Re: [Tigervnc-devel] [PATCH 00/13] SecurityType handling

2010-07-26 Thread Antoine Martin
On 07/23/2010 04:24 PM, DRC wrote: > On 7/23/10 3:40 AM, Martin Koegler wrote: >> On Thu, Jul 22, 2010 at 04:02:52PM -0500, DRC wrote: >>> This makes the use of extended authentication types somewhat useless >>> from the point of view of a SysAdmin, though. If there is not a way for >>> them to

Re: [Tigervnc-devel] [PATCH 00/13] SecurityType handling

2010-07-26 Thread DRC
On 7/26/10 4:43 PM, Antoine Martin wrote: >> You're missing my point. What I'm trying to do is implement a mechanism >> whereby the SysAdmin can set global defaults for all TigerVNC server >> sessions on the system. Yes, there are always ways to hack around this, >> but the idea is to make it dif

Re: [Tigervnc-devel] [PATCH 00/13] SecurityType handling

2010-07-26 Thread Antoine Martin
On 07/26/2010 11:38 PM, DRC wrote: > On 7/26/10 4:43 PM, Antoine Martin wrote: >>> You're missing my point. What I'm trying to do is implement a mechanism >>> whereby the SysAdmin can set global defaults for all TigerVNC server >>> sessions on the system. Yes, there are always ways to hack arou

Re: [Tigervnc-devel] [PATCH 00/13] SecurityType handling

2010-07-26 Thread Robert Goley
I believe he is referring to the ability of the user to upload and run a binary that does not look at that config file. All pre-compiled and ready for joe user to upload. This too could be prevented by locking down filesystems with noexec mount options, iptables rules, and/or selinux policies

Re: [Tigervnc-devel] [PATCH 00/13] SecurityType handling

2010-07-26 Thread DRC
On 7/26/10 6:54 PM, Antoine Martin wrote: > As someone said, you can bypass the restrictions by downloading other > Xvnc binaries for your platform of choice. (see rpmfind and others) > So the restriction is just an illusion of "security", and I worry that > people may start relying on it. > Not