On Sat, Dec 08, 2018 at 11:42:56AM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 08, 2018 at 06:38:30PM +0200, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> > While thinking about the previous, I ran into some issues with the
> > split mode. Firstly, if the fronting server does not encrypt the
> > client_hello when
On Sat, Dec 08, 2018 at 06:38:30PM +0200, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> While thinking about the previous, I ran into some issues with the
> split mode. Firstly, if the fronting server does not encrypt the
> client_hello when transmitting it to backend server, passive attack
> can match incoming
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:47 PM R duToit wrote:
> 2. The DoS (prevention) engineers should also weigh in on this. Would
> servers not start reusing TLS 1.3 keyshare values when under DoS attack?
DDoS (mitigation) engineer here,
I'll reiterate the idea I've raised before in quic-wg. The
On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 09:45:51PM +, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>
> I'm fine that such changes don't get done for a while (so
> I or my student get time to try make stuff work:-) and
> it might in any case take a while to figure out how to
> handle the multi-CDN use-case discussed in Bangkok
On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 11:14 PM Peter Gutmann
wrote:
> [0] "In principal" because there's a fair bit of SCADA gear that does this
> because it doesn't have the CPU power to generate new DHE values, as I
> found out when I turned on non-DHE checking some years ago.
>
I think these
