_process(struct proc *p)
acct.ac_io = encode_comp_t(r->ru_inblock + r->ru_oublock, 0);
/* (6) The UID and GID of the process */
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
acct.ac_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_ruid;
acct.ac_gid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_rgid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
/* (7) The terminal from which the process was started */
if ((pr->ps_flags & PS_CONTROLT) &&
Index: sys/kern/kern_exec.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_exec.c,v
retrieving revision 1.240
diff -u -p -r1.240 kern_exec.c
--- sys/kern/kern_exec.c23 Nov 2022 11:00:27 - 1.240
+++ sys/kern/kern_exec.c1 Dec 2022 18:15:06 -
@@ -649,9 +649,11 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, regi
if (pr->ps_ucred != cred) {
struct ucred *ocred;
- ocred = pr->ps_ucred;
crhold(cred);
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
+ ocred = pr->ps_ucred;
pr->ps_ucred = cred;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
crfree(ocred);
}
Index: sys/kern/kern_exit.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_exit.c,v
retrieving revision 1.207
diff -u -p -r1.207 kern_exit.c
--- sys/kern/kern_exit.c3 Nov 2022 04:56:47 - 1.207
+++ sys/kern/kern_exit.c1 Dec 2022 18:15:06 -
@@ -494,7 +494,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != NULL) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
info->si_signo = SIGCHLD;
if (pr->ps_xsig == 0) {
info->si_code = CLD_EXITED;
@@ -530,7 +532,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != NULL) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
info->si_signo = SIGCHLD;
info->si_code = CLD_TRAPPED;
info->si_status = pr->ps_xsig;
@@ -553,7 +557,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != 0) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
info->si_signo = SIGCHLD;
info->si_code = CLD_STOPPED;
info->si_status = pr->ps_xsig;
@@ -572,7 +578,9 @@ loop:
*retval = pr->ps_pid;
if (info != NULL) {
info->si_pid = pr->ps_pid;
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
info->si_uid = pr->ps_ucred->cr_uid;
+ mtx_leave(>ps_mtx);
info->si_signo = SIGCHLD;
info->si_code = CLD_CONTINUED;
info->si_status = SIGCONT;
Index: sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c
===
RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c,v
retrieving revision 1.108
diff -u -p -r1.108 kern_ktrace.c
--- sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c 14 Aug 2022 01:58:27 - 1.108
+++ sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c 1 Dec 2022 18:15:06 -
@@ -693,7 +693,12 @@ int
ktrcanset(struct proc *callp, struct process *targetpr)
{
struct ucred *caller = callp->p_ucred;
- struct ucred *target = targetpr->ps_ucred;
+ struct ucred *target;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ mtx_enter(>ps_mtx);
+
+ target = targetpr->ps_ucred;
if
