On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 5:25 PM Hal Murray wrote:
> Thanks.
>
> > It's been a few years, but IIRC my thinking was that the degree of trust
> > required in the Roughtime servers' long-term public keys is very low:
> you're
> > trusting them only for one server's assertion of the current time, not
Kyle Rose writes:
>Expired CAs are definitely a problem for PKI participation after such a
>delay, but probably one that is dwarfed by the near certain existence of
>known vulnerabilities in firmware that hasn't been updated in 10 years. So
>it's probably best they remain air-gapped and don't
I contact pointed me to the following:
https://medium.com/asecuritysite-when-bob-met-alice/the-state-of-tls-ecdsa-nonce-reuse-1489ab86e488
The article is unclear if this is a TLS 1.2 and/or 1.3 problem. It does
claim that 1.3 does not fix all problems with TLS.
It also seems this is a
