Re: [TLS] [solwo...@rites.uic.edu: TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto]

On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 01:08:39PM -0400, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > > > On Apr 11, 2016, at 12:36 PM, D. J. Bernstein wrote: > > > > I agree that the original goal of extensible "query types" in DNS (see > > RFC 1034, third paragraph) was ruined by poor implementation work (which

Re: [TLS] [solwo...@rites.uic.edu: TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto]

To add one more point here: the WG was very uncomfortable with having any kind of long-term delegation mechanism, which a static signature of this type would be (though perhaps it would be a weaker form of attack if you required an online signature as part of the handshake, as draft-12 does, in

Re: [TLS] [solwo...@rites.uic.edu: TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto]

> On Apr 11, 2016, at 12:36 PM, D. J. Bernstein wrote: > > I agree that the original goal of extensible "query types" in DNS (see > RFC 1034, third paragraph) was ruined by poor implementation work (which > was in turn encouraged by other aspects of the DNS protocol design, but >

Re: [TLS] TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto

> On Apr 11, 2016, at 9:05 AM, Martin Rex wrote: > > The TTL of a DNS record is *NOT* protected by DNSSEC, and can be > regenerated at will by an attacker, will be regenerated by intermediate > DNS server and its purpose is purely cache-management, *NOT* security. > > Only the

Re: [TLS] TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto

Salz, Rich wrote: >> In MinimaLT, the current ephemeral key for the server is added to >> the DNS record fetched during the DNS lookup. These entries expire fairly >> quickly, ensuring that old keys are never used. > > Can you compare the TTL of the ephemeral key record with the > A/

Re: [TLS] TLS weakness in Forward Secrecy compared to QUIC Crypto

> In MinimaLT, the current ephemeral key for the server is added to > the DNS record fetched during the DNS lookup. These entries expire fairly > quickly, ensuring that old keys are never used. Can you compare the TTL of the ephemeral key record with the A/ record TTL? Are they