Re: [TLS] PR to clarify RSASSA-PSS requirements

2017-11-21 Thread Eric Rescorla
I don't think that this is the right answer. Let's separate out the question of (a) what people need to support and (b) what the code points mean. (b) needs to be unambigous, as that's the point of the extension and this PR actually makes it explicitly unambigous. With that said, there seem to

Re: [TLS] Transcript-Hash during Handshake

2017-11-21 Thread Le Van Gong, Hubert
Hi Peter, Yes, that sentence is what made me think it must be over decrypted messages but I wanted to double check as it's not clearly stated. Thanks for confirming! Hubert On 11/21/17 19:59, Peter Wu wrote: Hi Hubert, On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 07:38:16PM -0800, Le Van Gong, Hubert wrote:

Re: [TLS] Transcript-Hash during Handshake

2017-11-21 Thread Peter Wu
Hi Hubert, On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 07:38:16PM -0800, Le Van Gong, Hubert wrote: > Greetings, > > Probably a trivial question but is the transcript hash (during handhsake) > calculated over decrypted versions of messages like EncryptedExtensions or > certificate or is it done over the

[TLS] PR to clarify RSASSA-PSS requirements

2017-11-21 Thread Peter Wu
Hi, At the moment there is still ambiguity in the requirements for PSS with relation to certificates. Proposal to clarify this: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1098 This PR intends to clarify the requirements for PSS support. The requirements are intentionally minimal to reduce

[TLS] Transcript-Hash during Handshake

2017-11-21 Thread Le Van Gong, Hubert
Greetings, Probably a trivial question but is the transcript hash (during handhsake) calculated over decrypted versions of messages like EncryptedExtensions or certificate or is it done over the raw/encrypted messages? I could not find an exact confirmation in the spec. Cheers, Hubert

Re: [TLS] PR#1091: Changes to provide middlebox robustness

2017-11-21 Thread Tapio Sokura
Hello, On 6.11.2017 20:19, Eric Rescorla wrote: Once you do this, the middleboxes seem to mostly ignore everything after the CCS, so the rest of the handshake proceeds smoothly. This is all a bit nasty, but none of it changes the cryptographic computations or the state machine (because you

Re: [TLS] question for the WG about draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates

2017-11-21 Thread Stephen Farrell
On 21/11/17 23:39, Martin Thomson wrote: > IESG action seems appropriate for both. I'm fairly sure the WG discussed the No->Yes (or new Yes) before and wanted standards action for that. I'd guess that changing that might take some discussion. (FWIW, I'd not support that change myself but

Re: [TLS] question for the WG about draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates

2017-11-21 Thread Martin Thomson
IESG action seems appropriate for both. If we could include guidance around this (values with Yes should only include those for which the community currently has consensus are worth having available at the current time), tat would be awesome. On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 7:37 AM, Stephen Farrell

[TLS] question for the WG about draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates

2017-11-21 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, I just posted a draft shepherd write-up for this [1]. (The write-up text was mostly written by Sean as it happens - for which he has my thanks as it's boring as hell to do that:-) There are nits but only one substantive question that I don't recall the WG discussing before (but maybe I'm