Re: [tor-bugs] #10426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "new identity" button causes in-progress downloads to be aborted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10426: "new identity" button causes in-progress downloads to be aborted
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-3.0, tbb-usability, tbb-newnym,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-easy, tbb-torbutton|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > Would it be possible to reuse the warning prompt that Firefox already
 provides when you attempt to quit when a download is in progress?

 I think the text used for that prompt is too focused on "Quit" or "Exit".
 Firefox already has several variations of the text (quit, offline, leave
 private browsing mode), so adding another one seems like the best
 approach. Existing text may be found here:
  https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-esr45/source/toolkit/locales/en-
 US/chrome/mozapps/downloads/downloads.properties#25

 The real work is to patch the Firefox code here to handle the New Identity
 case or to implement a similar prompt in Torbutton:
  https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr45/source/toolkit/components/downloads/nsDownloadManager.cpp#2454

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13464 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript blocks right-click searching of text

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13464: NoScript blocks right-click searching of text
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Resolved #20268 as duplicate. There is an additional, potentially useful
 idea I am posting here
 {{{
 As far as I see it, there is already an anti-xss exception rule for
 Yahoo!, maybe it would be a good idea to add something like

 ^https://startpage\.com/do/dsearch
 ^https://startpage.com/rto/search

 as an anti-xss exception rule to NoScript---to improve the usability of
 startpage.com as default search engine.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20268 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Usuability of right-click search for startpage.com

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20268: Usuability of right-click search for startpage.com
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #13464.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20264 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reduce number of security slider states from 4 to 3 (proposed)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20264: Reduce number of security slider states from 4 to 3 (proposed)
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 I also believe that reducing the choices from four to three makes sense in
 terms of usability. Looking at what is different between Medium-Low and
 Medium-High, the only setting that I am a little worried about is
 `javascript.options.baselinejit.content = false`. I don't know if that
 reduces JS performance enough that users will dislike Medium-High.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20204: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:14 gk]:
 > mcs: do you think we should just take those patches there, too, without
 further testing?

 Yes. This problem is annoying enough to users that I think we should take
 that risk.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20210: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:19 brade]:
 > Replying to [comment:18 gk]:
 > > Hm. We need the signed .dmg files anyway and just copying all the .bz2
 bundles over as well to solve the permission problem seems to be a bit of
 over-engineering to me. What speaks against adjusting the permissions with
 the `dmg2mars` script (if we can't solve this problem with `7z`)?
 >
 > It seems error prone (fragile) for us to adjust the permissions.  How do
 we know what permissions should be set?

 We set them already before creating the .dmg file with the `ddmg.sh`
 script, no?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19429 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean up our OpenSSL 1.1 support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19429: Clean up our OpenSSL 1.1 support.
-+
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-core tor-crypto  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 FYI, Tor 0.2.9.3-alpha doesn't compile with OpenSSL 1.1.0b with all
 deprecated features disabled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20210: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by brade):

 Replying to [comment:18 gk]:
 > Hm. We need the signed .dmg files anyway and just copying all the .bz2
 bundles over as well to solve the permission problem seems to be a bit of
 over-engineering to me. What speaks against adjusting the permissions with
 the `dmg2mars` script (if we can't solve this problem with `7z`)?

 It seems error prone for us to adjust the permissions.  How do we know
 what permissions should be set?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20220: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows 10
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:5 cypherpunks]:
 > The exact same Tor Browser 6.0.5 directory works fine for me on Windows
 8 32-bit.

 Are you sure there is no AV/anti-malware software that is preventing tor
 from making network connections? Or maybe something outside the computer
 is blocking things, e.g., on the network?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20210: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:18 gk]:
 >
 > Hm. We need the signed .dmg files anyway and just copying all the .bz2
 bundles over as well to solve the permission problem seems to be a bit of
 over-engineering to me. What speaks against adjusting the permissions with
 the `dmg2mars` script (if we can't solve this problem with `7z`)?

 Ah yes, fixing that issue by setting the permissions like `ddmg.sh` is
 doing should be simple. I think we can do that.

 If I understand the process we have correctly, we are creating
 `*-signed.tar.bz2` files on the signing machine, we copy them over an
 other machine where we run a script to create the dmg files from the
 `*-signed.tar.bz2` files, and we then use `dmg2mar` to convert those dmg
 files to mar files. I was thinking that the creation of the dmg and the
 mar files could be done at the same time, but maybe that should be a
 separate ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20280 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Tor Messenger - prefs.label & language

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20280: Tor Messenger - prefs.label & language
+---
 Reporter:  OpenPony|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Yes, sorry, this was a regression in v0.2.0b2.  We should have a fix out
 soon.  In the meantime, please see ticket:20231#comment:1 for a
 workaround.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16138 [Archived/operations]: SponsorU spreadsheet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16138: SponsorU spreadsheet
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16136   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16137 [Archived/operations]: SponsorT spreadsheet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16137: SponsorT spreadsheet
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16136   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16346 [Archived/operations]: Sort our internal policies and tell more people about them

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16346: Sort our internal policies and tell more people about them
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I am closing this ticket because most of this work is being taken care of
 by the Seattle office staff or is on their list to be dealing with.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds mocked functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16869: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds 
mocked
functions
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  unittests |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged as a49fb1e2e5ebb03d7d115b4a4eaa1c17c160f1a8 ; thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20163 [Core Tor/Tor]: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20163: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 merging, with copy-pasted changes file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16353 [Archived/operations]: Amazon "Simple pay" no longer works -- no Amazon donations until we fix it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16353: Amazon "Simple pay" no longer works -- no Amazon donations until we fix 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16354 [Archived/operations]: 2014 annual report

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16354: 2014 annual report
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16042 [Archived/operations]: Support after sponsorO

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16042: Support after sponsorO
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Closing this, Colin has been working with the Community Team to build a
 support.tpo website and they have a whole plan on how to revamp Tor
 support :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 (Also, thanks!)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Looks correct; merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16077 [Archived/operations]: Get personal info off the Paypal/etc accounts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16077: Get personal info off the Paypal/etc accounts
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20277 [Core Tor/Tor]: Confusing "Not all bridges handle conditional consensus downloading" comment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20277: Confusing "Not all bridges handle conditional consensus downloading"
comment
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master as trivially correct.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16092 [Archived/operations]: Decide where to accumulate small expense ideas

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16092: Decide where to accumulate small expense ideas
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Closing this one, as we have more staff now and don't need to be tracking
 these things here anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16218 [Archived/operations]: Improving Trac to better organize our work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16218: Improving Trac to better organize our work
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16076 [Archived/operations]: Get Financial quarterly reports in for Sponsors O and S (Apr 30)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16076: Get Financial quarterly reports in for Sponsors O and S (Apr 30)
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20278 [Core Tor/Tor]: cert-spec.txt contains incomplete reference / documentation for certificate types

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20278: cert-spec.txt contains incomplete reference / documentation for 
certificate
types
--+
 Reporter:  patrickod |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16097 [Archived/operations]: Figure out how people should do report back from traveling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16097: Figure out how people should do report back from traveling
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20163 [Core Tor/Tor]: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20163: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  029-proposed easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 (also, thanks!)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16266 [Archived/operations]: Write yearly report for SponsorM

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16266: Write yearly report for SponsorM
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16135 [Archived/operations]: Time report system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16135: Time report system
-+---
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I am closing this ticket because Shari will work on this with our finance
 grant manager and accounting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16100 [Archived/operations]: Tor Messenger and Mail after Sponsor O

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16100: Tor Messenger and Mail after Sponsor O
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Closing this - a lot have passed since this ticket was open. A lot have
 happen since them, we got small fund for Tor messenger but never manage to
 really get sponsors interested in this project. we just reviewed both
 projects: messenger and mail; at the Seattle Tor Meeting. I think this
 ticket can be closed as the follow up from Seattle discussion will
 probably take place with new tickets if necessary.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: teor (added)
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 Roger, what happens with this patch if a client doesn't actually have any
 bridges that support microdescriptors?  Is that now impossible?

 Other than that, I think we can merge this (if not the rest of #6769) into
 0.2.9

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15786 [Archived/operations]: Change name or take down Google Chrome extension Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15786: Change name or take down Google Chrome extension Tor
-+--
 Reporter:  sambuddhabasu|  Owner:  wseltzer
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  isabela => wseltzer
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Wendy, do you know anything about this? Can I close this ticket?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16136 [Archived/operations]: reproduce sponsorO spreadsheet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16136: reproduce sponsorO spreadsheet
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20185 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser alpha is broken on Linux (and probably OS X) if directory is nested too deep

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20185: Tor Browser alpha is broken on Linux (and probably OS X) if directory is
nested too deep
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14270| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20224 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Fix `BridgeDescriptorMappingsLimit` config option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20224: Fix `BridgeDescriptorMappingsLimit` config option
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Hmm, no, that seems wrong or at least confusing, and on second thought my
 patch above is wrong or at least confusing, too.

 Here's a table with some timestamps that seem to be relevant here:

 ||= Row=||= `BridgeDescriptorMappingsLimit`=||= ''Milliseconds since the
 epoch''=||=''ISO-8601 date/time'' =||
 || 1|| `0`|| `1475517323620`|| AD 2016-10-03 17:55:23.620 ||
 || 2|| `6120.7468`|| `94668479`|| AD 1999-12-31 23:59:59.999 ||
 || 3|| `17077.7468`|| `-1`|| AD 1969-12-31 23:59:59.999 ||
 || 4|| `17102.6019`|| `-Integer.MAX_VALUE = -2147483647`|| AD 1969-12-07
 03:28:36.353 ||
 || 5|| `-Integer.MAX_VALUE = -2147483647`|| `-18554583476380`|| BC
 5877475-12-05 17:55:23.620 ||

 Explanations for these rows:
  1. This is the current date/time, so if we had put in `0` as value for
 `BridgeDescriptorMappingsLimit`, that's what the cut off time would have
 been.
  2. This is what we had put in before using `Integer.MAX_VALUE` as
 parameter default value, and this date in 1999 is indeed small enough that
 no bridge descriptor could have been published earlier.
  3. This is what I had in mind in my patch above: pick `-1` as smallest
 possible time in milliseconds since the epoch, but only because I had
 misread 1999 as 1969.  Oops.
  4. That's what I think you're suggesting above, and I think it doesn't
 really make sense to use this threshold to decide whether or not to fall
 back to a date in 1999.
  5. Here's the explanation for this bug, which I found out today: we're
 not looking at an integer overflow/underflow, we're looking at BC dates
 rather than AD dates, and we're not including AD/BC in the output date
 format.  Ugh!

 My suggestion is to cut off at `1999-12-31 23:59:59` by hard-coding that
 date/time in milliseconds as threshold.  Untested code:

 {{{
SimpleDateFormat formatter = new SimpleDateFormat(
"-MM-dd HH:mm:ss");
formatter.setTimeZone(TimeZone.getTimeZone("UTC"));
long cutTime = System.currentTimeMillis() - 24L * 60L * 60L * 1000L
* limitBridgeSanitizingInterval);

final long MIN_CUT_TIME = 94668479L;
if (cutTime > MIN_CUT_TIME) {
  this.bridgeSanitizingCutOffTimestamp = formatter.format(cutTime);
} else {
  this.bridgeSanitizingCutOffTimestamp = "1999-12-31 23:59:59";
}
 }}}

 Does this make sense?  If so, want to submit another patch?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20210: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:21 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:18 gk]:
 > >
 > > Hm. We need the signed .dmg files anyway and just copying all the .bz2
 bundles over as well to solve the permission problem seems to be a bit of
 over-engineering to me. What speaks against adjusting the permissions with
 the `dmg2mars` script (if we can't solve this problem with `7z`)?
 >
 > Ah yes, fixing that issue by setting the permissions like `ddmg.sh` is
 doing should be simple. I think we can do that.
 >
 > If I understand the process we have correctly, we are creating
 `*-signed.tar.bz2` files on the signing machine, we copy them over an
 other machine where we run a script to create the dmg files from the
 `*-signed.tar.bz2` files, and we then use `dmg2mar` to convert those dmg
 files to mar files. I was thinking that the creation of the dmg and the
 mar files could be done at the same time, but maybe that should be a
 separate ticket.

 Aha! Yes, this should be a separate ticket. The .bz2 thing is only a
 stopgap and is outside of the gitian machinery currently (and I hope we
 get to a point where we don't need it or a similar stopgap anymore but
 that is going to take a bit of time).

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[tor-bugs] #20282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: macOS 10.12 window handles incorrect function

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20282: macOS 10.12 window handles incorrect function
--+
 Reporter:  bitlox|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:  macOS sierra
  |  window
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In macOS 10.12 (Sierra) and tor browser 6.0.5 dragging of the window by
 the top does not work at all. Windows can only be dragged when the cursor
 is positioned over the top or bottom edge (where it changes to the
 vertical resize cursor icon)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays (and bridges) don't use microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6769: Relays (and bridges) don't use microdescriptors
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


Comment:

 Calling this merge-ready, but for 0.3.0. I predict that there will be at
 least one impressively weird implication of removing the server_mode()
 check in we_use_microdescriptors_for_circuits().

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16102 [Archived/operations]: Get another person on donations@

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16102: Get another person on donations@
-+---
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This whole thing changed with the donation campaign system as well as by
 hiring Jon :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16095 [Archived/operations]: Another related expense: $4k for two more videos by Kajart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16095: Another related expense: $4k for two more videos by Kajart
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16092   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This money was received and the video has been produced and published.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16040 [Archived/operations]: Test passwords

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16040: Test passwords
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16039   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Not sure if this still makes sense.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16036 [Archived/operations]: Sponsor T financial report

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16036: Sponsor T financial report
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  sponsorT |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Closing this ticket. We ended this contract and the report has been
 submitted.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16037 [Archived/operations]: Organize Tor Dev meeting (late august/ early september)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16037: Organize Tor Dev meeting (late august/ early september)
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16219 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Evaluate trac plugins to make sure they are secure to use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16219: Evaluate trac plugins to make sure they are secure to use
--+
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16218| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18742 [Archived/operations]: Update PGP Key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18742: Update PGP Key
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13893 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser crashes on start when using MS EMET 5.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13893: Torbrowser crashes on start when using MS EMET 5.x
-+-
 Reporter:  Diapolo  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-crash, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  usability-stoppoint-app, fuck-mingw-gcc,   |
  GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201610R   |
Parent ID:  #12820   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunx):

 Your nightly works also on Windows 7 32 bit with EMET 5.1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17100 [Archived/operations]: Make a way to show donations momentum on the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17100: Make a way to show donations momentum on the website
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This is part of the work Giant Rabbit will be doing for our donation
 platform.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16041 [Archived/operations]: Finalize org structure for Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16041: Finalize org structure for Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This was the vegas plan! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16096 [Archived/operations]: CloudFlare captchas

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16096: CloudFlare captchas
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 A lot has happened since this was first created. There is an email list
 just for this subject and ongoing conversations between both party.
 Closing this ticket as new things are being followed somewhere else.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20264 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reduce number of security slider states from 4 to 3 (proposed)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20264: Reduce number of security slider states from 4 to 3 (proposed)
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fem):

 I think it's a good idea as the only difference between Medium-Low and
 Medium-High is that Medium-Low disables some JS performance optimizations
 (ION JIT, Type Inference, ASM.JS) while Medium-High disables all js
 optimizations (..., Baseline JIT) in addition to all js on non-https sites
 by default and SVG OpenType font rendering.

 The differences with Low would then be that Medium makes html5 media
 click-to-play, disables MathML and blocking JAR files (which there's
 another ticket open discussing dropping the option from the slider,
 enabling it by default).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra, macOS  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: boklm (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20219 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Redirect alpha and hardened channels to dist.tpo rather than aus1.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20219: Redirect alpha and hardened channels to dist.tpo rather than aus1.tpo
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * keywords:   => tbb-sandboxing


Comment:

 The Linux sandbox launcher currently refuses to do the version check
 because it does not (and probably will not) be willing to follow
 redirects.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: macOS 10.12 window handles incorrect function

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20282: macOS 10.12 window handles incorrect function
--+---
 Reporter:  bitlox|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  macOS sierra window   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #20204

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[tor-bugs] #20283 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser should run without a `/proc` filesystem.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20283: Tor Browser should run without a `/proc` filesystem.
--+
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Currently Tor Browser crashes immediately on startup if a proc filesystem
 is not mounted on `/proc`.  This also affects the upstream firefox code,
 so it technically is a Mozilla bug.

 {{{
 too much recursion
 Segmentation fault (core dumped)
 }}}

 `/proc` contains a large amount of information about the host system that
 can be used to fingerprint/identify users and additionally historically
 has been the source or part of many kernel security problems.

 While this problem can be mitigated by a MAC system (eg: AppArmor) to
 constrain what Firefox can access under `/proc`, the ideal fix is for
 Firefox to support running without `/proc`, while degrading gracefully
 (there is no truly ubiquitous MAC system available on all common Linux
 distributions by default, and the problem is severe enough that it should
 be resolved correctly).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20204: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: bitlox (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20204: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Resolved #20282 as duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra, macOS  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:21 tordevSZ0]:
 > Is there any news on this? Can someone else test this? Mac tor users in
 countries where tor is blocked rely on meek.

 We talked about it in [http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-dev/2016/tor-
 dev.2016-10-03-18.01.log.html the Tor Browser meeting today]. The next
 step is to try to reliably reproduce the behavior you reported.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20083 [Applications/Tor Browser]: `app.update.enabled` should remove updater UI elements when set to false.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20083: `app.update.enabled` should remove updater UI elements when set to 
false.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by yawning):

 * keywords:   => tbb-sandboxing


Comment:

 This also applies to the Tor Button menu entry `Check for Tor Browser
 Update` and the `about:tor` built in version check with the black arrow of
 doom.

 Not sure what the best way to approach this is.  Preferably all of this
 will be env var driven so the Linux sandbox doesn't need to write out a
 `prefs.js` file on bundle install, but I'm flexible at this point.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15786 [Archived/operations]: Change name or take down Google Chrome extension Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15786: Change name or take down Google Chrome extension Tor
-+--
 Reporter:  sambuddhabasu|  Owner:  wseltzer
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by wseltzer):

 Thanks Isa for bringing it to my attention. I reported today. You can
 close the ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pingl):

 Thanks for guiding me during the process :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20210: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:20 gk]:
 > We set them already before creating the .dmg file with the `ddmg.sh`
 script, no?

 I might be overlooking something, but it looks like ddmg.sh relies on some
 of the mode bits being correct in order to determine which files should
 have mode 0755, etc. Since the exec bits are lost during the 7z extraction
 process, I don't think ddmg.sh will work as-is (but I have not tried it).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > Roger, what happens with this patch if a client doesn't actually have
 any bridges that support microdescriptors?  Is that now impossible?

 Yes, every supported directory cache version supports microdescriptors
 (and if some custom version doesn't, it will be a useless bridge):
 {{{
  Tor 0.2.3.25, the first stable release in the 0.2.3 branch, features
   significantly reduced directory overhead (via microdescriptors),
 }}}

 And in 0.2.7.1-alpha:
 {{{
 - Tor no longer contains checks for ancient directory cache versions
   that didn't know about microdescriptors.
 }}}

 So we could have removed this check back in 0.2.7.

 > Other than that, I think we can merge this (if not the rest of #6769)
 into 0.2.9

 Yes, it is safe to default to microdesc consensuses.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, but what will actually happen if a new client (with this patch)
 tries to run with an 0.2.2.x bridge?  That will break, right?

 If so, are we okay with that breaking?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:9 nickm]:
 > Okay, but what will actually happen if a new client (with this patch)
 tries to run with an 0.2.2.x bridge?  That will break, right?
 >
 > If so, are we okay with that breaking?

 Yes, but we should log a warning to the client saying the bridge is too
 old.
 (We should reject the bridge's descriptor in 0.2.9 anyway, as it doesn't
 have an ntor key.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20210: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:23 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:20 gk]:
 > > We set them already before creating the .dmg file with the `ddmg.sh`
 script, no?
 >
 > I might be overlooking something, but it looks like ddmg.sh relies on
 some of the mode bits being correct in order to determine which files
 should have mode 0755, etc. Since the exec bits are lost during the 7z
 extraction process, I don't think ddmg.sh will work as-is (but I have not
 tried it).

 I think you are right, `ddmg.sh` is using `find $@ -executable` to find
 which files to change.

 I can see two options to fix this permissions problem:
 - generate the new mar files using the `*-signed.tar.bz2` files instead of
 the .dmg files
 - generate them from the .dmg files, and extract the old mar file to
 replicate the file permissions from the old mar file to the new one

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays (and bridges) don't use microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6769: Relays (and bridges) don't use microdescriptors
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:10 nickm]:
 > Calling this merge-ready, but for 0.3.0. I predict that there will be at
 least one impressively weird implication of removing the server_mode()
 check in we_use_microdescriptors_for_circuits().

 ++

 I predict one weird but very minor impact:
 * some DirPort reachability checks will fail, because relays will
 occasionally choose a relay that exits to their DirPort for most of the
 world, but not their address
   * in the rare cases where this does happen, there might be a short delay
 to relay initial bootstrap while the relay retries another exit
   * this has less impact on bridges, as they don't need a DirPort
   * relays only do reachability checks once, just after they start, so
 this has no ongoing impact for running relays

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[tor-bugs] #20284 [Core Tor/Tor]: consensus weight case 2b3 does not follow dir-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20284: consensus weight case 2b3 does not follow dir-spec
--+-
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n2681 dir-
 spec] says the following.

 {{{
 If M > T/3, then the Wmd weight above will become negative. Set it to 0
 in this case:
Wmd = 0
Wgd = weight_scale - Wed
 }}}

 The code dutifully sets `Wmd` to 0, but neglects `Wgd`.

 I assume the spec is correct and the intended behavior. Branch incoming
 once I get a ticket number.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20284 [Core Tor/Tor]: consensus weight case 2b3 does not follow dir-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20284: consensus weight case 2b3 does not follow dir-spec
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/pastly/public-tor/tree/ticket20284

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[tor-bugs] #20285 [Core Tor/Tor]: can't create valid case 2b3 consens weight calculation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20285: can't create valid case 2b3 consens weight calculation
--+-
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Even if #20284 is fixed, I still can come up with values that produce a
 `Wed` that is too large. Maybe I'm not trying hard enough, but I can't get
 case 2b3 to execute successfully.

 For example, let

 {{{
 M=80
 E=20
 G=30
 D=10
 T=M+E+G+D
 }}}

 In case 2b2, `Wed = (weight_scale*(D - 2*E + G + M))/(3*D) = 26667`.
 That's bigger than `weight_scale`. It (and `Wmd`) trigger case 2b3, which
 doesn't do anything about a too large `Wed` and thus
 `networkstatus_check_weights()` fails.

 I admit I don't know how reasonable the values are that I came up with
 above. I am writing test cases so #14881 can be closed though, and just
 about any weird combination should be handled without failing. Right?

 I don't know what the correct resolution is, so not patch/branch incoming
 at this time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20183 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Only recreate the incremental OS X MAR files if we need to take OS X signatures into account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20183: Only recreate the incremental OS X MAR files if we need to take OS X
signatures into account
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201610R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-gitian => tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201610R


Comment:

 The branch `bug_20183` in my git repository has a patch for this:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_20183

 I checked that when running `make dmg2mars-alpha` on this branch, only the
 OSX mar files a recreated.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20273 [Core Tor/Tor]: consensus weight inaccuracies: 1 --> weight_scale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20273: consensus weight inaccuracies: 1 --> weight_scale
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay ignore the patches. I've pushed a branch for tor and a branch for
 torspec. They should incorporate the patches and more.

 https://github.com/pastly/public-tor/tree/ticket20273
 https://github.com/pastly/torspec/tree/ticket20273

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,   |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan, |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604, review-group-9   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I've updated my [https://github.com/pastly/public-tor/tree/ticket14881-v2
 public branch] with tests. In comments I mention limitations due to #20272
 and #20285.

 teor: you mention it would be nice to have a test with values from a
 recent consensus. I agree. Where can I find recent real input values `M`,
 `G`, etc. that went into producing `Wxx` values? Will an authority need to
 be nice and share a line from his log with us?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10353 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Cookie Protection dialog is empty in FF24

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10353: Cookie Protection dialog is empty in FF24
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff24-esr, tbb-usability, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  helpdesk-frequent, tbb-torbutton,  |
  AffectsTails, ff52-esr-will-have   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 ff24-esr, tbb-usability, tbb-helpdesk-frequent, tbb-torbutton,
 AffectsTails
 =>
 ff24-esr, tbb-usability, tbb-helpdesk-frequent, tbb-torbutton,
 AffectsTails, ff52-esr-will-have


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20258 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make the Tor archive on OS X reproducible as well

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20258: Make the Tor archive on OS X reproducible as well
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, GeorgKoppen201609,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Applied to master with commit bfecaab2a6585e958bfbad9cd70fc9dfb5d2aad7,
 thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write "how to be nice to the Tor network" spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7106: Write "how to be nice to the Tor network" spec
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ tor-client tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > "how to be nice to the Tor network"

 lurk and surf

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pingl):

 Ok! I added the changes file changes/ticket20151.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20204: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. I take that for the next alpha (commits
 4dc2922a3071f1789cb0078809e4b28c48fb3922,
 037b95c9574e274274441a17d3f304d529417f7d and
 7298e8412e723ff90d74dd06124f8b1ae7e12980 on tor-browser-45.4.0esr-6.5-1)
 but am not sure about the stable yet. mcs: do you think we should just
 take those patches there, too, without further testing?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7168 [Metrics/Torperf]: Get Torperf results to be more realistic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7168: Get Torperf results to be more realistic
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Torperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * keywords:  SponsorZ =>


Comment:

 We're about to phase out Torperf and switch over to OnionPerf, so there's
 no need to find funding for this anymore.  Removing the SponsorZ keyword.
 Thanks for asking.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19922 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: server set up for giant rabit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19922: server set up for giant rabit
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isabela):

 Server A:
 crm.torproject.org
 staging.crm.torproject.org
 test.crm.torproject.org

 Server B:
 donate.torproject.org
 staging.donate.torproject.org
 test.donate.torproject.org


 * database and username for mariaDB on gillii.
 We'll need 3 databases:
 tor_prod
 tor_stag
 tor_test
 Username:
 www-data

 Tickets for accounts:

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7177 [Metrics/Torflow]: Understand how accurate the bandwidth authority estimates are

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7177: Understand how accurate the bandwidth authority estimates are
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  aagbsn
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by karsten):

 * keywords:  SponsorZ =>


Comment:

 This sounds like it should be part of a larger project to improve the
 bandwidth authority code.  Funding for this ticket alone doesn't make much
 sense.  Removing the SponsorZ keyword.  Thanks for asking.

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[tor-bugs] #20280 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Tor Messenger - prefs.label & language

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20280: Tor Messenger - prefs.label & language
+-
 Reporter:  OpenPony|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Major   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 Error on prefs.label on OTR sessions :
 XML Parsing Error: undefined entity
 Location: chrome://otr/content/prefs.xul
 Line Number 6, Column 1:https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20280>
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[tor-bugs] #20281 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please make the following user accounts for GiantRabbit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20281: Please make the following user accounts for GiantRabbit
-+
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #19922
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 User accounts:
 name: Peter Haight
 email: pet...@giantrabbit.com,
 PGP fingerprint: 4F95 A91F 7B34 8723 0BC9 CCF5 B5FB 9E3E 3661 A436
 username: peterh

 name: Ben Wheeler
 email: bwhee...@giantrabbit.com
 PGP fingerprint: E7CC 8108 A3A5 285B 84F3  EC17 14F6 1726 6D4E EB80
 username: bwheeler
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJX8lCqAAoJEDIkSZQVBkx74zoP/2Chx3eSkwX9iGq7nZ5YtYjg
 pgb1YbZW3s4nNLfuiRpabFUKqxCWT4i+C802lXVJHRq8FftNK5CscyZgLmC+IA0E
 9S8RJu19h/r4hb1pVtU27pbTqBQ68/CHAV5ug430Ef5qnCXqWtnxHV22G3m4Plna
 bugXEeHgQTr02ZLy1Va3moWf2+LEhsnMSRRp3DIQ822OsTXfqWp3V11YPFOTq3Ye
 uoHuM4PibOqvR2jSjBlnCzEbeYBcKGbCtTqhljgMvn8aQ512dak1J/v352nB8uYJ
 78xaO2IUz82yBhdD/esgGgMIR1ACYkpZXl4eiS8BYtN98R8/8KF5BFU51Fpag4A9
 s5d7OFQ8Zc6n0uuB2GUu2zfzNDM8U9ZxjzlYpCenpF4UdtndjHuNGlbsOSvKZVgs
 KGQYRfPJ6vAoDaalUVydlyQb77568vNa4gaWymWedgax/JUO6bVbPhdlGi75p2Mf
 4P03yfYZwA0mBDqR7IbBltI0NrjEjolQCydP6lxMjsgwVHIcUjVLgPa+fymfqePh
 /soe3ujgu2qtFBA4XWL4TkeycTQI1xffM4jrIGqngIE3o6wKRMjxexU7VfKtBdtj
 u9gtC10o7b71mGuu7MNBoscJeF9MSlnWY61lHe+qx/NRmz7P6Ka0E1RPE5YsfVR1
 8UW6IeyYDw/cKXhGdGUZ
 =5Gzd
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20210: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:17 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:10 mcs]:
 > > Replying to [comment:7 mcs]:
 > > > The file permission/mode problem may be related to #19410 (but I
 have no proof).
 > >
 > > Kathy and I have confirmed that file mode is lost inside dmg2mar
 during the 7z extraction step. Unless there is a 7z option to preserve
 this, it is probably a bug in 7z. In the short run, maybe we can:
 >
 > As part of the OS X signing process, we are creating `*-signed.tar.bz2`
 files containg the code signed OS X bundles, and we have a script that use
 them to create the .dmg files. Rather than using the dmg files (and 7z to
 extract them) as the source to create the code signed mar files, we should
 maybe use the `*-signed.tar.bz2` files instead.

 Hm. We need the signed .dmg files anyway and just copying all the .bz2
 bundles over as well to solve the permission problem seems to be a bit of
 over-engineering to me. What speaks against adjusting the permissions with
 the `dmg2mars` script (if we can't solve this problem with `7z`)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20264 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reduce number of security slider states from 4 to 3 (proposed)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20264: Reduce number of security slider states from 4 to 3 (proposed)
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 I think this is a good idea. I am not sure yet, though, whether we should
 put that on our October plate given all the loose ends with our SponsorU
 funding. But it could be something for Tor Browser 6.5. Adapting the code
 for just 3 settings for Android should not be that hard.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,   |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan, |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604, review-group-9   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: arma (added)
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:44 pastly]:
 > I've updated my [https://github.com/pastly/public-
 tor/tree/ticket14881-v2 public branch] with tests. In comments I mention
 limitations due to #20272 and #20285.

 Thanks for these!

 Code review:

 {{{
 -static int
 +int
  networkstatus_compute_bw_weights_v10(smartlist_t *chunks, int64_t G,
 }}}

 should replace static with STATIC. STATIC means "static when building tor,
 but available when building unit tests".

 Otherwise this looks good.

 > teor: you mention it would be nice to have a test with values from a
 recent consensus. I agree. Where can I find recent real input values `M`,
 `G`, etc. that went into producing `Wxx` values? Will an authority need to
 be nice and share a line from his log with us?

 That might be the easiest way - we could ask arma, who runs a recent
 directory authority, often at detailed log levels. Or we could write a
 script that downloads a consensus and does that calculation manually.
 Asking arma might be easier!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds mocked functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16869: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds 
mocked
functions
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  unittests |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by asn):

 Thanks for fixing this! It has been very annoying! I verified that the
 patch works by ctagging a few functions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20284 [Core Tor/Tor]: consensus weight case 2b3 does not follow dir-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20284: consensus weight case 2b3 does not follow dir-spec
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * cc: mikeperry (added)
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


Comment:

 This looks like a simple fix, and it seems to work, but I'm hesitant to
 apply it late in 0.2.9.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20285 [Core Tor/Tor]: can't create valid case 2b3 consens weight calculation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20285: can't create valid case 2b3 consens weight calculation
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: mikeperry (added)
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20030 [Obfuscation/meek]: meek-http-helper doesn't shutdown cleanly in 6.5a1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20030: meek-http-helper doesn't shutdown cleanly in 6.5a1
--+
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 arlolra]:
 > > arlolra, if you want to test this, you can just go build in the meek-
 client-torbrowser subdirectory, then copy meek-client-torbrowser into your
 bundle directory.
 >
 > Yup, seems to work.

 Thanks, merged in [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/commit/?id=125b0ca14312085def735bc8c239097972a166c5
 125b0ca1].

 Replying to [comment:8 yawning]:
 > You can and should do better on Linux, than just ignoring SIGPIPE (which
 is necessary for OSX).
 > {{{
 > cmd = exec.Command(absFirefoxPath, "--invisible", "-no-remote",
 "-profile", profilePath)
 > cmd.SysProcAttr = { Pdeathsig: syscall.SIGTERM}
 > }}}

 Good idea, did this in [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/commit/?id=a3cc514d6b85160ee01921e2cb514049391360c3
 a3cc514d].

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