Re: [tor-bugs] #31518 [Core Tor/Tor]: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31518: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.
--+
 Reporter:  haxxpop   |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  proxy tcp |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Print summary of features at end of configure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31373: Print summary of features at end of configure
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  configure, build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: App menu items stop working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31607: App menu items stop working
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Here is some more info:
 * This bug does not occur if the modal Tor Launcher window is not opened
 at startup.
 * The menu items stop working because the underlying C++ and Objective-C
 menu objects are destroyed.

 Kathy and I will continue to debug this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31679 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make checkShellScripts.sh handle path errors better

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31679: Make checkShellScripts.sh handle path errors better
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing, 042-should, asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  testing, 042-should => testing, 042-should, asn-merge
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31677 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add usage help option to git scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31677: Add usage help option to git scripts
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts, dev-tools, asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  git-scripts, dev-tools => git-scripts, dev-tools, asn-merge
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This looks okay to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31728 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The proxy server is refusing connections Firefox is configured to use a proxy server that is refusing connections. Check the proxy settings to make su

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31728: The proxy server is refusing connections  Firefox is configured to use a
proxy server that is refusing connections.  Check the proxy settings to
make sure that they are correct. Contact your network administrator to
make sure the proxy server is working.
--+---
 Reporter:  rpptor|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * severity:  Critical => Normal
 * component:  Internal Services/Services Admin Team => Applications/Tor
 Browser
 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team


Comment:

 Hm. So, Tor Browser is based on Firefox ESR 60 not 69. Where exactly did
 you download Tor Browser from?
 And does it work if you not install it to your pen drive but extract it on
 the hard disk somewhere?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31727 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31727: tor
--+---
 Reporter:  kain3e|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Maybe it is actually damaged? Please, re-download and make sure you got
 the right file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30304 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser locale can be obtained via DTD strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30304: Browser locale can be obtained via DTD strings
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-|  Actual Points:
  locale, TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-locale, TorBrowserTeam201909R =>
 ff68-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-locale, TorBrowserTeam201909
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Looks good to me. I guess we want to have a fix for
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1573276, too? Either way, I
 cherry-picked what we have at the moment and applied it to `tor-
 browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-2` (commit 93c30885b92760fcdf6bd06b235ddd3c87b09b97,
 2fe57c62af9706be45fc2085796a9398c3b10763, and
 7baed647f56e5d3e7c92eaffadb1c18c07aabe7f).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17222 [Community/Tor Support]: can't log in to soundcloud

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17222: can't log in to soundcloud
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Community/Tor Support
 * owner:  tbb-team => ggus


Comment:

 Soundcloud should work fine with Tor Browser. See:

 https://help.soundcloud.com/hc/en-us/articles/115003564308

 {{{
 What if I want to use a different browser, like Tor?

 SoundCloud has limited support for Tor Browser, meaning that you can login
 to existing SoundCloud accounts. However, you will not be able to sign up
 for a new account.

 Download Tor Browser from https://torproject.org, go to
 https://soundcloud.com and login.

 After authentication, you will be presented with a Google Captcha. Once
 solved, you should be signed in to your account.

 Please note that debugging issues with Tor is out of scope for support
 staff.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31757 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_parseconf.sh: apparently not reliable on Appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31757: test_parseconf.sh: apparently not reliable on Appveyor
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci 042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Arg, the name of the branch was wrong.  I've made a
 `ticket31757_workaround` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1326 .  Since this is a CI
 reliability issue, it can't hurt to let both CI runs finish.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31757 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_parseconf.sh: apparently not reliable on Appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31757: test_parseconf.sh: apparently not reliable on Appveyor
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci 042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 For reference, here is an example of a failing test:
 {{{
 ops_1: cmp: EOF on /tmp/tor_parseconf_tests.1JMUV6/output.ops_1 which is
 empty
 FAIL
 Sep 16 13:21:31.759 [notice] Tor 0.4.2.0-alpha-dev (git-804260828b13e76a)
 running on Windows Server 2016 [or later] with Libevent 2.1.11-stable,
 OpenSSL 1.1.1c, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.4, and Libzstd 1.4.2.
 Sep 16 13:21:31.759 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 Sep 16 13:21:31.759 [notice] This version is not a stable Tor release.
 Expect more bugs than usual.
 Sep 16 13:21:31.760 [notice] Read configuration file
 "C:\msys64\tmp\tor_parseconf_tests.1JMUV6\EMPTY".
 Sep 16 13:21:31.760 [notice] Read configuration file
 "C:\projects\tor\src\test\conf_examples\ops_1\torrc".
 Sep 16 13:21:31.769 [warn] Path for GeoIPFile () is relative and
 will resolve to C:\projects\tor\src\test\conf_examples\ops_1\. Is
 this what you wanted?
 Sep 16 13:21:31.769 [warn] Path for GeoIPv6File () is relative
 and will resolve to
 C:\projects\tor\src\test\conf_examples\ops_1\. Is this what you
 wanted?
 Sep 16 13:21:31.769 [notice] Your ContactInfo config option is not set.
 Please consider setting it, so we can contact you if your server is
 misconfigured or something else goes wrong.
 Sep 16 13:21:31.769 [notice] Based on detected system memory,
 MaxMemInQueues is set to 3749 MB. You can override this by setting
 MaxMemInQueues by hand.
 Sep 16 13:21:31.769 [notice] By default, Tor does not run as an exit
 relay. If you want to be an exit relay, set ExitRelay to 1. To suppress
 this message in the future, set ExitRelay to 0.
 --- ./expected  2019-09-16 13:09:34.157535000 +
 +++ /tmp/tor_parseconf_tests.1JMUV6/output.ops_12019-09-16
 13:21:31.650950300 +
 @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
 -Nickname Unnamed
 -ORPort 1000
 FAIL src/test/test_parseconf.sh (exit status: 1)
 }}}

 
https://ci.appveyor.com/project/torproject/tor/builds/27439727/job/4n0mtcayea8jwria

 Note that it is random which test fails, but the symptoms seem to be
 uniform: no actual error is logged, but the output file is empty.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31757 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_parseconf.sh: apparently not reliable on Appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31757: test_parseconf.sh: apparently not reliable on Appveyor
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci 042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 I have a temporary workaround in a branch called `ticket31754_workaround`;
 PR in https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1325

 I'll put this in needs_review once CI has passed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26345 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable tracking protection UI in FF67-esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26345: Disable tracking protection UI in FF67-esr
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 acat]:
 > Here is a patch for review: https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commit/26345
 >
 > I think with the current preferences we should not be blocking anything
 from the Firefox
 > Enhanced Tracking Protection/Content Blocking, other than the 3rd party
 cookies (which is the same as esr60).

 Yes (see my last comment).

 > With respect to that, Firefox moved the UI for changing cookie blocking
 preference (`network.cookie.cookieBehavior`) to the new content blocking
 section in `about:preferences`. If we hide that (as the patch currently
 does), there is no way that users can change it via UI. I'm not sure if
 that's so bad, since this would only be for advanced users that know what
 they are doing, and still is possible to modify it via `about:config`.

 Looking at the result of the hiding it seems this is okay. We want to
 avoid users shooting themselves in the foot by clicking on some of those
 options.

 > We currently block all 3rd party cookies (although there is #21905 to
 revise that), and this makes the "shield" icon in the siteIdentity UI
 appear, so that had to be hidden too.
 >
 > There are some requests because of this feature going in the background
 from time to time. The ones that I have checked are coming from
 [https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 esr68/rev/b1a2c428a9125ade87001bb6b9e990c886dcfd31/netwerk/url-
 classifier/UrlClassifierSkipListService.jsm#106
 UrlClassifierSkipListService.jsm]. But I guess we can deal with that in a
 separate ticket together with some other background requests that are
 still happening.

 Yes, please file a new ticket for that if needed. The patch looks okay to
 me, especially as this is a temporary measure anyway given that we are
 interested tin using tracking protection for performance improvements
 later on.

 Cherry-picked to `tor-browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-2` (commit
 cbf4dfb66958590b64cf5b2fc63ff0ed9e2d7d0e).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser Toolboxfails to open when tor-launcher is present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31303: Browser Toolboxfails to open when tor-launcher is present
-+-
 Reporter:  pospeselr|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 I do not think Kathy and I will have time to work on this before our
 vacation next week. I did a little research and fixing this issue might be
 as simple adding a check for `MOZ_BROWSER_TOOLBOX_PORT` inside
 `shouldStartAndOwnTor()` (in src/modules/tl-util.jsm). That environment
 variable should only be present in the debugger process' environment:
 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 esr68/source/devtools/client/framework/ToolboxProcess.jsm#258

 I am not sure if more things need to be fixed though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31757 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_parseconf.sh: apparently not reliable on Appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31757: test_parseconf.sh: apparently not reliable on Appveyor
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci 042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-ci => tor-ci 042-must


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[tor-bugs] #31757 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_parseconf.sh: apparently not reliable on Appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31757: test_parseconf.sh: apparently not reliable on Appveyor
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-ci
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 For some reason, I'm seeing intermittent failure from test_parseconf on
 appveyor.  Since we're close to a release, I think that for now I should
 make this test become allowed-to-fail on windows for now, and investigate
 it more after 0.4.2.1-alpha is released.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29646 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript XSS user choices are persisted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29646: NoScript XSS user choices are persisted
-+-
 Reporter:  atac |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak xss noscript tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  newnym ux-team |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 > But disk-avoidance is a MUST.

 Well, a user with interest in persistent features experiences a different
 threat model.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30304 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser locale can be obtained via DTD strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30304: Browser locale can be obtained via DTD strings
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-|  Actual Points:
  locale, TorBrowserTeam201906   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Ported patches and fixup for review in https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commits/30304+2 (last three commits).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30304 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser locale can be obtained via DTD strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30304: Browser locale can be obtained via DTD strings
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-|  Actual Points:
  locale, TorBrowserTeam201909R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-locale, TorBrowserTeam201906 =>
 ff68-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-locale, TorBrowserTeam201909R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30544 [Metrics/Library]: Using try-with-resources or close resource

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30544: Using try-with-resources or close resource
-+--
 Reporter:  fava |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 fava]:
 > [...] there are no more issues for try-with-resources .

 Cool! Closing this ticket then. Want to create a new ticket for the next
 issue type? Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31721 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding screen is not shown immediately on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31721: Onboarding screen is not shown immediately on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ff68-esr,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 {{{
 Bootstrapped manifest not allowed to use 'resource' directive.
 chrome.manifest:2
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26345 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable tracking protection UI in FF67-esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26345: Disable tracking protection UI in FF67-esr
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW: `populateCategoryContents()` (https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 esr68/source/browser/components/preferences/in-content/privacy.js#691) is
 the important function here to see what actually got enabled. Due to a
 combination of us setting prefs
 (`privacy.trackingprotection.pbmode.enabled` to `false`) and defaults
 already set we seem indeed to land at the status quo compared to esr60
 modulo the UI changes (so I guess we should be good here with the second
 remaining item mentioned in comment:17:ticket:27601?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31589 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Simplify decrypt_desc_layer interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31589: hs-v3: Simplify decrypt_desc_layer interface
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs easy refactoring tech-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31705 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31705: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31687 [Core Tor/Tor]: FreeBSD compilation warns with Tor 0.4.1.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31687: FreeBSD compilation warns with Tor 0.4.1.5
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  warning compiler 042-should  |  Actual Points:  .1
  041-backport 040-backport 035-backport |
  BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31679 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make checkShellScripts.sh handle path errors better

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31679: Make checkShellScripts.sh handle path errors better
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing, 042-should  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30743 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a coccinelle script to catch increment/decrement calls inside log_debug().

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30743: Write a coccinelle script to catch increment/decrement calls inside
log_debug().
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31675 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split microdescs_parse_from_string() into smaller functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31675: Split microdescs_parse_from_string() into smaller functions
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31677 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add usage help option to git scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31677: Add usage help option to git scripts
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts, dev-tools  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31552 [Core Tor/Tor]: --disable-module-dirauth broken (missing symbols)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31552: --disable-module-dirauth broken (missing symbols)
-+-
 Reporter:  LarryBitcoin |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  build, configure, features,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  modules, regression, 041-should, 041-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31475 [Core Tor/Tor]: config: stop using atof()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31475: config: stop using atof()
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  asn-merge |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31576 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix shellcheck errors in contrib/dist/rc.subr, and add to test-shellcheck

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31576: Fix shellcheck errors in contrib/dist/rc.subr, and add to 
test-shellcheck
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  shellcheck|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Hm. I think this one is probably safe to remove: it has decorations
 indicating that it came from FreeBSD's CVS repository, which suggests to
 me that the FreeBSD people are probably maintaining their own version.

 There are other scripts of this kind, however.  Maybe we should sent a
 message to the tor-packagers list, asking if anybody is currently using
 any of the init scripts from our repository?  If we find that some are in
 use, we can decide whether to keep them or to give other projects
 responsibility for them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across defaults, torrc, command line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31637: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across
defaults, torrc, command line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august asn- |  Actual Points:  1.5
  merge  |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31552 [Core Tor/Tor]: --disable-module-dirauth broken (missing symbols)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31552: --disable-module-dirauth broken (missing symbols)
-+-
 Reporter:  LarryBitcoin |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  build, configure, features,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  modules, regression, 041-should, 041-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:
 build, configure, features, modules, regression, 041-should,
 041-backport, asn-merge
 =>
 build, configure, features, modules, regression, 041-should,
 041-backport


Comment:

 Merged! Leaving open for backports.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31696 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion failure in map-anon.c:218

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31696: Assertion failure in map-anon.c:218
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, crash, 041-regression,   |  Actual Points:  .1
  BugSmashFund, 042-must, 041-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:
 regression, crash, 041-regression, BugSmashFund, 042-must,
 041-backport, asn-merge
 =>
 regression, crash, 041-regression, BugSmashFund, 042-must,
 041-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Merged! LEaving open for backports.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31751 [Circumvention/Pluggable transport]: About more powerful pluggable transport

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31751: About more powerful pluggable transport
---+---
 Reporter:  Anon8101919|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Pluggable transport  |Version:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Circumvention/Pluggable transport


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #31696, #31552

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #31696, #31552 by nickm:


Comment:
Setting two tickets to asn-merge, since dgoulet is on vacation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across defaults, torrc, command line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31637: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across
defaults, torrc, command line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august asn- |  Actual Points:  1.5
  merge  |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august => network-team-roadmap-august
 asn-merge
 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:20 teor]:
 > This looks great - I'm really happy with this level of testing.
 >
 > It looks like we're testing a lot of non-default options.
 > Did we try to test them all?

 I tried to avoid testing options, options that don't work on windows, and
 authority-only options.

 > Should we open a ticket for the tricky ones that we couldn't test?
 > HardwareAccel
 > ControlSocket
 > ControlSocketWriteable
 > Or are we just trying for a decent level of coverage right now?

 I was just trying for a decent level of coverage here.  I've opened #31756
 for this.

 > I'm happy to merge, if these tests also pass on 0.4.1.
 > (Or if there is a good explanation for why they don't pass, like a new
 option.)
 > That way, we can be sure that we aren't just testing the post-refactor
 behaviour.
 >
 > Feel free to flip to merge_ready once 0.4.1 passes.

 The tests pass for 0.4.1, with one exception: the large_1 test gives its
 output lines in a different order, since we previously didn't sort the
 options before writing them out.

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[tor-bugs] #31756 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cover all configuration options with test_parseconf.sh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31756: Cover all configuration options with test_parseconf.sh
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We now have a shell script to test whether parsing different configuration
 options works.  Right now there are some options it can't test, however,
 since they only work on some platforms.  There are also some that we
 aren't testing with it yet--and a bunch of remaining error cases that it
 doesn't test.

 Let's see if we can get all of our options tested.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30534 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Torbirdy: While TorBirdy running cannot seem to get any Add-ons from the Add-on Manager

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30534: Torbirdy: While TorBirdy running cannot seem to get any Add-ons from the
Add-on Manager
---+-
 Reporter:  torlove|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Great to hear.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31601 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't let Mozilla recommend extensions again

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31601: Don't let Mozilla recommend extensions again
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  -must-alpha, ff68-esr  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to comment on The Independent Newspaper

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30538: Unable to comment on The Independent Newspaper
--+--
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 `ff68-esr-will-have` then.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to comment on The Independent Newspaper

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30538: Unable to comment on The Independent Newspaper
--+--
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Glad to hear this is now fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31718 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31718: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains
-+-
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by hellais):

 Another record which is currently setup in a similar fashion is the
 `CNAME` for

 {{{
 get.ooni.torproject.org. 3599   IN  CNAME   get.ooni.io.
 }}}

 To be clear it's not a big problem if the policy WRT to setting up CNAME
 records has changed, I just need to be aware of it and plan according to
 it.

 This is probably also a good opportunity to do some cleanup of other
 `*.ooni.torproject.org` domains as we are trying to simplify our
 infrastructure and reduce our devops cognitive load by simplifying our
 infrastructure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31718 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31718: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains
-+-
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by hellais):

 Currently this is already happening though, `explorer.ooni.torproject.org`
 being a CNAME to `explorer.ooni.io`, I mistakenly thought this was not
 currently the case when opening the ticket, but this is already happening
 and no change is necessary on this front.

 It was done this way specifically to make it easier for us to more
 independently handle how we serve requests to users hitting out website
 from the various domains that were distributed.

 The website `ooni.org` & `ooni.io` & `ooni.torproject.org` is still
 running on tpo infrastructure, but we would like to change that to reduce
 the complexity of having something hosted on system where people need LDAP
 access to administer it.

 Our preference would be that we setup a CNAME record for
 `ooni.torproject.org` that points to `ooni.io` or `ooni.org` so that we
 are able to on our own setup a redirect, if desirable, or handle the
 requests directly by keeping the `ooni.torproject.org` domain (we probably
 will do this in the beginning).

 > would be to run a tiny webserver as the .torproject.org site, which
 sends an http-level redirect to the external site?

 > hellais, do you want an actual CNAME (ie. that the user doesn't know
 they get redirected to ooni) or a redirect (that the user *does* end up on
 ooni.io)?

 It would be preferable if we could get a CNAME record, so that we can
 manage how redirects are handled autonomously.

 > is this domain used by non-HTTP clients?

 It's the domain used for our primary website. We don't make any assumption
 as to what type of client is going to access it. I suppose most modern
 browsers will do HTTPS.

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[tor-bugs] #31755 [Metrics/Website]: Separate update pings and update requests graphs for Tor Browser alpha and release users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31755: Separate update pings and update requests graphs for Tor Browser alpha 
and
release users
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 On https://metrics.torproject.org/webstats-tb.html we have some graphs
 showing the number of Update pings and Update requests from Tor Browser
 users.

 Those numbers currently include both `alpha` and `release` users. However
 it would be nice to be able to know how many alpha users we have. For that
 we could have separate graphs for `alpha` and `release` users.

 According to https://metrics.torproject.org/stats.html#webstats-tb the
 `update_pings` and `update_requests` are counted with:
 * update_pings: GET requests to all sites with resource strings
 `'%/torbrowser/update\__/%'` and response code 200. To separate `alpha`
 and `release` users we could use the resource strings
 `'%/torbrowser/update\__/alpha/%'` and
 `'%/torbrowser/update\__/release/%'`.
 * update_requests: GET requests to all sites with resource strings
 `'%/torbrowser/%.mar'` and response code 302. Separating `update_requests`
 is more difficult as the URL does not include the word `alpha` or
 `release`. However it includes the version number (as the name of the
 directory under `/torbrowser/`), which includes an `a` in case of an alpha
 version, and no letter (only numbers and dots) in case of a stable
 release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19332 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add a BridgeDB module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19332: Add a BridgeDB module
-+-
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2, anti-   |  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-september   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:21 cohosh]:
 > These changes look good to me.

 Okay, please let me know when I need to do something on colchicifolium's
 side.

 > Since all logs (including previously rotated ones) are synced each time
 with rsync, is there a way to detect if old logs have been corrupted and
 are overwriting the previously synced logs? Not sure how we want to handle
 a case where logs that have previously been synced have changed for some
 reason, or what the easiest way to deal with this is.

 Thanks for thinking about such problems beforehand. In this case I think
 it's fine to just rsync what's on the BridgeDB host to colchicifolium. We
 can still decide on colchicifolium to not overwrite previously imported
 statistics, which I think is what we do with all other files. I'd say
 let's give it a try, and we can change this later if this turns out to be
 an issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check if Tor clients sometimes send duplicate cells on rendezvous circuits: Possible replay detected! An INTRODUCE2 cell with thesame ENCRYPTED section was seen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26806: Check if Tor clients sometimes send duplicate cells on rendezvous 
circuits:
Possible replay detected! An INTRODUCE2 cell with thesame ENCRYPTED section
was seen
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29995| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor27-must
 * parent:   => #29995
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


Comment:

 Marking as s27-must so that this gets handled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29699 [Core Tor/Tor]: INTRO2 replay warn logs with v3 onions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29699: INTRO2 replay warn logs with v3 onions
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, security,|  duplicate
  041-deferred-20190530 042-should   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29699 [Core Tor/Tor]: INTRO2 replay warn logs with v3 onions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29699: INTRO2 replay warn logs with v3 onions
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, security,|  Actual Points:
  041-deferred-20190530 042-should   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Closing this in favor of #26806. I'm moving #26806 to Sponsor27-must so
 that it gets handled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31603 [Internal Services/Service - github tpo]: GitHub close Support, tpo, community issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31603: GitHub close Support, tpo, community issues
-+-
 Reporter:  ggus |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - github   |Version:
  tpo|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I'm not sure who did this but issues are already disabled for community,
 support and too repos.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31408 [Core Tor/Tor]: torrc : ClientOnionAuthDir after include directives breaks client to v2 services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31408: torrc : ClientOnionAuthDir after include directives breaks client to v2
services
+--
 Reporter:  xaho|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs regression 042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * owner:  (none) => asn
 * status:  new => assigned


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[tor-bugs] #31754 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add HS DoS defence stats to heartbeat

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31754: Add HS DoS defence stats to heartbeat
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-
 Severity:  Normal   |  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, user-feedback, blog, easy
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #2
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor27-can  |
-+-
 We should add entries to our heartbeat about the new DoS defences we added
 to see how helpful and prevalent they are.

 In particular:
 - We should mention how many single-hop connections we blocked (#24962)
 - How many times we applied rate-limiting as an introduction point
 (#15516).


 (Marking this as easy since the heartbeat module is not too hard to figure
 out)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29461 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add a Snowflake module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29461: Add a Snowflake module
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-august, anti-|  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-september   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:40 karsten]:
 > All changes are merged, released, and deployed. Next steps are that we
 >  - wait for descriptors to show up on CollecTor and Tor Metrics,

 Done.

 >  - try out syncing from CollecTor host, and

 Done.

 >  - update the CollecTor mirror to sync from the main CollecTor instance.

 irl, do you want to do that, or shall I?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31739 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 9.0a6 Issues with Cloudflare

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31739: TBB 9.0a6 Issues with Cloudflare
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-must-alpha, ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I pinged the Cloudflare folks. Please file different tickets for the other
 issues, thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31750 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New tab title is 'Private Browsing' instead of previous 'New Tab' in esr60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31750: New tab title is 'Private Browsing' instead of previous 'New Tab' in 
esr60
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Seems to be a change visible in Firefox 68, too. Thus, nothing caused by
 one of our patches and I think the change is okay.

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[tor-bugs] #31753 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Web developer network tab breaks first-party isolation in some cases II

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31753: Web developer network tab breaks first-party isolation in some cases II
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 There are rare cases where the first-part isolation breaks if the Web
 developer Network tab is open. This got first reported on our blog:
 ​https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-65a5-released#comment-224102

 Steps to reproduce (works in the alpha series on Windows at least):

 1) Start a fresh Tor Browser and set the Torbutton log level to "3"
 2) Open the Network tab in the Web developer console (Ctrl + Shift + Q)
 3) Go to ​https://torproject.org
 4) Reload the page with the arrow in the URL bar

 Result:

 Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/static/css/bootstrap.css.map via--
 unknown--:878a267349f5b487247d0a0175ae27f2

 It is actually only the request for one resource that is affected. And
 having the Network tab open is crucial for reproducing the bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31448 [Applications/Tor Browser]: gold and lld break linking 32bit Linux bundles we need to resort to bfd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31448: gold and lld break linking 32bit Linux bundles we need to resort to bfd
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909|
Parent ID:  #30321   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:8 gk]:
 > boklm: are you building the browser part with commit
 4458b4e8a09aaa759f1735b36aec860aa61f3ba7 applied? (i.e. after the `tor-
 browser` patch for #31621 landed) I ask, because that's exactly the error
 you would get if the nodejs problem was not solved.

 Oh, I probably did an alpha build by mistake instead of nightly. I will
 try again doing a nightly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31448 [Applications/Tor Browser]: gold and lld break linking 32bit Linux bundles we need to resort to bfd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31448: gold and lld break linking 32bit Linux bundles we need to resort to bfd
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909|
Parent ID:  #30321   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 boklm: are you building the browser part with commit
 4458b4e8a09aaa759f1735b36aec860aa61f3ba7 applied? (i.e. after the `tor-
 browser` patch for #31621 landed) I ask, because that's exactly the error
 you would get if the nodejs problem was not solved.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20915 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Web developer network tab breaks first-party isolation in some cases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20915: Web developer network tab breaks first-party isolation in some cases
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-linkability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 cypherpunks]:
 > 9.0a6:
 > {{{
 > [09-15 07:30:53] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/static/css/bootstrap.css.map via--
 unknown--:878a267349f5b487247d0a0175ae27f2
 > }}}

 Let's keep this ticket closed (FWIW: I tried to reproduce the issue
 following the description and failed so far). Please open a new one with
 steps to reproduce (changes you make to Tor Browser, on which operating
 system this is visible etc.).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31448 [Applications/Tor Browser]: gold and lld break linking 32bit Linux bundles we need to resort to bfd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31448: gold and lld break linking 32bit Linux bundles we need to resort to bfd
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909|
Parent ID:  #30321   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 `gold` is working if we disable debug infos, and remove the `--verbose`
 option from `./mach build`. This is also fixing #31618.

 With the `--verbose` option, the build fails with the error:
 {{{
 20:23.94 [style 0.0.1] cargo:rerun-if-changed=/var/tmp/build/firefox-
 80f3dafdd420/obj-i686-pc-linux-gnu/dist/include/nsISelectionController.h
 20:23.94 thread 'main' panicked at 'stack backtrace:
 20:23.940: 0x556c358f0aaf -
 std::sys::unix::backtrace::tracing::imp::unwind_backtrace::h304be3226173ed42
 20:23.94at
 src/libstd/sys/unix/backtrace/tracing/gcc_s.rs:39
 20:23.941: 0x556c358d7027 -
 std::sys_common::backtrace::print::hd25e8e60339fbb32
 20:23.94at
 src/libstd/sys_common/backtrace.rs:70
 20:23.94at
 src/libstd/sys_common/backtrace.rs:58
 20:23.942: 0x556c358f6131 -
 std::panicking::default_hook::{{closure}}::h03a7ac06911d91f6
 20:23.94at src/libstd/panicking.rs:200
 20:23.943: 0x556c358f5eb3 -
 std::panicking::default_hook::hf698310ff6948dc9
 20:23.94at src/libstd/panicking.rs:215
 20:23.944: 0x556c358f681f -
 std::panicking::rust_panic_with_hook::h1110d0ebea64132e
 20:23.94at src/libstd/panicking.rs:478
 20:23.945: 0x556c358f63b1 -
 std::panicking::continue_panic_fmt::h021e998d93d9aaa2
 20:23.94at src/libstd/panicking.rs:385
 20:23.946: 0x556c358f62fe -
 std::panicking::begin_panic_fmt::h77660097330c47c3
 20:23.94at src/libstd/panicking.rs:340
 20:23.947: 0x556c358ed576 -
 std::io::stdio::_print::h6e57cfdb1b772a9e
 20:23.94at src/libstd/io/stdio.rs:735
 20:23.94at src/libstd/io/stdio.rs:744
 20:23.948: 0x556c3550d9aa -
 cargo::core::compiler::job_queue::JobQueue::drain_the_queue::hffcf682cf810a238
 20:23.949: 0x556c35549954 -
 std::panicking::try::do_call::h66c050aaf8a469a2
 20:23.94   10: 0x556c358f9829 - __rust_maybe_catch_panic
 20:23.94at src/libpanic_unwind/lib.rs:87
 20:23.94   11: 0x556c35602eb4 -
 crossbeam_utils::thread::scope::hf1785210d8a5b66b
 20:23.94   12: 0x556c3550b981 -
 cargo::core::compiler::job_queue::JobQueue::execute::h09f1e669b485a855
 20:23.94   13: 0x556c3555ecc1 -
 cargo::core::compiler::context::Context::compile::h8a68efdbc0494af1
 20:23.94   14: 0x556c35331d10 -
 cargo::ops::cargo_compile::compile_ws::hd78d2523b7ad97f6
 20:23.94   15: 0x556c3532dfd8 -
 cargo::ops::cargo_compile::compile::h509beaa3ec4c3493
 20:23.94   16: 0x556c3529033b -
 cargo::commands::rustc::exec::h3b4e359c9f17ec05
 20:23.94   17: 0x556c3527ce55 - cargo::cli::main::hc45236825e872f74
 20:23.94   18: 0x556c3529b01f - cargo::main::hda5e03499791a40b
 20:23.94   19: 0x556c35290ea2 -
 std::rt::lang_start::{{closure}}::h6ad13ea773945a56
 20:23.94   20: 0x556c358f6232 -
 std::panicking::try::do_call::h89d6bcd43bef83f4
 20:23.94at src/libstd/rt.rs:49
 20:23.94at src/libstd/panicking.rs:297
 20:23.94   21: 0x556c358f9829 - __rust_maybe_catch_panic
 20:23.94at src/libpanic_unwind/lib.rs:87
 20:23.94   22: 0x556c358ea51f -
 std::rt::lang_start_internal::h6d57f5d29fcde9f1
 20:23.94at src/libstd/panicking.rs:276
 20:23.94at src/libstd/panic.rs:388
 20:23.94at src/libstd/rt.rs:48
 20:23.94   23: 0x556c3529d641 - main
 20:23.94   24: 0x2adc4abcfeac - __libc_start_main
 20:23.94   25: 0x556c35272248 - 
 22:19.92 [style 0.0.1] cargo:rerun-if-changed=/var/tmp/build/firefox-
 80f3dafdd420/obj-i686-pc-linux-gnu/dist/include/mozilla/dom/TouchBinding.h
 22:19.92 make[4]: *** 

Re: [tor-bugs] #30683 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30683: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Alright, we are done here. The patch for #24056 got reverted on `tor-
 browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-2` and the patch for this bug landed as commit
 262c4677852fd683bd3257427b39fd5accc7b30f with
 80f3dafdd420491e23c22a688d075548480f78a6 as the follow-up Android fixup.
 (Both actually made it into 9.0a6, fwiw.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide stack smashing protection for mingw-clang builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29013: Provide stack smashing protection for mingw-clang builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201908,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-alpha   |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1492225

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31752 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security Slider button stops working sometimes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31752: Security Slider button stops working sometimes
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 It appears, but not where you expect it to ;)

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[tor-bugs] #31752 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security Slider button stops working sometimes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31752: Security Slider button stops working sometimes
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-security-
  |  slider
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I can reproduce with these steps (on alpha):

 1. Click `Security Slider` button so that popup shows.
 2. Click again so that it closes.
 3. Go to `Customize...` in burger menu.
 4. In `Customize...`, click `Done`.
 5. Click again `Security Slider` button, it does not work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31749 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security level popup should not open with middle or right click

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31749: Security level popup should not open with middle or right click
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by acat):

 * keywords:   => tbb-security-slider


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31747 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some browser UI is always shown in English

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31747: Some browser UI is always shown in English
-+--
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr tbb-9.0-must-alpha  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gk):

 (Oh, and I think the the text on the onboarding bubble in the upper left
 corner is a another case for this bug)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31747 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some browser UI is always shown in English

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31747: Some browser UI is always shown in English
-+--
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr tbb-9.0-must-alpha  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gk):

 I guess the first item is essentially #28196?

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[tor-bugs] #31751 [Core Tor/Tor]: About more powerful pluggable transport

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31751: About more powerful pluggable transport
--+--
 Reporter:  Anon8101919   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 I found a more powerful proxy protocol.
 It's "shadowsocks".
 https://github.com/shadowsocks
 This protocol was created to avoid GFW.
 If you can use shadowsocks for pluggable transport, I think we can use Tor
 more easily and faster in China.

 p.s. I'm Japanese so I understand English a little.
 Since there is a possibility that there is a mistake in the translation, I
 will post the original.

 日本語の原文
 私はより強力なプロキシープロトコルを見つけました｡
 それは｢shadowsocks｣です｡
 https://github.com/shadowsocks
 このプロトコルはGFWを回避するために作られました｡
 私はshadowsocksをpluggable transportとして利用できれば､中国でより簡単かつ
 高速にTorを利用できるようになると思います｡

 p.s. 私は日本人なので少ししか英語を理解出来ません｡
 翻訳に間違いがある可能性があるため､原文を載せておきます｡

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[tor-bugs] #31750 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New tab title is 'Private Browsing' instead of previous 'New Tab' in esr60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31750: New tab title is 'Private Browsing' instead of previous 'New Tab' in 
esr60
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff68-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Not completely sure if that's fine or not, though.

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[tor-bugs] #31749 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security level popup should not open with middle or right click

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31749: Security level popup should not open with middle or right click
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This is probably because of the change

 {{{
 -   oncommand="SecurityLevelButton.onCommand(this, event);"
 +   onmousedown="SecurityLevelButton.onCommand();"
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #31748 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Learn More" link in Security Level popup is not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31748: "Learn More" link in Security Level popup is not working
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff68-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--


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[tor-bugs] #31747 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some browser UI is always shown in English

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31747: Some browser UI is always shown in English
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff68-esr tbb-9.0-must-
 Severity:  Normal   |  alpha
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Some browser UI is always shown in English, tested with es-ES and fr. Not
 an exhaustive list:

 * Most of `about:preferences`.
 * `Tor Browser is up to date` and `Checking for updates...` in `About Tor
 Browser`.
 * Some internal pages like `about:support`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31738 [Community/Tor Support]: issue with tor 8.5.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31738: issue with tor 8.5.4
---+---
 Reporter:  torqq  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by gk):

 Just to add here what ggus said: those files are part of the Twisted
 library that the old `obfsproxy` pluggable transport uses (used). The 8.5
 series is the last one that contains those, thus the files you are
 concerned about will be gone with Tor Browser 9.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31538: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909R,  |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:23 tom]:
 > We seem to use a different technique for merging libraries than Martin:
 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 central/rev/d1e33e3e11f559952d7d80e722d26a6cf5dd80ac/taskcluster/scripts/misc
 /build-clang-8-mingw.sh#125

 No, that's a different piece. It merges `libc++` with `libunwind` which is
 actually okay. The problematic one, which you hit as well, is within the
 `libc++` build step where `libc++` and `libc++abi` are getting merged into
 `libc++`.

 > I don't know if ours is reproducible.  But Martin can probably upstream
 that clang change fairly easily. And I should - if not copy your approach
 - add a comment about it in our build.

 Upstream changed meanwhile, so the patch in question is only usable for
 clang 8-based toolchains. However, it seems the new changes still have the
 same issue potentially. I'll get back to Martin with that once this patch
 lands and we are good on our side.

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