This is the third iteration of the patch to make kernel module loading
more secure. The only change to the previous patch is that the code,
when loading a module from /stand/... now checks that the module name
does not contain a path separator character.
modload name still works, but name must
On Fri, 5 Aug 2011, Marc Balmer wrote:
This is the third iteration of the patch to make kernel module loading
more secure. The only change to the previous patch is that the code,
when loading a module from /stand/... now checks that the module name
does not contain a path separator
On Nov 20, 8:34pm, Iain Hibbert wrote:
} On Fri, 5 Aug 2011, Marc Balmer wrote:
}
} This is the third iteration of the patch to make kernel module loading
} more secure. The only change to the previous patch is that the code,
} when loading a module from /stand/... now checks that the module
Am 05.08.11 09:27, schrieb Iain Hibbert:
On Fri, 5 Aug 2011, Marc Balmer wrote:
This is the third iteration of the patch to make kernel module loading
more secure. The only change to the previous patch is that the code,
when loading a module from /stand/... now checks that the module name
In article alpine.neb.2.00.1108050808300.20...@galant.ukfsn.org,
Iain Hibbert plu...@rya-online.net wrote:
On Fri, 5 Aug 2011, Marc Balmer wrote:
This is the third iteration of the patch to make kernel module loading
more secure. The only change to the previous patch is that the code,
when
I'd like to keep the existing intr framework alone (mostly). Here's a strawman
for MI MSI support:
int pci_msi_request(const struct pci_attach_args *pa, pci_msi_handle_t *msihp,
size_t nmsi, int capid);
msih in an opaque handle which is returned.
nmsi is the maximum number of msi that can be
