Re: [tor-bugs] #32138 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clicking the 'new Identity' button in full screen causes the top and bottom of the browser to show white bars that do not go away

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32138: Clicking the 'new Identity' button in full screen causes the top and 
bottom
of the browser to show white bars that do not go away
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 The white bars are letterboxing, that's normal. It's stepping your width
 in `200`'s and height in `100`'s to allow for the maximum real estate used
 in the inner window. In your attachment, your inner window is approx
 `1334` pixels, but your viewport height is only `1200` - so that's a
 little weird: I would have expected it to be `1300`.

 When you first went to FS, did the inner window not get letterboxed?

 FWIW: on windows 7, if I enter FS, I get letterboxed. When I mouse up to
 show the chrome and click new Identity, I get a new 1000x1000px window

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[tor-bugs] #32137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split feature/include.am out of core/include.am

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32137: Split feature/include.am out of core/include.am
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-design
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #31851
   Points:  0.5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+--
 It seems a bit weird that we're missing feature/include.am, maybe it's
 time to fix that.

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[tor-bugs] #32138 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clicking the 'new Identity' button in full screen causes the top and bottom of the browser to show white bars that do not go away

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32138: Clicking the 'new Identity' button in full screen causes the top and 
bottom
of the browser to show white bars that do not go away
---+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version: |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 Full-screening TorBrowser then clicking the 'new Identity' button causes
 tor browser to come out of full screen and the top and bottom of the
 browser have large white bars.
 1. Open TorBrowser 9.0a8 on macOS 10.15 and click the green full screen
 button.
 2. Click the 'new Identity' button and choose to have a new Identity.
 Image attached showing the white bars.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32138 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clicking the 'new Identity' button in full screen causes the top and bottom of the browser to show white bars that do not go away

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32138: Clicking the 'new Identity' button in full screen causes the top and 
bottom
of the browser to show white bars that do not go away
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * Attachment "Screen Shot 2019-10-17 at 9.46.28 PM.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32124 [Core Tor/Tor]: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32124: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-october, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  build, no-backport?|
Parent ID:  #32123   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 nickm]:
 > I'd suggest 042 and forward, but master-only is also okay.  The fix
 looks fine.
 >
 > Do we make this mistake anywhere else?

 We made a similar mistake for tcmalloc, all the other uses of
 AC_ARG_{WITH,WITHOUT,ENABLE,DISABLE} are fine.

 > Please feel free to merge once there's a changes file.

 I'll do a similar fix, and merge both to 0.4.2 and later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32138 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clicking the 'new Identity' button in full screen causes the top and bottom of the browser to show white bars that do not go away

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32138: Clicking the 'new Identity' button in full screen causes the top and 
bottom
of the browser to show white bars that do not go away
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:1 Thorin]:
 > The white bars are letterboxing, that's normal. It's stepping your width
 in `200`'s and height in `100`'s to allow for the maximum real estate used
 in the inner window. In your attachment, your inner window is approx
 `1334` pixels, but your viewport height is only `1200` - so that's a
 little weird: I would have expected it to be `1300`.
 >
 > When you first went to FS, did the inner window not get letterboxed?
 >
 > FWIW: on windows 7, if I enter FS, I get letterboxed. When I mouse up to
 show the chrome and click new Identity, I get a new 1000x1000px window
 >
 When TorBrowser is brought out of full screen the letterboxing should not
 be visible, bringing Torbrowser out of full screen by clicking the green
 minimize button, Does Not show the letterboxing white bars, they only
 appear when clicking the new Identity button in full screen.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32124 [Core Tor/Tor]: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32124: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-october, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  build, no-backport?|
Parent ID:  #32123   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #32124 [Core Tor/Tor]: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32124: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-october, tor-
 Severity:  Normal   |  build, no-backport?
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #32123
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-can  |
-+-
 Currently, we treat --disable-module-dirauth=no as enabling the C macro,
 but disabling the Makefile variable.

 Apparently lots of people make this mistake:
 {{{
 The most common mistake for this macro is to consider the two actions as
 action-if-enabled and action-if-disabled.

 This is not the case!

 Since using --disable-foo or --enable-foo=no are equivalent, for the
 macro, you cannot really use this macro with those meanings.
 }}}

 I don't know if we should backport this change, it just didn't work
 before, so maybe it should just go in master?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32124 [Core Tor/Tor]: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32124: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-october, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  build, no-backport?|
Parent ID:  #32123   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Still needs a changes file, I'll split it out once we decide how far to
 backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32124 [Core Tor/Tor]: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32124: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-october, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  build, no-backport?|
Parent ID:  #32123   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 The fix is in:
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1421/commits/959c6a078dc03d0ae67775b57032740054270a76

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32124 [Core Tor/Tor]: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32124: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-october, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  build, no-backport?|
Parent ID:  #32123   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> Currently, we treat --disable-module-dirauth=no as enabling the C macro,
> but disabling the Makefile variable.
>
> Apparently lots of people make this mistake:
> {{{
> The most common mistake for this macro is to consider the two actions as
> action-if-enabled and action-if-disabled.
>
> This is not the case!
>
> Since using --disable-foo or --enable-foo=no are equivalent, for the
> macro, you cannot really use this macro with those meanings.
> }}}
>
> I don't know if we should backport this change, it just didn't work
> before, so maybe it should just go in master?

New description:

 Currently, we treat --disable-module-dirauth=no as enabling the C macro,
 but disabling the Makefile variable.

 Apparently lots of people make this mistake:
 {{{
 The most common mistake for this macro is to consider the two actions as
 action-if-enabled and action-if-disabled.

 This is not the case!

 Since using --disable-foo or --enable-foo=no are equivalent, for the
 macro, you cannot really use this macro with those meanings.
 }}}
 https://autotools.io/autoconf/arguments.html

 I don't know if we should backport this change, it just didn't work
 before, so maybe it should just go in master?

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32052 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Linux32 bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32052: Linux32 bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Critical| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb-9.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: manishearth@…, acrichton@… (added)


Comment:

 Here is what we know so far: while the `libxul.so` usually matches between
 different builds if one tries hard enough (building over and over again)
 one gets different libraries. Looking at the diff shows that `gkrust-
 f4d3d8c9a1eaf037.gkrust.eac5ce9j-cgu.0.rcgu.o` is different from non-
 matching builds.

 Looking closer at that one gets us something like
 {{{
 --- /dev/fd/63  2019-10-17 08:43:29.203950618 +0200
 +++ /dev/fd/62  2019-10-17 08:43:29.207950653 +0200
 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
  : 7f45 4c46 0101 0100      .ELF
  0010: 0100 0300 0100       
 -0020: d08e d100   3400   2800  4.(.
 +0020: 908e d100   3400   2800  4.(.
  0030: 4c7b 0100        L{..
  0040: 5553 5756 83ec 0c8b 4424 20e8    USWVD$ .
  0050: 5b81 c303  008b 7024 85f6 745d 8b4c  [...p$..t].L
 @@ -2879,26 +2879,26 @@
  b3e0: 6c6c 2d61 7272 6f77 2d66 6f72 7761 7264  ll-arrow-forward
  b3f0: 646f 772d 6275 7474 6f6e 2d63 6c6f 7365  dow-button-close
  b400: 2d6d 6f7a 2d77 696e 646f 772d 6275 7474  -moz-window-butt
 -b410: 6c65 7468 756d 622d 7665 7274 6963 616c  lethumb-vertical
 -b420: 7363 616c 6574 6875 6d62 2d76 6572 7469  scalethumb-verti
 -b430: 7466 6965 6c64 2d6d 756c 7469 6c69 6e65  tfield-multiline
 -b440: 7465 7874 6669 656c 642d 6d75 6c74 696c  textfield-multil
 -b450: 7262 7574 746f 6e2d 6472 6f70 646f 776e  rbutton-dropdown
 -b460: 746f 6f6c 6261 7262 7574 746f 6e2d 6472  toolbarbutton-dr
 -b470: 6568 6561 6465 7273 6f72 7461 7272 6f77  eheadersortarrow
 -b480: 7472 6565 6865 6164 6572 736f 7274 6172  treeheadersortar
 -b490: 6963 6174 696f 6e73 2d74 6f6f 6c62 6f78  ications-toolbox
 -b4a0: 2d6d 6f7a 2d77 696e 2d63 6f6d 6d75 6e69  -moz-win-communi
 -b4b0: 6572 7461 6262 6172 2d74 6f6f 6c62 6f78  ertabbar-toolbox
 -b4c0: 2d6d 6f7a 2d77 696e 2d62 726f 7773 6572  -moz-win-browser
 -b4d0: 756c 6c73 6372 6565 6e2d 6275 7474 6f6e  ullscreen-button
 -b4e0: 2d6d 6f7a 2d6d 6163 2d66 756c 6c73 6372  -moz-mac-fullscr
 -b4f0: 6f6e 2d62 6f78 2d6d 6178 696d 697a 6564  on-box-maximized
 -b500: 2d62 7574 746f 6e2d 6d61 7869 6d69 7a65  -button-maximize
 -b510: 2d62 7574 746f 6e2d 6d69 6e69 6d69 7a65  -button-minimize
 -b520: 772d 6275 7474 6f6e 2d72 6573 746f 7265  w-button-restore
 -b530: 646f 772d 6672 616d 652d 626f 7474 6f6d  dow-frame-bottom
 -b540: 2d6d 6f7a 2d77 696e 646f 772d 6672 616d  -moz-window-fram
 +b410: 646f 772d 6672 616d 652d 626f 7474 6f6d  dow-frame-bottom
 +b420: 2d6d 6f7a 2d77 696e 646f 772d 6672 616d  -moz-window-fram
 +b430: 6c65 7468 756d 622d 7665 7274 6963 616c  lethumb-vertical
 +b440: 7363 616c 6574 6875 6d62 2d76 6572 7469  scalethumb-verti
 +b450: 7466 6965 6c64 2d6d 756c 7469 6c69 6e65  tfield-multiline
 +b460: 7465 7874 6669 656c 642d 6d75 6c74 696c  textfield-multil
 +b470: 7262 7574 746f 6e2d 6472 6f70 646f 776e  rbutton-dropdown
 +b480: 746f 6f6c 6261 7262 7574 746f 6e2d 6472  toolbarbutton-dr
 +b490: 6568 6561 6465 7273 6f72 7461 7272 6f77  eheadersortarrow
 +b4a0: 7472 6565 6865 6164 6572 736f 7274 6172  treeheadersortar
 +b4b0: 6963 6174 696f 6e73 2d74 6f6f 6c62 6f78  ications-toolbox
 +b4c0: 2d6d 6f7a 2d77 696e 2d63 6f6d 6d75 6e69  -moz-win-communi
 +b4d0: 6572 7461 6262 6172 2d74 6f6f 6c62 6f78  ertabbar-toolbox
 +b4e0: 2d6d 6f7a 2d77 696e 2d62 726f 7773 6572  -moz-win-browser
 +b4f0: 756c 6c73 6372 6565 6e2d 6275 7474 6f6e  ullscreen-button
 +b500: 2d6d 6f7a 2d6d 6163 2d66 756c 6c73 6372  -moz-mac-fullscr
 +b510: 2d62 7574 746f 6e2d 6d61 7869 6d69 7a65  -button-maximize
 +b520: 2d62 7574 746f 6e2d 6d69 6e69 6d69 7a65  -button-minimize
 +b530: 6f6e 2d62 6f78 2d6d 6178 696d 697a 6564  on-box-maximized
 +b540: 772d 6275 7474 6f6e 2d72 6573 746f 7265  w-button-restore
  b550: 746c 6562 6172 2d6d 6178 696d 697a 6564  tlebar-maximized
  b560: 2d6d 6f7a 2d77 696e 646f 772d 7469 746c  -moz-window-titl
  

Re: [tor-bugs] #31497 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Link Cupcake from snowflake.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31497: Link Cupcake from snowflake.torproject.org
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 I like it!

 Note that the patch is missing the translation string in
 `proxy/static/_locales/en_US/messages.json` (alas, the redundancy there is
 unfortunate).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ESR68 Network Code Review

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31144: ESR68 Network Code Review
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
  -must-alpha, tbb-proxy-bypass  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:23 sysrqb]:
 > >> CustomTabsActivity.java - Several methods emit potentially external
 Intents
 > > My only concern here is onLoadRequest() when the scheme isn't handled
 by the browser. That's the only place where the user wasn't prompted. I
 don't know how the customtabs UI should handle this situation. We can
 break this functionality for now, until we find how this should be done
 correctly.
 >
 > This is included in the patch for #26529, but in this case we don't
 prompt. #26529 seemed like the better commit, but I can move this into its
 own commit.

 I pushed `bug31144_05` with only this patch on top of `68.1.0esr-9.0-3`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix conflicts in mobile onbarding while rebasing to esr68.2.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32097: Fix conflicts in mobile onbarding while rebasing to esr68.2.0
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb-9.0-must => TorBrowserTeam201910R,
 tbb-9.0-must


Comment:

 I used `22182890f20069201b37a0e8d9a849d2e54fcc25` as the new base. I
 reverted (in order): `484ec9407da4234000a73d2426f09de62de0274e`
 `ab8797462cefdaf99d10e1981f2a168750cc697a`
 `303c1ef548d23dfd0d8aa1e9e61481c1baea02a8`
 `896fa0df588de10b22e827b8fc69daa9e05d`
 `1c54037a5bb7ded841b5a795041772a4571944f9`
 `a7cc5967877636728e29ea865dc46a2889b7de58`
 `a3f466a3ac73f0d11f3f3ba054173087e66a0ab5` and then rebased `origin/tor-
 browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-3` onto the result.

 I fear we may have more problems with this in the future if/when Mozilla
 modify the onboarding panels again. I felt resolving the merge conflict
 wasn't easy to review, but we can reconsider this if needed.

 I pushed branch `bug32097_02` based on 68.2.0esr.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix conflicts in mobile onbarding while rebasing to esr68.2.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32097: Fix conflicts in mobile onbarding while rebasing to esr68.2.0
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:4 sysrqb]:
 > I used `22182890f20069201b37a0e8d9a849d2e54fcc25` as the new base. I
 reverted (in order):

 Sorry, it's based on `8b37b0197138897a766056fe3d4e6c53b891cdcb`, branch
 `bug32097_02`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32063 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1454769: Resource leaks in build_establish_intro_dos_extension()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32063: CID 1454769:  Resource leaks in build_establish_intro_dos_extension()
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, memleak,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good, merged to 0.4.2 and later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32037 [Circumvention/meek]: Tor Browser 8.5.5 Encounters Javascript problem when attempting to use Meek-Azure bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32037: Tor Browser 8.5.5 Encounters Javascript problem when attempting to use
Meek-Azure bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  bakertaylor28|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/meek   |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  meek, meek-azure, bridge,|  Actual Points:
  javascript, jar|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by bakertaylor28):

 Interesting thing is that the problem has seemed to have spontaneously
 fixed itself without intervention.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31999 [Core Tor/Tor]: Default log file is handled inconsistently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31999: Default log file is handled inconsistently
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31241| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Seems fine to me.

 I was wondering how we should test this as I was reading it:
 * can we test the individual functions like we used to test
 options_validate()?
 * should we try to test using our command-line harness?

 It would also be nice to remove unused variables in this ticket:
 {{{
 /* 29211 TODO: Remove this from the API. */
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #32136 [- Select a component]: Cancel my subscription

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32136: Cancel my subscription
+--
 Reporter:  Sherrylouisehodges  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I bought the Tor App from Apple ITunes, with a free trial.  Cancel it,  I
 don’t want to pay for this app.  It has a recurring charge of $9.99.  I
 don’t want it.  Thank you

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31705 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31705: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should|  Actual Points:  1.5
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Seems fine, but there are some typos and minor commit message/content
 issues.

 How do you want to make progress on the remaining files?
 Do you want to set up CI, so we preserve cocci compatibility over time?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32136 [- Select a component]: Cancel my subscription

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32136: Cancel my subscription
--+-
 Reporter:  Sherrylouisehodges|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Hi, I'm sorry, that's not our app, it's probably a scam.

 You'll have to ask Apple, or the developer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32032 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion mp->conf_state == PT_PROTO_COMPLETED failed in managed_proxy_stdout_callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32032: Assertion mp->conf_state == PT_PROTO_COMPLETED failed in
managed_proxy_stdout_callback
+
 Reporter:  dcf |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should? tor-pt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by ahf):

 I believe this is a duplicate of #31091, but I'm gonna keep it open to
 verify that the bug goes away when #31091 is fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31740 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review RemoteSettings usages in esr68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31740: Review RemoteSettings usages in esr68
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:  1.5
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * actualpoints:   => 1.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30518 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android - Add missing command line options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30518: Android - Add missing command line options
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201910 => tbb-mobile,
 tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201910R


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[tor-bugs] #32127 [Applications/GetTor]: Tor browser manual section on downloading using gettor is incomplete

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32127: Tor browser manual section on downloading using gettor is incomplete
--+-
 Reporter:  bluemoon  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Applications/GetTor
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  get, tor, gettor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31982| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
 https://tb-manual.torproject.org/downloading/

 has title "TO USE GETTOR VIA JABBER/XMPP (JITSI, COYIM, ETC.):" but the
 instructions underneath are for using email to get the Chinese browser for
 linux.

 Furthermore the parent ticket suggests there are additional methods, such
 as Twitter, which are missing from this page. Probably a link to the rest
 of the gettor resources (if the pages exist) will be sufficient.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32055 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Importing bookmarks from Safari doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32055: Importing bookmarks from Safari doesn't work
--+--
 Reporter:  rex4539   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Kathy and I confirmed that importing via this method does not work in Tor
 Browser 8.5.5 or 9.0a8. We tested on a macOS 10.14.6 system which has
 Safari 13.0.2.

 In Tor Browser 8.5.5, the browser console shows the following (even though
 the GUI shows "success"):
 {{{
 Could not read Bookmarks.plist 1 SafariProfileMigrator.js:39
 B_migrate/<
 
jar:file:///Users/USER/Desktop/TB/tb.app/Contents/Resources/browser/omni.ja!/components/SafariProfileMigrator.js:39:15
 InterpretGeneratorResume self-hosted:1257:8
 next self-hosted:1212:9
 some bookmarks did not successfully migrate.
 }}}

 A similar error is logged in TB 9.0a8.

 After some searching, we found a corresponding Firefox bug report:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1493103

 The root cause is that macOS 10.14 and 10.15 "lock down" access to more
 system files, and that includes Safari's `Bookmarks.plist` file. Possible
 workarounds:
 1. Temporarily enable "Full Disk Access" for Tor Browser. See
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1493103#c12
 2. Use `File|Export Bookmarks…` in Safari to save the bookmarks as an HTML
 file, and then import the file into Tor Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32127 [Applications/GetTor]: Tor browser manual section on downloading using gettor is incomplete

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32127: Tor browser manual section on downloading using gettor is incomplete
-+
 Reporter:  bluemoon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  get, tor, gettor |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31982   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by bluemoon):

 I made a PR here: https://github.com/torproject/manual/pull/53

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32123: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  october|
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See my draft branch, which sets up --disable-module-relay, and makes it
 imply --disable-module-dirauth:
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1421

 Am I on the right track here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32126 [Metrics/Ideas]: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32126: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * cc: phw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32127 [Applications/GetTor]: Tor browser manual section on downloading using gettor is incomplete

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32127: Tor browser manual section on downloading using gettor is incomplete
-+
 Reporter:  bluemoon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  get, tor, gettor |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31982   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by ggus):

 > has title "TO USE GETTOR VIA JABBER/XMPP (JITSI, COYIM, ETC.):" but the
 instructions underneath are for using email to get the Chinese browser for
 linux.

 The instructions aren't good, but it's correct. XMPP is based on email
 accounts. I don't know if gettor XMPP is working, tho.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32127 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Tor browser manual section on downloading using gettor is incomplete

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32127: Tor browser manual section on downloading using gettor is incomplete
--+--
 Reporter:  bluemoon  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  get, tor, gettor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31982| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ggus):

 * owner:  (none) => ggus
 * component:  Applications/GetTor => Community/Tor Browser Manual


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32101 [Core Tor/Tor]: Generate and publish doxygen output automatically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32101: Generate and publish doxygen output automatically
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 Did we arrive at a (domain) name we want to use for this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32033 [Core Tor/Tor]: process_unix_exec assertion failure when ServerTransportPlugin refers to nonexistent file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32033: process_unix_exec assertion failure when ServerTransportPlugin refers to
nonexistent file
+
 Reporter:  dcf |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt 042-should?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by ahf):

 This is a duplicate of #31810 I believe.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Print summary of features at end of configure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31373: Print summary of features at end of configure
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  configure, build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Great; merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32058 [Core Tor/Tor]: mainloop: make periodic events restartable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32058: mainloop: make periodic events restartable
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should, regression?, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,  |
  042-backport, BugSmashFund |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Okay, made a squashed branch as `ticket32058_035_01_squashed` and a PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1422 .  When CI is done, we can
 merge to 0.4.2 and forward, then mark for backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32124 [Core Tor/Tor]: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32124: Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-october, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  build, no-backport?|
Parent ID:  #32123   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 I'd suggest 042 and forward, but master-only is also okay.  The fix looks
 fine.

 Do we make this mistake anywhere else?

 Please feel free to merge once there's a changes file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31730 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Revert aarch64 fixup for ESR 60-based bundles with Tor Browser 9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31730: Revert aarch64 fixup for ESR 60-based bundles with Tor Browser 9
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  TorBrowserTeam201910R tbb-9.0-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32123: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  october|
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned


Comment:

 This looks fine so far.  I'd like it to prevent us from becoming a relay
 as part of the "minimum viable product", and it should also be listed when
 we say "--list-modules".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32052 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Linux32 bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32052: Linux32 bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Critical| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb-9.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by alexcrichton):

 Thanks for the cc and for the investigation into this! This looks like
 it's either a compiler but or a bug in the build system because the Rust
 object file is what's changing here. A compiler bug could definitely cause
 it but there may also be something nondeterministic being fed into rustc
 (e.g. generated code or something like that).

 I don't know of rustc bugs off-hand (although I'm not exactly all-
 knowing!). In terms of minimization I think the "easiest" way would be to
 start playing whack-a-mole with code. Basically get to a point where you
 can edit the gkrust crate and then delete code incrementally until you
 can't get a compile difference.

 If this is a build system bug then you may need to trace the
 nondeterministic codegen back further from gkrust, since generics may be
 getting monomorphized into gkrust itself.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31941 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Old reverse DNS lookups are sometimes not cleared properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31941: Old reverse DNS lookups are sometimes not cleared properly
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Reviewed this offline and forgot to update the ticket.

 This looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32126 [Metrics/Ideas]: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32126: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32101 [Core Tor/Tor]: Generate and publish doxygen output automatically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32101: Generate and publish doxygen output automatically
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * cc: weasel (added)


Comment:

 * We build it automatically, cf. https://jenkins.torproject.org/job/tor-
 doxygen/
 * Still to do: set up a static component, the corresponding web stuff, and
 figure out pushing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30920 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30920: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy overflow  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 Looks good to me too.  It just needs some documentation updates and (I
 think) a sign check.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32092 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser Support should link to our support portal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32092: Tor Browser Support should link to our support portal
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-must,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31982 [Applications/GetTor]: Problems with Gettor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31982: Problems with Gettor
-+---
 Reporter:  lwsullivan   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  get, tor, gettor |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---

Comment (by bluemoon):

 Checked gettor email. There was a bug such that the links were shown as
 "None" and the string after "Download the file" at the end was empty.
 Reported on IRC and was quickly fixed by @hiro.


 Replying to [ticket:31982 lwsullivan]:
 > The Gettor area is a confusing mess of multiple landing pages, multiple
 repositories, and broken functionality.
 >
 > The starting point seems to be a blog post from 2016,
 https://blog.torproject.org/gettor-new-ways-download-tor-browser
 >
 > That directs to a landing page, https://gettor.torproject.org, which
 lists options.
 >
 > But https://thetorproject.github.io/gettor seems to be another landing
 page with another list of options.
 >
 > That second landing page only goes up to Tor Browser version 8.0.2, and
 in any case, the links to download Tor Browser return 404 not found.
 >
 > It looks like https://github.com/TheTorProject/gettorbrowser is empty.
 >
 > There is a repository for Gettor https://github.com/TheTorProject/gettor
 but that has had no commits since 2017.
 >
 > The similar https://github.com/torproject/gettor has more recent commits
 but is under an account https://github.com/torproject which is described
 as "unofficial" repositories.
 >
 > Also, has anyone actually checked that the email, XMPP, and Twitter
 responders still work?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32105 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: brid...@torproject.org don't respond

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32105: brid...@torproject.org don't respond
+--
 Reporter:  mh828   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30
+--

Comment (by arma):

 hiro tells me that she rebuilt the gettor machine last week and added all
 the needed packages to puppet. so gettor is already all set wrt this bug
 (and maybe encountered it independently, i'm not sure).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32101 [Core Tor/Tor]: Generate and publish doxygen output automatically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32101: Generate and publish doxygen output automatically
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 Also let us know if you want the doxygen tree to be at /, or if you want
 some directory structure (like /tor/master or something).  We can redirect
 from / to that directory for now if we want.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32039 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.5.5 is not working on macOS 10.15 after being freshly installed on macOS 10.15

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32039: Tor Browser 8.5.5 is not working on macOS 10.15 after being freshly
installed on macOS 10.15
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for the investigation. I am closing this as 9.0 as about to get
 built.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix tor-browser's .mozconfig so that ./mach configure succeeds on Linux by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32116: Fix tor-browser's .mozconfig so that ./mach configure succeeds on Linux 
by
default
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Hm, I guess we should come up with a general idea of what the purpose of
 the `.mozconfig` files in `tor-browser` is and then treat all of them
 accordingly. Maybe my idea of just being able to build `tor-browser` out
 of the box with proper settings should be reconsidered, dunno.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32100 [Core Tor/Tor]: Resolve all doxygen warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32100: Resolve all doxygen warnings
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:  .2
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, ahf |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet, ahf


Comment:

 PR 1416 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Print summary of features at end of configure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31373: Print summary of features at end of configure
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  configure, build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Pushed!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26294 [Core Tor/Tor]: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26294: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:  6
  roadmap-august, security   |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  7
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32003 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unify handling of command-line option parsing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32003: Unify handling of command-line option parsing
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  .4
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (To be clear, the 100% coverage is on the lines modified by this branch; I
 hope that's ok)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30461 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30461: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201910|
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:40 sisbell]:
 > Replying to [comment:39 gk]:
 > > Replying to [comment:38 sisbell]:
 > > > I'm agreeing with you, let's move mavenLocal to tor-android-service.
 I'll open the issue on tor-android-service and then remove the patch.
 > >
 > > #32043 got merged. Could you fix the remaining issue (I think the
 tickets got filed as children of #32069) in `tor-browser-build` and then
 we can close the whole Android toolchain upgrade bug, too.
 > I'm not clear which issue you are referring too. Is it related to this
 bug?
 >

 We wanted to get rid of the mavenLocal patch in `tor-browser-build` and
 use the `tor-android-service` commit instead that contains the fix I
 merged yesterday.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32107 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ruleset updates in HTTPS-Everywhere complain sometimes about blocked cookie/storage access

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32107: Ruleset updates in HTTPS-Everywhere complain sometimes about blocked
cookie/storage access
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 alexishan]:
 > Did the report have a sample page where this error occurs?

 Unfortunately, no.
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/284375#comment-284375 is all we have.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32126 [Metrics/Ideas]: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32126: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "vanilla-tor-bootstrap-2019-10-17-c.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32126 [Metrics/Ideas]: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32126: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "vanilla-tor-bootstrap-2019-10-17-b.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32126 [Metrics/Ideas]: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32126: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "vanilla-tor-bootstrap-2019-10-17-a.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32100 [Core Tor/Tor]: Resolve all doxygen warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32100: Resolve all doxygen warnings
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:  .2
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, ahf |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => accepted


Comment:

 merged!

 Now the only doxygen warnings are ones about missing docs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32125 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Using private obfs4 bridge does not show circuit display

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32125: Using private obfs4 bridge does not show circuit display
--+---
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-circuit-display   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by ggus):

 >BridgeDB bridges work?

 Yes.

 > How do they look differently

 These private obfs4 bridges have OR port firewalled and other torrc diffs,
 but I'm copying phw here since he can check if these private bridges were
 properly configured.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ESR68 Network Code Review

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31144: ESR68 Network Code Review
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
  -must-alpha|
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32003 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unify handling of command-line option parsing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32003: Unify handling of command-line option parsing
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  .4
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Ok, if we have 100% coverage, we don't need more tests.

 There's one fix remaining: the CMD_OTHER rename didn't reach the
 nt_service files:
 
https://ci.appveyor.com/project/torproject/tor/builds/28177080/job/svbqubudyuw6c38i#L3075

 When that's fixed, and CI passes, feel free to merge this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32003 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unify handling of command-line option parsing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32003: Unify handling of command-line option parsing
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  .4
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 ok, pushed a fix and waiting for CI.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support Tor Running on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30607: Support Tor Running on Android Q
+--
 Reporter:  sisbell |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ff68-esr-will-have  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: macOS bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: macOS bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Critical| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb-9.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * Attachment "macOS_diff_1000" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24607 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24607: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult
-+-
 Reporter:  alison   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-november,|  Actual Points:
  s30-o22a2  |
Parent ID:  #31279   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30920 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30920: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy overflow  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 Looks good to me, but I'd like someone else to also do a review,

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30382 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop304: Implement SOCKS new HS error code (was: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an onion)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30382: prop304: Implement SOCKS new HS error code
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, hs-auth,  |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-september, tor-spec,  |
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Renaming ticket to reflect the work actually done in this ticket now. It
 is not about control event anymore. This might come later.

 tor-dev@ thread that explains the basics of what will be done with
 prop304: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2019-October/014053.html

 I will also create a new branch after I address everything from asn and
 fix things to follow the proposal on the tor-dev@ thread above ^. And will
 rebase to latest 043 in the process. Expect new things! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32125 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Using private obfs4 bridge does not show circuit display

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32125: Using private obfs4 bridge does not show circuit display
--+---
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-circuit-display   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-circuit-display
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Hm. So, BridgeDB bridges work? But not other private bridges? How do they
 look differently?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ESR68 Network Code Review

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31144: ESR68 Network Code Review
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
  -must-alpha|
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0-alpha-must =>
 TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0-must-alpha


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTML5 media support may lead to fingerprinting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13543: HTML5 media support may lead to fingerprinting
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff68-esr,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910,
 tbb-9.0-must => tbb-fingerprinting, ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30461 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30461: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201910|
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 As you said in comment:38
 {{{
 I'm agreeing with you, let's move mavenLocal to tor-android-service. I'll
 open the issue on tor-android-service and then remove the patch.
 }}}
 The "remove the patch" part is still missing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: macOS bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: macOS bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Critical| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb-9.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: manishearth@…, acrichton@… (added)
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb.9.0-must => TorBrowserTeam201910,
 tbb-9.0-must


Comment:

 I got differences for macOS after a while (but I agree with boklm that
 this seems to be harder to achieve). `libgkrust.a` does not match. More
 specifically `gkrust-6f8221aa429c2389.gkrust.41si33dt-cgu.0.rcgu.o`. I am
 not convinced yet that this is a duplicate of #32052 as the diff looks
 different enough. And it is considerably larger (way over 1 GiB!). I'll
 add the first thousand lines in case it helps.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32125 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Using private obfs4 bridge does not show circuit display

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32125: Using private obfs4 bridge does not show circuit display
--+---
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-circuit-display   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by ggus):

 * Attachment "circuit-display-bridge-obfs4.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32111 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adding your own custom bridges generates a parsing error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32111: Adding your own custom bridges generates a parsing error
--+---
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Applied to `tor-browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-3`
 (7aca86c1666873378ab6b9845acdee93b16468a9) (I added a fixup commit to deal
 with some typos (commit 83a889d1fcdc8cb01497faaa225987e22d91d94b))

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31740 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review RemoteSettings usages in esr68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31740: Review RemoteSettings usages in esr68
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 acat]:

 Thanks for the detailed analysis, really appreciated!

 > To give an idea about what these remote-settings requests look like.
 Periodically, or responding to some events (e.g. creating a
 `RemoteSettings(...)` client for a new collection), there will be a GET
 request to
 
`https://firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com/v1/buckets/monitor/collections/changes/records`,
 used to obtain a list of available "collections" and metadata about them
 (https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 
esr68/rev/4fc15df791ad4d3ceaf1a958af2bfc1252433ca8/services/settings/Utils.jsm#57).
 Each entry looks like:
 >
 > {{{
 > id: 8da7db1e-dffb-18c9-2efe-0e9d7459a0f4
 > last_modified: 1571184016986
 > bucket: main
 > collection: normandy-recipes
 > host: firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com
 > }}}
 >
 > For each collection (distinct `RemoteSettings("...")` call), depending
 on the corresponding `last_modified` value returned in the previous
 request another request might be performed to retrieve the records of that
 collection (possibly only the ones that changed since some timestamp). For
 example, for `onecrl` collection
 `https://firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com/v1/buckets/security-
 state/collections/onecrl?_expected=1568310941289` would be fetched (with
 possibly different parameters).
 >
 > One concern is that the different parameters (etag, timestamps...) might
 be leaking enough info about the user state that it allows linking
 together requests done over time as belonging to the same user. In
 principle, the request parameters depend on the values returned in
 previous responses, and these seem not to change very often. I did not do
 a deep analysis, but I feel like we would not lose too much by doing the
 same requests without parameters (as if there was no previous state in the
 browser). I don't see the responses being so big, nor the requests done so
 often. But this would probably require a bit more time to make sure the
 changes are not breaking the `RemoteSettings` functionality. Perhaps on a
 different ticket?

 Sounds good, please file one.

 > For now, I think we can disable the `RemoteSettings("...")` calls that
 we do not need, if only for sparing some unnecessary requests. The
 currently active `RemoteSettings` instances are:
 >
 > * `toolkit/components/search/SearchService.jsm` (hijack-blocklists)
 >   * I think we don't want this one, it allows mozilla to blacklist
 search extensions.
 > * `browser/components/preferences/browserLanguages.js` (language-
 dictionaries):
 >   * I think we need this one if we allow changing language via
 `about:preferences`.
 > * `netwerk/url-classifier/UrlClassifierSkipListService.jsm` (url-
 classifier-skip-urls):
 >   * We don't need this one until we enable enhanced tracking protection
 (content blocking).
 > * `services/common/blocklist-clients.js` (onecrl, pins):
 >   * OneCRl and certificate pinning blocklist? I think we want to have
 these.
 >
 > Note that the previously mentioned `RemoteSettings` instances in
 `toolkit/mozapps/extensions/Blocklist.jsm` are actually currently disabled
 because of `extensions.blocklist.useXML = true`, see
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16931#comment:8.
 >
 > So here is a patch disabling `hijack-blocklists` and `url-classifier-
 skip-urls`: https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commit/31740. If
 it's ok to disable the latter, we could update #30939, as we will need to
 reenable if we decide to enable Firefox Enhanced Tracking Protection.

 Looks good, thanks! I cherry-picked the commit to `tor-
 browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-3` (commit
 e1e1f70187dc106628e8e8c58ecbe23976b31131). Making a note on #30939 would
 be good. Maybe we don't want to use that protocol when working on ETP but
 we should have it on our radar that we disabled it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32126 [Metrics/Ideas]: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32126: Add OONI's Vanilla Tor measurement data to Tor Metrics
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Here are the results from my analysis in the past few days:

 [[Image(vanilla-tor-bootstrap-2019-10-17-a.png, 700px)]]

 This first graph shows all measured times until 100% bootstrapped between
 2016-01 and 2019-10. Some observations:

  - 50% of measurements were done in under 15 seconds, and roughly 90%
 finished in under 1 minute.
  - There's a bump shortly after 120 seconds, which is most likely the
 result of a 120 second timeout somewhere in the process.
  - A few percent of measurements did not succeed within the test timeout
 of 300 seconds: the line is not at 100% at the 300 seconds mark but
 roughly at 97%.

 [[Image(vanilla-tor-bootstrap-2019-10-17-b.png, 700px)]]

 The second graph shows different stages of the bootstrap process. Again
 some observations:

  - It's not entirely clear (to me) why 0% bootstrapped is not just a
 vertical line at the 0 s mark. If it requires work to get to 0%, it's not
 0% but rather 2%, 1%, or 0.5% of the process. Maybe a naming issue,
 possibly a measurement issue. At least all measurements succeed at
 bootstrapping to 0% within the test time.
  - The 20% line has a small bump right after 120 s, so there must be a 120
 s timeout for this early bootstrap phase. There's another bump at roughly
 130 s which could be due to the same 120 s timeout that was started later.
  - The 80% and 100% line are almost the same. If a client makes it to 80%,
 it's just a matter of seconds to get to 100%.

 [[Image(vanilla-tor-bootstrap-2019-10-17-c.png, 700px)]]

 The third graph shows the same data broken down by country for the slowest
 5 countries. Observations:

  - Most measurements in China and Egypt did not proceed past the 0%
 bootstrapped point.
  - Almost none of the Kazakhstan succeeded, even fewer than in China and
 Egypt. The 20% bootstrapped line looks really funny, starting to increase
 only after full 2 minutes. Maybe these measurements would succeed after 10
 or 20 minutes, which is something we won't find out from this data.
  - Belarus has two visible bumps shortly after 2 and 4 minutes. I would
 guess that there'd be more bumps after 6 and 8 and 10 minutes. Maybe this
 is related to some subset of relays not being reachable.
  - Turkey has roughly 1/4 of measurements not succeeding, with the
 remaining ones looking slow-but-okay. The reason might be that we're
 looking at almost 3 years of measurements here, and maybe bootstrapping
 succeeded in 75% of the time and did not succeed in 25% of the time.

 The next step here is to discuss '''what''' results we want to add to Tor
 Metrics. Are these graphs useful, or is there something potentially more
 interesting in the data that we want to have? I'm hoping for input from
 other teams here.

 All graphs above are ECDFs, unlike other graphs on Tor Metrics. This is a
 smaller issue on the graphing side, because we need to process non-
 aggregated measurements for making a graph. It's also a possible issue on
 the usability side, because ECDFs are probably harder to understand than
 time plots.

 The next step after answering the questions above is to figure out
 '''how''' we'd get the data for these new graphs. Some thoughts:
  - Maintaining our own copy of the OONI metadata database, like I did for
 this analysis, isn't feasible. We only need a small fraction of ~40G of
 this database which currently has a total size of 696G. Also, cloning this
 database took way too long for us to do it once per day.
  - We might be able to maintain a copy of the .yaml files of vanilla_tor
 measurements only. We would sync these once or twice per day and serve
 them with CollecTor. We'd have to define our own database schema for
 importing and aggregating them. This is not a small project and not a
 small commitment.
  - A while ago we were hoping to get a .csv file from OONI with just the
 data we need. For example, the .csv file behind the three graphs above is
 150M large, though it could easily be reduced to 75M, uncompressed. Maybe
 we'd have to define precisely what data we want (the discussion above) and
 then write the database query for it. This would be the smallest project
 and commitment from our side; in other words, it would be most likely to
 happen soon.
  - A possible variant of the ideas above would be that we operate on a
 read-only copy of the metadata database where we can define views, run
 queries, and export results as .csv files.

Re: [tor-bugs] #32114 [Community/Tor Support]: Tor and Tor Alpha on OS X Capitan

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32114: Tor and Tor Alpha on OS X Capitan
---+--
 Reporter:  mwolfe |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:32114 mwolfe]:
 > On Macintosh, Tor goes in the Applications directory and writes data to
 user/Library and other places.

 Tor Browser on macOS should not store any data outside of its `TorBrowser-
 Data` directory (it it does, that is a bug we should fix). That is another
 way of saying that the macOS info on the following page is correct: https
 ://tb-manual.torproject.org/uninstalling/

 As implied by the "uninstalling" instructions, you can place `Tor
 Browser.app` in any folder; it does not need to be installed in
 `/Applications`. If you place the app in its own folder, e.g., in
 `~/Desktop/tb-alpha/`, all of its associated data will be placed in a
 `TorBrowser-Data` folder next to `Tor Browser.app`. This approach of using
 separate folders is highly recommended when switching between the stable
 releases and alpha releases.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31632 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Service doesn't re-upload descriptor on circuit failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31632: hs-v3: Service doesn't re-upload descriptor on circuit failure
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 042-deferred-20190918  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30200 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * points:   => 0.5
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23313 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: The trac "reply/edit/delete" comment buttons now require JavaScript

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23313: The trac "reply/edit/delete" comment buttons now require JavaScript
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  worksforme =>


Comment:

 In Tor Browser on macOS, when No Script is blocking scripts, the
 reply/edit/delete buttons are not present in *comments*.

 But the reply/delete buttons are present on the ticket description. (You
 replied to the ticket description.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
-+-
 Reporter:  torcrash |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  040-unreached-must, network-team-roadmap-  |
  august, regression?, 041-unreached-must,   |
  042-should |
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: asn (removed)
 * reviewer:   => asn
 * status:  reopened => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31147 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check tor_vasprintf for error return values.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31147: Check tor_vasprintf for error return values.
-+-
 Reporter:  paldium  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport 040-backport|  Actual Points:
  041-backport 042-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Okay, I think the patch looks good.

 To the merger: it seems like something went fishy with AppVeyor and Travis
 at first where it tried to pull a branch from `torproject/tor` instead of
 `ahf/tor`, which failed, but the second round seems to have passed. I have
 no idea why that is the case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31730 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Revert aarch64 fixup for ESR 60-based bundles with Tor Browser 9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31730: Revert aarch64 fixup for ESR 60-based bundles with Tor Browser 9
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910 tbb-9.0-must  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201910R tbb-9.0-must =>
 tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201910 tbb-9.0-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32076 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update goptlib to v1.1.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32076: Update goptlib to v1.1.0
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  goptlib TorBrowserTeam201910R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Applied to `master` (commit
 d0139c1f9a838732577a38b88dc6d341bed65308).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32052 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Linux32 bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32052: Linux32 bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Critical| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb-9.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by boklm):

 I uploaded a tarball containing two versions of the file `libgkrust-
 f4d3d8c9a1eaf037.a`, as well as the output from diffoscope:
 https://people.torproject.org/~boklm/builds/bug_32052/libgkrust.tar.xz
 https://people.torproject.org/~boklm/builds/bug_32052/libgkrust.tar.xz.asc

 {{{
 3f89552d3f37c2e1bbe8beab8561cc397561f030a6d8d236516eb3645a2ad63a
 libgkrust.tar.xz
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32114 [Community/Tor Support]: Tor and Tor Alpha on OS X Capitan

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32114: Tor and Tor Alpha on OS X Capitan
---+--
 Reporter:  mwolfe |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => ggus
 * component:  Applications => Community/Tor Support


Comment:

 ggus: I think I hear this issue from time to time. Do we have a good and
 working FAQ-entry/documentation of how to work around this problem? If not
 we should probably create one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32092 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser Support should link to our support portal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32092: Tor Browser Support should link to our support portal
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-must,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Applied to `tor-browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-3` (commit
 fa8eb720629b18e1ca34cae0f50ab670c96b29ea).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32120 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Figure out what to do with hidden 'Learn More' link in about:preferences#tor in the 'Advanced' section

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32120: Figure out what to do with hidden 'Learn More' link in
about:preferences#tor in the 'Advanced' section
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ggus):

 * owner:  hiro => ggus
 * component:  Webpages/Website => Community/Tor Browser Manual


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32119: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-onboarding   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ux, onboarding => ux-team, tbb-onboarding


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31749 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security level popup should not open with middle or right click

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31749: Security level popup should not open with middle or right click
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, tbb-9.0,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Cherry-picked to `tor-browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-3` (commit
 071eea2a3b95c686b4a044481a975131a3261a34). I put a small fixup on top of
 it to remove some typos (commit f17113f06b92a16e01973b1f05b795ed321ffc7f).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29206 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: New design for client -- server protocol for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29206: New design for client -- server protocol for Snowflake
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-september  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  dcf|Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor28-must
---+---

Comment (by dcf):

 I think this design is looking pretty good. You and I converged on similar
 decisions here and in
 https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/14#issuecomment-542898991, such
 as maintaining a dynamic map of session ID to `net.Conn` on the server,
 and treating a session ID as a `net.Addr`.

 I see that a map of the type
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/1707fcc125180b73509688a510bfbe8fa697a99d/server/server.go#L44-L48
 Flurry] maintains the set of mappings from client session IDs to
 (Snowflake proxy, OR conn). The map definitely needs protection against
 concurrent modification—I wonder if that's the cause of the occasional
 server failures you saw. If you haven't done it yet, try building with `go
 build -race` and see whether it reports anything. Take a look at the
 `connMap` type in reconnecting-kcp/server/conn_map.go in
 https://github.com/net4people/bbs/files/3736441/turbo-tunnel-reconnection-
 demo.zip. It's meant to be a synchronized version of the same data
 structure.

 Could `Flurry.conn` be a plain `net.Conn`, and `Flurry.or` also? Or do
 they need the specialization to `*proto.Snowflake.Conn` and
 `*net.TCPConn`?

 Could the directory common/snowflake-proto be called common/proto instead,
 so that the directory name matches the package name?

 > I see some motivation for another feature that allows us to set some
 kind of FIN or RST flag to notify the client that the OR port has been
 closed and the server that the client has closed the connection.

 Yes, but in the Tor model, it essentially never happens that a
 relay/bridge closes an ORPort connection, right? It's usually the client
 that decides when to disconnect.

 > Perhaps 10s is too long a timeout?

 I don't understand this. Do you mean too ''short'' a timeout? As a
 retransmission timer, 10 s doesn't seem short, but as a timer that
 terminates the whole end-to-end connection, it does seem short. Since in
 this design, there's no retransmission except when kicked off by a
 `NewSnowflake` transition, it might be worth increasing the timeout.

 I'm not sure about
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/1707fcc125180b73509688a510bfbe8fa697a99d/common
 /snowflake-proto/proto.go#L341-L353 this design] of setting a timer on
 every `Write`, to wait for the ack to come back. Does the `timers` slice
 grow without bound? In the name of simplicity, could there be one timer,
 that gets reset whenever any amount of data is acked?

 Speaking of timeouts, I think it's worth reducing the timeout in tests, to
 make them run faster.

 I don't understand the design where methods such as
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/1707fcc125180b73509688a510bfbe8fa697a99d/common
 /snowflake-proto/proto.go#L168 NewSnowflake] and
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/1707fcc125180b73509688a510bfbe8fa697a99d/common
 /snowflake-proto/proto.go#L242 readLoop] take an optional
 `*snowflakeHeader`. Can you explain that?

 What's the reason for the
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/1707fcc125180b73509688a510bfbe8fa697a99d/common
 /snowflake-proto/proto.go#L76-L78 nil check in snowflakeHeader.Marshal]?
 It's not a typical pattern for a method like this. Is there a place where
 the error is anticipated, or would it always indicate a bug of some sort?

 It looks like
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/1707fcc125180b73509688a510bfbe8fa697a99d/common
 /snowflake-proto/proto.go#L333-L339 this block] is meant to return `0,
 err2`, not `len(b), nil`? Also `err2.Error()` in the log statement, not
 `err.Error()`.
 {{{
 if err2 != nil {
 log.Printf("Error writing to connection: %s", err.Error())
 return len(b), nil
 }
 }}}

 `SnowflakeConn` needs a test for duplicate and overlapping sequence
 numbers. That's the primary expected use case: the client sends 100 bytes
 with seq 1234, the server receives, the proxy dies before sending the
 server's ack, the client reconnects to a different proxy and retransmits
 the same 100 bytes with seq 1234, the server receives duplicate sequence
 numbers and should ignore the 

Re: [tor-bugs] #31920 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the shield button to stop working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31920: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the 
shield
button to stop working
+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf   |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0, TorBrowserTeam201910R  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Cherry-picked to `tor-browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-3` (commit
 ec6ab177fd17a27ee6c7305c5433870d8d097097) (with typo fixups etc. to avoid
 another roundtrip).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31286: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must-alpha, ff68-esr, ux-|  Actual Points:
  team, TorBrowserTeam201910R|
Parent ID:  #10760   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:42 pospeselr]:
 > I've amended the review4 branch to change the last commit to a fixup!
 commit:
 >
 > tor-browser: tor-browser fixup:
 ​https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_31286_review4

 Thanks! `git commit --fixup ` is what you want next
 time. ;) Othewise `git rebase` has trouble to figure out which commit you
 actually want to fix up. I did that in commit
 569fa462103fdd3547da0a44cffae51b2011b2b6 on `tor-browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-3`.

 > gk: I opted to move the existing strings to the DTD as I gathered from
 acat's changes to securityLevel.js that DTD was what we were using going
 forward (since those strings had originally been in a properties file in
 tor-button).
 >
 > Once tor-launcher is gone and its functionality has been completely
 integrated into Tor Browser (9.5?) then the tor-launcher (and maybe also
 tor-button?) strings can live nicely together in one place in the tor-
 browser repo and the 'TorStrings' module can ''mostly'' go away. I think
 it would make sense to do the string merge at that point.

 Sounds good.

 > Given that new tor bootstrapping UX is going to be coming down the pipe
 soonish, do we need --without-tor-launcher support? What dev scenarios
 does that enable? If so, I'll create a bug to track doing that.

 We can think about that once the plans are a bit more mature. Right now
 the configure switch is useful as we don't build Tor Launcher for mobile
 e.g. as it is not needed there.

 > EDIT: Created #32120 to track the hidden 'Learn More' link

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31918 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase and squash mobile/android patches into desktop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31918: Rebase and squash mobile/android patches into desktop
---+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb-9.0  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 Another thing I am just dropping here to not forget about it: there are a
 number of securitySettings "fixup" commits we should squash while we are
 at it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29395 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Document the steps of adding someone to the TSA team

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29395: Document the steps of adding someone to the TSA team
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29396   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ln5):

 * owner:  ln5 => anarcat


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  Rezonansowy  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-parity, ux-team,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha, GeorgKoppen201908, |
  TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb-no-uplift|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32114 [Community/Tor Support]: Tor and Tor Alpha on OS X Capitan

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32114: Tor and Tor Alpha on OS X Capitan
---+--
 Reporter:  mwolfe |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by ggus):

 We have updated the uninstall instructions:

 https://tb-manual.torproject.org/uninstalling/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32118 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Identity button icon could be more legible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32118: New Identity button icon could be more legible
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Useful feedback from our blog regarding the icon:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/284465#comment-284465.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32118 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Identity button icon could be more legible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32118: New Identity button icon could be more legible
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ux => ux-team


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