Re: [Tigervnc-devel] potential vulnerability in TLS secType?

2011-05-10 Thread Adam Tkac
Hello Brian, thanks for your feedback, I committed (r4400 and r4401) Martin's patch with my modification. Thanks for your report! Regards, Adam On 05/05/2011 01:27 PM, Brian Hinz wrote: Adam, Martin's patch seems to work (my suggestion did not). -brian On Thu, May 5, 2011 at 5:45 AM,

Re: [Tigervnc-devel] potential vulnerability in TLS secType?

2011-05-05 Thread Adam Tkac
Hello Brian, thanks for notification about this issue, you are right that password might been sent over network without proper validation of the X.509 certs. Can you please test if attached patch solves this issue? It is Martin's patch with little modification (result is rdr::U32 instead of

Re: [Tigervnc-devel] potential vulnerability in TLS secType?

2011-05-05 Thread Brian Hinz
Wouldn't this (also untested) work as well, and have the advantage of relying on gnutls to verify that the handshake was completed? diff -Nr -C 6 rfb.unix/CSecurityTLS.cxx.bak rfb.unix/CSecurityTLS.cxx *** rfb.unix/CSecurityTLS.cxx.bak 2011-05-05 06:54:11.018963720 -0400 ---

Re: [Tigervnc-devel] potential vulnerability in TLS secType?

2011-05-05 Thread Brian Hinz
Adam, Martin's patch seems to work (my suggestion did not). -brian On Thu, May 5, 2011 at 5:45 AM, Adam Tkac at...@redhat.com wrote: Hello Brian, thanks for notification about this issue, you are right that password might been sent over network without proper validation of the X.509 certs.

Re: [Tigervnc-devel] potential vulnerability in TLS secType?

2011-05-05 Thread Martin Koegler
On Thu, May 05, 2011 at 07:01:49AM -0400, Brian Hinz wrote: Wouldn't this (also untested) work as well, and have the advantage of relying on gnutls to verify that the handshake was completed? diff -Nr -C 6 rfb.unix/CSecurityTLS.cxx.bak rfb.unix/CSecurityTLS.cxx ***