Re: [TLS] ESNI: Tracking and blocking via record_digest

Actually there is one use case in which the anonymity set is size 1 -- mobile servers. The name of the mobile server cannot be deduced from its temporary address. It can also not be deduced from the ESNI. But it can be deduced from the record digest. The mobile server who wants to maintain privacy

Re: [TLS] ESNI: Tracking and blocking via record_digest

Yes, and this concern is covered well by the draft in GitHub, imho. thanks, Rob On Mon, Nov 25, 2019 at 7:33 PM Christian Huitema wrote: > Actually there is one use case in which the anonymity set is size 1 -- > mobile servers. The name of the mobile server cannot be deduced from its >

Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests

On Thursday, 21 November 2019 07:35:09 CET, Rob Sayre wrote: On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 10:25 PM David Schinazi wrote: Hi Rob, The SHOULD from your point (1) is there to address Daniel's concern about IoT. Is the idea that excess tickets would be wasteful? I think that's true, but I would

Re: [TLS] Adoption call for draft-rescorla-tls-ctls

I support this effort, and would like to point out that we have recently published a paper [1] and a collection of tools [2] to automatically verify the security (non malleability) of binary message formats, which we successfully applied to all of TLS [3] (which revealed many small

Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests

On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 10:20 PM David Schinazi wrote: > Hi folks, > > I've chatted with Daniel and Chris offline, and I think there might > have been some miscommunication here. Please allow me to > rephrase what I think is going on, and please let me know if > this accurately represents your

Re: [TLS] ESNI interoperability questions

On Sun, Nov 24, 2019 at 10:46 PM Rob Sayre wrote: > Hi, > > This client now interoperates with Cloudflare and the https://defo.ie > copy of OpenSSL. It's tri-licensed under the Apache 2, MIT, and ISC > licenses. It won't be merged until draft-06 is out, at a minimum. > >

[TLS] Last Call: (TLS Certificate Compression) to Proposed Standard

The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to consider the following document: - 'TLS Certificate Compression' as Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive

[TLS] Draft minutes available

Draft minutes are available here: https://github.com/tlswg/wg-materials/blob/master/ietf106/minutes.md Thanks to Tommy and Joe for taking notes! Please send edits to the list or chairs as needed. Best, Chris ___ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org

[TLS] ESNI: Tracking and blocking via record_digest

Hi, I see the issue of tracking and blocking via record_digest has come up a few times in the github repository, but I don't understand the resolution. If someone wanted to observe or block traffic to "example.com", couldn't they retrieve the ESNI keys, calculate the record_digest themselves,

Re: [TLS] ESNI: Tracking and blocking via record_digest

You're right, this is all there in the draft. It's just scattered around a bit, and "anonymity set" is used only once and not defined. I filed an issue https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/204 in case the editors want to consolidate text on this concern. thanks, Rob On Mon, Nov

Re: [TLS] Adoption call for draft-rescorla-tls-ctls

Hi Hannes, My reading is that only compression/decompression applies to our case. Fragmentation is optional and only concerns ipv6. I did not intent to make the comment at an inappropriate time, but if so, please consider it when it is appropriate. Yours, Daniel On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 10:34 PM