Re: [tor-bugs] #31666 [Applications/Tor Browser]: font whitelists: add EmojiOne Mozilla

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31666: font whitelists: add EmojiOne Mozilla
--+--
 Reporter:  Thorin|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > That's for Linux and Windows only, anyways, though...
 For now, but also they are moving to
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1336208

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31713 [Core Tor/Tor]: Automatically rectify include paths before every commit

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31713: Automatically rectify include paths before every commit
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29226| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Yes, let's do that, and then we'll shake out a lot of the bugs in
 autostyling before the big restyle.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31657 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rephrase "missing descriptors" notice log to be less confusing

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31657: Rephrase "missing descriptors" notice log to be less confusing
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-0421, fast-  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  fix, log, tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client,   |
  BugSmashFund, 042-should 041-backport? |
  040-backport? 035-backport?|
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 fast-fix, log, tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client, BugSmashFund,
 042-should 041-backport? 040-backport? 035-backport?
 =>
 consider-backport-after-0421, fast-fix, log, tor-guard, tor-bridge,
 tor-client, BugSmashFund, 042-should 041-backport? 040-backport?
 035-backport?


Comment:

 If a backport stops us getting one more bug report, I think the cost of
 the backport would be worthwhile.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across defaults, torrc, command line

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31637: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across
defaults, torrc, command line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:14 nickm]:
 > Okay, I did a less big test suite than I had expected here, but I
 believe it covers +Option and /Option.
 >
 > I'm not sure how exactly to make it handle `%include` though -- The
 problem is that `%include` relative paths are apparently interpreted
 relative to Tor's cwd.

 Oh dear. I thought we tried to stop using the cwd for everything.

 Maybe we should open a ticket to run tests from an empty temp cwd, so we
 catch issues like this in future.

 > I think my options are:
 >   * Defer integration testing for `%include` directives.

 Adds risk to refactoring, let's try something else first.

 >   * Make sure that the test script runs from a known location inside the
 source directory.

 Good idea, and probably something we want to do for test stability anyway.

 >   * Add a step to generate the `%include` paths in our examples before
 we run the test scripts.

 Yeah let's not unless we have to: unless we get that step exactly right,
 it could cause instability or failures.

 >   * Open a ticket to change how relative paths are interpreted by
 `%include`.

 Yes I think we should do this long-term.

 > I think that the second idea is reasonable for now, but the fourth might
 be what we want to do long-term.  What do you think?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31666 [Applications/Tor Browser]: font whitelists: add EmojiOne Mozilla

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31666: font whitelists: add EmojiOne Mozilla
--+--
 Reporter:  Thorin|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 I wondered when that was changed - thanks. I see no reason not to patch
 this for Windows and Linux users at a minimum. Adding `Twemoji Mozilla`
 (with a space in it) gives `~2501/2575`

 Mac: `Apple Color Emoji`? But I'm not sure if that's consistent per
 release (updated?)
 - see https://ghacksuserjs.github.io/TorZillaPrint/txt/fonts_mac_all.txt
 for sources
 - 10.9: `8.0d7e1`, 10.12: `12.0d11e1, 10.13 + 10.14: `13.2d1e1`

 Android: not my area. Any reason besides the size, not to bundle with all
 platforms?

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[tor-bugs] #31727 [- Select a component]: tor

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31727: tor
+--
 Reporter:  kain3e  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 tor is not opening i have mac book how do i fix it says the file is
 damaged...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Print summary of features at end of configure

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31373: Print summary of features at end of configure
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  configure, build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Author merged the special permission to the file: https://git.lttng.org/?p
 =lttng-
 
tools.git;a=blob;f=m4/pprint.m4;h=a18a2ac6bf73bcc6bf42730eb9c08344cc2e25f8;hb=HEAD

 So we can proceed with this. I've pushed the update on the branch rebased
 on master and with the new license from upstream.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31692 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Upgrade obfs4 Docker image to Debian buster

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31692: Upgrade obfs4 Docker image to Debian buster
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 Merged the patches into [https://dip.torproject.org/torproject/anti-
 censorship/docker-obfs4-bridge/commits/master docker-obfs4-bridge] and
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/web/community.git/commit/?id=315fcc6bd4d2b6607d8a8b441ddd8036411af110
 updated our website].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across defaults, torrc, command line

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31637: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across
defaults, torrc, command line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, I did a less big test suite than I had expected here, but I believe
 it covers +Option and /Option.

 I'm not sure how exactly to make it handle `%include` though -- The
 problem is that `%include` relative paths are apparently interpreted
 relative to Tor's cwd.  I think my options are:
   * Defer integration testing for `%include` directives.
   * Make sure that the test script runs from a known location inside the
 source directory.
   * Add a step to generate the `%include` paths in our examples before we
 run the test scripts.
   * Open a ticket to change how relative paths are interpreted by
 `%include`.

 I think that the second idea is reasonable for now, but the fourth might
 be what we want to do long-term.  What do you think?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across defaults, torrc, command line

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31637: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across
defaults, torrc, command line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've messed around with the branch and tried to fix the issues -- then I
 tried to fix the issues caused by fixing those issues .

 I'm going to start writing a nice big test suite here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31475 [Core Tor/Tor]: config: stop using atof()

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31475: config: stop using atof()
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I agree with your observation about overflow/underflow: I'll try to fix
 those.

 I don't think that checking the return value for 0 is a good idea though,
 for two reasons:
   1. Our compilers give warnings when you do an `==` comparison with two
 doubles, so we'd have to work around that.
   2. My understanding is that the only way that `*endptr` can be equal to
 `nptr` is if no input is converted at all. If any input is converted, then
 `*endptr` points to the first unconverted byte.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24653 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24653: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-torbutton, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  security-slider, tbb-parity,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:  #10760   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Fixed in https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commit/24653+1. Isn't
 `custom_summary` already the same as in torbutton?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31652 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Service circuit retry limit should not close a valid circuit

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31652: hs-v3: Service circuit retry limit should not close a valid circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit, 042-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30200   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Fixed it!

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[tor-bugs] #31726 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate using Snaps

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31726: Investigate using Snaps
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Should we distribute Tor Browser as a snap?

 https://snapcraft.io/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30683 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30683: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Replying to [comment:15 gk]:
 > Looks good. I wonder whether the ServiceWorker `ReportToAllClients()`
 messages are detectable from web content actually. Have we ruled that out?
 (while not being enabled in ESR 68 it will be for mobile IIRC).

 I think we are good. [https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 
esr68/rev/92032fc58f059a475a3f3999741fbd9d3c389b61/dom/serviceworkers/ServiceWorkerManager.cpp#1363
 LocalizeAndReportToAllClients] ends up calling [https://searchfox.org
 /mozilla-
 
esr68/rev/92032fc58f059a475a3f3999741fbd9d3c389b61/dom/console/ConsoleUtils.cpp#134
 ConsoleUtils.cpp] which seems it's only logging to console. I also tested
 a bit with the different error handlers in Service Workers and I could not
 get a localized message.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31725 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Macedonian 9.0a6 bundles are missing localized strings (was: Macedonian 9.0a6 bundles is missing localized strings)

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31725: Macedonian 9.0a6 bundles are missing localized strings
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31226 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: add validation checks in puppet

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31226: add validation checks in puppet
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 update: i'm using this fork of the validator: https://github.com/cmeissner
 /puppet-git-hooks

 it has a few improvements, most notably a better handling of missing yaml-
 lint requirements.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31672 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android: Onion Service authentication

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31672: Tor Browser for Android: Onion Service authentication
--+---
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 How are they using it now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29206 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: New design for client -- server protocol for Snowflake

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29206: New design for client -- server protocol for Snowflake
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-september  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  dcf|Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor28-must
---+---

Comment (by dcf):

 I would like there to be a paragraph-long or so comment at the top of
 snowflake-proto/proto.go that briefly explains how things work.

 `windowSize = 1500` seems small; it would only allow for ≈1 full-sized
 packet in flight at a time. (I realize `windowSize` is not used yet.)

 Does `SnowflakeConn.Conn` need to be exposed publicly? Maybe
 `NewSnowflakeConn` and `SnowflakeConn.NewSnowflake` should be the only
 ways to modify it externally.

 `LocalAddr`, `RemoteAddr` should return non-nil. They could pass through
 to `s.Conn.LocalAddr` and `s.Conn.RemoteAddr`, but maybe better is to have
 them return an `Addr` type that reflects the `sessionID`, because that is
 our persistent addressing abstraction over ephemeral network connections.
 Like:
 {{{
 type sessionAddr []byte;
 func (addr sessionAddr) Network() string {
 return "session"
 }
 func (addr sessionAddr) String() string {
 return string(addr)
 }
 }}}

 The `header.ack > s.acked` comparison looks like it will have problems
 with overflow. It probably ought to be something like `int32(header.ack -
 s.acked) > 0` instead. Same on the inside, it is probably important to use
 `int32` rather than `int`. There should be a test for it, too.
 {{{
 if header.ack > s.acked {
 // remove newly acknowledged bytes from buffer
 s.buf.Next(int(header.ack - s.acked))
 s.acked = header.ack
 }
 }}}

 You don't need an extra check here because
 [https://golang.org/pkg/io/#Writer io.Writer says] "Write must return a
 non-nil error if it returns n < len(p)."
 {{{
 //TODO: check to make sure we wrote out all of the bytes
 }}}

 > - SnowflakeConn now has a new method to set and reset the underlying
 connection. If there is buffered data, SnowflakeConn will resend that data
 under the same session ID whenever a new underlying connection has been
 specified

 The `NewSnowflake` function writes the locally buffered bytes directly to
 the underlying `Conn`, without prepending new headers as
 `SnowflakeConn.Write` does. I expected it to chop up the buffer into new
 packets and send them with headers (and up-to-date ack numbers).

 `io.ReadFull(r, b)` would be more clear than `io.ReadAtLeast(r, b,
 len(b))`.
 {{{
 b := make([]byte, snowflakeHeaderLen, snowflakeHeaderLen)
 _, err := io.ReadAtLeast(r, b, snowflakeHeaderLen)
 }}}

 I don't think this is worth checking for in `SnowflakeConn.Read`. I would
 just let it crash. Or else, panic instead of returning an error. In any
 case, a check on `s.Conn` would be better in `readLoop` than `Read`,
 because `Read` does not even access `s.Conn`. A better overall design may
 be to have `NewSnowflakeConn` take a `Conn` as a parameter, so that it's
 impossible to create one that's uninitialized.
 {{{
 if s.Conn == nil {
 return 0, fmt.Errorf("No network connection to read from
 ")
 }
 }}}

 Replying to [comment:23 cohosh]:
 > The next step of course is to allow for resetting the underlying
 connection in SnowflakeConn and using the sessionID to correlate new
 connections with old ones. There's going to have to be some tricky
 refactoring here. Right now when the webrtc connection times out (due to
 staleness), both the webrtc connection and the socks connection are closed
 and the client waits for a new socks connection to open. The SnowflakeConn
 should be persistent across snowflakes (and the way it is currently set up
 perhaps also across SOCKS connections (??)), so the question is where
 SnowflakeConn should "live".
 >
 > I'm thinking of adding a new method to SnowflakeCollector that will set
 (and reset) the underlying connection, and then modifying the
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/sequencing/client/lib/snowflake.go#L24
 Handler function] to redefine the snowflake rather than closing the SOCKS
 connection and waiting for a new one. This doesn't fit perfectly with what
 I'd assume a SnowflakeCollector does by name, but then again maybe it
 does. This would make 

Re: [tor-bugs] #31666 [Applications/Tor Browser]: font whitelists: add EmojiOne Mozilla

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31666: font whitelists: add EmojiOne Mozilla
--+--
 Reporter:  Thorin|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 I guess that's `TwemojiMozilla.ttf` now, given
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1358240? That's for Linux and
 Windows only, anyways, though...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31475 [Core Tor/Tor]: config: stop using atof()

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31475: config: stop using atof()
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Did a review and left a comment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31724 [Webpages/Website]: Localizations not working

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31724: Localizations not working
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * cc: ggus (removed)
 * resolution:  not a bug =>


Comment:

 Well, it's a bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31724 [Webpages/Website]: Localizations not working

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31724: Localizations not working
--+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 The translation switch is working, but currently this website is being
 translated and some sections are still under development (Training, Onion
 Services, Outreach).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30468 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship macedonian Tor Browser in alpha series

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30468: Ship macedonian Tor Browser in alpha series
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  localization,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907R, GeorgKoppen201907   |
Parent ID:  #29935   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Indeed, that's weird. I've opened #31725, thanks.

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[tor-bugs] #31725 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Macedonian 9.0a6 bundles is missing localized strings

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31725: Macedonian 9.0a6 bundles is missing localized strings
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-9.0-must-alpha
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.25 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 It turns out that for some reason Macedonian is not properly localized on
 9.0a6. Other locales don't suffer from this problem, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31652 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Service circuit retry limit should not close a valid circuit

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31652: hs-v3: Service circuit retry limit should not close a valid circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit, 042-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30200   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Close but slight problem!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31570 [Core Tor/Tor]: INTERNAL ERROR: raw assertion failed (core dump) in termux

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31570: INTERNAL ERROR: raw assertion failed (core dump) in termux
-+-
 Reporter:  foremtehan   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  042-should, regression?, mmap,   |  Actual Points:  .1
  android, crash BugSmashFund dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31571 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add the tor version and a newline to raw_assert()

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31571: Add the tor version and a newline to raw_assert()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-042-stable,  |  Actual Points:  0.3
  BugSmashFund, diagnostics, android, dgoulet-   |
  merge, macos 035-backport 040-backport |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #31570 =>


Comment:

 Unparenting so I can close parent that was just merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31626 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move confparse.[ch] into lib/confmgt

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31626: Move confparse.[ch] into lib/confmgt
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  042-should dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31724 [Webpages/Website]: Localizations not working

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31724: Localizations not working
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:1 ggus]:
 > Hi, in which website(s) this is happening?

 Sorry, I forgot to include that! I found this problem on
 https://community.torproject.org

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31724 [Webpages/Website]: Localizations not working

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31724: Localizations not working
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by ggus):

 Hi, in which website(s) this is happening?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31692 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Upgrade obfs4 Docker image to Debian buster

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31692: Upgrade obfs4 Docker image to Debian buster
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good, built the container and it appears to be working!

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[tor-bugs] #31724 [Webpages/Website]: Localizations not working

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31724: Localizations not working
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Selecting another language from the drop-down list does not reload the
 page with the new language.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19332 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add a BridgeDB module

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19332: Add a BridgeDB module
-+-
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2, anti-   |  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-september   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 These changes look good to me.

 Since all logs (including previously rotated ones) are synced each time
 with rsync, is there a way to detect if old logs have been corrupted and
 are overwriting the previously synced logs? Not sure how we want to handle
 a case where logs that have previously been synced have changed for some
 reason, or what the easiest way to deal with this is.

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[tor-bugs] #31722 [Webpages/Website]: make a new product assignment page

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31722: make a new product assignment page
--+--
 Reporter:  anarcat   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 During the Stockholm meeting, the TPA team identified there were many
 sources of "service lists" in the wiki (and elsewhere). As part of #31261,
 some work was done to clean that up. One of the pages that remained after
 the work is this one:

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/operations/ProductsandAssignments

 Apparently, this could be covered by the new developer website, and I was
 told to open a ticket to track that work.

 So basically, I think the job is to convert the above wiki page into
 something in the new developer website.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19417 [Applications/Tor Browser]: asm.js files should be no linkability risk

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19417: asm.js files should be no linkability risk
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201609,  |  Actual Points:
  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 How were `typeinference`, `native_regexp`, `baselinejit` & `ion` checked?

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[tor-bugs] #31723 [Community/Training]: design help documents for the help service and provide support for new users

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31723: design help documents for the help service and provide support for new
users
+
 Reporter:  anarcat |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Training  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:  #30608
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 As part of the new email service, we might get more people unfamiliar with
 the LDAP infrastructure on board. The TPA team will need help onboarding
 those people.

 Furthermore, this is a new configuration for many people, and we might
 need to design documents like "How do i connect to the Tor SMTP server
 with Thunderbird" or "Gmail" and so on.

 I'm not sure if I'm filing this in the right place but anyways: the point
 is, we'll need help with training and documentation if we want this ship
 to sail. :)

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31261 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: cleanup services inventories in the wiki

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31261: cleanup services inventories in the wiki
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 product assignments will be cleared out by
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31722

 i need to look at the hosts page next.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30857 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30857: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tickets-migration|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29400   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 re the webhooks configuration, the Debian Perl team has this program which
 installs a kgb hook automatically and does other things:

 https://manpages.debian.org/buster/pkg-perl-tools/dpt-salsa.1.en.html

 it's part of the pkg-perl-tools debian package and might need a little bit
 of configuration to do what we want, but it's a thing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19417 [Applications/Tor Browser]: asm.js files should be no linkability risk

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19417: asm.js files should be no linkability risk
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201609,  |  Actual Points:
  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:40 acat]:
 > I do not see any asm.js cache, disk or in-memory.
 >
 > It's not a strong proof, but I did a quick test with
 https://kripken.github.io/Massive/ (there are console logs with asm.js
 compilation time). Testing with Firefox 64, where caching was still
 enabled, shows that for cached asm.js loading time is much faster (like
 50ms vs 1000ms). In 68 there is no difference in times, either in PBM or
 "persisting" mode.
 >
 > Regarding comment:32, if the disk leak was solved (in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1047105), what were the FPI
 concerns back then? Was there an in-memory cache that did not respect FPI?

 Well, it was not really solved as you would get the problem again when not
 being in PBM. If there is no in-memory cache (anymore), good. So asm.js
 files are just loaded on the fly and executed? If there is no storage
 involved and no identifier read-back/extraction over domains, great. Then
 we are done with the FPI concern. If we enable it again we should make
 sure it's disabled on safer and safest levels, though, I think (as it was
 before).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24653 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24653: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-torbutton, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  security-slider, tbb-parity,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:  #10760   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:
 tbb-mobile, tbb-torbutton, tbb-security-slider, tbb-parity,
 TorBrowserTeam201909, TorBrowserTeam201909R
 =>
 tbb-mobile, tbb-torbutton, tbb-security-slider, tbb-parity,
 TorBrowserTeam201909


Comment:

 Okay, the Torbutton changes look good to me now. A small fixup for the
 browser patch is needed: please update the fallback strings for
 `click_to_play_media` and `custom_summary` according to the version that
 is in the `en-US` `torbutton.dtd` of your branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19417 [Applications/Tor Browser]: asm.js files should be no linkability risk

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19417: asm.js files should be no linkability risk
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201609,  |  Actual Points:
  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 I do not see any asm.js cache, disk or in-memory.

 It's not a strong proof, but I did a quick test with
 https://kripken.github.io/Massive/ (there are console logs with asm.js
 compilation time). Testing with Firefox 64, where caching was still
 enabled, shows that for cached asm.js loading time is much faster (like
 50ms vs 1000ms). In 68 there is no difference in times, either in PBM or
 "persisting" mode.

 Regarding comment:32, if the disk leak was solved (in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1047105), what were the FPI
 concerns back then? Was there an in-memory cache that did not respect FPI?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31601 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't let Mozilla recommend extensions again

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31601: Don't let Mozilla recommend extensions again
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
  -must-alpha, ff68-esr  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 Replying to [comment:5 acat]:
 > Thanks. I think `extensions.htmlaboutaddons.recommendations.enabled` is
 enough.

 Yes. Sorry about that. the `.enabled` pref wasn't added until after 68.0b9
 and I already had the other two pegged (because I'm that efficient!). They
 are indeed redundant

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31701 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Reachability tests for new obfs4 bridges

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31701: Reachability tests for new obfs4 bridges
---+
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  reachability, measurement  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by phw):

 Sounds good to me. I will extract a few and send them your way. I'm
 particularly interested in learning if our moat bucket is being scraped
 too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30462 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orbot, Tor Browser for Android (Alpha), Orfox don't work on Chrome OS

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30462: Orbot, Tor Browser for Android (Alpha), Orfox don't work on Chrome OS
--+---
 Reporter:  softwdensky   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I'm confused by your comment. Are you reporting a problem with Orfox or
 Orbot? With regard to Orbot, are you reporting apps can't access the
 internet when Orbot is running?

 Replying to [comment:4 Dabunne]:
 > I'm running orbot on a google android device and having this same
 problem.

 This seems like a very different problem compared with the original
 ticket. Can you provide more logs or information?

 >
 > I had Orfox before too. Recently Orfox reported an update was available,
 and after I updated it, it stopped working completely. When I tapped the
 icon a small message box would appear over the icon saying, "App doesn’t
 exist" or "Application doesn’t exist" ...something like that.

 How did you install Orfox? Did you use Google Play or another app store?
 Do you remember the date this began?

 >
 > then a week later, orfox and orbot both offered an update.

 Do you remember the date this happened? Orfox received an update recently,
 but it was many months between updates, so "a week later" is very
 suspicious and confusing.

 > I was hopeful. maybe that glitch on orfox was fixed. I updated both. Not
 only did the problem with the "non-existent" orfox persist, but I also
 started having a problem with orbot. I checked the bridges and there
 seemed to be some trouble there:
 > -Connect through community servers: This would stall, hang for 30 sec,
 then show a message: "FAILED. Try another option"
 > -Connect directly to Tor (Best): This gives an immediate message:
 "Success. Bridge Configuration is good." but the entire "Use Bridges"
 option is instantly turned off completely when this option is chosen.
 > -Connect through cloud servers: This gives an immediate message:
 "Success. Bridge Configuration is good." and the "Use Bridges" option
 stays active. It was even working for a while.. then I restarted my phone
 today and now all I get is this message: "NOTICE: Application request when
 we haven't used client functionality lately. Optimistically trying known
 bridges again."

 This is usually a normal message and it can be ignored.

 >
 > I did not update anything else on my phone.
 > I can use internet without issue when I reboot the device and make sure
 orbot never loads up on reboot, but turning orbot off while the device is
 running doesn’t restore internet functionality.
 > My connection to WiFi is not changed, and the router still has internet
 as other devices access internet easily.
 > it appears as if something "unknown" and not reported in the orbot logs,
 is being run when I start orbot.
 >
 > Did Google find a way to block Tor so that they could track their users
 even more? Are people infiltrating and secretly creating code for Tor
 tools that disables them? Is there a 3rd party back door hack going on
 that creates a **false** update for Tor tools?

 No, this is extremely unlikely.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30870 [Applications/Orbot]: Default obfs4 bridges are all offline

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30870: Default obfs4 bridges are all offline
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:5 n8fr8]:
 > Why is it so hard to keep good obfs4 bridges online? It is frustrating
 that we have to keep changing these.
 [[br]]
 The last few disappeared because 1) one operator's server contract
 expired, 2) another operator wanted to reduce his maintenance burden, and
 3) several default bridges disappeared without anyone noticing, so we
 removed them.
 [[br]]
 > I am not even talking about "unblocked in China", I just mean reliably
 running. What is the expected life time of an obfs4 bridge?
 [[br]]
 The longer, the better. We are in touch with a bunch of research groups
 who are interested in setting up a default bridge (e.g., #31164).
 Hopefully, this will result in several new and long-lived bridges.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27399 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Leading Orfox users to Tor Browser Android

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27399: Leading Orfox users to Tor Browser Android
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 \o/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27399 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Leading Orfox users to Tor Browser Android

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27399: Leading Orfox users to Tor Browser Android
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 With the final Orfox update released, this is finished!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29955 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Final Orfox update

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29955: Final Orfox update
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:  #27399   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is completed! Some users are sad, as expected :(

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31351 [Applications/Tor Browser]: localization orfoxRIP

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31351: localization orfoxRIP
+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel|  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29955  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31351 [Applications/Tor Browser]: localization orfoxRIP

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31351: localization orfoxRIP
+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel|  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29955  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I'm going to assume this is done :) woo!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31594 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close all the log fds before aborting

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31594: Close all the log fds before aborting
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, consider-backport-if-   |  Actual Points:  0.9
  needed, consider-backport-after-042-stable,|
  042-should, android, macos, 040-backport-  |
  maybe, 041-backport-maybe, BugSmashFund|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:
 diagnostics, consider-backport-if-needed, consider-backport-
 after-042-stable, 042-should, android, macos, 040-backport-maybe, 041
 -backport-maybe, BugSmashFund, asn-merge
 =>
 diagnostics, consider-backport-if-needed, consider-backport-
 after-042-stable, 042-should, android, macos, 040-backport-maybe, 041
 -backport-maybe, BugSmashFund
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to master! Moving to 041 for possible backports.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31354 [Core Tor/Tor]: Compiler "note" in test_addr.c: variable tracking size limit exceeded with ‘-fvar-tracking-assignments’

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31354: Compiler "note" in test_addr.c: variable tracking size limit exceeded 
with
‘-fvar-tracking-assignments’
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression, 042-should, asn-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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[tor-bugs] #31721 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding screen is not shown immediately on Android

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31721: Onboarding screen is not shown immediately on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ff68-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201909
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 After loading Tor Browser there are a few seconds between `about:tor`
 loading and the onboarding screen loading.

 This is probably due to the new onboarding flow fennec is using. I rebased
 the implementation we used in 60, so we may need to convert this into the
 "new way of doing it".

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[tor-bugs] #31720 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Address bar auto-complete is broken on Android

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31720: Address bar auto-complete is broken on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ff68-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201909
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 When text is typed into the address bar, none of the auto-complete options
 are shown.

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[tor-bugs] #31719 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: obfs4proxy should be more helpful if state file is empty

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31719: obfs4proxy should be more helpful if state file is empty
-+
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor|   Keywords:  ux
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #30471
   Points:  0.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 We had a user on IRC who ran into the following error message:
 {{{
 [warn] Server managed proxy encountered a method error. (obfs4 failed to
 load statefile '/var/db/tor/pt_state/obfs4_state.json': unexpected end of
 JSON input)
 }}}
 It turns out that the user's state file was empty. Removing the state file
 and then having obfs4proxy re-create it fixed the problem. Obfs4proxy
 should realise that the state file is empty (was opposed to corrupt) and
 either re-create it itself or advise the user to delete it and try again.

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[tor-bugs] #31718 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31718: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains
-+-
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 To make it easier for us to manage where these domains point to it would
 be great if the records for the domain `explorer.ooni.torproject.org` were
 to point to `explorer.ooni.io` and the record for `ooni.torproject.org`
 pointed to `ooni.io`.

 The most high priority is the update of explorer.ooni.torproject.org as we
 are launching that today and we still have places where we link to
 explorer.ooni.torproject.org instead of explorer.ooni.io.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across defaults, torrc, command line

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31637: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across
defaults, torrc, command line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:10 teor]:
 > I like this idea.
 > I also think it could replace some of the repetitive parts of
 test_options.c
 >
 > I have some questions about the design:
 > 1. Should we name the tests, rather than numbering them?

 I think we should.

 > 2. Will we ever have enough tests that we want to split tests into
 categories, and put each category of tests in its own directory?

 Possibly. I think that should be an easy change to make later, if we
 decide to do so.  We'd just replace a "*" with a "*/*", and do a "git mv"
 command.

 > 3. Are there any tests that we can't do using this framework?
 >   a) We can't test the basic "missing torrc, missing defaults torrc, no
 command line args" case, because the script supplies an empty file,
 instead of a missing defaults torrc

 That's right.  I think this kind of test would do better in
 test_cmdline.sh.

 >   b) We can't do tests that expect error on some platforms, but success
 on others (is "Sandbox 1" an example of this kind of test?)

 There are some options like this; I don't think that `Sandbox 1` is one of
 them.  (For me, it passes --verify-config on OSX.)

 We could extend the script later on if needed to accomodate this -- for
 example, by having it check for "expected.linux" and "error.osx".  But I
 think I'd like to see how far we get with the first version of the script.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30857 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30857: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tickets-migration|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29400   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 == IRC bot issues discussions

 To expand on what is discussed in the document about IRC There are two
 things we do with Trac on IRC, as far as I know:

  * "#1234" gets turned into a message by zwiebelbot showing the ticket
 title, status and URL, this happens in multiple channels
  * another bot ("nsa") announces new commits and Trac ticket changes in
 #tor-bots

 Examples:

 {{{
 09:47:20  test: #1234
 09:47:21 -zwiebelbot:#tpo-admin- tor#1234: Exception in Firebug console in
 FF3.6 Sessionstore - [closed] - https://bugs.torproject.org/1234
 09:40:53 <+nsa> or: [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] #30857 was updated:  #30857:
 migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab -
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30857#comment:49
 09:40:53 <+nsa> or: Comment (by anarcat):
 09:40:53 <+nsa> or:  I added comments in the GitLab migration plan. The
 gist of my
 09:40:53 <+nsa> or:  modifications is as follows:[...]
 09:41:43 <+nsa> or: [styleguide/master] b75855b 2019-09-12 13:41:26 hiro
 : Add .github/FUNDING.yml
 }}}

 The above is me pinging the bot for information about ticket #1234, and
 the NSA bot announcing, without being prompted, a modification to ticket
 #30857 and a commit from hiro in the styleguide project.

 There are multiple projects to do the latter: I wrote one myself based on
 the `irker` irc bot (which doesn't work very well):

 https://gitlab.com/anarcat/irklab

 Another implementation is the "KGB" bot which can interpret GitLab
 webhooks on its own:

 https://salsa.debian.org/kgb-team/kgb

 This is what's used on salsa: https://salsa.debian.org/kgb-
 team/kgb/wikis/usage

 Then there are two more similar bots:

 https://github.com/chkelly/gitlab-irc
 https://github.com/nTraum/gitlab-irc

 And finally, GitLab itself has "native" "integration" with irker, provided
 you set it up somewhere.

 All of those (except the native integration) generally work as "webhooks"
 in that they "ping" (make an HTTP request) to a web server endpoint, which
 in turns talks to IRC.

 We'd need to do this to replace the "nsa" service. A friend implemented
 this with the KGB bot by setting up a webhook in GitLab that points to his
 own KGB install. He setup a reverse proxy in Apache with a configuration
 that looks like this:

 {{{
 ProxyPassReverse /kgb/ http://127.0.0.1:5391/
 
Require expr %{HTTP:X-Gitlab-Token} == 'GITLAB TOKEN HERE'
 
 }}}

 Finally, note that group-level webhooks are a paid feature, which means
 that we'd need to hook each project to those bots *individually* which is
 pretty annoying. It should probably be part of the migration to facilitate
 our lives. Alternatively, I think the debian.org folks wrote commandline
 shortcuts to configure a project like this automatically.

 For the zwiebelbot functionality, something new would need to be
 implemented. We should check with the Debian folks if that already exists,
 and if not, it will need to be done ourselves.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29945 [Webpages/Website]: fiscal documents page has missing docs, typos, and wrong labels

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29945: fiscal documents page has missing docs, typos, and wrong labels
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29901| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed a,b,c,d,e.

 For 2018 report, please open a new ticket here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31425 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31425: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  broker   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:16 cohosh]:
 > Ah ha! I see these messages now in the snowflake broker logs:

 Good find. I'm looking now, and
 {{{
 # lsof -n -p $(pidof broker) | grep -c IPv
 1019
 # ulimit -n
 1024
 }}}

 In /etc/runit/snowflake-broker/run, we're running the broker via
 [http://smarden.org/runit/chpst.8.html chpst]. I've just added `-o 32768`
 to the command to raise the limit on open files and restarted the process
 with `sv restart snowflake-broker` at 2019-09-12 14:19:00.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28704 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28704: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901, tbb-parity   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by eighthave):

 It seems that Android is moving to clang, and clang has more limited
 options for reproducibility.  I think GCC support is still there, but
 deprecated.  I found some specific issues on what is missing from clang
 here:
 https://reproducible-builds.org/docs/build-path/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31687 [Core Tor/Tor]: FreeBSD compilation warns with Tor 0.4.1.5

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31687: FreeBSD compilation warns with Tor 0.4.1.5
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  warning compiler 042-should  |  Actual Points:  .1
  041-backport 040-backport 035-backport |
  BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 grarmamp confirms the fix, but notes that another instance of the bug
 exists. Apparently we started using these macros a second time in 0.4.0,
 for tor_isinf().  I've added a new branch `ticket31687_040` to be merged
 into 0.4.0 and forward to fix the issue there as well.  PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1323

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31425 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31425: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  broker   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Ah ha! I see these messages now in the snowflake broker logs:

 {{{
 2019/09/12 13:50:21 http: Accept error: accept tcp [scrubbed]: accept4:
 too many op
 en files; retrying in 20ms
 2019/09/12 13:50:21 http: Accept error: accept tcp [scrubbed]: accept4:
 too many op
 en files; retrying in 40ms
 2019/09/12 13:50:21 http: Accept error: accept tcp [scrubbed]: accept4:
 too many op
 en files; retrying in 80ms
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30857 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30857: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tickets-migration|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29400   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 I added comments in the GitLab migration plan. The gist of my
 modifications is as follows:

  1. added the migration itself as a "challenge"
  2. added "milestones" as a possible solution for "ticket relationships"
  3. added details and possible solutions for the irc bot problem
  4. added another possible solution (OpenPGP signatures on commits and
 tags) to the "gitolite" problem
  5. expanded on the CI section (we will still use jenkins at first)
  6. i'm not sure it's totally accurate to say trac is unmaintained
 upstream. the 1.2.x branch had a release about a month ago (aug. 2019) and
 they also released a  new stable branch (1.4) not long ago... so it's
 still maintained
  7. also outlined that Trac also uses javascript in the table
  8. finally, i think i identified a new issue with git repository
 redirections:

 == New issue: git repository redirections

 Finally, i'm a little confused about the way the group/project namespace
 is organized... i see that everything seems to be under "torproject/foo"
 *except* "web/foo" and i wonder why it's been done that way. I would
 definitely put stuff under `tpa/*` for example, and have one project per
 service, with all the service admins stuff under `services/` maybe?

 I'm not sure how best to organize this, but having "everything under
 torproject/ except not quite" doesn't seem like a great match ;) Couldn't
 we replicate the hierarchy from https://gitweb.torproject.org/ ? that
 would make git repository redirections much easier...

 Note that renaming projects in gitlab is cheap and reliable (it keeps
 redirects) so we can also fix this later if we need to, i think, but i'd
 like to get it right, at least in terms of redirections. After all, we
 don't want to tell people that all their git URLs are broken now

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31713 [Core Tor/Tor]: Automatically rectify include paths before every commit

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31713: Automatically rectify include paths before every commit
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29226| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Another possibility here is to run "make autostyle", which runs
 rectify_include_paths and several other autoformatters.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31626 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move confparse.[ch] into lib/confmgt

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31626: Move confparse.[ch] into lib/confmgt
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready
 * keywords:  042-should => 042-should dgoulet-merge


Comment:

 > We also rectified some unrelated include paths in this patch.
 > I'm ok with that.
 > But if you want to put them in a separate commit, that might be nice.

 I think I'd rather leave them in a single commit -- IMO splitting it up
 loses some of the point of having these commits be automatically
 generated.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31657 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rephrase "missing descriptors" notice log to be less confusing

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31657: Rephrase "missing descriptors" notice log to be less confusing
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, log, tor-guard, tor-   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  bridge, tor-client, BugSmashFund, 042-should   |
  041-backport? 040-backport? 035-backport?  |
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 fast-fix, log, tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client, BugSmashFund,
 042-should
 =>
 fast-fix, log, tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client, BugSmashFund,
 042-should 041-backport? 040-backport? 035-backport?
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to master; marking for possible backport, though I don't have
 strong feelings either way.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19417 [Applications/Tor Browser]: asm.js files should be no linkability risk

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19417: asm.js files should be no linkability risk
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201609,  |  Actual Points:
  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201609, ff68-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201805 => tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201609, ff68-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201909


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:38 acat]:
 > The asm.js caching was removed in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1520931. Should we revisit
 this and try to enable asm.js for esr68? We should be able to remove
 `Services.qms.clear()` in torbutton and revert #31396.

 Sounds good. Please do, if you want. How does it work then, though, if you
 have PBM disabled? Is everything happening on the fly, in memory, or...?
 We should investigate the FPI concerns here, too. See: comment:32

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31703 [Internal Services/Service - dist]: Downloading Tor Browser from 2620:0:6b0:b:225:dada:19:1 is painfully slow

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31703: Downloading Tor Browser from 2620:0:6b0:b:225:dada:19:1 is painfully 
slow
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - dist  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19417 [Applications/Tor Browser]: asm.js files should be no linkability risk

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19417: asm.js files should be no linkability risk
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201609,  |  Actual Points:
  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201805 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201609, ff52-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201805 => tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201609, ff68-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201805


Comment:

 The asm.js caching was removed in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1520931. Should we revisit
 this and try to enable asm.js for esr68? We should be able to remove
 `Services.qms.clear()` in torbutton and revert #31396.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Build for Android

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28766: Tor Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201812, tbb-parity   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by eighthave):

 * cc: hans@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28704 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28704: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901, tbb-parity   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by eighthave):

 * cc: hans@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13056 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some stack canaries are still missing on Tor Browser binaries

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#13056: Some stack canaries are still missing on Tor Browser binaries
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Another one since esr68 is `liblgpllibs.so`. I guess part of this ticket
 is to figure first out which of the errors are actually false positives
 and which need to get addressed. We can then file new tickets for the
 latter and adapt our test tools accordingly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31708 [- Select a component]: Make the Tor website join the Digital Climate Strike on September 20

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31708: Make the Tor website join the Digital Climate Strike on September 20
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I love some of that climate change awareness but it is unfortunately all
 hopeless, [https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/what-if-we-
 stopped-pretending we're already all doomed]. Thanks modernity-cum-
 capitalism!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13373 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get rid of LD_LIBRARY_PATH and use a relative RPATH/RUNPATH in Linux bundles

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#13373: Get rid of LD_LIBRARY_PATH and use a relative RPATH/RUNPATH in Linux
bundles
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW: the updater is built with `RUNPATH` `$ORIGIN` starting with esr68.
 So using the normal `checksec.sh` tool shows a false positive now, see
 #29818.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29461 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add a Snowflake module

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29461: Add a Snowflake module
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-august, anti-|  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-september   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-

Comment (by karsten):

 All changes are merged, released, and deployed. Next steps are that we
  - wait for descriptors to show up on CollecTor and Tor Metrics,
  - try out syncing from CollecTor host, and
  - update the CollecTor mirror to sync from the main CollecTor instance.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31704 [Community/Tor Support]: help

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31704: help
---+--
 Reporter:  kain3e |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by ggus):

 * owner:  (none) => ggus
 * component:  Applications => Community/Tor Support


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20322 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SafeSEH support for mingw-w64 for Tor Browser on Windows

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20322: SafeSEH support for mingw-w64 for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201711,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201711, tbb-rbm |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/reference/safeseh-image-has-
 safe-exception-handlers?redirectedfrom=MSDN=vs-2019
 {{{
 /SAFESEH is only valid when linking for x86 targets. /SAFESEH is not
 supported for platforms that already have the exception handlers noted.
 For example, on x64 and ARM, all exception handlers are noted in the
 PDATA. ML64.exe has support for adding annotations that emit SEH
 information (XDATA and PDATA) into the image, allowing you to unwind
 through ml64 functions. See MASM for x64 (ml64.exe) for more information.
 }}}
 So, 64bit files `PASS` in our check script just because they are 64bit
 ones. I wonder whether we need to do more here, though, given that we
 don't use `ML64.exe`.

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[tor-bugs] #31717 [Core Tor]: cyber hacking when I became aware of it, =when I discovered it; that its inception was at the location of Table Rock Acres 37 parrellel Branson Missouri

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31717: cyber hacking when I became aware of it, =when I discovered it;  that 
its
inception was at the location of Table Rock Acres 37 parrellel Branson
Missouri
--+---
 Reporter:  kenthalas |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorU-must
--+---
 cyber hacking when I became aware of it, =when I discovered it;  that its
 inception was at the location of Table Rock Acres 37 parrellel Branson
 Missouri  all of my creativity is copyrighted trademarked
 tradename, registered, lp, land patents, homesteaded



 cyber hacking when I became aware of it, =when I discovered it;  that its
 inception was at the location of Table Rock Acres 37 parrellel Branson
 Missouri

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31716 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Harden obfs4proxy.exe shipped with Tor Browser

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31716: Harden obfs4proxy.exe shipped with Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-security |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Closed #16417 as a duplicate for this more specific one. Yawning's
 comment, however is probably still valid:
 {{{
 Anything that's Go based won't ever have either, because the upstream Go
 maintainers place way too much faith in their compiler and runtime to
 allow for such things. I think this is shortsighted and stupid (Golang
 binaries are also statically linked so ASLR seems somewhat less useful).
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16417 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DEP/ASLR missing on some Tor Browser (Pluggable Transports) binaries on Windows

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16417: DEP/ASLR missing on some Tor Browser (Pluggable Transports) binaries on
Windows
--+---
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-rbm |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 We are left with `obfs4proxy.exe`. Let's track the specific hardening task
 for that one in #31716.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27141 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport TLS1.3 patches

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27141: Backport TLS1.3 patches
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28707| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We won't do that anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20322 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SafeSEH support for mingw-w64 for Tor Browser on Windows

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20322: SafeSEH support for mingw-w64 for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201711,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201711, tbb-rbm |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:9 gk]:
 > > I think we are done here with mingw-w64-clang but we should double-
 check that.
 >
 > It seems the mingw-w64/gcc toolchain is not doing the right thing for
 32bit exe/dll files. Thus, fixing this needs #29318 solved first, too.

 PTs based on `Go` need separate treatment. I've opened #31716 for `obfs4`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31716 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Harden obfs4proxy.exe shipped with Tor Browser

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31716: Harden obfs4proxy.exe shipped with Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-security |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 For posterity here comes the 32bit output
 {{{
 Checking obfs4proxy.exe for /DYNAMICBASE... FAIL
 Checking obfs4proxy.exe for /NXCOMPAT... FAIL
 Checking obfs4proxy.exe for /SAFESEH... FAIL
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12968 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Specify HEASLR (High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization) in MinGW-w64

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#12968: Specify HEASLR (High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization) in
MinGW-w64
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-rbm, boklm201811,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Note: the HEALSR part for our PTs which are written in `Go` needs to get
 addressed separately. For `obfs4` we have #31716.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31715 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build obfs4

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31715: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build obfs4
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29318| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 That's actually bullshit as obfs4 is a `Go` program. All hardening
 deficiencies need to get addressed on the `Go` side. I've created #31716
 for that.

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[tor-bugs] #31716 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Harden obfs4proxy.exe shipped with Tor Browser

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31716: Harden obfs4proxy.exe shipped with Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-
  |  security
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Right now we have something like
 {{{
 Checking obfs4proxy.exe for /DYNAMICBASE... FAIL
 Checking obfs4proxy.exe for /NXCOMPAT... FAIL
 Checking obfs4proxy.exe for /SAFESEH... PASS
 Checking /obfs4proxy.exe ImageBase (0x40 < 4GB)... FAIL
 }}}
 for 64bit versions and a similar output for 32bit ones. We should get rid
 of the `FAIL`s.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20322 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SafeSEH support for mingw-w64 for Tor Browser on Windows

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20322: SafeSEH support for mingw-w64 for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201711,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201711, tbb-rbm |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #29318 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20322 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SafeSEH support for mingw-w64 for Tor Browser on Windows

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20322: SafeSEH support for mingw-w64 for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201711,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201711, tbb-rbm |
Parent ID:  #29318   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:   => #29318


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20322 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SafeSEH support for mingw-w64 for Tor Browser on Windows

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20322: SafeSEH support for mingw-w64 for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201711,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201711, tbb-rbm |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:9 gk]:
 > I think we are done here with mingw-w64-clang but we should double-check
 that.

 It seems the mingw-w64/gcc toolchain is not doing the right thing for
 32bit exe/dll files. Thus, making this needs #29318 solved first, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31712 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Release CollecTor 1.10.0

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31712: Release CollecTor 1.10.0
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Here's the release: https://dist.torproject.org/collector/1.10.0/ .
 Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12968 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Specify HEASLR (High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization) in MinGW-w64

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#12968: Specify HEASLR (High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization) in
MinGW-w64
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-rbm, boklm201811,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW the plan here is to switch for the remaining executables/dlls we
 expose to mingw-w64-clang, which is doing The Right Thing for 64bit by
 default.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31153 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Create a "tor-bridge" Debian meta package

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31153: Create a "tor-bridge" Debian meta package
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  project | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4 |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471  | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor30-can
+--

Comment (by irl):

 Many different ways have different advantages and disadvantages. There is
 no One True Way™.

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[tor-bugs] #31715 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build obfs4

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31715: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build obfs4
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29318
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When switching more and more projects over tor mingw-w64-clang we should
 not forget our PTs, in particular obfs4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across defaults, torrc, command line

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31637: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across
defaults, torrc, command line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => new
 * type:  defect => enhancement


Comment:

 I like this idea.
 I also think it could replace some of the repetitive parts of
 test_options.c

 I have some questions about the design:
 1. Should we name the tests, rather than numbering them?
 2. Will we ever have enough tests that we want to split tests into
 categories, and put each category of tests in its own directory?
 3. Are there any tests that we can't do using this framework?
   a) We can't test the basic "missing torrc, missing defaults torrc, no
 command line args" case, because the script supplies an empty file,
 instead of a missing defaults torrc
   b) We can't do tests that expect error on some platforms, but success on
 others (is "Sandbox 1" an example of this kind of test?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across defaults, torrc, command line

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31637: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across
defaults, torrc, command line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Oh I also put some detailed comments on the pull request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31153 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Create a "tor-bridge" Debian meta package

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31153: Create a "tor-bridge" Debian meta package
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  project | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4 |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471  | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor30-can
+--

Comment (by eighthave):

 I think a better way to handle this is writing scripts for server
 automation software like Ansible, Chef, etc. @uniqx has done just that for
 obfs4proxy using Ansible:

 * https://gitlab.com/uniqx/pt-obfs4proxy-minimal-demo
 * https://gitlab.com/uniqx/pt-socks5-over-obfs4proxy

 There is an in-depth explanation here:
 https://guardianproject.info/2019/04/16/exploring-possibilities-of-
 pluggable-transports-on-android/

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[tor-bugs] #31714 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Update instructions for enabling javascript when javascript is disabled

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31714: Update instructions for enabling javascript when javascript is disabled
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When a user with javascript disabled is visiting
 https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search they can see the following
 text:
   Please enable JavaScript to use this service. If you are using Tor
 Browser on High Security mode, it is possible to enable JavaScript to run
 only on this page. Click the NoScript  icon
 on your address bar and select "Temporarily allow all on this page". Relay
 Search only uses JavaScript resources that are hosted by the Tor Metrics
 team.

 However in recent versions of Tor Browser, there is no NoScript button in
 the address bar by default.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31626 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move confparse.[ch] into lib/confmgt

2019-09-12 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31626: Move confparse.[ch] into lib/confmgt
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Let's avoid issues like this in future, by implementing #31713.

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