Re: [tor-bugs] #5085 [Obfsproxy]: managed obfsproxy does not quit if tor dies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5085: managed obfsproxy does not quit if tor dies
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfsproxy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 arma]:
 > Ok to close this ticket, maybe even as a duplicate of #15435?

 Closed!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15434 [Tor]: Tor dies if you send it a HUP before it read its config, and doesn't take PTs with it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15434: Tor dies if you send it a HUP before it read its config, and doesn't 
take
PTs with it
---+
 Reporter:  TvdW   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge tor-pt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  medium?
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorS-can
---+

Comment (by arma):

 I think we might want to close this one, either as resolved or as a
 duplicate of #15435?

 Or we can retitle it to simply "Tor dies if you send it a HUP before it
 read its config", but isn't that both kind of expected and also kind of
 unfixable?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15435 [Tor]: Tor should not close stdin on child processes.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15435: Tor should not close stdin on child processes.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Tor  |  0.2.7.x-final
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, needs-spec-patch pt-wants,   |  0.2.7
  SponsorS, 027-triaged-1-in | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  implemented
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  small-
 |  remaining
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * points:  small-remaning => small-remaining
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18177 [DocTor]: Check Fallback Directory IPv4 and IPv6 addresses using DocTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18177: Check Fallback Directory IPv4 and IPv6 addresses using DocTor
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  DocTor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:17 atagar]:
 > > The fingerprint.
 > > I guess stem can't check the fingerprint unless it speaks the ORPort
 protocol?
 >
 > What value are you hoping to get from this? Would checking that the
 fingerprint matches what's in the consensus do what you're after? Stem
 validates signatures of a few descriptor types but I don't think that's
 really what you're after here.

 Clients will refuse to connect to a fallback if it's changed its
 fingerprint from the fingerprint in the hard-coded list.

 So yes, comparing the fingerprint in the fallback list to the current one
 for that IPv4:ORPort and IPv6:IPv6ORPort (if present) would discover this
 kind of failure. (And the IPv6 check wouldn't need any IPv6 connectivity!)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18779 [Service - lists]: Request for tor-team@ list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18779: Request for tor-team@ list
-+
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Done, and list announced - thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18835 [Service - git]: Giving Alison access to user-manual.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18835: Giving Alison access to user-manual.git
---+
 Reporter:  phoul  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by phoul):

 * cc: alison (added)


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[tor-bugs] #18835 [Service - git]: Giving Alison access to user-manual.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18835: Giving Alison access to user-manual.git
---+
 Reporter:  phoul  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 Please give user 'alison' access to https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser/user-manual.git/

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18758 [Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create an LDAP account for iwakeh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18758: Please create an LDAP account for iwakeh
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:4 qbi]:
 > @iwakeh: I created your account, however it would be nice if you could
 provide a real name for the GECOS field.

 Maybe qbi would be happier if there are two words in the name. (You could
 call one of them the "first" name, and the second the "last" name.) See
 also #6658 for when Mr. Monster provided two names.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18758 [Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create an LDAP account for iwakeh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18758: Please create an LDAP account for iwakeh
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 @iwakeh: I created your account, however it would be nice if you could
 provide a real name for the GECOS field.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18771 [Tor Messenger]: Fails to extract correctly v1.0b6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18771: Fails to extract correctly v1.0b6
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 > B5 works fine. No issues.

 How about Firefox 45?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18772 [Tor Messenger]: Fails to start v1.0b6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18772: Fails to start v1.0b6
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by gk):

 Starting works fine here on a Win7 home premium x64 box. Both immediately
 by choosing the respective option on the last pane of the install wizard
 and by clicking manually. Restarting works, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18834 [Onionoo]: non-running relays (running=0) should have a consensus_weight of 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18834: non-running relays (running=0) should have a consensus_weight of 0
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 That non-zero consensus weight value is what those relays had when they
 were last listed in a network status.  Setting that value to 0 would
 remove information that might otherwise still be useful.  The same applies
 to a lot of other fields that we could set to zero when the relay goes
 offline, but why should we do that?  You could always look at both the
 `"running"` and the `"consensus_weight"` field and only consider running
 relays.  Or you could add the parameter `running=true` to only look at
 running relays.  Closing as won't fix, unless you have another reason for
 still wanting this change, in which case you should re-open this ticket.
 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18771 [Tor Messenger]: Fails to extract correctly v1.0b6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18771: Fails to extract correctly v1.0b6
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by gk):

 This works for me on a Win7 home premium x64 machine. I get entries in the
 start menu and the icon shows up, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18213 [Tor]: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the documentation, no warning is logged in the log file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18213: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the
documentation, no warning is logged in the log file
---+---
 Reporter:  propropus  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:
 Priority:  High   |  needs_information
Component:  Tor|  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Major  |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  WarnUnsafeSocks, Log 027-backport  |Version:
Parent ID: | Resolution:
 Reviewer: |  Actual Points:
   | Points:
   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:9 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > > Seems like the condition should be removed completely.
 >
 > I'm not yet convinced.

 Ok, but how is '''not''' removing the condition going to help then? If you
 remove the condition then you '''will''' get the warning, unless of course
 you're over the rate-limiting threshold.

 To fully regain the semantics before Nick's patch, it is necessary to
 disable the rate-limiting, now part of the logging function itself, in the
 case of `safe_socks` being true. Depending on the implementation, a
 similar condition might be necessary. Is this what you are trying to get
 to?

 Or am I misremembering the code that badly?

 (I don't yet understand your second paragraph.)

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[tor-bugs] #18834 [Onionoo]: non-running relays (running=0) should have a consensus_weight of 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18834: non-running relays (running=0) should have a consensus_weight of 0
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Current state:
 there are relays which are not running but have a cw value > 0.

 Can we set their cw value to 0?

 Was that already the case at some point in the past?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18177 [DocTor]: Check Fallback Directory IPv4 and IPv6 addresses using DocTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18177: Check Fallback Directory IPv4 and IPv6 addresses using DocTor
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  DocTor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by atagar):

 > The fingerprint.
 > I guess stem can't check the fingerprint unless it speaks the ORPort
 protocol?

 What value are you hoping to get from this? Would checking that the
 fingerprint matches what's in the consensus do what you're after? Stem
 validates signatures of a few descriptor types but I don't think that's
 really what you're after here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18213 [Tor]: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the documentation, no warning is logged in the log file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18213: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the
documentation, no warning is logged in the log file
---+---
 Reporter:  propropus  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:
 Priority:  High   |  needs_information
Component:  Tor|  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Major  |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  WarnUnsafeSocks, Log 027-backport  |Version:
Parent ID: | Resolution:
 Reviewer: |  Actual Points:
   | Points:
   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:9 arma]:
 > The original goal was to warn every single time we had an unsafe
 connection, when SafeSocks is on. That way you don't end up in a situation
 where you do a thing, check your log, see no complaints, and decide that
 the thing was ok to do.

 Ok, let me try that one again. If SafeSocks is on, then Tor will actually
 reject the unsafe connections. So your Tor will mysteriously not be
 working. That's when a user (at least a power user) might go to her logs
 to see what went wrong. We want a reject message for that connection to be
 there in the logs for her.

 Here's the commit message from da3a6e7 when we made that choice:
 {{{
 We also keep warning every time if safesocks is
 specified, because then the user presumably wants to hear about every
 blocked instance.
 }}}

 So it is ok if we want to change our intended behavior, but we should
 first know what the original intended behavior was. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18213 [Tor]: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the documentation, no warning is logged in the log file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18213: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the
documentation, no warning is logged in the log file
---+---
 Reporter:  propropus  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:
 Priority:  High   |  needs_information
Component:  Tor|  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Major  |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  WarnUnsafeSocks, Log 027-backport  |Version:
Parent ID: | Resolution:
 Reviewer: |  Actual Points:
   | Points:
   |Sponsor:
---+---
Description changed by arma:

Old description:

> The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the
> documentation, no warning is logged in the log file when a connection is
> done to an ip address.
>
> If WarnUnsafeSocks 1 (default) is set there is no warning in the log
> file.
> If you look at the code for log_unsafe_socks_warning, the only case where
> an error is logged is when safe_socks is true. safe_socks is true only
> when SafeSocks parameter is set, but not when WarnUnsafeSocks is set.
>
> The code should be
>
> if (safe_socks || options->WarnUnsafeSocks) {
>
> instead of
>
> if (safe_socks) {

New description:

 The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the
 documentation, no warning is logged in the log file when a connection is
 done to an ip address.

 If WarnUnsafeSocks 1 (default) is set there is no warning in the log file.
 If you look at the code for log_unsafe_socks_warning, the only case where
 an error is logged is when safe_socks is true. safe_socks is true only
 when SafeSocks parameter is set, but not when WarnUnsafeSocks is set.

 The code should be

 {{{
 if (safe_socks || options->WarnUnsafeSocks) {
 }}}
 instead of
 {{{
 if (safe_socks) {
 }}}

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18213 [Tor]: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the documentation, no warning is logged in the log file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18213: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the
documentation, no warning is logged in the log file
---+---
 Reporter:  propropus  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:
 Priority:  High   |  needs_information
Component:  Tor|  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Major  |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  WarnUnsafeSocks, Log 027-backport  |Version:
Parent ID: | Resolution:
 Reviewer: |  Actual Points:
   | Points:
   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:7 dgoulet]:
 > We should srubbed() the port number here in the log.

 Why? We want this log to be useful. Hm. There's definitely a conflict
 here. The man page offers
 {{{
This way logs can still be useful, but they don’t leave behind
personally identifying information about what sites a user
 might
have visited.
 }}}
 Are destination ports PII? "It depends."

 > Also, I'm worried of a side effect on the user here.
 >
 > This adds a warning that could scare a user (maybe that's the whole
 point). I, for instance, often use IPs for my torsocks SSH and with this
 patch I'm getting quite a bit of warning in my notice log (even though
 it's rate limited) but still it's on purpose...

 Then you should either see the warnings and decide they're ok, or turn off
 this warning feature in Tor because you know you're using an unsafe socks
 variant and you've decided it's ok?

 > Are we worried about that? I am a bit to be honest... maybe it's just
 me.

 The even more complicating issue here is that back when I made all these
 config options, users actually knew what logs were and they looked at
 them. Now only the expert power users know that there *are* logs.
 Actually, no, now only the expert power users *have* logs at all. So we
 might want to do a bigger rethink here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18213 [Tor]: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the documentation, no warning is logged in the log file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18213: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the
documentation, no warning is logged in the log file
---+---
 Reporter:  propropus  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:
 Priority:  High   |  needs_information
Component:  Tor|  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Major  |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  WarnUnsafeSocks, Log 027-backport  |Version:
Parent ID: | Resolution:
 Reviewer: |  Actual Points:
   | Points:
   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > Seems like the condition should be removed completely.

 I'm not yet convinced. The original goal was to warn every single time we
 had an unsafe connection, when SafeSocks is on. That way you don't end up
 in a situation where you do a thing, check your log, see no complaints,
 and decide that the thing was ok to do.

 There's a bigger issue here though. We have a
 {{{log_unsafe_socks_warning}}} parameter in the parent function, which is
 set by the TestSocks config option, and that parameter isn't making its
 way to this log_unsafe_socks_warning() function. Yuck.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18213 [Tor]: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the documentation, no warning is logged in the log file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18213: The parameter WarnUnsafeSocks does not work as specified in the
documentation, no warning is logged in the log file
---+---
 Reporter:  propropus  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:
 Priority:  High   |  needs_information
Component:  Tor|  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Major  |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  WarnUnsafeSocks, Log 027-backport  |Version:
Parent ID: | Resolution:
 Reviewer: |  Actual Points:
   | Points:
   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 I've closed #18833 as a duplicate of this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18833 [Tor]: Tor doesn't warn for socks5-not-hostname connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18833: Tor doesn't warn for socks5-not-hostname connections
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Closing as duplicate of #18213

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18833 [Tor]: Tor doesn't warn for socks5-not-hostname connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18833: Tor doesn't warn for socks5-not-hostname connections
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I think you just re-discovered #18213, arma. Congrats! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18833 [Tor]: Tor doesn't warn for socks5-not-hostname connections (was: "TestSocks 1" is silent for socks5-not-hostname connections)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18833: Tor doesn't warn for socks5-not-hostname connections
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Actually, I think it's worse than the original title -- even with
 TestSocks at its default, Tor doesn't warn anything when we use a
 dangerous type of socks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18177 [DocTor]: Check Fallback Directory IPv4 and IPv6 addresses using DocTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18177: Check Fallback Directory IPv4 and IPv6 addresses using DocTor
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  DocTor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:15 atagar]:
 > Hi teor, sounds good.
 >
 > > it doesn't respond to an ORPort request
 >
 > Hmmm. We can ping the ORPort but that's about it. DocTor can exercise
 the **DirPort**, but nothing besides tor knows how to talk the ORPort
 protocol. Capability I'd love to have in Stem though. :)
 >
 > So to be clear are you asking for a ORPort ping? DirPort usage? Both?

 Please ping the IPv4 ORPort, download a consensus from the IPv4 DirPort,
 and, when #17298 is done, ping the IPv6 ORPort. (Downloading a consensus
 from the IPv6 DirPort will be unreliable, and should wait for #18394. But
 that's OK, because almost all clients use the ORPort.)

 > > the key doesn't match the one in the fallback list
 >
 > Which key doesn't match? fallback_dirs.inc includes the address,
 dir_port, orport, fingerprint, and weight. Not spotting any keys.

 The fingerprint.
 I guess stem can't check the fingerprint unless it speaks the ORPort
 protocol?

 > > it takes longer than 15 seconds to serve a consensus
 >
 > Sure, can do. I probably won't be getting to this for a while though
 (pretty busy with nyx).
 >
 > > How do I get that email/notification?
 >
 > Specify an address and we'll have DocTor send the notices there.

 teor2...@gmail.com, and someone else as a backup. I think this should be
 nickm. He needs to know about failing fallbacks so we can decide whether
 to do a new point release, even if I'm the one that updates the fallback
 list.

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[tor-bugs] #18833 [Tor]: "TestSocks 1" is silent for socks5-not-hostname connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18833: "TestSocks 1" is silent for socks5-not-hostname connections
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  029-proposed
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 In parse_socks(), we do
 {{{
   if (log_sockstype)
 log_notice(LD_APP,
   "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) instructed "
   "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if "
   "necessary. This is good.", req->port);
 }}}
 and
 {{{
 if (log_sockstype)
   log_notice(LD_APP,
  "Your application (using socks4a to port %d)
 instructed "
  "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if "
  "necessary. This is good.", req->port);
 }}}
 But for the "you gave us socks5, the wrong kind" case, we call
 log_unsafe_socks_warning(), and it ends up not logging anything.

 On first look, the issue is in log_unsafe_socks_warning(), where it says
 {{{
   if (safe_socks) {
 }}}

 In commit a7334f5, we see
 {{{
 -  if (safe_socks || (m = rate_limit_log(_ratelim, approx_time(
 {
 -log_warn(LD_APP,
 +  if (safe_socks) {
 +log_fn_ratelim(_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
 }}}

 That doesn't look right, does it?

 (That commit got into 0.2.4.11-alpha it seems.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17457 [Tor Messenger]: Implement OMEMO

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17457: Implement OMEMO
---+-
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 Notes from the OTRv4 meeting:
 https://lists.cypherpunks.ca/pipermail/otr-dev/2016-March/002447.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18777 [Tor Browser]: restore "black on black constrast fix" to ESR45

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18777: restore "black on black constrast fix" to ESR45
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Tor Browser  |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, tbb-6.0a5, | Resolution:
  TorBrowserTeam201604R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15197   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Looks good to me as well. Applied to
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commits/15197+11
 Hash 3a1d2eb572da6c7fb441437a7ea4ae6e75c87e2d

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18802 [Tor Browser]: remove Shumway (JS-based Flash VM)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18802: remove Shumway (JS-based Flash VM)
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_revision
Component:  Tor Browser  |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, tbb-6.0a5, | Resolution:
  TorBrowserTeam201604   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > It seems you got the nsBrowserGlue.js part wrong. And is there a reason
 to have
 > {{{
 > -browser/fuel/**
 > }}}
 > ?

 Thanks for catching those. I applied a fixup:
 ​https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commits/15197+11
 Hash: c734da3fde70f8818a94a5e3b93d34f0602d2cec

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18177 [DocTor]: Check Fallback Directory IPv4 and IPv6 addresses using DocTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18177: Check Fallback Directory IPv4 and IPv6 addresses using DocTor
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  DocTor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi teor, sounds good.

 > it doesn't respond to an ORPort request

 Hmmm. We can ping the ORPort but that's about it. DocTor can exercise the
 **DirPort**, but nothing besides tor knows how to talk the ORPort
 protocol. Capability I'd love to have in Stem though. :)

 So to be clear are you asking for a ORPort ping? DirPort usage? Both?

 > the key doesn't match the one in the fallback list

 Which key doesn't match? fallback_dirs.inc includes the address, dir_port,
 orport, fingerprint, and weight. Not spotting any keys.

 > it takes longer than 15 seconds to serve a consensus

 Sure, can do. I probably won't be getting to this for a while though
 (pretty busy with nyx).

 > How do I get that email/notification?

 Specify an address and we'll have DocTor send the notices there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17282 [Chutney]: Chutney could use a HOWTO for writing new test cases, network tests, etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17282: Chutney could use a HOWTO for writing new test cases, network tests, etc
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc TorCoreTeam201604 tor-tests- |  Actual Points:
  integration tor-chutney-usability  | Points:  medium
Parent ID:   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |  SponsorS-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  doc TorCoreTeam201604 => doc TorCoreTeam201604 tor-tests-
 integration tor-chutney-usability


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17799 [Tor]: Hash All PRNG output before use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17799: Hash All PRNG output before use
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Tor|Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201604  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  small/medium-remaining
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18814 [Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create an LDAP account for Alison

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18814: Please create an LDAP account for Alison
---+
 Reporter:  mrphs  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18812 [Tor]: [warn] Tried connecting to router at 81.7.17.171:443, but identity key was not as expected: wanted 00C4B4731658D3B4987132A3F77100CFCB190D97 but got CFECDDCA990E3EF7B7EC958

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18812: [warn] Tried connecting to router at 81.7.17.171:443, but identity key 
was
not as expected: wanted 00C4B4731658D3B4987132A3F77100CFCB190D97 but got
CFECDDCA990E3EF7B7EC958B22441386B6B8D820.
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_information
Component:  Tor  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  fallback, must-fix-before-028-rc,|Version:  Tor:
  easy   |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 '''Fallback List Creation Fix'''

 The updateFallbackDirs.py script now logs a warning when a fallback's IP
 (v4 or v6) and ORPort (v4 or v6) match, but the key id does not.

 We can deal with these the same way we deal with added or missing IPv6
 addresses (or any other fallback detail change):
 * the script excludes the relay automatically because it doesn't match the
 whitelist entry exactly,
 * someone contacts the operator to confirm whether the change is permanent
 and will last 2 years,
 * if they are stable, we update the whitelist with the relay's new
 details.

 I added a commit to my branch fallbacks-201604-v9 which checks for key
 mismatches. I also upgraded any detail change from the whitelist to a
 warning. Looks like I have some other operators to contact about IPv4
 changes:

 {{{
 WARNING::6DE61A6F72C1E5418A66BFED80DFB63E4C77668F excluded: has it changed
 IPv4 from 85.25.138.93 to 91.121.84.137?
 WARNING::00C4B4731658D3B4987132A3F77100CFCB190D97 excluded: has OR
 81.7.17.171:443 changed fingerprint to
 CFECDDCA990E3EF7B7EC958B22441386B6B8D820?
 WARNING::00C4B4731658D3B4987132A3F77100CFCB190D97 excluded: has OR
 [2a02:180:1:1::517:11ab]:443 changed fingerprint to
 CFECDDCA990E3EF7B7EC958B22441386B6B8D820?
 WARNING::774555642FDC1E1D4FDF2E0C31B7CA9501C5C9C7 excluded: has it changed
 IPv4 from 188.166.123.212 to 188.166.133.133?
 }}}

 Fortunately, my mail client is good at searching for 40-character hex
 strings.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18832 [metrics-lib]: Support parsing Torperf results files written by OnionPerf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18832: Support parsing Torperf results files written by OnionPerf
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * cc: iwakeh (added)
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-18832

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[tor-bugs] #18832 [metrics-lib]: Support parsing Torperf results files written by OnionPerf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18832: Support parsing Torperf results files written by OnionPerf
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I'm testing [https://github.com/robgjansen/onionperf OnionPerf] which is
 supposed to become the new Torperf and which also produces .tpf files.
 When parsing those files with metrics-lib, I noticed a few problems and
 wrote patches for those.  I'll post a branch shortly (once I have a ticket
 number).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18812 [Tor]: [warn] Tried connecting to router at 81.7.17.171:443, but identity key was not as expected: wanted 00C4B4731658D3B4987132A3F77100CFCB190D97 but got CFECDDCA990E3EF7B7EC958

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18812: [warn] Tried connecting to router at 81.7.17.171:443, but identity key 
was
not as expected: wanted 00C4B4731658D3B4987132A3F77100CFCB190D97 but got
CFECDDCA990E3EF7B7EC958B22441386B6B8D820.
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_information
Component:  Tor  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  fallback, must-fix-before-028-rc,|Version:  Tor:
  easy   |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:  fallback => fallback, must-fix-before-028-rc, easy
 * points:   => small
 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha


Comment:

 '''Analysis'''

 I suspect the operator changed keys (unnecessarily) in January:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2016-January/008466.html
 This is unfortunate, as they only opted-in in December:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2015-December/008365.html
 I emailed the operator to confirm the key change:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2016-April/009121.html

 '''Fallback List Fix'''

 This particular relay was excluded when I rebuilt the list of fallback
 directories for 0.2.8-rc, as its key / IP combination doesn't match the
 one in the whitelist.
 See my branch fallbacks-201604-v9 on https://github.com/teor2345

 Normally, we would have required a longer stability period (120 days), but
 I had to reduce the stability period to 7 days, as no current released tor
 version has the fix for #18050. We'll fix this for 0.2.9 in #18828. Of
 course, this doesn't prevent operators changing keys in the future - it
 just checks if they have in the past.

 '''Fallback Check Fix'''

 I have reopened #18177 to ask atagar to include ORPort and key checks in
 the existing DocTor fallback directory checks.

 '''Log Message Fix'''

 I'm happy to make a fix to the log message in this ticket, and get it in
 0.2.8.

 Do you have a suggested "less scary" wording, arma?
 I'd go with:

 "[notice] The relay at IP:ORPort has changed its key from A to B. Trying a
 different relay."

 These messages will only occur on bootstrap, so I think it's ok to leave
 them at notice.
 But there may be a few if a few fallbacks change keys.
 And tails users will get then on every boot. Should we reduce them to
 info?

 Note that this wording and the change of log level will apply even if the
 relay is a guard.
 Is this what we want? Or should we change it only for the fallback case?
 (We can do this, there are functions that tell us when we're
 bootstrapping.)
 If so, I'd say "info" for fallbacks, and "warn" for guards/authorities.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18801 [Tor Browser]: disable the dom.push prefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18801: disable the dom.push prefs
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Tor Browser  |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, tbb-6.0a5, | Resolution:
  TorBrowserTeam201604R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18177 [DocTor]: Check Fallback Directory IPv4 and IPv6 addresses using DocTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18177: Check Fallback Directory IPv4 and IPv6 addresses using DocTor
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  DocTor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 atagar]:
 > > That's not good, can doctor please report any fallback directories
 that take a relatively long amount of time to serve a consensus (like
 doctor does for the authorities), and report any that take more than 10
 seconds?
 >
 > I doubt Nick wants a ticket every time a fallback directory is sluggish.
 If you're interested in avoiding slow fallback directories any reason not
 to simply run the script I gave above when picking them?

 So I'm doing that when I pick them, but what if they become slow some time
 after the release?

 Also, in #18812, we realised that we'd like to check that the fallback's
 current key matches the one in the source code.

 So can you modify DocTor to call a fallback "failed" if:
 * it doesn't respond to an ORPort request, or
   * (almost all clients will connect to the ORPort and issue a begindir
 request)
 * the key doesn't match the one in the fallback list, or
 * it takes longer than 15 seconds to serve a consensus

 (Are these doable? Is the amount of effort ok?
 The current checks are still quite useful.)

 It's ok to have a few fallbacks fail.
 But I'd like to know when 25% of fallbacks are failing, so that we can
 update the list in the next point release.
 How do I get that email/notification?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18828 [Tor]: Regenerate fallback list for 0.2.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18828: Regenerate fallback list for 0.2.9
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Tor  |  0.2.???
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201609, 029-proposed  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:  medium
 |Sponsor:  SponsorU-
 |  can
-+-
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> We need to regenerate the fallback directory mirror list in 0.2.9 in case
> any of the 0.2.8 fallbacks have changed details or gone down.
>
> This should not require another opt-in mailout, as we had ~70 additional
> fallbacks in 0.2.8 that were suitable but not selected.
>
> We should also:
> * check the bandwdith range in the script's generated C comments
> * check the IP version, netblock, port, and Exit flag proportions in the
> script's stderr output
>
> Over the longer term, we could:
> * reconsider whether to allow 2 fallbacks per operator (contact, family),
> while keeping 1 per IP
> * decide whether to change to an opt-out system, where we includes
> fallbacks unless operators specifically opt-out

New description:

 We need to regenerate the fallback directory mirror list in 0.2.9 in case
 any of the 0.2.8 fallbacks have changed details or gone down.

 This should not require another opt-in mailout, as we had ~70 additional
 fallbacks in 0.2.8 that were suitable but not selected.

 We should also:
 * restore the 120 day stability period and 99% uptime requirement that
 were reduced in 0.2.8 due to #18050
 * check the bandwdith range in the script's generated C comments
 * check the IP version, netblock, port, and Exit flag proportions in the
 script's stderr output

 Over the longer term, we could:
 * reconsider whether to allow 2 fallbacks per operator (contact, family),
 while keeping 1 per IP
 * decide whether to change to an opt-out system, where we includes
 fallbacks unless operators specifically opt-out

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17928 [Tor]: Warnings in syslog for wrong permissions on hidden service dir are misleading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17928: Warnings in syslog for wrong permissions on hidden service dir are
misleading
-+
 Reporter:  throwaway232344  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.5
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  small/medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  logging permissions => tor-hs
 * sponsor:   => SponsorR-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18801 [Tor Browser]: disable the dom.push prefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18801: disable the dom.push prefs
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Tor Browser  |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, tbb-6.0a5, | Resolution:
  TorBrowserTeam201604R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > It seems Mozilla did already a good job at disabling the DOM Push prefs.
 See: https://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr45/source/modules/libpref/init/all.js. So, the only thing that is
 actually missing is getting rid of the serverURL?

 Yes, you are correct. Sorry about that. Please use the revised patch that
 I just attached to this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8786 [Tor]: Add extra-info line that tracks the number of consensus downloads of each pluggable transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8786: Add extra-info line that tracks the number of consensus downloads of each
pluggable transports
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 Priority:  Low  |  needs_revision
Component:  Tor  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  pt, tor-bridge, flashproxy,  |Version:
  026-triaged-1, 026-deferrable, | Resolution:
  027-triaged-1-out  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * sponsor:   => SponsorS-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8001 [Tor]: obfsproxy makes tor warn when one bridge is down

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8001: obfsproxy makes tor warn when one bridge is down
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Tor   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal|Version:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-bridge tor-pt  | Resolution:
Parent ID:|  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:| Points:  small
  |Sponsor:  SponsorS-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client tor-bridge => tor-client tor-bridge tor-pt
 * severity:   => Normal
 * sponsor:   => SponsorS-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18720 [Tor]: Improve comments on connection_t address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18720: Improve comments on connection_t address
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Tor|  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal |Version:
 Keywords:  comment-only tor-doc-lowlevel  | Resolution:  implemented
Parent ID: |  Actual Points:  1 hour
 Reviewer: | Points:  small
   |Sponsor:  SponsorU-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  comment-only => comment-only tor-doc-lowlevel
 * sponsor:   => SponsorU-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18200 [Tor]: TrackHostExits overrides effects of SOCKSPort isolation flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18200: TrackHostExits overrides effects of SOCKSPort isolation flags
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small/medium
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18491 [Tor]: Stop logging identifying bridge info at 'notice'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18491: Stop logging identifying bridge info at 'notice'
+
 Reporter:  ln5 |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  small/medium
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorS-can
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-bridge
 * sponsor:   => SponsorS-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18693 [Tor]: New SOCKS port restriction to only allow connections to .onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18693: New SOCKS port restriction to only allow connections to .onion
---+
 Reporter:  ioerror|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, socks  |  Actual Points:  6 hours
Parent ID: | Points:  small-remaining
 Reviewer:  special|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:  dgoulet => special
 * sponsor:   => SponsorR-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18607 [Tor]: torspec: Fix typo and explain variable in prop 224

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18607: torspec: Fix typo and explain variable in prop 224
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Tor |  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal  |Version:
 Keywords:  torspec, TorCoreTeam201604  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:  asn | Points:  small-remaining
|Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * sponsor:   => SponsorR-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17715 [Tor]: Write unit tests for directory_initiate_command_rend

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17715: Write unit tests for directory_initiate_command_rend
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Tor  |  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  easy tor-tests-unit tor-tests-   | Resolution:
  coverage   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |  small/medium
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy tests => easy tor-tests-unit tor-tests-coverage
 * sponsor:   => SponsorS-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #4580 [Tor]: Some Tor clients go nuts requesting the consensus if there is no recent enough consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4580: Some Tor clients go nuts requesting the consensus if there is no recent
enough consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Tor  |  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  tor-client 024-backport tor-dos  |  unspecified
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:
 |  medium/large
 |Sponsor:  SponsorS-
 |  can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client 024-backport => tor-client 024-backport tor-dos
 * severity:   => Normal
 * sponsor:   => SponsorS-can


Comment:

 This speaks to the maintainability of the network and the liveness of the
 dirauths.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #8453, #14881, #14921

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #8453, #14881, #14921 by nickm:
keywords to tor-sponsorU-orphan

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8625 [Tor]: Do not call networkstatus_reset_download_failures() hourly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8625: Do not call networkstatus_reset_download_failures() hourly
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Tor  |  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  tor-client 025-backport  | Resolution:
  026-triaged-1 026-deferrable tor-dos   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client 025-backport 026-triaged-1 026-deferrable => tor-
 client 025-backport 026-triaged-1 026-deferrable tor-dos


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #13966, #13968

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #13966, #13968 by nickm:
keywords to tor-doc-process

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #14683, #17292

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #14683, #17292 by nickm:
keywords to tor-doc-modules

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18345, #17294

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18345, #17294 by nickm:
keywords to tor-doc-lowlevel

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #4581, #7572, #13339, #13737, #15942, #18346, #18613, #18637, #18641, #2668, #9664, #11624, #17640, #17806, #18320, #18322, #18642, #18643, #18644, #1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #4581, #7572, #13339, #13737, #15942, #18346, #18613, 
#18637, #18641, #2668, #9664, #11624, #17640, #17806, #18320, #18322, #18642, 
#18643, #18644, #18645, #18646, #18647, #17293 by nickm:
keywords to tor-dos

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #15940, #15941, #18636, #18639, #18635, #18638, #17280

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #15940, #15941, #18636, #18639, #18635, #18638, #17280 by 
nickm:
keywords to tor-dos-designs

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15087 [Tor]: Move timeliness check out of tor_cert_checksig, or into tor_cert_get_checkable_sig

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15087: Move timeliness check out of tor_cert_checksig, or into
tor_cert_get_checkable_sig
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  assigned
Component:  Tor  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged tor-   |Version:  Tor:
  ed25519-proto  |  0.2.7
Parent ID:  #15054   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged => 027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged
 tor-ed25519-proto
 * severity:   => Normal


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17639, #18319, #16785, #15059, #15054, #15055, #15056

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17639, #18319, #16785, #15059, #15054, #15055, #15056 by 
nickm:
keywords to tor-ed25519-proto

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16120 [Tor]: Detect if the network goes down

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16120: Detect if the network goes down
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Tor|  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal |Version:
 Keywords:  network tor-guards-revamp  | Resolution:
Parent ID: |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer: | Points:  large
   |Sponsor:  SponsorU-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  network => network tor-guards-revamp
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #3259 [Tor]: don't give up on your bridges so easily

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3259: don't give up on your bridges so easily
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Tor  |  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, 027-triaged-1-in tor-|  0.2.7
  guards-revamp? | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:  medium
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-bridge, 027-triaged-1-in => tor-bridge, 027-triaged-1-in
 tor-guards-revamp?
 * severity:   => Normal


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #9241, #17295

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #9241, #17295 by nickm:
keywords to tor-route-testing

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #7173, #8782, #11327, #13989, #17688, #5462, #14334, #18624, #12595, #17262, #8018, #16852, #17295

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #7173, #8782, #11327, #13989, #17688, #5462, #14334, 
#18624, #12595, #17262, #8018, #16852, #17295 by nickm:
keywords to tor-guards-revamp

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17983, #13753

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17983, #13753 by nickm:
keywords to tor-sponsorS-orphan

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18240

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18240 by nickm:
keywords to tor-tests-stem

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #7144, #9729, #17193, #17963, #17854, #18153

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #7144, #9729, #17193, #17963, #17854, #18153 by nickm:
keywords to tor-bridge

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15434 [Tor]: Tor dies if you send it a HUP before it read its config, and doesn't take PTs with it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15434: Tor dies if you send it a HUP before it read its config, and doesn't 
take
PTs with it
---+
 Reporter:  TvdW   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge tor-pt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  medium?
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorS-can
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-bridge tor-pt


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #12600, #10218, #11101

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #12600, #10218, #11101 by nickm:
keywords to tor-bridge tor-pt

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17275, #17233, #18240

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17275, #17233, #18240 by nickm:
keywords to tor-tests-integration

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #14164, #18685

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #14164, #18685 by nickm:
keywords to tor-controller-extension

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #16791, #16792, #16805, #16809, #6313, #16698, #16794, #16795, #16798, #16799, #16801, #16808, #17101, #17253, #17684, #17740, #17845, #18665, #18668

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #16791, #16792, #16805, #16809, #6313, #16698, #16794, 
#16795, #16798, #16799, #16801, #16808, #17101, #17253, #17684, #17740, #17845, 
#18665, #18668 by nickm:
keywords to tor-tests-coverage tor-tests-unit

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #6837, #16764, #18362, #18363, #18617, #18618, #18803

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #6837, #16764, #18362, #18363, #18617, #18618, #18803 by 
nickm:
keywords to tor-modularity

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17285, #17291

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17285, #17291 by nickm:
keywords to tor-modularity

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17289, #17288

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17289, #17288 by nickm:
keywords to tor-tests-coverage

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17284, #17287

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17284, #17287 by nickm:
keywords to tor-controller-extension

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #15588, #17241, #17049, #17239, #18456, #17388

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #15588, #17241, #17049, #17239, #18456, #17388 by nickm:
sponsor to 

Comment:
These tickets had Sponsor == "None".  Our convention seems to be Sponsor == "".

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18685, #7144, #12600, #9729, #10218, #11101, #15434, #17193, #17963, #17854, #18153

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18685, #7144, #12600, #9729, #10218, #11101, #15434, 
#17193, #17963, #17854, #18153 by nickm:
sponsor to SponsorS-can

Comment:
Tagging these bridge- and PT- items as S-can.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18295 [Tor]: Make shared random rounds configurable in test networks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18295: Make shared random rounds configurable in test networks
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16943   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * sponsor:   => SponsorR-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18685 [Tor]: Fire a`STATUS_SERVER` event when the hibernation state changes.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18685: Fire a`STATUS_SERVER` event when the hibernation state changes.
+--
 Reporter:  yawning |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Tor |  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal  |Version:
 Keywords:  tor-core TorCoreTeam201604  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  #17284  |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:  | Points:
|Sponsor:  SponsorS-can
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * sponsor:  SponsorS => SponsorS-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18365 [Tor]: Fined-grain timer implementation to support per-connection or per-circuit timers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18365: Fined-grain timer implementation to support per-connection or 
per-circuit
timers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Tor  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  performance, backend,|Version:
  TorCoreTeam201604  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   | Points:  medium
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Now it has complete test coverage.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18365 [Tor]: Fined-grain timer implementation to support per-connection or per-circuit timers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18365: Fined-grain timer implementation to support per-connection or 
per-circuit
timers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Tor  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  performance, backend,|Version:
  TorCoreTeam201604  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   | Points:  medium
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Now see `timeouts_v2`, rebased and squashed a little.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18812 [Tor]: [warn] Tried connecting to router at 81.7.17.171:443, but identity key was not as expected: wanted 00C4B4731658D3B4987132A3F77100CFCB190D97 but got CFECDDCA990E3EF7B7EC958

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18812: [warn] Tried connecting to router at 81.7.17.171:443, but identity key 
was
not as expected: wanted 00C4B4731658D3B4987132A3F77100CFCB190D97 but got
CFECDDCA990E3EF7B7EC958B22441386B6B8D820.
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => fallback
 * cc: teor (added)


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[tor-bugs] #18831 [Tor Browser]: We need Yasm >= 1.2.0 to build ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18831: We need Yasm >= 1.2.0 to build ESR 52
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 It might not be available as a configure check then (see:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1260362) but we need Yasm >=
 1.2.0 for ESR 52 due to
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1214462.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16009 [Quality Assurance and Testing]: Move away from Mozmill to Marionette for Tor Browser tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16009: Move away from Mozmill to Marionette for Tor Browser tests
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Quality Assurance and Testing  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:11 boklm]:
 > The slider_settings and dom-objects-enumeration are now converted to
 marionette.


 After converting the dom-objects-enumeration test to marionette, we see a
 `DOMConstructor` object that we didn't see when using mozmill. I have
 added it to the list of expected objects to avoid an error.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15197 [Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to ESR 45

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15197: Rebase Tor Browser patches to ESR 45
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 Type:  task |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Very High| Status:
Component:  Tor Browser  |  needs_revision
 Severity:  Critical |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604,  |Version:
  tbb-6.0a5  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (removed)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15197 [Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to ESR 45

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15197: Rebase Tor Browser patches to ESR 45
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 Type:  task |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Very High| Status:
Component:  Tor Browser  |  needs_revision
 Severity:  Critical |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604,  |Version:
  tbb-6.0a5  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


Comment:

 Arthur, could you take care of #18632 and #18777 + a fixup for #18802?
 These are the current blockers for getting our nightlies switched to ESR45
 and I'd like to do that over the weekend.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18811 [Tor Browser]: Our first-party isolation patch incorrectly rejects blobs retrieved in workers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18811: Our first-party isolation patch incorrectly rejects blobs retrieved in
workers
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  defect   |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:  new
Component:  Tor Browser  |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604,  | Resolution:
  tbb-6.0a5  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #15197 =>


Comment:

 We should fix this but that is not necessary for switching our nightlies
 to ESR45.

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[tor-bugs] #18830 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Loop when accessing https://www.rtbf.be/radio/liveradio/purefm

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18830: Loop when accessing https://www.rtbf.be/radio/liveradio/purefm
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  EFF-HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  httpse-ruleset-bug
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hi,

 On firefox, when accessing http://www.rtbf.be/radio/liveradio/purefm I get
 a redirection loop.

 Version: 5.1.6

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18779 [Service - lists]: Request for tor-team@ list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18779: Request for tor-team@ list
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by qbi):

 It is done from a sysadmin perspective. Please configure the list as you
 like and add an information to
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/emailLists

 Thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18802 [Tor Browser]: remove Shumway (JS-based Flash VM)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18802: remove Shumway (JS-based Flash VM)
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_revision
Component:  Tor Browser  |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, tbb-6.0a5, | Resolution:
  TorBrowserTeam201604   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 It seems you got the nsBrowserGlue.js part wrong. And is there a reason to
 have
 {{{
 -browser/fuel/**
 }}}
 ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18801 [Tor Browser]: disable the dom.push prefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18801: disable the dom.push prefs
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Tor Browser  |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, tbb-6.0a5, | Resolution:
  TorBrowserTeam201604R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 It seems Mozilla did already a good job at disabling the DOM Push prefs.
 See: https://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr45/source/modules/libpref/init/all.js. So, the only thing that is
 actually missing is getting rid of the serverURL?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18782 [Tor Browser]: media tab in Page Info can bypass NoScript on Linux if gstreamer is used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18782: media tab in Page Info can bypass NoScript on Linux if gstreamer is used
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:20 cypherpunks]:
 > As for chrome vs. content and NoScript's focus, ok. But did you miss the
 part about Media Preview running a music player
 I did not. You don't seem to understand how that works.
 The element is an HTML5 audio, that's Firefox player. You can read the
 source for said player if you look in Firefox's source tree.
 > even though javascript was turned off completely in about:config?
 News flash: a huge part of Firefox is written in javascript. The
 about:config preference only disables it in content contexts, disabling
 everywhere would make the browser stop working.
 > I'm pretty sure the content wasn't php.
 No idea what you're trying to say here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18782 [Tor Browser]: media tab in Page Info can bypass NoScript on Linux if gstreamer is used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18782: media tab in Page Info can bypass NoScript on Linux if gstreamer is used
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I did see #13020, and thank you for addressing.

 However, ESR45 won't change the fact that Page Info/Media Preview allows
 things that seemingly should be disabled via internal settings; that part
 of Firefox may not be affected by the same controls as other parts of the
 browser.

 As for chrome vs. content and NoScript's focus, ok. But did you miss the
 part about Media Preview running a music player even though javascript was
 turned off completely in about:config? I'm pretty sure the content wasn't
 php.

 Anyway, new bug filed at #18829.

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[tor-bugs] #18829 [Tor Browser]: Media Preview in Page Info may not meet TBB expectations for media handling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18829: Media Preview in Page Info may not meet TBB expectations for media 
handling
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Media Preview seems to allow what should be disabled via internal
 settings, and may not be under the same controls as other parts of the
 browser.

 Examples with gstreamer at #18782; an additional test was performed using
 the internal setting for disabling images (permissions.default.image) and
 they still showed up in Media preview. Not just in the Address section as
 URLs, but as actual displayed pictures. Any need for eliminating tracking
 pixels, for instance, might be subverted by this.

 The objective here is to check where Page Info/Media Preview's settings
 are, whether they are under the control of settings at all, and most
 importantly to find out if anything they do can contradict user-
 intended/expected levels of security.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18782 [Tor Browser]: media tab in Page Info can bypass NoScript on Linux if gstreamer is used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18782: media tab in Page Info can bypass NoScript on Linux if gstreamer is used
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Seems like a few misconceptions have made our fellow cpunk a little
 anxious. Maybe the following will help (gk can correct me if I say
 something stupid):
 1. Disabling embedded objects on chrome contexts was never among
 NoScript's goals. It only ever tries when in content context. (So this bug
 is hardly a "bypass".)
 2. The rationale for using NoScript to disable embedded multimedia objects
 is not preventing IP leaks (that would be a catastrophic failure; such
 identity leaks should never happen, ever, no matter the security slider
 setting, full stop). No, the idea is reducing the attack surface:
 multimedia codecs are known to be large pieces of flaky, vulnerable
 software. So the less you use them, the better your odds look.
 3. The media previewer doesn't run any content javascript. (If it runs
 javascript, it's chrome.)

 Replying to [comment:18 gk]:
 > And FWIW Tor Browser based on ESR45 won't have this problem anymore as
 Mozilla is not using gstreamer anymore.
 But what about whatever replaces it (I'm assuming there is such
 replacement)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18791 [Tor Browser]: Fix for #13252 does not compile on ESR 45

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18791: Fix for #13252 does not compile on ESR 45
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, tbb-6.0a5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201604R  | Points:
Parent ID:  #15197   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Seems to be there now. Closing this one, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18602 [Tor Browser]: Make sure our SVG disabling patches work with SVG favicons

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18602: Make sure our SVG disabling patches work with SVG favicons
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, tbb-6.0a5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201604R  | Points:
Parent ID:  #15197   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This good applied in 15197+11 (commit
 f3584b6dc11f7b76ddae72af2ebacf23198d5258).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18663 [Onionoo]: Onionoo doesn't send certain headers on even-numbered responses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18663: Onionoo doesn't send certain headers on even-numbered responses
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 So, I took out that Jetty filter a week ago and learned yesterday that
 Apache's `mod_deflate` module was enabled all the time.  I ''think''
 everything is working as expected now.  Can you check again?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18782 [Tor Browser]: media tab in Page Info can bypass NoScript on Linux if gstreamer is used (was: media tab in Page Info can bypass NoScript)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18782: media tab in Page Info can bypass NoScript on Linux if gstreamer is used
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:15 cypherpunks]:
 > So fundamentally, the expected behaviour is not to leak data? To obey
 the security slider? To start shipping TBB with media.gstreamer.enabled
 set to false, or incorporating that setting into the slider?
 >
 > Do you even know if gstreamer has been leaking this whole time and
 should be removed as an option until upstream passes an audit?
 >
 >  - If you can determine gstreamer isn't leaky (meaning outside the Tor
 network) then media.gstreamer.enabled should become part of what the
 security slider controls
 >  - if you cannot determine anything about gstreamer's network activity
 conclusively (?) then it should be removed from interaction from TBB
 completely

 See #13020 for the network activity. The sole reason I was asking about
 the expected behavior was that there are a bunch of possible ways to deal
 with this issue and I certainly don't want to pick one users are unhappy
 about as this would result in follow-up bugs leading to extra work.

 And FWIW Tor Browser based on ESR45 won't have this problem anymore as
 Mozilla is not using gstreamer anymore. We'll start shipping that in
 roughly 10 days with the next alpha.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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