Re: [TLS] open issues for draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-00

2015-08-06 Thread Martin Thomson
On 5 August 2015 at 11:13, Wan-Teh Chang w...@google.com wrote: Then, define the ChaChaNonce struct as described in the draft-TLS 1.3. struct { opaque nonce[12]; } ChaChaNonce; 1. The 64-bit record sequence number is padded to the left with zeroes to

Re: [TLS] open issues for draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-00

2015-08-05 Thread Wan-Teh Chang
On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 10:35 AM, Martin Thomson martin.thom...@gmail.com wrote: On 4 August 2015 at 10:24, Wan-Teh Chang w...@google.com wrote: The consistency you want to see seems to be consistency with the AES GCM cipher suites, rather than with TLS 1.2. Yes, this is correct. RFC 5288:

[TLS] open issues for draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-00

2015-08-04 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Hi, An open issue for draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-00 raised by Eric Rescorla is that this draft doesn't use the draft-TLS 1.3 mechanism for setting the nonce per record [0]. Is there any support for switching these ciphersuites to draft-TLS 1.3 nonce mechanism even for TLS 1.2? The

Re: [TLS] open issues for draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-00

2015-08-04 Thread Salz, Rich
Personally, I would rather see the nonce construction follow the form defined in the respective TLS version. Yes, consistency. +1 ___ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

Re: [TLS] open issues for draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-00

2015-08-04 Thread David Benjamin
On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 12:20 PM Salz, Rich rs...@akamai.com wrote: Personally, I would rather see the nonce construction follow the form defined in the respective TLS version. [DB: Adding back in for context: That means including redundant bytes in TLS 1.2 and only getting the full

Re: [TLS] open issues for draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-00

2015-08-04 Thread Martin Thomson
On 4 August 2015 at 05:37, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos n...@redhat.com wrote: Is there any support for switching these ciphersuites to draft-TLS 1.3 nonce mechanism even for TLS 1.2? The alternative is to use the TLS 1.2 mechanism with the redundant bytes redacted as the draft is now [1].