On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 9:12 AM, Dr Stephen Henson <
li...@drh-consultancy.co.uk> wrote:
> On 27/03/2017 08:47, Olivier Levillain wrote:
> >
> > For a longer version, post-handshake records of type Handshake can be of
> > three kinds:
> > - NewSessionTicket (sent by the server, and that can
On 27/03/2017 08:47, Olivier Levillain wrote:
>
> For a longer version, post-handshake records of type Handshake can be of
> three kinds:
> - NewSessionTicket (sent by the server, and that can safely be ignored
> entirely by clients)
> - KeyUpdate (sent by either party, requiring only a bit of
On Tuesday, 28 March 2017 08:23:33 CEST Kaduk, Ben wrote:
> On 3/13/17, 12:30, "Sean Turner" wrote:
> Do we want to add some commentary about the extant SHA1 collisions when we
> say that {rsa_pkcs1,dsa,ecdsa}_sha1 are only SHOULD NOT?
There still are non-insignificant number of
Yes, we discussed this at IETF 98 and had rough consensus. I'll be merging
this PR this
week
-Ekr
On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 6:57 AM, Olivier Levillain <
olivier.levill...@ssi.gouv.fr> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> > I think there is at least another issue that still needs to be
> > discussed: how to properly
Hi,
> I think there is at least another issue that still needs to be
> discussed: how to properly handle post-handshake handshake messages.
>
> The subject has also been raised several times on GitHub
> (https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/680,
>