On Friday, 22 September 2023 08:08:17 CEST, Peter Gutmann wrote:
This draft still has the same problem that's been pointed out previously:
Clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select FFDHE cipher
suites in TLS 1.2 connections.
What this means is that if the implementation doesn't
Thanks! Both points sound good to me.
I pushed these changes to the main branch, I guess we'll wait to accumulate
more (hopefully small) changes before publishing a new version.
thanks,
Nimrod
On Thu, 21 Sept 2023 at 18:24, Thomas Fossati
wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Maybe I am completely confused but It
This draft still has the same problem that's been pointed out previously:
Clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select FFDHE cipher
suites in TLS 1.2 connections.
What this means is that if the implementation doesn't support ECC, as some do,
then it's in effect saying:
Clients and
Hi,
Maybe I am completely confused but It also looks like the "SHOULD NOT
non-ephemeral ECDH" (second para of §2) is already in the "general
guidelines" of RFC9325.
If you want to reiterate the point (which is good), you could just reference it?
cheers, t
On Thu, 21 Sept 2023 at 17:13, Thomas
Hi,
It looks like the requirements in §2 and §3 regarding FFDH(E) update
the guidance given in RFC9325 (i.e., SHOULD NOT => MUST NOT).
I guess this must be reflected in the "Updates" header.
cheers, thanks
t
On Thu, 21 Sept 2023 at 10:22, wrote:
>
> Internet-Draft
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-03.txt is now available.
It is a work item of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) WG of the IETF.
Title: Deprecating Obsolete Key Exchange Methods in TLS 1.2
Authors: Carrick Bartle
Nimrod Aviram
Name:
