Re: [TLS] Empty CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithms in TLS 1.2

2018-11-21 Thread Eric Rescorla
On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 1:50 PM Martin Thomson wrote: > In attempting to fix a bug related to this, a question came up about > what the semantics of an empty value is here. Some implementations > seem to infer that empty means {*,SHA1}, which effectively assumes > that an empty value is

Re: [TLS] Empty CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithms in TLS 1.2

2018-11-21 Thread David Benjamin
On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 3:50 PM Martin Thomson wrote: > In attempting to fix a bug related to this, a question came up about > what the semantics of an empty value is here. Some implementations > seem to infer that empty means {*,SHA1}, which effectively assumes > that an empty value is

[TLS] Empty CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithms in TLS 1.2

2018-11-21 Thread Martin Thomson
In attempting to fix a bug related to this, a question came up about what the semantics of an empty value is here. Some implementations seem to infer that empty means {*,SHA1}, which effectively assumes that an empty value is equivalent to an absent signature_algorithms extension (Section

Re: [TLS] Empty CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithms in TLS 1.2

2018-11-21 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
> On Nov 21, 2018, at 4:50 PM, Martin Thomson wrote: > > In attempting to fix a bug related to this, a question came up about > what the semantics of an empty value is here. Some implementations > seem to infer that empty means {*,SHA1}, which effectively assumes > that an empty value is

Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex

2018-11-21 Thread Florian Weimer
* Paul Wouters: > On Wed, 21 Nov 2018, Stephen Farrell wrote: > >>> We currently permit >1 RR, but >>> actually >>> I suspect that it would be better to try to restrict this. >> >> Not sure we can and I suspect that'd raise DNS-folks' hackles, >> but maybe I'm wrong. > > I think the SOA record is

Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex

2018-11-21 Thread Eric Rescorla
On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 11:28 PM Paul Wouters wrote: > Although, if I am correct, the epectation is that all of this data > will be used without mandating DNSSEC validation, so all these > security parameters could be modified by any DNS party in transit > to try and break the protocol or

Re: [TLS] Empty CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithms in TLS 1.2

2018-11-21 Thread Martin Thomson
On Thu, Nov 22, 2018 at 9:08 AM David Benjamin wrote: > Maybe we should errata this by fixing that <2^16-1> to <2..2^16-1>? https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid2864 was filed a while ago. Apparently also erratum 1585 found an error. We really need a view of these documents that includes