Re: [time-nuts] Measuring GPS noise floor (sort of)

2012-12-03 Thread Ulrich Bangert
Mark, what you are doing is not wrong but must be interpreted in the correct way. Please keep in mind that you are NOT comparing two naked GPS receivers. In fact you are comparing the outputs of two GPSDOs. The deeper sense of a GPSDO is to surpress the noise floor of the GPS receiver as good as

[time-nuts] UK: GPS Jamming Notices

2012-12-03 Thread David J Taylor
I have received the three following notices: NOTIFICATION OF GPS JAMMING EXERCISES STANFORD TRAINING AREA, EAST ANGLIA, FEBRUARY 2013 Dates: Between 11 and 15 February 2013. Times: 0900 -1600 GMT. Location of MULTIPLE jammers: Land based within

Re: [time-nuts] UK: GPS Jamming Notices

2012-12-03 Thread lists
Relative to the last notice, a CW jammer would be at a single frequency, so it seems odd they specify a band. Perhaps a CW anywhere in that band. I talked to the USAF about their jamming, and they use white noise over the band. A certain COTS Marconi (IIRC) signal generator produces the band

Re: [time-nuts] Measuring GPS noise floor (sort of)

2012-12-03 Thread Mark Spencer
Thanks for the comments and suggestions. With regards to the equipment used to collect the data, I am using two HP 5370B's. The 1 pps output of the PRS10 is connected to the start input of each counter, the 10Mhz output of each of the GPSDO's is connected to the stop input of one of the

Re: [time-nuts] Measuring GPS noise floor (sort of)

2012-12-03 Thread Mark Spencer
Sorry I meant to say I'm confident the measurements are above the noise floor after approx 100 seconds. -- On Mon, 3 Dec, 2012 4:56 AM PST Mark Spencer wrote: Thanks for the comments and suggestions. With regards to the equipment used to collect the data, I am

Re: [time-nuts] Using a frequency synthesizer replacement for motherboard oscillator

2012-12-03 Thread Erich Heine
On Sun, Dec 2, 2012 at 3:16 PM, Magnus Danielson mag...@rubidium.dyndns.org wrote: Erich, On 12/02/2012 08:54 PM, Erich Heine wrote: Jonathan, My research group has had some good experiences using products from Endace ( http://www.endace.com/) for network timing measurement at the

[time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Erich Heine
One of my favorite things about being in security, (and a researcher in general), is that we regularly get to say that sounds too hard, what if we look $HERE instead. So while I catch up on security in the time synchronization space, I've also been musing on this notion of attacking the clock. By

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Bob Camp
Hi One very basic question might be - is a public list read by millions of people the right place to dig into this? The most basic thing you can detect is time went backwards. Obviously, it should never to this. Because it's easy to detect, I'd assume that the attacker isn't going to do anything

Re: [time-nuts] 3120A Phase Noise Test Probe

2012-12-03 Thread shalimr9
Well, I hope they made it worth your while! Congrats! Didier Sent from my Droid Razr 4G LTE wireless tracker. -Original Message- From: John Miles jmi...@pop.net To: 'Discussion of precise time and frequency measurement' time-nuts@febo.com Sent: Sun, 02 Dec 2012 11:33 PM Subject: Re:

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread dlewis6767
I agree, Bob. Like the billboard on the side of the highway says: - Does Advertising Work? JUST DID - The bad guys can read this list same as the good guys. -- From: Bob Camp li...@rtty.us Sent: Monday, December 03, 2012 11:18 AM To:

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Scott McGrath
And proprietary security schemes always fail due to insufficient vetting. Security by obscurity is not security at all IPsec is secure because it it's inner workings are there for all to see and it's never been broken the compromises have happened because of poor key management not because of

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Edgardo Molina
Dear Erich, I will allow myself to comment briefly on the RF part of your concerns. * Random thought - Can I point a highly directed microwave beam at the coax from the GPS antenna to the clock to cause noise inside that channel? GPS signals are very low level as we all know and are subject

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Bob Camp
Hi If your GPS is sitting somewhere on the main power grid, it's often already in a pretty massive electromagnet field. Early on they tried lower frequency time sources and simply could not hear them above the noise of the power plant or switching station. There are multiple papers from the

Re: [time-nuts] Using a frequency synthesizer replacement for motherboard oscillator

2012-12-03 Thread Eric Garner
I'm an applications engineer for a company that makes Ethernet controllers and PHYs. Some of our customers use crystals (more often oscillators) that they selected based on price rather than performance. when i'm debugging a customer issue replacing the clock source with a synthesizer is a good

Re: [time-nuts] PTTI 2012, part 2

2012-12-03 Thread Tom Van Baak
Continuing from previous posting... Still, there are always a number of talks of more general interest to us time nuts. In the next few postings I'll give more details on a couple of topics: - Neutrino time-of-flight update Last years' faster-than-light neutrino fiasco is now old news, but

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Don Latham
Well, if it's the current set of ruffians we're worried about, my guess is a reasonably well-placed RPG would get the job done 1/2 :-). Don L Bob Camp Hi If your GPS is sitting somewhere on the main power grid, it's often already in a pretty massive electromagnet field. Early on they tried

Re: [time-nuts] PTTI 2012, part 2

2012-12-03 Thread Poul-Henning Kamp
In message AB5B0278225B4BD483382A39E6834203@pc52, Tom Van Baak writes: - USNO rubidium fountains While many national labs have developed cesium fountains (for accuracy), USNO has been gradually building rubidium fountain clocks (for stability) and 4 of them are now fully operational.

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Scott McGrath
All of these attacks the clock would notice and probably go into holdover So far these attacks do not allow the time product to be altered in a deterministic manner Sent from my iPhone On Dec 3, 2012, at 1:46 PM, Don Latham d...@montana.com wrote: Well, if it's the current set of ruffians

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Bob Camp
Hi The key words there being so far. If: 1) You can flood the antenna with a synthetic signal ( = come up with RF power) 2) You can synthesize synthetic sat signals ( = buy fancy signal generators ) 3) You can walk those signals off ( = do some complicated math ) I believe that given enough

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Erich Heine
On Mon, Dec 3, 2012 at 11:18 AM, Bob Camp li...@rtty.us wrote: Hi One very basic question might be - is a public list read by millions of people the right place to dig into this? Thanks for bringing this up. I probably should have asked the list about general comfort levels regarding such a

Re: [time-nuts] Using a frequency synthesizer replacement for motherboard oscillator

2012-12-03 Thread Tom Van Baak
My research group has had some good experiences using products from Endace ( http://www.endace.com/) for network timing measurement at the ethernet level. I don't have a pointer immediately to the work, but if there is interest can ask tomorrow at work. The gist of it though was to understand

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread lists
Or you just hack the SCADA. Far nastier. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Hal Murray
sophac...@gmail.com said: So what I am trying to understand today is ways we can affect the reliability of the clock, having affects on everything mentioned above. There is a big overlap between maliciously attacking the clock and the clock doing something crazy due to bugs in hardware,

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Jim Lux
On 12/3/12 9:32 AM, dlewis6767 wrote: I agree, Bob. Like the billboard on the side of the highway says: - Does Advertising Work? JUST DID - The bad guys can read this list same as the good guys. Security through obscurity never works in the long run. Much better to discuss

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread lists
I have one of those key fobs. Does the code somehow inform the power the be about the drift in the built in clock? Or is the time element of the code so sloppy that the drift is acceptable? -Original Message- From: Jim Lux jim...@earthlink.net Sender: time-nuts-boun...@febo.com Date:

[time-nuts] GPSDO Alternatives

2012-12-03 Thread Tom Clifton
While the Trimble Tbolts are still out there and reasonably available, are there any newer alternatives in the same general price range?  ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Scott McGrath
I think this class of attack would be directed along the order of financial crimes or industrial espionage where you want to hide the audit trail or convince a database that the update is legitimate We really need to think more about the secure distribution of time products In the past in

Re: [time-nuts] GPSDO Alternatives

2012-12-03 Thread Bob Camp
Hi The TBolt is the newest of the used category. For newer, you skip up to brand new. Bob On Dec 3, 2012, at 7:42 PM, Tom Clifton kc0...@yahoo.com wrote: While the Trimble Tbolts are still out there and reasonably available, are there any newer alternatives in the same general price range?

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Chris Albertson
On Mon, Dec 3, 2012 at 4:51 PM, Scott McGrath scmcgr...@gmail.com wrote: We really need to think more about the secure distribution of time products Is NTP not secure. I know it can be secured but I think in practice people disable passwords. -- Chris Albertson Redondo Beach,

Re: [time-nuts] GPSDO Alternatives

2012-12-03 Thread paul swed
Hmmm new and better. That means better stability, noise, lower power, lower heat, for less and works with lady heather? :-) I can hope. Regards Paul WB8TSL On Mon, Dec 3, 2012 at 7:52 PM, Bob Camp li...@rtty.us wrote: Hi The TBolt is the newest of the used category. For newer, you skip up to

Re: [time-nuts] GPSDO Alternatives

2012-12-03 Thread Magnus Danielson
On 12/04/2012 02:44 AM, paul swed wrote: Hmmm new and better. That means better stability, noise, lower power, lower heat, for less and works with lady heather? :-) I can hope. Mostly cheaper actually. Better GPS to start with, probably. Lower power, most probably. We should discuss if we

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Edgardo Molina
NTP is not secure in nature. MD5 key exchange between client and server is the only secure feature up to now, for the client to be sure that he/she is getting a correct time sync to the desired server. On the other side if the server does not receive a matching MD5 key, it will simply ignore

Re: [time-nuts] GPSDO Alternatives

2012-12-03 Thread Bob Camp
Hi The gotcha is that you go from paying surplus prices to paying new prices. New price to new price, they certainly are cheaper. Not so easy to beat a $100 TBolt on price (if you can find one). Bob On Dec 3, 2012, at 8:50 PM, Magnus Danielson mag...@rubidium.dyndns.org wrote: On 12/04/2012

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Hal Murray
li...@lazygranch.com said: I have one of those key fobs. Does the code somehow inform the power the be about the drift in the built in clock? Or is the time element of the code so sloppy that the drift is acceptable? The magic number changes every second or so. You only have to scan a few

[time-nuts] Lady Heather V3.10, ALARM: 4000

2012-12-03 Thread Stan, W1LE
Hello The Net: Any idea what this alarm is ? It appreared, I got out of the application, I restarted, and no more alarm notification. Stan, W1LE ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Hal Murray
albertson.ch...@gmail.com said: Is NTP not secure. I know it can be secured but I think in practice people disable passwords. The default in most distributions and most servers is no crypto. So it's not that anybody disables authentication but doesn't go through all the work to enable it.

Re: [time-nuts] GPSDO Alternatives

2012-12-03 Thread paul swed
Yes sir $139. But boy I have not seen cheap tbolts in bit. As I recall $260 these days? On Mon, Dec 3, 2012 at 9:12 PM, Bob Camp li...@rtty.us wrote: Hi The gotcha is that you go from paying surplus prices to paying new prices. New price to new price, they certainly are cheaper. Not so easy

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Harlan Stenn
What is the 'thing' being secured? H ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Hal Murray
xe1...@amsat.org said: On the other hand PTP is evolving to be a future protocol for time transfer. Nowadays it is superior than NTP in the LAN environment. Superior is an interesting word. I'm not familiar with the details of current PTP implementations. I am reasonably familiar with the

[time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock

2012-12-03 Thread M. Simon
A dirty power supply might go unnoticed. Maybe feed in line noise to the LV stuff with a HV cap.   The problem is that it is difficult to fool for long people who are paying attention. Simon Engineering is the art of making what you want from what you can get at a profit.

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Jim Lux
On 12/3/12 6:34 PM, Hal Murray wrote: li...@lazygranch.com said: I have one of those key fobs. Does the code somehow inform the power the be about the drift in the built in clock? Or is the time element of the code so sloppy that the drift is acceptable? The magic number changes every second

[time-nuts] PPS offset between GPS receivers

2012-12-03 Thread Gabs Ricalde
I'm using a Symmetricom 58534A GPS timing receiver and a GPS board with a SkyNav SKG25A1 module driving stratum 1 NTP servers. On one of the servers, the ppstest output while the 58534A is connected looks like: source 0 - assert 1354495734.00102 source 0 - assert 1354495735.00040 When I

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Hal Murray
jim...@earthlink.net said: The question is: Can I distribute timing information through a network reliably I think so. The better question is how accurately? Assume client and server share a secret key and the server is trustworthy. Assume the protocol allows the client to put a magic

Re: [time-nuts] PPS offset between GPS receivers

2012-12-03 Thread Tom Van Baak
Hi Gabs, and welcome to the list. Or, the 58534A is 2 us late compared to the SKG25A1. If you have a 'scope handy check the risetime of the signal at all points in the long chain from the 58534A to the GPIO. Better yet, if you have a dual-channel 'scope or TI counter, compare the 1PPS's as

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread gary
I was a bit concerned about clicking the fob for no good reason. I assume each click is a different number. I only use it for ebay and paypal. [Incidentally, they jacked the price from $5 to $30.] Now a phone has accurate network time, so they could get really tricky with the time as part of

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Sanjeev Gupta
On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 1:59 PM, gary li...@lazygranch.com wrote: Things were going OK but then I heard a nasty sound and the lights flickered a bit. It turns out some curious students wanted to see what happened if the generator and mains were out of phase. Well, the mains wins. Been there,

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Hal Murray
li...@lazygranch.com said: Now a phone has accurate network time, so they could get really tricky with the time as part of the code. Are you sure? I don't have a smart phone, but I've heard various war stories of crappy time keeping. I assume the time was coming from an ap rather than the

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread gary
All my blackberries synced to the network. I presume all phones do this. I still have an Android HTC G2 that has a NTP app, not that it ever worked! On 12/3/2012 10:27 PM, Hal Murray wrote: li...@lazygranch.com said: Now a phone has accurate network time, so they could get really tricky

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Tom Van Baak
Please. May we call this thread finished. It's way off topic. Thanks, /tvb ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.

Re: [time-nuts] Time security musing - attacking the clock itself

2012-12-03 Thread Jonatan Walck
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 12/04/2012 04:44 AM, Hal Murray wrote: PTP is basically making the network transit times more accurate than symmetrical by measuring them. Each box that processes a packet updates the packet with the processing/queuing delays. I think